
Routledge Studies in Modern History
EXPERIENCES OF WAR IN EUROPE AND THE AMERICAS, 1792–1815
SOLDIERS, SLAVES, AND CIVILIANS
Mark Lawrence
ROUTLEDGE

Experiences of War in Europe and the Americas, 1792–1815

This work seeks to offer a new way of viewing the French Wars of 1792–1815. Most studies of this period offer international, political, and military analyses using the French Revolution and Napoleon as the prime mover. But this book focuses on military and civilian responses to French Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, throughout the rest of Europe and the Americas. It shows how the unprecedented mobilization of this era forged a generation of soldiers and civilians sharing a common experience of suffering, bequeathing the West with a new veteran sensibility. Using a range of sources, especially memoirs, this book reveals the adventure and suffering confronting ordinary soldiers campaigning in Europe and the Americas, and the burdens imposed on civilians enduring rising and falling empires across the West. It also reveals how the wars liberated slaves, serfs, and common people through revolutions and insurgencies.

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Soldiers, Slaves, and Civilians

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Preface and Acknowledgements

The French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars are a staple interest for students, scholars, and the general public. They seldom fail to attract interest either from my own students, or in western higher education institutions more broadly (which in other ways are turning away from Eurocentric research). The galaxy of talent amongst historians of this period is almost too long to list. Yet even such a well-known field as the wars of 1792–1815 could benefit from new research. Events in the Americas are all too often seen as 'peripheral' to Europe, or they are considered as case-studies alone without much reference to the Old World. The military history is in a far better state than it was even 20 years ago. But it does not yet rival the innovations which have been evident in respect of the world wars of the twentieth century.

I wrote this book during a strange time of global pandemic, when conferences were cancelled and international travel grounded. Like untold millions around the world I worked from home. I pieced together a trans-Atlantic history at a time when the skies were emptied of trans-Atlantic flights, and a glorious spring and summer smiled on my corner of rural Kent. My work was eased immensely by the support, guidance, and encouragement I received from numerous friends, colleagues, and family members. I would like to thank all of them, above all my daughter, Nicole, who is a bookworm in the style of her father, and my wife, Susana. I am also indebted to three fellow academics who at different stages read some of my drafts. Charles Esdaile surpassed even his usual generosity by commenting on several early chapters, offering me help and encouragement at a busy time in his life. Leighton James commented usefully on my original proposal. And Julia Osman commented on the same proposal and two chapter samples. Her comments were of immense help. I have tried to take into account all comments and criticisms made, and any outstanding flaws or weaknesses in my book are entirely my own. I should also like to thank Rob Langham, senior publisher at Routledge, and especially, Max Novick, my editor who has been patient and supportive throughout my writing process.

Mark Lawrence,
Canterbury, December 2020

Timeline of Major Events

1791
Start of the Haitian Revolution
1792–1793
War of the First Coalition pits Revolutionary France against Austria, Prussia, Piedmont, Britain, Holland, and Spain
1793
Execution of deposed King Louis XVI; Reign of French Revolutionary Terror; Federalist revolt inside France; counter-revolution in the Vendée; French military reverses in the Austrian Netherlands and the Rhineland; mass conscription (*levée en masse*) in France
1794
Polish rising against Russia and Prussia and its suppression; French Revolutionary invasion of the Austrian Netherlands, Rhineland, and Spain
1795
End of the French Revolutionary Terror; French Revolutionary annexation of Belgium and conquest of Holland; Prussia and Spain sign Treaty of Basel ending their war against France
1796
French satellite (Batavian) republic established in Holland; Napoleon begins French Revolutionary conquest of northern Italy; Spain declares war on Britain
1797
Napoleon completes conquest of northern Italy; French satellite republics (Ligurian and Cisalpine) established in Italy; Austria ends war with France
1798
French satellite republics established in Switzerland and Rome; French invasion of Ireland in support of rebellion defeated; French invasion of Egypt; Russia and Naples enter war against France; slave and peasant revolts in Brazil

1799

French conquest of Naples hampered by irregular resistance; French defeats in northern Italy, Switzerland and Middle East; Anglo-Russian invasion of Holland defeated; Napoleon launches military coup overthrowing French government

1800

French counteroffensive in Italy; Russia establishes anti-British League of Armed Neutrality

1801

Austria and Naples make peace with France; League of Armed Neutrality collapses, British victory in Egypt

1802

Treaty of Amiens; general European peace

1803

War resumes between Britain and France; British offensive in the Caribbean; British defeat of Maratha Confederacy (India); French occupation of Hannover and Naples; French start invasion preparations against Britain; Haitian Revolution is triumphant

1804

Napoleon becomes Emperor of France; Serbian revolt; war resumes between Britain and Spain

1805

French annexations in northern Italy; Napoleon crowned King of Italy; Britain, Russia, Sweden, Naples, and Austria form Third Coalition against France; Napoleon defeats Austrians at Ulm and Russians at Austerlitz; British defeat Franco-Spanish navy at Trafalgar

1806

French invade Naples and face popular insurrection; Prussia declares war on France and suffers major defeats at Jena and Auerstädt; start of Napoleon's Continental System

1807

Russians defeated in eastern Prussia; Napoleon establishes satellite Grand Duchy of Warsaw; British invade Denmark; French war against Portugal and occupation of Spain

1808

French occupation of Rome; Russian occupation of Finland; further French annexations in Italy; Napoleon's overthrow of the Spanish monarchy frustrated by Spanish Patriot rising and start of the Peninsular War; British liberation of Portugal

1809

Juntas formed in Chuquisaca and La Paz, Upper Peru, and at Quito, New Granada; French counteroffensive in Spain and Portugal; military coup in Sweden; Tyrol rising against Bavarians and

French; Austria defeated in battle of Wagram; Royalist troops defeat South American juntas

1810

Napoleonic conquest of most of Spain; Spanish-American revolutions begin, juntas being formed across the hemisphere; French annexations in Holland and Germany; French invasion of Portugal defeated

1811

Royalist victories in New Spain and execution of Miguel Hidalgo; independence declared in Venezuela and New Granada; Napoleonic conquest of most of Spain; anti-French revolt in Calabria collapses

1812

Cádiz Constitution in Spain; capitulation of the First Venezuelan Republic; British-led liberation of Spain begins; Napoleon invades Russia; war breaks out between Britain and the USA

1813

Napoleonic troops retreat from Russia through central Europe; Simón Bolívar declares 'war to the death' in Venezuela and the Second Venezuelan Republic is proclaimed; Prussia, Austria, and former satellite states declare war on Napoleonic France; French defeat at Battle of Leipzig, Serbian revolt collapses; British-led invasion of southern France

1814

Allied invasion of France; surrender of remaining French allies; Swedish occupation of Norway; end of the war between Britain and the USA; Napoleon abdicates and Louis XVIII proclaimed King of France; Ferdinand VII restores absolutism in Spain and America; peace conference begins at Vienna

1815

Battles of New Orleans and Waterloo end the wars in North America and Europe; royalist counteroffensive in Spanish America bolstered by the arrival of Pablo Morillo's expedition, setting in motion two years of royalist dominance in the Americas; Congress of Vienna concludes peace in Europe and agrees the Allied occupation of France

1 Introduction

Europe and the Americas are the centre of the West, with all its geo-strategic, political, and economic connotations. Even though commentators use the term 'the West' either casually or as a point of political reflection, historians are circumspect in its historical meaning.[1] In recent years, studies of the western world have been overshadowed by studies of global history. But the 'global turn' has been criticized for its patronizing attitude towards studies of history which are firmly rooted 'somewhere'.[2] It also tends to promise more than it delivers, as several purportedly global histories have continued to relegate the non-European world to the periphery.[3]

The Americas were certainly less populated, and led by men who themselves could not agree exactly what relations they possessed with the European side of the Atlantic, or even with their own hemisphere. 'Latin America' originated as a term in the 1850s, when the French empire of Napoleon III tried to confront the US expansionism, and is now generally considered to comprise all of the mainland Americas south of the United States of America.[4] But the boundaries of America were as disputed in 1800 as the boundaries of Europe are today. John Quincy Adams, son of the Founding Father John Adams, considered 'America' to comprise the United States of America, certainly not the strange lands to the south; Henry Clay, by contrast, was a pan-American who thought in terms of a 'western hemisphere'. The South American revolutionary, Simón Bolivar, thought that all of Spanish America should be united against Spain. But he was ambivalent about the United States of America, and did not invite the empire of Brazil to the pan-American Congress of Panama in 1826. The Brazilians, who peacefully hosted the Portuguese Braganza royal family from 1807, considered themselves civilized and the insurgent Spanish-Americans barbaric, even though Brazil would not end its slavery empire until 1888. Even though the definition of the West remains fuzzy, what is undisputed is that both Europe and the Americas were engulfed in conflict unleashed either directly or indirectly by the French Revolution.

A better historical term could be 'Atlantic History'. Atlantic History is usually relegated to the eighteenth century, or to the time of Revolutions, perhaps ending with the French Revolution or the Haitian Revolution. Its breakthrough study in the mid-twentieth century was R.R. Palmer's *Age of Democratic Revolution*.[5] The American Revolution and French Revolution certainly transformed the term 'democracy' from a debating point for scholars of Ancient Greece into a relevant option for modern politics. But neither Revolution was launched with the intention of establishing 'democracy'. Still less could either metropole, neither the wealthy seaboard of the Thirteen Colonies nor the might of Bourbon France, be accepted as a proxy for 'Atlantic' history. In fact this field of history has been criticized for focusing on emerging or declining great powers and on imperial, political, and diplomatic history. It has tended to mean 'imperial' history when addressing Europe, and 'colonial' history when addressing the Americas.[6] It also tends to remain eighteenth century in focus and is not known for adopting new military history approaches. 'Atlantic' understates the vastness of the Americas. Terminologically it either excludes or subordinates significant areas like Peru and the Baltic and Mediterranean tributaries. Thus this volume hopes to extend our usual idea of Atlantic history well into the early nineteenth century, especially considering the war of 1812 and the continued war in Haiti, which tied the Americas and Europe together in terms of experience even as they grew apart as nations. Around 1800, Europe's population was probably about 170 million, whereas the Americas, despite their vaster landmass, contained only about 45 million souls.[7] I thus lean more on experiences in Europe, and more on populous and contested parts of the Americas (more, for example, on central America, and less on underpopulated Canada or the Pacific littoral).

Thus our title remains 'Europe and the Americas', even though a case can be made for a more emphatic 'War of the West', given the developments of the preceding 150 years. The horrors of the Thirty Years' War (1618–1648) had toppled 'Christendom' from the discourse, as the Muslim Ottoman empire began its long retreat from Europe, and European powers no longer made the imposition of a true Christianity an objective in their wars with their neighbours. Wars continued, and some of them, especially the Seven Years' War (1756–1763), had global repercussions. But war was an accepted method of diplomacy, as one royal dynasty protesting the advance of a rival would secure concessions as part of a peace treaty, and a power losing territory in one part of its realm would gain new territory somewhere else. The subjects lost and gained in these so-called cabinet wars did not seem to matter. Nations barely existed, and even a defeated power could hope to regain territory at the next round of conflict, and no defeat threatened to overturn the political and social order. Frederick the Great of Prussia, for example, made the holding of Austrian Silesia the cornerstone of Prussian military expansionism. Yet

he saw no business in conquering Hungary or toppling the Habsburgs.[8] War was a regular recourse for defending dynastic interests. As historian Jeremy Black observed, warfare before the French Revolution was 'litigation by other means'.[9]

Sometimes wars drummed unhappy young men into the army. But soldiers were expensive to arm and supply, so monarchies preferred to maintain a small cadre of long-serving professionals backed up by mercenaries, often foreign in origin. European generals sought wherever possible to avoid battle and to win their campaigns by manoeuvre. In the War of Spanish Succession (1700–1714), there were only about a dozen major battles. Yet 100 years later in the Napoleonic Wars, there were at least 40.[10] Cabinet war strategy abhorred chance and risk-taking. As Maurice de Saxe wrote in 1732: 'war can be made without leaving anything to chance'.[11] Commanders were aristocrats and often old. They did not need to make their reputations in reckless actions. Men even dreamed that wars would one day become redundant altogether. Educated men, and even a minority of educated women in their salons, drew lessons from Ancient Greece and Rome, and read the latest philosophical ideas, and monarchs liked to consider themselves 'enlightened'. This Age of Enlightenment offered a universal frame of reference. There were hopes that progress would render wars redundant. Philosopher Immanuel Kant hoped that a confederation of republics in Europe would guarantee the end of offensive wars.[12]

But there were other visions of the future, especially in France. New ideas about artillery, light infantry, and mobilizing the population offered a dystopian contrast to Kant's utopia. In 1772, Jacques Antoine Hippolyte, Count de Guibert, published his influential *Essai General de Tactique* about future 'total' war. He prophesied 'that a people will arise in Europe that would combine the virtues of austerity and a national militia with a fixed plan of expansion, that it would not lose sight of this system, that, knowing how to make war at little expense and to live off its victories, it would not be forced to put down arms for reason of economy. One would see it subjugate its neighbours, overthrow our weak constitutions, just as a fierce north wind bends the slender reeds'.[13] A few years after Guibert's essay, the revolutionary potential of a national militia was displayed in the American War of Independence, even though Guibert decried the fact that the poor performance of the British forces handed victory to the Americans by default. Whereas the regular Continental Army tended to lose pitched battles, the Americans excelled against the British redcoats exploiting local militia tactics of terrain and ambush.

Scientific improvements in map-making suggested more brutally effective war in future. Eighteenth-century texts on siege warfare employed mathematical calculation, requiring armies to include engineers alongside mathematically illiterate nobles.[14] Army commanders were now expected to have a perfect knowledge of the country where their army

was campaigning, and to consider every possibility in their own head. This very personal concept of military knowledge reflected the continued dominance of high nobles as generals. Late-eighteenth-century thinkers also planned to move armies better. Pierre de Bourcet in his book, *Principles of mountain warfare*, proposed 'divisions' which would march divided but fight united.[15] The French Revolutionary army would show the many advantages of the divisionary system.[16] First, an army walking widely dispersed could more easily requisition supplies in scattered villages, and therefore rely less on slow wagons, partially breaking free from the 'tyranny of the magazines' to which such old regime armies as the Habsburg and Prussian were still subjected. By living off the land, the armies of the French Revolution performed what may be termed 'the tax of violence'.[17]

Writing the Wars of Europe and the Americas

This book is written with the perspective of 'new' rather than 'old' military history. Old military history is concerned with campaigns, weapons, leaders, and strategy, whereas the new is concerned with the full spectrum of military experience, namely, recruitment, training, and socialization of personnel, combat motivation, the effect of service and war on the individual soldier, the veteran, the internal dynamics of military institutions, inter- and intra-service tensions, civil-military relations, and the relationship between military systems and the greater society.[18] New military history has been around for some time. Historian Joanna Bourke states that the term new military history is a misnomer, considering it was birthed in the upheavals of the 1960s, making it thoroughly middle-aged.[19] But studies of wars and military institutions continue to reveal *new* insights, so the adjective remains valuable. Historians now embrace the full spectrum of human experience in war, on soldiers and civilians alike. This new variety of history has enriched our understanding of the German Wars of 1914–1918 and 1939–1945, especially regarding the everyday lives of soldiers and civilians. The door is wide open to adapt a wider spectrum of human experience to the French Wars of 1792–1815. In Europe, the Napoleonic empire is now increasingly seen as a colonial experience, which creates opportunities to explore subaltern lives, both military and civilian. In Latin America historians have become much more interested in history 'from below' as a consequence of their hemisphere's democratization since the 1980s.[20] Yet the trend of research into the 1792–1815 war tends towards either more traditional approaches to military history, or towards elite-centred imperial, political, and biographical history.[21] Such varieties can only be enhanced by a study of experiences. After all, Napoleon quipped how men's behaviours were shaped by how they saw the world when they were 20.[22]

This book is thus an experiential history. It is concerned less with social, political, and military structures, and more with understanding individuals and groups on their own terms. Similar approaches have borne fruit elsewhere. Michael Hughes has explained how Napoleon's soldiers sustained their morale through attitudes and exploits which amounted to a form of martial masculinity.[23] Almost 20 years ago, a social history of the Spanish Civil War raised the importance of individuals to its rightful place in a historiography dominated by the study of ideologies and collectives.[24] Experiential history used to be rejected as a mere *histoire événementielle* (history of events) by the Annales School of historians who were interested in long-term social changes. But in fact studying individuals and groups immersed in wars and revolutions not of their choosing reveals, what one German anthropologist called an *Eigensinn*, or their ability to assert their interests and manage their survival even against the constraints of power and violence.[25]

The sources for understanding the war of 1792–1815 are varied. They reveal that the 1792–1815 period was indeed a war of the whole west, and not just a French War, either in its Revolutionary or Napoleonic phases. Germany, the centre of the most protracted war in this era, remembered this era as *constant* war, which blurs the distinctions which historians usually make between the French Revolutionary wars (1792–1802) and the Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815).[26] This period of upheaval on both sides of the Atlantic was what Reinhart Koselleck called a 'saddle era' (*Sattelzeit*), or a time when new ideas were spawned whose impact would gallop away in the nineteenth century. In the Americas, Absolutism as a form of government would never return unchallenged. After the implosion of the Spanish monarchy in 1808, any successful form of government in the Spanish dominions would need to establish both authority and legitimacy, legally or by force of arms. Unlike in most of Europe, Spanish America after 1815 remained mired in conflict, political instability, debt, and inefficient economic organization. The period also birthed new terminology and changes in meaning. 'Partisan', for example, became a challenge to regular armies and state power instead of an adjunct to them.[27]

Whereas modern ideas developed over time, the experience of war was sudden and profound. The South American revolutionary, Simón Bolívar, turned his society upside down, yet he admitted having 'democracy on my lips, but aristocracy in my heart'.[28] Historian Paul Schroeder has shown that a diplomatic order was emerging even before the upheaval caused by the French Revolution, and Tim Blanning has dated the onset of war to 1787 with Denmark fighting Sweden, Sweden fighting Russia, and Austria and Russia fighting Turkey. France remained aloof, even when flashpoints emerged in 1790 over the Partition of Poland and the Anglo-US-Spanish standoff at Nootka Sound (now British Columbia). The year 1792 in many ways can

be seen as the continuation of a 'second hundred years war' throughout the eighteenth century between Britain and France, with Britain in 1793 joining the coalition because the French looked overextended in the Low Countries.[29] Even the initial stages of the French Revolution failed to wrench policy-makers into the new century. Charles Esdaile has shown that French leaders in the 1790s continued to set strategic limits to their expansionist policies, and that the ideological commitment felt by the 'old order' towards reversing the French revolution was weak, if it really existed at all.[30] The collapse of France's old regime did not impress contemporaries as much as later historians. It is not too much of an exaggeration to suppose that a commentator in 1789 would have predicted that the Habsburg monarchy, rather than France, was the likeliest candidate for disintegration, given the Belgian revolt and the counterproductive effect of Joseph II's reforms.[31] France was not even the sole repository of political radicalism, as the definitive American and Haitian Revolutions, and shorter-lived revolutions in Belgium, Netherlands, and Geneva, showed.

Yet later generations believed that the wars hinged almost entirely on the French Revolution and its ideology. Champions and detractors imagined that the upheaval was intentional instead of contingent. European progressives falsely claimed that the French Revolution emancipated the slaves of Haiti, and the Jesuit priest, Augustin Barruel (1741–1820), polemicized Revolutionary ideals as a conspiracy hatched by Masons to overturn Christianity.[32] Of course, the ideology of the French Revolution cannot be entirely ignored in a study of experiences. All the major 'isms' that would dominate subsequent modern history – nationalism, militarism, liberalism, etc. – were moulded in the French Revolutionary cauldron. The political threat to old regime Europe posed by the French Revolution's merging into one of State, Nation, and People was plain and long-lasting. However, beyond elite political discourse, non-French as well as French populations were transformed by the experience of war over 1792–1815. The French statesman, Charles Maurice de Talleyrand, famously claimed that men who had no memory of life before the French Revolution could never know the 'sweetness of life', and still less ever hope to be happy. Beneath Talleyrand's aristocratic gaze, the common generation of his nostalgic youth could hardly have imagined what turmoil the events of 1789 would unleash on their lives. It was still a time when, as one Spanish dissident recalled, 'most people spent their lives in the villages and towns where they were born ... and very few women ever wandered out of sight of the bell tower of their parish church'.[33] But the onset of general war from 1792 tore the quiet life asunder. The concept of 'civilian' life as separate from the 'military' was generalized in language and attitudes for the first time, a consequence of the conscription of mass armies and the burdens this placed on non-combatants. Also, the French Revolutionaries were

not alone in professing the depressingly modern belief that revolutionary violence could have 'regenerative' qualities.[34]

Given the transformative effect of the war in Europe and the Americas, the experience of the common soldier has come back into focus. Historians have ascribed this to the agenda 'set by studies of the First World War, who pioneered the study of questions such as masculinity, the body, national identity, and cultural memory in the military sphere.'[35] In Europe and North America, long histories of violent contest gave rise to sites and dates of mourning and celebration which became part of the essential equipment of consolidated nationhood.[36] Unsurprisingly, all this political and emotional investment spawned a thriving genre of military history. And this is evident in the realms of popular military history, too: notably the work of military historians who return timelessly to Napoleon, Bolívar, Marlborough, Waterloo, Westphalia, Stalingrad, and who are keen always to reiterate those time-worn topics.[37] The surge of popular military history is often criticized by both academics and literary commentators. A *Guardian* columnist referred to it as a 'dumbed-down ... porridgy pabulum for the lowest common denominator ... lacking academic rigour'.[38] More to the point, later generations of historians writing about the powers surrounding France tended to stress the central role played by the French Revolution and, especially, Napoleon, in transforming their case-studies. Thomas Nipperdey placed Napoleon at the centre of Germany's trajectory in the nineteenth century, Linda Colley saw Britons undergo accelerated forging as patriots and nationalists, and generations of historians saw Spain's struggle against Napoleon as the birth of modern Spain.[39] European nations were imagined through warfare, and social structures, especially those lying west of the River Elbe, opened up. Serfdom was abolished in western and central Europe, where it had not disappeared already, and the impact of warfare meant that it did not endure in the east beyond the 1860s.

The scale and impact of war stretched far beyond Europe. Transatlantic communications, and naval war in general explain much of Britain's strategy, the only truly global power. Colonial fronts included the slave revolt in Saint-Domingue (later known as Haiti) in 1791, and the subsequent Anglo-Spanish intervention in that island which would cost over 60,000 British lives, and would be followed by Napoleon's equally disastrous intervention in 1802. Whilst war raged in the Atlantic World, the British also extended their control over Dutch South Africa, and much of India. The Americas emerged as independent actors in the wider western world, as British and Spanish power retreated from the vast North American territories west of the Appalachian Mountains and east of the Mississippi River, reducing support for Indians. Napoleon's sale of Louisiana allowed the United States of America to occupy those territories and begin the process of becoming a global power. The juntas that emerged across Spanish America after 1808 set in train a process

of independence that expelled Spanish control from the entire mainland within a generation. Arguably, as Alexander Mikaberidze has commented, the American experience of the War of the West was more profound than the European.[40] It wrenched the Americas into a new era of upheaval not witnessed since Europeans spread settlers and disease in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Unlike Europe with its memory of the religious wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Iberian America had been largely unaccustomed to large-scale violence.[41]

Small-scale violence, however, was a way of life. Slave economies dominated the European empires in the western hemisphere, and in the newly independent United States. In Spanish America, Europe's largest empire in the west, female slaves tended to be domestic slaves while male slaves tended to perform the physically more demanding urban and mining trades. Slaves occupied what the Hispanic legal code defined as 'borrowed bodies' (cuerpos prestados). Children birthed by slave mothers remained slaves, whereas children birthed by free women to slave fathers were born free. There were only three options for a slave woman to gain freedom, or manumission. Firstly, a grateful owner might reward her out of kindness, gratitude, or as an afterthought in a property exchange. Secondly, and the most common, slave women could prostitute themselves in order to raise money to afford to buy their 'borrowed bodies' and achieve freedom. But prostitution was risky, given the chances of unwanted pregnancy and reprisals from masters. Thirdly, slave women could appeal to the authorities in cases of suffering visible cruelty, in which case a common result was the ironic 'self-purchase' by the slave of her own body at a devalued price in order to end litigation.[42] Evidence from Buenos Aires around 1800 suggests, that a slave earning cash wages typically had to save about 200 days' worth of a journeyman's pay in order to reimburse his owner the going rate for manumission. The fact that modest households already relied on the income earned outside of the home by their slaves meant that manumission proceeded more easily than on the captive plantations.[43] Evidence from Guatemala suggests that most slave-owners did not refuse money from their slaves in return for manumission. Slaves could also appeal through law. But the odds were long in a colonial system which instinctively protected the rights of property (i.e. slavers) against humanity.[44] And of all slavery powers, only Britain and Denmark had developed serious abolitionist movements by 1792. Even so, the term 'humanity' was increasingly invoked in Spanish slavery disputes by the end of the eighteenth century. Slaves in Spanish-American domestic service were relatively better off than their doomed plantation fellows, who had no right to perform outside economic activity and buy their freedom. The polymath, Alexander von Humboldt, witnessed the 'sordid interest' of a slave market at Cumaná (Venezuela) in 1800:

> Of all European governments Denmark was the first and for a long time the only power, which abolished the traffic; yet notwithstanding that fact, the first negroes we saw exposed for sale had been landed from a Danish slave-ship ... The slaves exposed to sale were young men from fifteen to twenty years of age. Every morning cocoa-nut oil was distributed among them, with which they rubbed their bodies, to give their skin a black polish. The persons who came to purchase examined the teeth of these slaves, to judge of their age and health; forcing open their mouths as we do those horses in a market. This odious custom dates from Africa, as is proved by the faithful pictures drawn by the inimitable Cervantes, who after his long captivity among the Moors, described the sale of Christian slaves at Algiers. It is interesting to think that even at this day there exist European colonists in the West Indies who mark their slaves with a hot iron, to know them again if they escape.[45]

Despite the abject misery of slavery, their owners, especially the creole plantocracy on the intensely slave-worked economy of Cuba, defended Spanish slavery as something paternalistic. They often compared their system with even worse regimes, such as the French slavery in Saint-Domingue (now Haiti) or the American slavery that replaced the Spanish system in Florida after 1819. Certainly the degree of decency, if not dignity, which a slave might hope to achieve in domestic service in Spanish America, was even harder to achieve in the slave islands of the Caribbean. The most extreme abjection faced the slaves in Saint-Domingue/Haiti, where only a minority of slaves (urban servants, skilled workers, and foremen) avoided the direst drudgery of the majority of plantation workers, whose life expectancy once enslaved was estimated between seven and ten years.[46] Unsurprisingly, the luckiest slaves escaped to freedom, and lived in hiding amongst fellow fugitives. Such 'maroon' communities grew in Surinam, various sugar islands, and elsewhere, and over time were tolerated by colonial authorities.[47]

Transatlantic Experiences?

A study encompassing experiences in Europe and the Americas has been missing in part because of sources. Memoirs, mostly, have been written by Europeans, especially by French and British authors. The recording of wartime experiences by contemporaries in the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars was uneven. Written accounts did not achieve the range and authority of the autobiographies emerging from the more literate eras of the First and Second World Wars. Yet as Catriona Kennedy has explained, soldiers had a 'desire accurately to convey the experience of war' and 'to carry the reader with them on their journeys'. This desire still often conflicted with the need to reassure friends and families of

their well-being, and so it is unsurprising that such accounts of starvation and plundering are rare in letters.[48] Some nationalistic traditions celebrated popular participation in the anti-French wars, but their aim, as the Spanish and Russian versions perhaps demonstrate the best, was to support whichever left-wing or right-wing version of mythologized nation-building was in vogue amongst subsequent generations of writers.[49] In the highly memoiristic case of British officers, the experiences of fighting and campaigning were almost universally 'over there', in far-off European or global battlefields. British memoirs were often clouded whenever veterans read famous works on their experiences, Napier's *History of the War in the Peninsula* being a good example.[50] By contrast, French, German, and Spanish memories were much more likely to relate to fighting and campaigning 'here', or 'on the other side of the hill', one effect being that people could be more easily brought to sites where campaigns and conflict took place. In both cases, post-war memoirs were clearly prone to conceit, verbiage, and selective memory.[51] Primary sources from private soldiers were unsurprisingly fewer in number than those of the more literate and educated officers. But several soldiers' accounts appear in the 'glut of memoirs' published in the wake of the Battle of Waterloo.[52] With such large numbers of men participating in war, many decided to record their experiences in either letters or diaries, with many being published in the 1820s and 1830s, but some accounts continued to be published well into the 1850s and 1860s.[53]

Memoirs and letters have enabled historians to understand what motivated soldiers to enlist and fight. John Lynn's *Bayonets of the Republic* drew heavily upon the body of literature on combat effectiveness that has appeared since the mid-1940s, setting an example for methodology that has been followed by Edward Coss and Ilya Berkovich. Drawing upon memoirs, letters, and archives, Berkovich has shown that soldiers had their own moral code.[54] Lynn emphasized that loyalty among the soldiers, and subsequently motivation to endure and fight, rested in 'the national socio-political system, the military unit, and the primary group'.[55] Similar emphasis on the primary group has been made in respect of the British army, where the largest comrade group of the regiment comprised small primary affinities formed within the companies by men who fought and lived closely together.[56] The idea that a soldier is driven in combat by a desire to fight for his 'buddies', 'mates', or 'comrades' is nothing new, and indeed forms key themes for accounts of war in popular culture.[57] Today, perhaps, this idea is taken for granted, as a cliché of military scholarship. But the trend of scholarship concerning troops' motivation in the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars has tended to emphasize coercion or ideological motivation.[58] Yet it is clear that the soldier relied on the primary group for survival, and that this insight which originated in sociology over a century ago is overdue rather than novel.[59] The primary group as a motivator in combat is evident in many personal accounts of the wars. Soldiers' accounts reveal their mutual reliance.[60] One British

soldier wrote how 'the steady, determined scowl of my companions assured my heart and gave me determination'.[61] An officer recalled how 'men stand together and encourage each other in the hour of danger'.[62] The bonds of comradeship were just as important, if not more important, for the bandits and partisans who fought Napoleonic imperialism in Europe and the Spanish empire in the Americas.

Soldiers' memoirs offer rich insights into motivation. Northern Europe and North America especially, with their greater literacy and lesser religious upheaval, offer the greatest range of experiential memoirs.[63] Indeed the revolutionary era of 1776–1815 witnessed a boom in wartime memoirs in Protestant countries.[64] But memoirs present other problems. The vast majority perforce relate the experiences of literate officers and civilians. In the extreme old regime example of the Russian empire, only two non-officer memoirs are known to have been written relating to the decisive 1812–1814 campaign, even though some 1.5 million men and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) served in the Russian army and militia.[65] Very little evidence has been left by either free or slave blacks during the upheaval in Saint-Domingue/Haiti, but plenty by the white plantocracy.[66] Often memoirs were written with the benefit of hindsight, sometimes to defend a reputation or to please a patron or audience, or to 'set the record straight'.[67] Still, memoirs are useful when describing the aspects of daily life that soldiers take for granted when writing letters and diaries, and relatively few diaries in any case survived this era.[68]

For all their flaws, memoirs in some ways are more advantageous to historians than letters. Letters have been cited as better sources than memoirs because of their 'highly personal nature'.[69] But letters left behind by statesmen have often been edited over the decades in order to corroborate the assertions of memoirs. Besides, not all letters were intended for personal use, as some were diarised for posterity, and officers' letters were sometimes published in newspapers.[70] Letters also left much to the imagination: did a lack of detail or a short, formulaic letter mean that a soldier felt little appetite for writing, or that he was too busy with army duties, or that he simply struggled to transfer words to paper?[71] Also, unlike letters, memoirs offer a veracity to historians which cannot always be taken for granted in letters written at the time. Information relayed in letters was often second-hand because literate officers and men did a roaring trade in writing letters on behalf of their less-educated subordinates.[72] Fewer than half of French army conscripts could sign their own name. Letters were also prone to self-censorship in order not to distress addressed colleagues or loved ones with news of injury or death.[73] Silence, as Jay Winter has explained, did not necessarily indicate forgetting any more than speech necessarily indicated remembrance.[74] Most subalterns did not leave written records, especially the slaves emancipated in Haiti and Spanish America. Rumours and news communicated orally were the only reliable means for slaves to learn of, and respond to, the upheaval. Historians thus discover slaves' experiences vicariously, via legal records

of slave markets and disputed inheritances, or via memoirs from leaders either leading or resisting conflict involving emancipated slaves.[75]

The experiences of diverse groups of people caught up in this period of warfare across the New and Old worlds are the focus of this book. The chapters are organized thematically, as the context of the French Revolution and art of war, campaigning, civilians coping with armies in their midst, and the experience of the upheaval caused by the advance and retreat of empires and the associated insurrections. The term 'total war' has been used too liberally to describe this era.[76] There has been, as two military historians argued, an 'almost inflationary use of the term total war' by scholars interested in the cultural and ideological nature of conflict.[77] But this book argues that 'total war' is a fitting description. The period 1792–1815 was 'total' not so much in the modern cultural conception of extremism in war, as David Bell contends, but as the unprecedented demands made by old as well as new regimes on the lives across what we might broadly call the 'western' world as a whole, on both sides of the Atlantic. This total experience was provoked by the French Revolution, but thereafter much less moulded by its modernity than David Bell allows. Veterans, victims, and refugees acquired norms of survival which answered to the demands of their environment, and much less to the pretensions of revolutionary or counter-revolutionary regimes.

Notes

1. Geoffrey Parker identified a western 'military revolution' in the Early Modern era, stressing Europe's advances in artillery and fortification (Parker, *The Military Revolution: Military Innovations and the Rise of the West, 1500-1800* (Cambridge, 1996)). Victor David Hansen controversially argued that western military dominance was a product of a superior political and values system (Hanson, *Why the West Has Won* (2002)), in an analysis which was heavily criticized by other historians, most notably, by John Lynn (*Battle: A History of Combat and Culture*).
2. Jeffrey James Byrne, 'Reflecting on the Global Turn in International History or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Being a Historian of Nowhere', in *Rivista italiana di storia internazionale*, Vol. I, No. 1 (2018), Gennaio-Giugno, 11–41, 12–14.
3. A volume which has been much criticized in this regard is Stefan Smid, *Der spanische Erbfolgekrieg: Geschichte eines vergessenen Weltkriegs* (Cologne: Böhlau-Verlag, 2011).
4. Natalia Sobrevilla, 'Interrogating Culture in Latin America', *Latin American Research Review* Vol. 55 (2019), 360–367.
5. R.R. Palmer, *The Age of Democratic Revolution: A Political History of Europe and America, 1760-1800* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959).
6. Jeremy Adelman, *Sovereignty and Revolution in the Iberian Atlantic* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), p. 6.
7. R. Cameron, Concise Economic History of the World (New York: O.U.P., 1993), p. 193, accessed at http://www.thuto.org/ubh/ub/h202/wpopl.htm (Accessed 6 September 2020).

8. Esdaile, *Napoleon's Wars* (London: Penguin, 2008), p. 12.
9. Beatrice Heuser, *The Evolution of Strategy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 49.
10. Esdaile, *Napoleon's Wars* (London: Penguin, 2008), pp. 9–10.
11. Beatrice Heuser, *Evolution of Strategy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 88–89.
12. Beatrice Heuser, *Evolution of Strategy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 75.
13. Beatrice Heuser, 'Guibert, Prophet of Total War', in Roger Chickering and Stig Förster (eds.), *War in an Age of Revolution, 1775-1815* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 55.
14. Jeremy Black, 'A Revolution in Military Cartography?: Europe, 1650-1815', *The Journal of Military History*, Vol. 73, No. 1 (2009), 49–68.
15. Pierre Joseph de Bourcet, *Principes de la guerre de Montagnes* (Paris: Imprimiere Nationale, 1775).
16. Steven T. Ross, 'The Development of the Combat Division in Eighteenth-Century French Armies', *French Historical Studies*, Vol. 4, No. 1 (1965), 84–94.
17. John Lynn, 'How War Fed War: The Tax of Violence and Contributions During the Grand Siècle', *The Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 65, No. 2 (June, 1993), 286–310.
18. Robert M. Citino, 'Military Histories Old and New: A Reintroduction', *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 112, No. 4, (October, 2007), 1070–1071.
19. M. Hughes and W.J. Philpott, *Palgrave Advances in Modern Military History* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), p. 258.
20. Ambrogio Caiani, 'Introduction', in Broers and Caiani (eds.), *A History of European Restorations* (London: Bloomsbury, 2020), Vol. I, pp. 8–9; Carlos Contreras, 'La independencia del Perú: Balance de la histroiografía contemporánea', in Manuel Chust and José Antonio Serrano (eds.), *Debates sobre las independencias iberoamericanas* (Madrid: Iberoamericana, 2007), p. 108. 'Subaltern' as a historical term describes people with some sort of political consciousness who were excluded from power networks because of their caste, sex, age, occupation, or other disqualifiers.
21. A noteworthy exception to the trend is Carl Buschmann (ed.), Die Erfahrung des K rieges: Erfahrungsgeschichtliche Perspektiven von der Französischen Revolution bis zum Zweiten Weltkrieg (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh Verlag, 2001).
22. Peter Singer, *Marx: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), ch. 7.
23. Michael Hughes, *Forging Napoleon's Grande Armée: Motivation, Military Culture, and Masculinity in the French Army, 1800-1808* (New York: New York University Press, 2012).
24. Michael Seidman, *Republic of Egos* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2002).
25. Alf Lüdtke, 'Eigensinn', in Heike Diekwisch (ed.), *Alltagskultur, Subjektivität und Geschichte. Zur Theorie und Praxis von Alltagsgeschichte* (Münster: Westfälisches Dampfboot, 1994), pp. 139–153.
26. Ute Planert, *Der Mythos vom Befreiungskrieg: Der Mythos vom Befreiungskrieg. Frankreichs Kriege und der deutsche Süden: Alltag-Wahrnehmung-Deutung, 1792-1841* (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2007), p. 113.
27. 'Partisan', 'guerrilla' and 'insurgent' are used interchangeably in this book. There are nuances of meaning, but I plead for a liberal usage given best practice elsewhere (for example, the application of the contemporary term 'geopolitics' to historical events).
28. Donald Worcester, *Bolivar* (London: Hutchinson, 1978), p. 49.

29. Timothy Blanning, *The Origins of the French Revolutionary Wars* (Harlow: Pearson Education Limited, 1986), p. 45, 207.
30. Charles Esdaile., *The Wars of the French Revolution, 1792-1801* (London: Routledge, 2019).
31. Blanning, *Joseph II* (London: Routledge, 2004).
32. Popkin, *You are all Free* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 6–9, 88–94; Augustin Barruel, *Memoirs Illustrating the History of Jacobinism* (London: Hudson and Goodwin, 1799).
33. Blanco White testimony cited in Maria Gemma Rubi i Casals, 'La supervivencia cotidiana durante la Guerra de la Independencia', in Antonio Moliner (ed.), *La Guerra de la Independencia en España (1808-1814)* (Barcelona: Nabla Ediciones, 2007), p. 301.
34. David A. Bell, 'The Birth of Militarism in the Age of Democratic Revolutions', in Alan Forrest, Karen Hagemann and Rafe Blaufarb (eds.), *War, Demobilization and Memory: The Legacy of War in the Era of Atlantic Revolutions* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2016), pp. 31–35, 40.
35. Kevin Linch and Matthew McCormack, 'Wellington's Men: The British Soldier of the Napoleonic Wars', *History Compass*, Vol. 13, No. 6 (2015), 289. For examples of First World War studies, see Joanna Bourke, *Dismembering the Male: Men's Bodies, Britain and the Great War* (Chicago MI: Chicago UP, 1996); Jay Winter, *The Great War and the British People* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 1987).
36. Notably, see Jay Winter, *Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning: The Great War in European Cultural History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). For a compelling account of histories of national catastrophe drawing on the examples of the American South after 1865, France after 1871, and Germany after 1918, see Wolfgang Schivelbusch, *The Culture of Defeat: On National Trauma, Mourning, and Recovery* (New York: Henry Holt, 2003).
37. Anthony Beevor, Andrew Roberts, etc.
38. Alastair Harper, 'A Popular History of History' (*The Guardian*, 26 August 2008) (https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2008/aug/26/history.celebrity).
39. Thomas Nipperdey and, *Deutsche Geschichte, 1800-1866: Bürgerwelt und starker Staat: Bürgerwelt und starker Staat* (Munich: Beck, 1983), p. 11; Linda Colley, *Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707-1837* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992); Miguel Artola-Gallego, *La España de Fernando VII* (Madrid: Espasa, 2008).
40. Alexander Mikaberidze, *The Napoleonic Wars: A Global History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020), p. 501.
41. Brian Hamnett, *The End of Iberian Rule on the American Continent, 1770-1830* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), pp. 149–150.
42. Romina Martínez Castellanos, 'La defensa del "cuerpo prestado": artificios para la libertad', in Maria Alicia Peredo Merlo (coordinator), *Jalisco: Independencia y Revolución. Cultura y Sociedad emergente durante el proceso de independencia, 1792-1822* (Zapopan: Colegio de Jalisco, 2010), pp. 30–43.
43. Lyman L. Johnson, *Workshop of Revolution. Plebeian Buenos Aires and the Atlantic World, 1776-1810* (London: Duke University Press, 2011), pp. 39–43.
44. Catherine Komisaruk, 'Becoming Free, Becoming Ladino: Slave Emancipation and Mestizaje in Colonial Guatemala', in Lowell Gudmundson and Justin Wolfe (eds.), *Blacks and Blackness in Central America: Between Race and Place* (London: Duke University Press, 2010), pp. 154–155.

45. Alexander von Humboldt, *Personal Narrative of Travels to the Equinoctial Regions of America During the Years 1799-1804* (London: William Clowes and Sons, 1851), 3 Vols. I, pp. 175–176.
46. Popkin, *You are All Free* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 66–67.
47. Richard Price and Sally Price (eds.), *Stedman's Surinam: Life in an Eighteenth-Century Slave Society* (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1992), p. 25.
48. Catriona Kennedy, *Narratives of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, Military and Civilian Experience in Britain and Ireland* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), p. 2.
49. For excellent revisionism of the politicized 'people' in Spain and Russia, see Charles Esdaile, *Fighting Napoleon* (London: Yale University Press, 2004) and Dominic Lieven, *Russia against Napoleon* (London: Penguin, 2007), respectively. For a study of the politicization of French Revolutionary mobilization, see Daniel Moran and Arthur Waldron (eds.), *The People in Arms: Military Myth and National Mobilization Since the French Revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
50. Mark Wilson, *German Forces and the British Army* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2013), p. 9; Rory Muir, *Salamanca 1812* (New York: Yale University Press, 2001).
51. Forrest, *Napoleon's Men* (London: Hambledon Continuum, 2002), p. 23.
52. Kevin Linch and Matthew McCormack, 'Wellington's Men: The British Soldier of the Napoleonic Wars', *History Compass*, Vol. 13, No. 6 (2015), 288–296.
53. Gavin Daly, 'British Soldiers and the Legend of Napoleon', *The Historical Journal*, Vol. 61, No. 1 (2018), 133, 144.
54. Ilya Berkovich, *Motivation in War: The Experience of Common Soldiers in Old Regime Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), pp. 1, 5, 15–16.
55. John Lynn, *The Bayonets of the Republic: Motivation and Tactics in the Army of Revolutionary France, 1791-94* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), pp. 24–25, 163.
56. John Cookson, 'Regimental Worlds: Interpreting the Experience of British Soldiers During the Napoleonic Wars', in Alan Forrest, Karen Hagemann and Jane Rendall (eds.), *Soldiers, Citizens and Civilians: Experiences and Perceptions of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, 1790-1820* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2009), pp. 33–34.
57. Some of the most striking examples are *Saving Private Ryan*, Steven Spielberg (DreamWorks & Paramount Pictures: 1998) and *Band of Brothers*, Steven Spielberg, Tom Hanks (HBO: 2001).
58. Kennedy, *Narratives of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, Military and Civilian Experience in Britain and Ireland* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2013), p. 82; A recent study of friendship and homosexuality in Napoleon's army is suggestive, but also limited by its heavy reliance on literary rather than autobiographical evidence (Brian Joseph Martin, *Napoleonic Friendship: Military Fraternity, Intimacy and Sexuality in Nineteenth-Century France* (Durham: University of New Hampshire Press, 2011)).
59. Charles Horton Cooley, *Social Organization: A Study of the Larger Mind* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1910), pp. 23–24, 26.
60. Coss, *All for the King's Shilling* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2010), p. 7.
61. Anon, *A Soldier of the Seventy-First, The Journal of a Soldier in the Peninsular War* (London: Constable Miscellany, 1828), p. 18.

62. George Bell, *Rough Notes by an Old Soldier During Fifty Years Service* (London: Day and Son Limited, 1867), p. 21.
63. Bard Frydenlund, 'Southern Influences on Nordic Political Culture', in Broers and Caiani (eds.), *A History of European Restorations* (London: Bloomsbury, 2020), Vol. 1, p. 204.
64. Philip Dwyer, 'Making Sense of the Muddle: War Memoirs and the Culture of Remembering', in, Philip Dwyer (ed.), *War Stories: The War Memoir in History and Literature* (Oxford: Berghahn, 2017), p. 1.
65. Dominic Lieven, *Russia Against Napoleon* (London: Penguin, 2007), p. 15.
66. Jeremy D. Popkin, *You are All Free, The Haitian Revolution and the Abolition of Slavery* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 6.
67. Berkovich, *Motivation in War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), p. 38; Alan Forrest, *Napoleon's Men: The Soldiers of the Revolution and Empire* (New York: Hambledon and London, 2002), p. 23; Laurence Montroussier-Favre, 'Remembering the Other: The Peninsular War in the Autobiographical Accounts of British and French Soldiers', in, Alan Forrest, Étienne François and Karen Hagemann (eds.), *War Memories: The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars in Modern European Culture* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), p. 61; Franklin L. Ford, *Europe 1780-1830* (London: Routledge, 1989), p. 10.
68. Muir, *Tactics and the Experience of Battle in the Age of Napoleon* (London: Yale University Press, 2000), pp. 301–302; Franklin L. Ford, *Europe 1780-1830* (London: Routledge, 1989), p. 11.
69. Berkovich, *Motivation in War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), p. 39.
70. G. Daly, 'British Soldiers and the Legend of Napoleon', *The Historical Journal* Vol. 61, No. 1 (2018), 131–153.
71. Forrest, Hagemann and Rendall, 'Introduction: Nation in Arms - People at War', in Forrest, Hagemann and Rendall (eds.), *Soldiers, Citizens and Civilians* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2009), p. 11.
72. Leighton James, *Witnessing the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars in German Central Europe* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2013), p. 44.
73. Leighton James, *Witnessing the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars in German Central Europe* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2013), p. 6; for a first-hand example of daring to resist self-censorship in a post-war memoir, see Adrien Jean-Baptiste François Bourgogne, *Memoirs of Sergeant Bourgogne, 1812-1813* (New York: Doubleday & McClure Co, 1899), p. 83.
74. Jay Winter, 'War Memoirs, Witnessing and Silence', in Philip Dwyer (ed.), *War Stories: The War Memoir in History and Literature* (New York: Berghahn, 2018), p. 29.
75. Celia del Palacio Montiel and Arturo Camacho Becerra, 'Introducción', in María Alicia Peredo Merlo (coordinator), *Jalisco: Independencia y Revolución. Cultura y Sociedad emergente durante el proceso de independencia, 1792-1822* (Zapopan: Colegio de Jalisco, 2010), pp. 18–21.
76. Most controversially by David Bell, *The First Total War* (London: Bloomsbury, 2007).
77. Stig Förster and Jörg Nagler, 'Introduction', in Stig Förster and Jörg Nagler (eds.), *On the Road to Total War: The American Civil War and the German Wars of Unification, 1861-1871* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 13.

2 Context of the French Revolution and the Art of War

The French Revolution transformed political, social and military relations within France and beyond. It was midwife to a clash of modern ideologies, even though the general war which began in 1792 had more traditional rather than modern causes. The war of 1792 produced both the last great conflict of the pre-industrial era and a military revolution enabling Europe's great powers to field armies of immense size.[1] This experience, especially its French variety, is referred to as the 'revolution in military affairs'. Improvements in artillery had taken place in the latter years of the century. Frederick the Great had introduced new mobile artillery prior to the Seven Years' War, Prince Lichtenstein had reformed Habsburg artillery following this conflict, while France responded to its defeat by devising the best 'Gribeauval' field-guns of the late eighteenth century.[2] But the concentration of ever-larger armies in European campaigns during the last decade of war increased the concentration of artillery. Perhaps as many as 20–25% of casualties in the Napoleonic Wars were artillery-related, proportionately greater than in the infantry slogging matches of the Seven Years' War, and even of the American Civil War (when infantry no longer formed in ranks and were therefore less exposed).[3] As insurgencies challenged Napoleon's empire in Europe and Spain's empire in the Americas, smaller and mobile howitzers were supplied to troops accessing perilous mountain paths and forests.[4]

But most other tactics and weapons remained recognizably early modern. Cavalry tended to be divided into three categories: light, line/medium, and heavy (Chasseurs, Hussars, Curaissiers, in the Napoleonic case). Heavy cavalry was used much less in Prussian, Austrian, and especially, Russian armies than in the French. Irregular units mastered light cavalry, especially the Cossacks of the Don basin and the blandengues of the Pampas. The melée of South American cavalry clashes produced chaos. In regular battles, the cavalry's traditional role was more systematic: as reconnaissance troops and skirmishers in the light role, and as shock units to break and chase enemy units in the heavy role. As a result, whilst cavalrymen formed a small

noble elite of expensive and relatively fragile regiments compared to the hordes of infantry and more scientific artillery, they often had a totally disproportionate effect on enemy formations. In pitched battles, cavalrymen tended to sustain wounds on the arm, which often proved survivable. Torsoes were protected either by rolled-up cloak (in the British case), or by defensive 'plate' (in the case of the French curaissiers). The most lethal cavalry arm was the lance, especially when deployed in large numbers like in the French army. It was invariably fatal in its thrusting power. Cavalry tactics varied from the line formation of stirrup-to-stirrup heavy charging, to the echelon attack, to the wild confrontations in the Americas.

Infantry, usually the vast majority of any army, also deployed tactics and weapons that were recognizable in eighteenth century. Muskets and rifles were fundamentally the same as those used during the middle-late eighteenth century. Infantrymen were instructed to sacrifice accuracy in order to fire as quickly as possible. Infantry tactics since had not changed much since the era of Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden, with linear formations relying on shock tactics, often exchanging volleys, and resorting to the bayonet to force an enemy formation to break. Nevertheless, these linear formations were slow to manoeuvre, especially on broken ground. They presented easier targets for artillery, as Napoleonic warfare would show. The initiative conferred upon an individual soldier was thus minimal in this period, demonstrating tactics akin to those of the *ancien régime* armies rather than of the fully rifled armies of the future.[5] Logistics and supply methods were still modelled on established principles dating back to the early eighteenth century.[6] Late and insufficient supplies, combined with infections, accounted for most losses. Most casualties continued to arise from diseases rather than direct enemy action, as neither the organization of army medical services nor the practice of military medicine underwent any far-reaching change.

But mass armies would overhaul the traditional magazine system. Some armies, such as Austrian, sustained on average marches of less than ten miles per day, owing to its doctrine of protecting its baseline of supply while marching against that of the enemy.[7] But the French mastered paces which could reach 25 per day under duress. Mass armies ended up reducing the importance of fortresses as supply centres. Smaller forts would now only be relevant in people's wars to the extent that insurgents could plan to use forts for supplies.[8] Inaccessible terrain continued to demand the careful handling of pack animals. The polymath, Alexander von Humboldt, when climbing the Cordillera mountain range in Venezuela, discovered the wisdom of his muleteers who told him, 'I will not give you the mule whose step is easiest, but the one which is most intelligent'.[9] But an intelligent mule could still be outwitted by his master. Intelligent muleteers often absconded with their animals amidst the

threat of ambush, as the Anglo-Portuguese army campaigning in Iberia discovered to its cost. But muleteers also offered intelligence to whichever side won their allegiance.

The major change or revolution came with the tactics, methods, and ultimate goal of the commanders. The armies of the French Revolution and, especially, Napoleon, transformed all this. Almost without exception, Napoleonic war battles were one of attack and defence, in the sense that one army adopted a position and was assaulted by the other. There were variations of this theme. For example, at Marengo, Auerstädt, and Friedland, armies that had launched an offensive but found themselves the subject of an attack, or at Austerlitz, Salamanca, and Waterloo, where the reverse dynamic was in operation in terms of devastating counterattacks. Only at Wagram (1809) did two armies attack each other simultaneously.[10] Friedland was particularly notable for Napoleon's successful use of massed artillery bombardment to rout an entire wing of the Russian army. The huge scale of European battlefields towards the end of the wars reflected a revolution in logistics and strategy. Mass mobilization and extremism in living off the land allowed a focus on the pursuit and destruction of the enemy rather than the 'compensations' sought in old regime cabinet warfare.[11] France was the trendsetter in strategy and tactics. But none of the French military prowess would make sense unless we understand how France underwent its revolution, sparking a series of wars lasting a generation.

The French Origins of the Wars of 1792–1815

France in the late eighteenth century was beset by a political and economic crisis. The population had risen by almost half over the course of the century, but economic expansion could not keep pace. The old order jealously guarded its privileges. Louis XVI (reigned 1774–1792), France's good-natured but inept king, discovered that his supposedly absolute monarchy was less absolute than several of his peers. France's pyrrhic victory in the American War of Independence (1776–1783) bequeathed a huge debt, and there was no real national bank or efficient tax base to pay it off. Venality (the sale of clerical, legal, and military offices) eased the regime's cash flow but also impeded necessary fiscal reforms. Venality symbolized the unsustainable political and military crisis in France. Officers either inherited their post or purchased a commission. The appeal was obvious: the price of the colonelcy of a regiment exceeded the price of a judgeship in the Parliament of Paris between 1714 and 1776.[12] King Louis XVI's attempts to reduce the number of venal commissions were not motivated by enlightened thinking. Rather they were motivated by a drive to increase professionalism, as was best demonstrated with the 'Ségur reform' of 1781, which insisted on candidates for senior officer positions possessing four generations of noble ancestry. The provincial

nobility who formed the bulk of the officer corps had no problem with the insistence on the four quarters: after all, the ruling protected both their social predominance and their sense of professionalism, this last being something that was very important to them. But noble opinion soured at France's humiliating inaction during the Prussian invasion of Holland in 1787. Meanwhile the central grievance was the monarchy's last-ditch attempt to get more money from the Second Estate.

The noble 'second estate' was also divided, as envy grew between blue-blooded and upstart nobles, analogous to the elite rivalry between European and Spanish-American whites in Latin America during the second half of the eighteenth century. In the nobility's *Cahiers de doléances* (list of grievances), drawn up in 1789, venality was repeatedly attacked.[13] The blueblood aristocrats, 'noblesse présentée', clashed with the purchased commissions or the promotion of the 'officiers de fortune'. The post-1789 abolition of the sales of military commissions, the professional privileges of court favourites, along with the privilege reserved to serving officers to reserve places for their sons at the military school, all had the effect of assuaging the grievances not just of the bourgeoisie but also of the military nobility.[14]

Poor harvests from 1787 sent bread prices spiralling, and unemployment in Paris surged to almost half of the working-class (*sans-culotte*) population. Riots spread, nobles abandoned their rural estates, and the army tried to restore order. King Louis tried to rule by decree, but the nobles and clergy demanded that he convene the Estates-General, the traditional parliament that had not met since 1614. Revolutionary events in the summer of 1789 turned the Estates-General into a single legislative body called the National Assembly. The 'nation', hitherto a vague concept preached by philosophers, was now proclaimed indivisible and the source of all political legitimacy. Absolutism, already unviable, was definitively undone. France's nobles had killed royal absolutism, but in so doing, they had ironically unleashed a revolution that would end up killing them as a class. Over the summer and autumn of 1789, the French Revolution drove royal control from the streets of Paris and the royal family itself from its glorious palace at Versailles to the easily surveilled Tuilleries in Paris. Royal attempts to cling to power proved counterproductive, as mutinies struck the army in 1790 and inept attempts to disperse mobs fed popular anger against the king and, especially, his unpopular wife, Marie Antoinette.

In June 1791, after two years of power seeping away to the Assembly and his ministers, Louis made an attempt to flee France. Reality had finally intruded upon a royal household that had tried to deny the political reality of the nation by clinging to the pageantry and symbols of monarchy.[15] But the National Guard, volunteers sworn to defend the French nation, arrested Louis at Varennes, still short of the border with the Holy Roman empire, and escorted him back to Paris. The king, whom the

National Assembly had tactfully declared the victim of a 'kidnap' plot, was forced to accept the liberal Constitution of 1791. But royal humiliation did not end there. Europe's monarchies grew hostile to the radical course of the French Revolution, and they were egged on in this feeling by the clerical and aristocratic émigrés, including army officers, who fled to Mainz and other German lands in despair at their king's humiliation. Meanwhile, the ascendant Girondin faction in the Assembly supported war with Absolutist Europe, especially with Austria, facing down protests from the more radical Jacobin faction whose leader, Maximilien Roberspierre, warned that 'no-one welcomes armed missionaries'. Ironically, Louis XVI also supported war. He naively believed either that a French victory would strengthen what remained of monarchical power, or that a French defeat would see Germans storm Paris and rescue the royal family.[16]

French Revolutionary War

France declared war on Prussia and Austria in 1792, after long, ideologically heated debates. The leading pro-war advocate on the French side was Jacques Pierre Brissot (1754–1793). Brissot was opposed by the more radical Jacobins. Uncertainty shrouds much of the Jacobins. They have been viewed as visionary democrats or as proto-totalitarian terrorists, with many graduations in between. Jacobinism was a fluid movement that evolved significantly during the Revolution. This was especially the case in 1791 when the moderate Feuillant faction broke away from the Jacobins. From this period onwards, the movement constantly became more radical.

Yet beyond the hotheads of Paris, the persistence of old norms was strong. Anti-revolutionary royalist emissaries and priests fanned the immemorial problem of desertion by writing to their former parishioners to urge them to come home. The persistence of Early Modern economic reality meant that, in Jean-Paul Bertaud's words, 'the Army of the Rhine generals Marceau, Bernadotte and Kleber echoed each other; the soldier going barefoot, his clothes in rags, receiving neither food nor pay, and dreaming of flight and pillage'.[17] The 'new' army peaked, perhaps, during the liberal apogee of 1791–1792, and its associated volunteerism and 'virtuous' patriotism.[18] But thereafter Jacobin values were shallow, both in the larger society and in the army. Troops during 1793–1794 obeyed the Committee of Public Safety and the War Ministry but without enthusiasm. The Terror government of 1793–1794 had no army of virtue, despite what Robespierre may have thought. Instead generals such as Carnot maintained discipline via promotion and other honours.[19] The initial fanaticism of the ideology of the Revolution had only the most fleeting control over men, largely when foreign armies invaded in 1793. Instead rudimentary supplies, the promise of material gain and honour, and

harsh discipline, kept an army in the field. As Philippe de Ségur, future aide-de-camp to Napoleon, later recalled: 'After 1796 and 1797 in the Army of the Rhine the spirit of conquest had succeeded to this former exaltation of the defensive virtues of the country, it had all become modified by the continuance of war, by the fascination of celebrity, and the contagion of acquired fortunes'.[20]

Mass conscription – the *Levée en masse* of 1793 – saw the ideological rhetoric of Paris impose itself on rural tradition and indifference. The call to arms of a million men over 1793 biased citizenship away from rights and towards obligations. The early months of the French Revolution had seen the abolition of the hated practice of conscription, with a view towards creating a long-term professional army instead. But events intervened and in March 1793, there was a call for a 300,000-man levy (for use against the Vendée insurrection), even though this demand was supposedly only 'temporary' in nature. The levée en masse later in 1793, however, called for 750,000 men. But by 1798, only half of these numbers remained, the same year that conscription was systematically regulated with the Loi Jourdan.[21] The levée was saturated in ideological rhetoric, mobilizing the nation and calling free men to fight for the Revolution. It mobilized civilians as much as soldiers, as disused convents and aristocratic estates became arms factories, and open-air workshops made the streets and parks of Paris reverberate with the sound of hammers. France struggled to keep up with the demands of the size of its own army with the Jacobin government heavily relying on the 'patriotism of Paris' for gunpowder, ammunition, weaponry, and uniforms. The Paris Armoury became vital with a massive upturn in production. The armoury, which had produced 9,000 muskets per year before September 1793, turned out over 145,000 in the 13 months that followed. But chaos persisted. Contractors became ineffective due to the unreliability of currency to pay them.[22] One-tenth of French soldiers were issued with firearms that did not fire in Year II. The French Revolutionary praise of the pike as the symbol of French patriotism made a virtue out of a necessity. Whether before or after 1792, all armies relied on buying and seizing the bulk of their day-today needs from the local populace. During Year III, half of the grain produced in Belgium was decreed to be sent to the French army. Civilians became part of the military machine, operating under centralized direction. Church-bells were melted to produce weapons, shoemakers were paid to produce boots for the army during the winter months, and carters and drovers were exempted from being conscripted into the army if they could show they were engaged in military provisioning. But the initial war enthusiasm degenerated into attacks by *sans-culottes* against the property and persons of the propertied classes.[23]

While Parisian elites were fearful of the Revolution, the French countryside was either indifferent or opposed. In western France – the Vendée – the countryside was downright hostile.[24] The peasant population

between the Loire and the Sèvres (historic Brittany) had never fully accepted the Revolution, and the conscription edict of February 1793, coming in the wake of the execution of the king, inflamed tensions. Soon a peasant-royalist army of about 30,000 captured several western towns and cities in the spring, at a time of foreign invasions in the east and south of France. But defeats in the autumn sent the Vendée rebels reeling. Thousands were slaughtered after their defeat at Le Mans (12 December 1793), and the civilian deaths, committed by both rebels and the Revolution, multiplied this amount several times. Revolutionary General Westermann sent Paris a gruelling communique of the Vendée 'having perished under our free sword along with its women and children' and of his 'having rushed women under the feet of our horses and massacred women who at least will engender no more brigands'.[25] As one Revolutionary officer wrote: 'We can no longer hope to bring them to reason. We must kill them all, or they will kill us'.[26] The regenerative violence of Revolutionary propaganda coincided with obscene reality, as both rebels and government committed local acts of terror and massacre.

The ideological rhetoric surged from the Paris government's alienation from its own countryside. Atheistic, centralist, and enlightened, Paris began to alienate the religious, semi-autonomous, and traditional regions of France. The levée en masse alienated community from government in those parts of France where central control was still eyed with confused suspicion. Unlike the levies of the old regime, the levee demanded civilian participation – administrative, logistical, manufacturing – as much as military.[27] Revolutionary centralized control instigated urban economic alleviations with decreed *maximum* laws, particularly the 1793 *maximum générale*, which fixed grain prices to the market price and allowed Parisians to eat. Yet, the decrees were detrimental to producers, the peasantry.[28] A further policy of alienation was the Terror of 1793–1794, which was instigated in order to 'save' the nation from 'internal enemies'.[29] Accompanied with the *maximums*, the Jacobin government introduced a type of economic terror, which implemented draconian penalties accompanied with armed militias that scoured the countryside to force producers to exchange goods at the fixed *assignat* prices.[30] All items of military application ran short, including drugs and surgical equipment. French naval ships were distributed with handbills urging captains to prioritize the seizure of surgical instruments whenever they boarded enemy vessels.[31] Peasants already under siege from fixed prices showed little zeal for enlisting in the levee.[32] The resistance to Parisian conscription and economic turmoil was answered by a brutal regime of terror.

An Age of Terror

The Great Terror in France (1793–1795) continues to loom large in the imagination, conjuring images of the blood-soaked guillotine and

the very term 'terrorism'. The origins and nature of the Terror during the French Revolution remain one of the most enduring mysteries of the entire revolutionary period.[33] Left-wing historians viewed the Terror as a product of circumstance. They held that the Terror was not intrinsic to the revolution, nor was it based on ideology. Instead, it was forced on the Revolution to protect France and democracy against the threats of war and counter-revolution.[34] On the other hand, both the conservative and revisionist historians view the Terror as being primarily ideological, and present since the onset of the revolution.[35] The founder of modern conservatism and keen observer of the Revolution, Edmund Burke, condemned the Revolution and predicted that it would always lead to tyranny and that Terror was present since 1789.[36] Hippolyte Taine later shared Burke's sententiousness and saw no bright moment in the Revolution.[37] More recently, both political views have been revised. François Furet also saw the Terror as a mentality that had existed since the very beginning of the Revolution. Premeditated terror ensured a quick and systematic way of mobilizing the population and punishing the 'enemies of the people'. Yet, unlike the conservatives, revisionists like Furet accepted that the Terror was a necessary step towards democracy.[38] This democracy was based on what the intellectual historian, Isaiah Berlin, defined as 'positive liberty'. Subjects of the revolutionary experiment were to be 'liberated' by state action, rather than merely left in 'liberty' as in such 'negative liberty', or common-law, jurisdictions as Britain or the new United States. The violent liberation doctrine was not confined to Europe. Simón Bolivar was inspired less by George Washington and more by Voltaire and Rousseau. The 'war to the death' Bolívar unleashed in South America in 1813 paralyzed any hope of civil society existing outside of arbitrary military action.[39] As the aims of the Revolution, whether in France or South America, were pristine, any means, even mass killings, were justifiable.[40] In Spanish America, captives were frequently tortured, quartered, and even castrated. The subversive violence of insurgents in New Spain was answered by the repressive violence of the colonial authorities. But the terror committed by both sides followed similar patterns.[41]

Terror was considered outside and above the law, and necessary in order to perfect the Revolution and destroy its detractors.[42] Maximilien Robespierre said, 'the state must be saved by whatever means, and the only unconstitutional acts are those which lead to its ruin'.[43] The onset of war in 1792 heightened the Terror. The September 1792 massacres were motivated by fear of military defeat in the wake of the Prussian victory at Verdun.[44] Priests were forced to swear allegiance to the Revolution, and thereby undermine all sacred authority for their vocation. Alternatives included flight, transportation, or death. Europe had been no stranger to legislative anti-clericalism. Joseph II of Austria in 1782 dissolved one-third of the monasteries in his empire and forced almost half of all monks and nuns to leave their vocation and seek 'productive' work. But the

hostility of enlightened monarchs towards the Catholic Church's corporate power and privileges paled in comparison to the terror unleashed by the French Revolutionaries, as well as their promotion of revolutionary creeds in the place of the suppressed Church. The religious support for the Vendée insurgents of 1793 inflamed anti-clericalism even more. The popular support for the insurgency across western France produced such local leaders as the haulier, Jacques Cathelineau, and the gamekeeper, Jean-Nicolas Stofflet. Villages flaunted their Catholic revival, huntsmen joined the 'Royal Army', and all united in opposition to Parisian conscription. The killing ranged far beyond the irregular tactics employed in the bocage, and no exact figures exist for the thousands of prisoners executed by both sides in cold blood, or for the traumatized lives of refugees.[45]

The terror associated with the French Revolution spurned waves of voluntary and involuntary emigration, and not just within Europe. The Caribbean island of Saint-Domingue was the centre of France's slavery empire. France's share in the slave trade had increased significantly since 1783, and its Caribbean plantations were outstripping British competition.[46] But exploitation produced a massive slave revolt in the north of Saint-Domingue in 1791. Some 4,000 whites were killed and over a 1,000 plantations wrecked. Surviving whites formed a militia and killed even more Blacks. But the rebels held onto a third of the island. On 20 June 1793, Revolutionary commissioners sent from France allied with disgruntled sailors and free people of colour on the island in raising the slave population of Le Cap, a port the size of Boston and source of France's colonial prosperity. The town was destroyed and thousands were massacred. Thousands more – whites, free people of colour, and slaves owned by both – fled to the United States of America, where their presence probably spread the yellow fever epidemic in Philadelphia in 1793. They also sharpened the young US republic's own slavery fault-lines. Southern whites were confirmed in the righteousness of their slavery amidst the spectacle of brutal violence in the Caribbean, while people of colour who settled in New York and Philadelphia took the opposite view.[47] Refugees from revolution set off class conflict. Saint-Domingue whites finding refuge in the United States lamented the 'uncouth' ways of this republic and the absence of 'gratitude' for France's help in its independence.[48]

And tens of thousands of dissidents fled revolution in France itself. French royalists exiled in German towns complained of their bleak experiences. Four thousand royalists crammed into Villingen deemed its climate 'veritably Siberian'. But locals had cause to resent the influx even more. The presence of some 25,000 French émigrés in Swabia alone raised local tensions as the added demand for food and services raised prices. Alsatians were usually welcomed out of affinity from language and class. But the presence of aloof aristocrats raised tensions, especially when news spread of the elopement of local women

with émigré royalist officers.[49] The movement of people, voluntary and involuntary, ahead of armies or in the wake of them, heralded an unprecedented movement of people. The start of a generation of war in 1792 upended the refugee experience as much as that of transient soldiers and of locals.

The wars that surged from the French Revolution were partly characterized by strategy and tactics from the eighteenth century, and partly new practices and ideologies. Over five years of war (1792–1797) waged between France and a loose coalition of European powers led to French victory, the beginnings of French conquests in Europe, and the introduction of mass conscription. The French Revolutionary, and especially the Napoleonic, art of war, set the tone for this era. But other armies evolved to meet the French challenge. In all cases, societies in Europe and the Americas felt the burden of war to a degree outside of living memory. Military and civilian life collided, especially in the matter of conscription.

The French Revolutionary Armies

Prior to 1789, the French army had solved many of the issues that caused its humiliating defeat in the Seven Years' War (1756–1763). But even its technical proficiency was outweighed by the twin advantages of size and ruthless new ideology. Given France's huge population, the Revolution did not feel the need to spare the lives of its soldiers. Armed hordes emerged out of the mass conscription of 1793. The 1793 military landscape was bleak for Republican France, with the First Coalition armies invading French soil. The Austrians were attacking from Belgium, the Prussians from the Rhine, the Spaniards over the Pyrenees, and the British occupied Toulon. Meanwhile a dissident Federalist movement gripped the provinces, including Lyon, and the Catholic west erupted in violent opposition to Parisian anti-clericalism and conscription. Volunteers defending the Revolution were highly motivated but too few. The French military reformer, Dubois-Crancé, in a report to the National Assembly, advocated mass conscription and the formation of a national army.[50] On February 1793, the convention levied 300,000, essentially doubling the size of the army. On August of the same year, the decree of levée en masse was adopted. The exact scale of the armies fielded by France is difficult to assess, given the impediments of early modern logistics. But they certainly expanded from around 200,000 in 1792 to more than 700,000 by 1794.[51] While the size was new, most of the order of battle was inherited. Artillery had already been evolving from a siege to a battlefield role, but the wars of 1792–1815 would deploy artillery in unprecedented numbers. The Valliere and Gribeauval systems gave the French army mobility and firepower, as its field-guns were better standardized while also being lighter and longer-ranged.[52] But technology needed human application.

Artillerymen were only a tiny fraction of an army dominated by line infantry. And the Revolution had made the infantry leaderless.

Jacobin hostility to the noble caste, the frustrated flight of the king, and unpalatable policing duties, all had the effect of persuading most French officers either to resign or to emigrate by the end of 1792. The Revolutionary government therefore approved the promotion into the officer corps of rankers, and it expanded access to the officer corps for remaining 'patriotic' families, both noble and non-noble. The French example was the most extreme but was not unique. One-third of the Spanish army officer corps was non-noble in 1807, and the insurrection the following year accelerated this contingency. But the demands of war after 1792 improved social mobility in the French army far more than any other. But command was dangerous, and not just for military reasons. *Représentants en mission* ('Representatives on mission') – political commissars *avant la lettre* – were dispatched from Paris to the field armies, with the power of life and death over commanders. The French Navy lost 22 of its 28 admirals and 128 of its 170 captains, of which just under half were due to executions ordered by the *Représentants*. The French Navy never truly recovered. The situation was hardly better in the army, in which out of nearly 1,400 generals, 994 had charges brought against them by the *Représentants*, and 67 were executed in 1794 on the grounds of treason to the Republic.

Upheaval also affected the ranks. In 1793, there was friction between the early volunteers and the new conscripts in the French army. Friction persisted between the old line regiments and the new volunteers of the National Guard. The volunteers were amalgamated (*amalgame*) into 'demi-brigades' with older royalist officers and soldiers, in the hope of blending Revolutionary fervour with military experience.[53] The sans-culottes recruits of 1792 ironically had more in common with the ancien regime recruits than they had with the bourgeois volunteers of 1791. The officers leading the new army had undergone trauma. Some officers saw the Revolution through, others defected, while others joined the new National Guard and amalgame units. The 1793–1794 Terror was particularly unkind to officers, but the post-1795 Thermidor reaction ushered in a stable era of a resilient and highly capable French officer corps. Between 1793 and 1800, the new demi-brigades reduced the monarchist 'regiments' by merging two National Guard battalions with one from the ancien regime. As early as 1794, the impact of these evolutionary reforms was plain to see at the French victory at Fleurus, thanks to the blend of a superior organizational structure (basically, divisions) and a mixing of successful pre-revolutionary and revolutionary techniques. During the course of the Revolutionary Wars, the French infantry integrated light infantry tactics and the effective use of columns.[54] Yet most of the success can be attributed to greater manpower resources and often

reckless tactics wasting the lives of untrained conscripts. Much of the 'heroic' success of the French Revolutionary armies can be attributed to weight of numbers, especially in the Armée du Nord invading the Low Countries. The French victory at Jemappes on 6 November 1792 tends to be remembered for French 'heroic enthusiasm' and first use of the column. But the Habsburg army almost won the battle, despite being outnumbered more than two to one.[55]

French military and daily civilian life were merged together with the military taking centre place in many public holidays and festivals. The Fête de la Federation in 1794 involved large-scale marches and parades by National Guardsmen and soldiers alike. Political festivities indoctrinated new ideas whilst also offering common people a safety valve to release the stresses of traditional everyday life.[56] This military theatre gave symbolic meaning to a society that from the mass *levée* of 1793 was built around war. Similar integration of military and civilian life occurred in the Spanish-American revolutions. An organized insurrection could bridge chaos and authority. One of the most enduring examples of organized insurrection was the 'pronouncement', or *pronunciamiento*, a rebellion by a leading army officer in the name of a political programme. The pronunciamiento acquired a particular legitimacy in the Spanish-speaking world, especially in Spain and New Spain/Mexico where a rebel officer's manifesto tended to carry more weight than in South America. Thus an officer staging an *pronunciamiento* could claim legitimacy when successful, undermining the charge of illegitimacy which coloured so many attitudes towards waging war at a time of revolution.[57]

Meanwhile, old regime armies got sucked into a larger scale of violence and campaigning. The massing of light infantry attacks by the French required sophisticated countermeasures, for which the closely drilled line infantry of the old regime armies were poorly suited. The Habsburg monarchy was acutely aware of the political dangers in educating its conscripts in independent light infantry tactics. Innovation was limited, and slow, close-order tactics predominated, with direct effects on policy, such as Vienna's reluctance to invade Switzerland during 1799 out of fear of French superiority there in irregular mountain tactics.[58] The Habsburg army remained old-fashioned, with poorly trained officers and a weak intelligence service.[59] But the shock of defeat at Austerlitz in 1805 drove the Austrian Archduke Charles to implement army reforms which exacted a greater toll of blood from Napoleonic forces during the War of the Fifth Coalition (1809). Other old regime armies were even less subjected to reforms than the Austrian. The most extreme example of old regime military establishments, the Russian army, displayed some of the most aggressive tactics of the Second Coalition: General Suvorov's 'cult of the bayonet'. The Second Coalition War (1798–1902) united most European powers against the expansion of Revolutionary France, and was the Russian empire's debut in the wars in western Europe. A British

spymaster reported the murderous effect of Suvorov's Alpine campaign in 1799:

> The hedges and vineyards all about the villages were full of wounded and dead Russians, though I do not recollect having seen five dead French men on the whole ground. This is easily accounted for from the nature of the country, which is particularly well calculated for the French manner of fighting and from the mode of attack of the Russians who appear only to trust the bayonet against the French.[60]

The Tsarist army recruited serfs, not citizens. Catherine the Great of Russia (reigned 1762–1796) had modernized the power relations of elites in her empire, but had kept her serfs subject to the patrimonial violence of their masters.[61] French troops, by contrast, were emancipated by the Revolution. But the relentless logic of war diluted this distinction as the experience of conscription and campaigning gave common ground to men from otherwise very different political systems. The early phases of the French Revolution had witnessed popular revulsion at the 'military slavery' of old regime conscription and mutinies for better conditions in 1790.[62] But conscription was reintroduced from 1792, and enacted famously *en masse* the following year, restoring and extending the coercion of the old regime, albeit with far superior conditions for common soldiers. French Revolutionary generals and politicians subjected their soldiers to bulletins and propaganda to a degree that would have been inconceivable before 1789. Soldiers thus began to be motivated by norms of behaviour (psychological, emotional, and symbolic factors) in greater proportion to the traditional motives of coercion and pay.[63] And there were many more of them. The years 1792–1815 made military service a rite of passage across Europe and the Americas.

Conscription – The *Real* Revolution

Armies had traditionally served a social function by levying unwanted vagrants and criminals into the ranks. The gradual monopoly of armed force enjoyed by states over the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries meant that while young men served their noble lords, they did so in the name of their king or emperor.[64] A grey area existed between voluntary and obligatory service. Britain, for example, is usually credited with having no conscription for overseas service. But impressment into naval service was widespread. Feudal structures persisted in the Highlands of Scotland. Even though service for Highlanders was 'voluntary', Scottish lairds exercised huge economic power over their tenants. Tenants were free to disobey, but lairds could easily take reprisals of eviction from lands, which was usually in their economic interest to

do, given that sheep were more profitable than tenants. But 'voluntary' service obliged the laird to respect his tenant's property whilst he was under arms.[65]

But the French Revolution transformed conscription into a way of merging the state with the community. Napoleonic conscription (1803-1815) was more revolutionary than its Revolutionary predecessor. Whilst it lacked the radical rhetoric of the levée, its lasting impact on the scale of warfare, the relationship between civilian and the state, its state-building potential, and the creation and unleashing of the force of nationalism across Europe, all made it a revolution in military affairs. The *Loi Jourdan* of 1798 turned conscription into a regular calendar event, first three times per year and then four times under Napoleon, touching even the remotest villages. By 1804, Napoleon normally had at his disposal 500,000 men. The creation of this *Grande Armée* and its constant need for fresh recruits inexorably changed the relationship between the civilian and the state. The old regime had been impersonal, dedicated mostly to extracting taxes from the population. But Napoleon's Imperial regime was a far more intimate form of state control.[66]

This new era of mass military service also brought opportunities and adventure. The tradition of mercenary service was key. In the Rhineland Confederate state of Anhalt-Dessau, a young Dessauer drew a lot to serve under the new Napoleonic conscription system. Luckily, Gottfried Krüger possessed a wanderlust to 'see the world', and being a soldier seemed to him 'not a lowly vocation, but something honourable'. Krüger's immersion into adventure ensued on deployment in the Tyrol and Spain, where he would be captured by the British, taken to England, and recycled willingly into British service to appear on the anti-Napoleonic side in Lisbon as part of the 60th regiment of the fifth battalion of riflemen that was dispatched to Lisbon in April 1812.[67] The small German principality of Isenburg sent its tiny army to fight with Napoleon. The army comprised mostly Russian and Austrian prisoners captured at the Battle of Austerlitz, who had since accepted service under their old enemy. Many of these troops later serving in Spain defected to the Patriot guerrillas.[68] Senior officers could also experience the war in transnational terms. Mariano Renovales had played a leading role in the defeat of the British invasion of the River Plate in 1806. Two years later, he found himself as an ally of the erstwhile British enemy, fighting the French siege of Zaragoza. After being captured, he was taken to France but released on parole to French-occupied Pamplona. He broke his parole, joined the Patriot guerrilla campaign, and ended his days in 1820 after a terminal exile to Britain following the restoration of Bourbon absolutism in Spain in 1814.[69]

The protracted struggle in Spain and its empire created unusual opportunities for adventurers; all from a pre-war military establishment that in the Americas was modest. Spain only had a limited

history of conscription. Peacetime conscription was introduced in 1770 and it was broadly tolerated for imposing only limited obligations upon communities by targeting the poorest of the poor.[70] Spain's defeat in the Seven Years' War, especially the shock British conquest of Havana, gave a military emphasis to the Bourbon reforms. By the end of the eighteenth century, Spanish military reforms had been extended to America. Troop numbers were expanded, albeit to nothing like European or even North American levels in proportion to population, and were concentrated at such vulnerable strategic locations as Cuba, Veracruz, and Caracas, as well as the wild frontiers in Texas and Patagonia. Criollos (American-born whites) were increasingly commissioned, but senior command posts remained mostly in the hands of Peninsular Spaniards. A reserve militia, which was modelled on Spain, ballotted men for weekly service. Militiamen enjoyed the coveted privilege of military jurisdiction in civil matters (*fuero militar*), tax exemptions, and payment when mobilized. Thus militia service proved popular amongst mixed-race and free Black (*moreno*) men who were traditionally prevented from enjoying much status in the empire's racial hierarchy. Fear of Indian and slave attacks, in Chile and Cuba respectively, as well as external attacks in both, appears to have promoted high participation in the militia. But the militia was less numerous in territories with large Indian populations who were excluded from the militia ballot (like New Spain).[71] Instead areas of New Spain classed as 'frontier', like the Zacatecas-Jalisco-Durango borderlands, were policed by Indian arrowmen. But these forces were disbanded under the Revillagigedo Viceroyalty (1789–1794). Ostensibly they were disbanded for their poor discipline and inexperience with modern arms. But in reality, the colonial authorities wanted to strip the Indians of the tax exemptions and fuero militar which the arrow units had conferred on them.[72] Indian arrowmen also featured further north on the borders of English America. Fighting on the British side in the war of 1812, their fire arrows made little impression against wooden US forts equipped with the countermeasure of water buckets.[73]

Military service offered few prospects to the poor in the Spanish empire, at least until revolution struck between 1808 and 1810. The liberating effect of war proved greater in the Americas, where both royalists and rebels enhanced opportunities for men in inferior positions in the racial hierarchy. Recruits enlisting in the militia won prestigious military jurisdiction (fuero militar) and exemption from having troops billeted in their homes. Free Blacks in Spanish America had to pay a two-peso annual tribute to the Crown, but this was waived if they joined the militia, which led to Black militias being formed across Spanish America, and to declining revenue for the exchequer.[74] The American racial hierarchy was at least as much homegrown as imported from Europe. But

once independence movements had triumphed, Indians and Blacks were likelier to support liberal projects more than conservative ones because of the opportunities in terms of career and identity for slave veterans finding their way in new nation-states.[75] Peasants, indigenous peoples, slaves, and women serving in militia and army units led to the undermining of established values and codes of conduct.

But for criollos, the appeal of militia service was mixed at best. Criollo (American-born whites) militia officers in New Spain, as Alexander von Humboldt mockingly observed, donned their fancy uniforms and insignia in civilian activities as well as military.[76] But the rank-and-file resented the long days and nights away from home, patrols, lost opportunities for earnings, as well as the risk of fighting once insurrection swept the continent after 1810. The royalist 'Volunteers of Ferdinand VII', which the Spanish coup plotters of September 1808 established in Mexico City, demonstrated this resentment in microcosm. Single men working in private industry overwhelmingly shouldered the burden of guard duty in the largest city in the Americas. Complaints and indiscipline mounted in response to the exemptions lavished upon public office-holders, those who could feign illness or purchase replacements (*alquilones*), and upon those who simply had friends in authority.[77]

Military revolution emanated from events in France to the rest of Europe and to the Americas, reinvigorating military establishments in some places and creating new ones in others. Prussia routinely boasted a burden of conscription some two–three times greater in proportion to population than that of other continental great powers (4.1% of the Prussian population was conscripted). Even during the peace of 1800, the same burden of conscription was about 50% greater in Prussia.[78] If Prussia was the most militarized society in Europe, by some measurements it was not the most militarized in the western world. The degree of mobilization in the River Plate was extremely high. By 1818, about 40% of all adult men (a population of about 110,000) was in a state of either permanent or intermittent militarization, a figure which surpassed even Prussia in its moments of crisis. But 'intermittent' mobilization conformed much more to everyday life than a Eurocentric definition of militarization would allow. The famous *gauchos* (cowboys) of the Pampas formed and disbanded without overburdening their rural economies. Gaucho cavalry did not serve on expeditions of Bolivarian length and would often secure booty, given their unequalled skills in irregular tactics (particularly the anarchic melée known as the *desbandada*).[79] A British merchant in Buenos Aires romanticized these hardy horsemen: 'with a Saddle, a Lassoo, a Knife and a Poncho, they were able to meet their little wants as they arise, living always on horseback or in the fields ... sleeping in the air or under a hide, eating without even the addition of salt, beef all year round'.[80]

Prussian conscripts drilled in the Frederickian style enjoyed no such liberty. But one historian probably exaggerated in describing Prussian soldiers as 'walking muskets'[81], reduced to automatons by a harsh disciplinary system which prevented initiative. Certainly the relationship between state-building and military power was more intimate in Prussia than anywhere else in Europe, and the law reflected this. The ordinances of 1722 concerning desertion set the tone for Prussian militarism: monthly instructions were ordered in churches concerning civilian responsibility for apprehending deserters, and death by hanging ordered for anyone helping a deserter to escape.[82] But over the course of the century, the Prussian military system was mitigated by the impact of the German Enlightenment. Corporal punishment was reduced and regulated, especially after 1807, education was provided for soldiers' children, and pensions were provided for veterans.[83]

Serfdom survived in German lands into the nineteenth century. Although Joseph II of Austria in 1781 had abolished serfdom in his empire, resistance from the nobility stalled its impact until well into the nineteenth century.[84] Further north in Germany, serfdom differed between a harsher bonded system (*Gutsherrschaft*) prevailing east of the River Elbe and the less authoritarian labour and fiscal serfdom prevailing in southern and western Germany.[85] Eighteenth-century rulers, especially Frederick the Great, had haltingly improved the conditions of serfs. But their motive was not to emancipate the serfs, but to make them better soldiers, all the while without alienating the landed Junker class who officered their army. Even though the Seven Years' War had decimated the Prussian officer corps, Frederick the Great was determined to preserve its aristocratic exclusiveness, even importing foreign aristocrats instead of commissioning Prussian burghers. This exclusiveness in turn allowed the Prussian king to maintain an iron grip over the autonomy of the feudal Junkers.[86]

The Habsburg monarchy, Germany's other great power, presided over a more heterogeneous military establishment than Prussia. Its infantry regiments were either 'German' or 'Hungarian', even though German parts were comprised of Czechs, Poles, Italians, or even Belgians, and the Hungarian parts also included Romanians and Croats. The communication of orders thus faced unusual hurdles. The majority of the recruits came from the lower classes both by conscription and voluntary service depending on the origin of the recruits. Whilst the imperial lands of Bohemia and Galicia were subject to conscription, exemptions applied to autonomous areas like Hungary and the Tyrol. Exemptions and privileges given to specific territories made the system inoperative. Austrian peculiarities were also exemplified in the system of the military borders. The many wars in the region between Croatia, Hungary, and the Ottoman empire forced the local populations to flee and encouraged the Habsburgs to establish military colonies on the border with

the Ottoman empire. The Grenzer (border light infantry) kept both the retreating Ottomans in check as well as the restive Hungarians in their hinterland. They were no conscript hordes but committed and capable frontiersmen, akin to the 'blandengue' frontier cavalry created in 1751 to guard the Pampas frontier in Spanish South America.[87] The reforms of Maria Theresa turned the Grenzer outwardly into troops of the line, even though they continued to be used much as before. Just like the blandengues, the Grenzer were hostile towards being commanded by any other than local officers. On paper, Austria could count on some 300,000 soldiers in 1792. But financial problems and Habsburg diversity reduced this number effectively to 200,000.

The Tsarist army also faced geographical exemptions. Russian conscription was levied mainly against ethnic Russians, making it the most homogeneous of the major armies of this period. The Russian army recruited no Jews from the recently acquired western lands, few non-Russian minorities and few foreign mercenaries. Only the navy attracted significant numbers of foreigners. The Russian experience of military service was grim, even by the extreme standards of the era. Traditional communal authorities (*mir*) decided how to fill their quotas, invariably with indigent and otherwise unwanted young men, and the experience of service for these unlucky conscripts was appalling. Even though the initial life-long service terms were reduced to 25 years, it was still treated as a 'life sentence'. Villages held wakes for departed men. The mortality rate for conscripts according to an 1802 estimate was two-three times greater than the average for 20–40-year-olds.[88] Foreign observers were struck by the yawning gulf between Russia's serf-soldiers and surly officer class. General Wilson, a British liaison officer, contrasted the infantry 'inured to the extremes of weather and hardship, to the worst and scantiest of food, to marches for days and nights, of four hours repose and six hours progress ...' to their officers who in the main were 'indolent, pleasure-seeking, (and disliking) walks or lengthy rides'.[89] Over 1.6 million men were conscripted into the Russian army over the course of 1796–1815. The serf soldiers of the Tsar were thus treated little better than slave soldiers, which made their victory of 1813–1814 all the more remarkable.

French Satellite Armies

French incursions beyond their borders were substantial under the Directory (1795–1799) and exponential when Napoleon rose to power. Napoleon was 26 years old when the Directory sent him with a bad army on a diversionary campaign against the Austrians in Italy. Napoleon was never expected to achieve so much with so little. At his headquarters, Napoleon found 37,000 ill-fed, unpaid, and demoralized troops, with which he was supposed to clear 52,000 Austrians out of half a dozen

mountain passes between Nice and Genoa.[90] But the enemy's numerical superiority was deceptive, as Allied cohesion was weakened by mutual suspicion, leading to fragmented communications towards command at Mantua and Turin. The mountainous terrain also impeded lateral communications, and proved too vast for the Allies to maintain an effective strategic reserve.[91] General Napoleon's defeat of the Habsburgs at the Battle of Lodi (Lombardy) in 1796 cleared the way for cumulative French control of northern Italy. Successive republics (Cisalpine 1797–1802, and Italian 1802–1805) and a kingdom of Italy from 1805 to 1814, all entrenched French indirect control in Europe's most prolonged colonial enterprise of the 1792–1815 era. Military reforms in the Italian Republic copied the French model of conscription, as 20–25-year-olds became eligible for being conscripted for four years' service. Conscription was enforced relentlessly. As Joachim Murat, later King of Naples, noted in 1803: 'Everything is conscription at the moment, they dream only of conscription. The executive, the council, the ministers have all become the Sons of Mars ...'.[92]

Even the southern half of Italy, which became the Napoleonic Kingdom of Naples minus Sicily in 1806, was subjected to French militarization. But the Neapolitan army was probably the least effective of all the satellites. Napoleon envisaged the Neapolitan army as a mercenary force. King Joseph, however, wanted a national army in the hope that military commissions would prove an incentive to Neapolitan elites to support his regime. But what emerged was strongly mercenary force; most of the Royal Guard was French, German, or Swiss. Two foreign line regiments, mostly German and Swiss, were transferred from the French service. Naples in 1806 received a 'Royal African Regiment' of black troops whom Napoleon had recruited in 1803 from his lost colony of Haiti. When Joseph left his throne to become king of Spain, his army was about 11,000-strong, of whom just 2,000 were Neapolitans. Four battalions of the army went with Joseph to Spain. Conscription had been introduced in March 1807, calling to the colours only one man in a thousand. But even this modest demand was much resented in Naples and desertion rates were very high. Joseph had some success in establishing the Military Polytechnic that trained young aristocrats for commissions. His successor, king Murat, built up a larger army, conscripting two men per thousand and recruiting in French, foreign, and Italian regiments, and conscripting also in Corsica and the Kingdom of Italy. By mid-1809, he had 20,000 men and by mid-1810, he had 40,000.[93]

Meanwhile, north of the Alps, the Prussian defeat at Jena in October 1806 extended Napoleon's empire to the parts of Poland that had been captured and added to Prussia in 1772, 1793, and 1795. Napoleon tapped into Polish nationalism, especially the Greater Poland uprising (1806) which exploited the advance of French troops by overthrowing Prussian control in the partitioned Wielpokolska region. Napoleon, despite his

heroic image amongst Polish nationalists, exploited the rising not for premeditated reasons, but rather out of concern for the supply situation of his army so far from France, and the appeal of a friendly Poland as a suitable base. Once the Duchy of Warsaw was established as a Napoleonic satellite in 1807, its army enjoyed high social prestige. The hope of liberating other parts of Poland from Austrian and Russian domination meant that Polish troops were enthusiastic supporters in Napoleon's Wars. From 1808, a French-style conscript system operated, even though the burden of service still fell on peasants. By 1812, there were a total of about 104,000 Polish soldiers in Napoleonic service, including those in the French army proper and volunteers from the Russian partitioned parts of Poland. In 1813, 20,000 soldiers of the Grand Duchy left their homeland to fight on under Napoleon through the rest of the 1813–1814 campaigns.[94]

Time and again, Napoleon prioritized conscription over other political considerations, including constitutional reforms and support for nationalism. Eager not to upset diplomacy with rival eastern European powers, Napoleon would not even refer to 'Poland' by name, calling emissaries 'Varsoviennes' instead. Finally, Napoleonic conscription was also enforced on the Grand Duchy of Warsaw. The Poles did have a recent military heritage and this is one of the main factors that allowed conscription to flourish much better in the Grand Duchy of Warsaw. Some 57,000 Polish soldiers fought the Russians in 1792.[95] Another example of recent military experience for the Poles were the Polish Legions, who had fought on the side of the French in Italy.[96] After conscription was enforced from 1810, probably some 4.2% out of a population of 3,334,000 ended up serving in the army of the Grand Duchy, proportionately the largest military support of any satellite state.[97] Some of the motivation to enlist lay in the economic slump caused by the Continental System. The Polish economy, which had relied on its export of cereals from Danzig to British markets, suffered badly. Wheat exports collapsed, which proved devastating for indebted landowners and peasants alike.[98]

Other places in the Napoleonic empire experienced conscription which often proceeded more smoothly than in France itself. The Kingdom of Westphalia rivalled the Grand Duchy in terms of conscripts per capita and Switzerland provided its full annual quota of 24,000 men throughout the wars.[99] Both efficient policing and the eighteenth-century tradition of mercenary service (*Soldatenhandel*) eased Napoleonic conscription in the Kingdom of Westphalia. But the mercenary ethos survived, if French complaints about poor Westphalian discipline are anything to go by.[100] But few other German satellites matched Westphalia. Bavaria, despite the efforts of its popular monarch Maximilian I, did not reach Westphalian levels of military service.[101]

Resisting Military Service

Obligatory military service, like serfdom or slavery, exploited humans in their physical prime. Exhaustive labour on plantations or noble estates could ruin physical health as much as military service. But the oppressed could use their bodies as weapons for resistance, as the repeated slave revolts and attempts at 'self-purchase' showed. Men resisting obligatory military service, by contrast, often tried to invalidate their bodies in order to escape conscription. The mutilation of trigger fingers, extraction of the tooth needed for 'biting the bullet', and feigning of medical impediments, were all rife. The large number of false exemptions and rushed examinations made French authorities suspicious and scornful of doctors' notes. The prefect of the Somme only accepted official letters from the mayor to exempt service.[102]

The prefect of Pas-de-Calais noted that the more urbanized towns in the area he governed were willing to give up men for the levies, but the villages and smaller hamlets rioted and required coercion. Regional traditions played a great role in the relationship between civilians and the military, as areas near to large bases were often quite supportive of the military, having a strong martial tradition. Rural opposition to Napoleonic conscription in France itself often to the more peaceful aspects of corruption, as local mayors often mislaid documents, misspelled marriage and death certificates, and fiddled other communal records, claiming plausible deniability rather than personal or family interest. The village registers of Maucourt in Picardy show that some men in their 20s contracted marriages with women in their 70s and, in one case, of 87 years of age.[103] In 1799, the Midi department of Lot registered a 70% rate of draft-dodging, while draft-dodgers and deserters in Normandy formed their own *chouannerie* in the countryside.[104]

Where dodges failed, violence often resulted. Resistance to conscription was usually characterized by violent disorder, followed by draconian law and order delivered by the gendarmerie, the first full-time police force in Europe dedicated solely to pacifying the countryside.[105] Gradually, the hatred and fear of the military were reduced in Revolutionary France; rioting in villages was gradually replaced by acquiescence, as conscription and the military in general began to be perceived as, although brutal, equitable and egalitarian. Draft-dodging was generally more common in the southern departments close to the Pyrenees. In 1806, the French government pressured the Spanish to close the frontier to all Frenchmen except those who had diplomatic passports. Yet the Franco-Spanish war of 1808–1814 lured draft-dodgers back over the Pyrenees once Imperial troops were pushed back from Spain after 1812.[106] Authorities cracked down on communities harbouring men who should have been in the colours. The dreaded law of 10 Vendémiaire, year IV, could place whole communes under military occupation at their own expense in an act

of legalized collective punishment designed to produce refractory conscripts and deserters.[107] A 1,500-franc fine was levied on the families of draft-dodgers, and replacements were demanded for draft-dodgers and deserters who were at large.[108] In 1802, the law against substitutes was tightened up (allowing only for replacements to be sourced from the locality), but in 1803, there was some liberalization of this draconian law in response to popular protests.[109] The drive to mitigate draft-dodging and desertion was relentless. From 1805, families of absent soldiers were burdened with billeting, being obliged to provide lodging and food for up to four soldiers per household. One report in 1805 from the southern French prefecture of Var found that 100 of 611 men from a recent conscription round deserted en route to their units, but that all but 10 of these men subsequently handed themselves in after troops were billeted on the deserters' households.[110] Historians used to view France as mostly accepting of conscription until the defeat in Russia in 1812.[111] But even in France, which had done the most to propagate the citizenry-in-arms, draft evasion and desertion remained rife.[112]

Draft-dodgers cut off from support turned to banditry, either in the attempt to halt conscription from taking place or to flee after the fact. One of the earliest and bloodiest attempts at the former came in the Massacre of Machecoul in March 1793, which opened the war in the Vendée. Around 5,000 peasants stormed Machecoul demanding 'peace' and a halt to the conscription levy. Armed mostly with pitchforks, knives, and in one case spades turned against a cavalryman dragged from his horse, the peasants massacred some 200 people, mostly National Guardsmen and gendarmes.[113] Bandits targeted grain and weapons stores, often singling out unpopular mayors for arson attacks. Thus mobile sweeps against draft-dodgers were initiated not from Paris, but from local authorities. These initiatives tended to lead to greater and longer-lasting pacification, not least because they put a relatable face on a Parisian policy.[114]

Absolute monarchies, unlike Revolutionary France, had no claim to revolutionize their societies via conscription. Even the extreme demands of the Napoleonic Wars seldom swayed them wholeheartedly behind it.[115] In fact, not even the political efforts of Paris in 1793 could produce a militarized society. Napoleon's empire, by contrast, was built on conscription. It overshadowed every problem of administration in Napoleonic France, and given its unending expansionist ambitions, the regime's survival depended on it.[116] By 1798, conscription had become formalized in France, via the Loi Jourdan. This law made conscription part of national life but never managed to recruit the necessary quotas. Conscription in France remained inefficient and regularly suffering huge shortfalls in numbers. It remained viable only because Napoleon until nearly the end displaced the burden to satellite states and thereby mitigated conscription

in France itself.[117] Parts of France itself, particularly the restive Catholic west, rivalled Italy in their hostility to conscription. The prefecture of Morbihan (Brittany) in 1806 reported 71 draft-dodgers from the latest conscription round, and that the numbers were growing.[118]

Even territories more docile to conscription required bureaucratic efforts and the allure of Imperial victories to attract willing conscripts. When Napoleonic conscription was introduced with Confederation in 1806, Württemberg was witness to rowdy draft-dodgers overwhelming local authorities and sometimes bending them to their will. An eyewitness to a crackdown to meet the draft quota at the end of 1806 reported crowds of young women distracting gendarmes by 'screaming, and even kissing them' so that assembled draftees got the chance to flee.[119] But options to resist conscription proliferated in less centralized regions. At the end of 1810, villagers in Asturias mobbed and beat a Spanish sergeant who had been sent to round up deserters.[120] In the Napoleonic case, relentless pressure and the allure of Imperial victories lessened resistance. It was not until 1813 that quotas from the likes of Bavaria started to go unfulfilled.[121] Westphalia, which rivalled the Grand Duchy in its high conscription, was bloodied accordingly. Only around 1,500 Westphalians survived the 1812 Russian campaign out of the 22,000 who went to war.[122] In this territory, the administration set up an office tasked with judging the men, screening exemptions, while sub-prefects inspected the men and verified their records with the mayor. There was less chance of men skipping service and there was less chance of men being called up who could not serve, making the system operate more effectively. These men were also tasked with tracking down draft-dodgers and deserters. Resistance to conscription was always present, but grew significantly after 1809.[123] Westphalian troops only began to desert in masses in 1813–1814.[124]

But most Napoleonic satellites were ingrained in their anti-militarism. In Italy, draft-dodging grew rapidly, and bands of *briganti* became commonplace. Conscription targeted able young men whom rural populations needed as a labour force. The Po valley, which offered few places for recalcitrants to hide, was a great source of conscripts.[125] Wealthy urban citizens were as intractable as their poorer rural cousins: the prefect of Istria noted that 'the aversion of those citizens to a military career is general'.[126] Even Piedmont, the region of Italy most accustomed to military life, witnessed significant opposition. The Piedmontese noble, Massimo d'Azeglio, managed to save his son from conscription by sending him to become a Jesuit priest.[127] Napoleon, who always claimed an instinctive understanding of Italians, was forced to lower conscription quotas.[128] Amnesties were issued to draft-dodgers and deserters alongside major matters of state, such as Napoleon's coronation as king of Italy, or his marriage to Marie Louise. But they appeared to have had only limited success in persuading Italians to hand themselves in.[129]

In the satellite kingdom of Holland (1806–1810), conscription proved one of the greatest crises undermining Louis's reign. The Dutch were historically more advanced economically and constitutionally than France, and steeped in an anti-militarist culture which erupted in the face of French pressure for conscription. Napoleon in 1806 ended the Batavian republic and installed his brother Louis as King of Holland. But Louis, realizing how unpopular conscription would be in Holland, decided to rely, as far as possible, on recruiting orphans into his armed forces. Orphans were required to sign up with the military at the age of 18. But in October 1806, there was a widespread riot in Sneek in which the crowd freed boys from a military escort. In 1809, there were mass riots in Amsterdam and Rotterdam where citizens surrounded orphanages and fought military escorts. These riots played their part in Napoleon's decision to simply incorporate Holland as part of France proper in 1810. The imposition of French-style conscription in April 1811 led to mass riots in Amsterdam and during 1811–1812, 20 revolts took place throughout Holland. In 1813, when the National Guard was imposed on Holland, there were a number of riots where enrolment registers were burned. After riots in Amsterdam in April 1811, three ringleaders were executed by firing squad. The revolt in April 1813 in southern Holland had much to do with attempts to conscript men. Western Holland was seen as one of the more turbulent parts of Napoleon's empire and up to 1813, and 15,000 French troops were stationed there.[130]

Allied powers fighting Napoleon's empire also faced variations of resistance to conscription. The governor of Pskov in western Russia complained of the epidemic of mangy heads amongst peasant men between the ages of 18 and 35. Mange was one of the conditions that exempted a man from being conscripted. The governor noted that neither women nor men over the age of 35 were afflicted with this condition.[131] Further east in Perm in 1795, wealthy residents paid 460 roubles in bribes to local authorities in order to ensure that the 18 conscripts earmarked from their estate did not come from their own families.[132]

At the other end of Europe, Spanish authorities confronted a tradition of popular hostility to military service. Recruitment was designed in two ways, the first (and crudest) being the *leva*. Marginalized and unemployed men were forced into military service at regular intervals, the last pre-war occasion being in 1787. This mechanism obviously served a social function in terms of welfare and order, as local communities singled out criminals and otherwise transgressing individuals. But the second, more sophisticated recruitment system, was deeply unpopular. The *sorteo* or *quinta* was a ballot system moderated by fixed exemptions and the option to purchase substitutes. Unsurprisingly, men without money, marriage, or protected vocations, found this system hateful and often took part in riots.[133] In August 1804, authorities had to back down after a rising in the Basque country against the decreed enrolment of men aged 15–50.[134] Even

the Peninsular War (1808–1814) failed to change attitudes, as local communities sheltered deserters. Desertion was in many ways a product of its social order, and of the marginal agricultural economy of most of Spain. Deserters lived with their families, worked the fields, and fled into hiding only on unfortunate occasions when a party of troops or an overzealous judge came searching. Desertion, in the words of one Spanish historian, was 'not desirable, rather an inevitable choice for men who wished to save their families, and themselves, from hunger and misery'.[135] Whereas some deserters preyed on civilians, this behaviour was not exclusive to them, and even villages harbouring deserters tended to resist the French invaders.[136] Spanish military authorities in Asturias in 1809 arrested the families of deserters in a bid to persuade the men to return to the ranks. But as the problem became generalized, communities successfully sheltered young men en masse, protecting their own rural livelihoods in the process. A letter from a cleric to the Asturias junta in April 1809 lamented how he had witnessed more than 100 deserters from the Siero regiment pass through his village. He recommended that regiments in future be deployed further from their homes, so that 'they don't go home every day as they do now'.[137] But draft evasion and desertion persisted, even when Patriot Spain imposed conscription nationwide and devolved powers to local authorities. A long-suffering resident of Lorca (Murcia) wrote to the press complaining of corruption in his town. The priest preached patriotism even while his uncle, brothers, and nephews used their official positions to exempt their relatives from conscription.[138]

Guerrilla forces, for all their reputation for relying on voluntary recruitment, also conscripted men, albeit in an opportunistic rather than bureaucratic fashion. Patriot guerrillas in Spain routinely swept up all the men from villages they overwhelmed, ransoming them back to their families and farms at prices that reflected their military usefulness.[139] Catalan villagers caught between the French coastal garrisons and the mountain guerrillas shielded their property and menfolk from both. But the urban population of war-torn Zaragoza had nowhere to turn in 1813 when Patriot General Espoz y Mina's guerrillas began conscripting and confiscating.[140] Even when insurgents forged regular armies, such as during the Spanish-American wars, urban populations drew horror at the prospect of participating in rural campaigns. Colonel José Félix Ribas, military governor of liberated Caracas, despaired at the lack of response to his call to arms, but gave the ungrateful citizens one more chance: 'The call to arms shall be repeated this afternoon at 4, and anyone not present in the Main Plaza or not in the Cachupin Canton, or found at home or in the street, shall be shot with no more than three hours chapel, and no other justification than that needed to prove his absence'.[141] Men knew that conscription meant disease and death, as well as destitution for their families. The prospect of campaigning in strange lands under strange officers attracted only the desperate and the adventurous.

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3 Living with Campaigning

It was the daily experience of ordinary soldiers, rather than the aims of their generals and politicians, which dominated campaign. For a long time, military historians related épauletted accounts of illustrious generals and campaigns. But the second half of the twentieth century started to produce more complex histories, including the study of veterans' accounts. The values and norms of the military elite fell out of focus as military culture was more broadly understood as the negotiation and co-option by social groups within both the military and civil society. Memoirs show how military lives were shaped by morale and demoralization, discipline, desertion, disease, environment, logistics, nourishment, friendships, primary group cohesion, superstition, and encounters with civilians. The experience of campaign used to be relegated to letters, memoirs, and oral history. It was seldom of interest to the academy until 'new military history' approaches developed in the 1960s. Letters and memoirs revealed men who were neither fired up by patriotic ideologies nor browbeaten by old regime officers. Napoleon's Grande Armée officers recalled positive experiences: adventure, exposure to new places, womanizing, food and drink in the presence of comrades, the bravura of a victorious campaign, the intense male bonding of the small group. For those who stayed on, there was a limited degree of fervour for fighting, but this was not the overriding opinion; on the battlefield more traditional sources of morale prevailed, not nationalism or patriotism. At the time, the strength of the revolutionary armies was seen as coming from their republican 'heroic enthusiasm and indiscipline', as Thomas Hippler noted. But this was hardly the case for all involved. The French Revolutionary victory at Valmy was won by artillery and highly trained career soldiers, the mass of infantry being largely a non-actor. Most of the morale of the French army came from traditional sources.[1] Drink was a highly effective tool for motivating soldiers in this period; Napoleon famously ordered brandy rations be given out before the battle of Austerlitz. Similarly, enthusiasm ran low when material conditions worsened and when pay was not forthcoming. Soldiers were motivated by the same

things that have motivated soldiers for thousands of years – quality of leadership, material conditions, and, all else failing, alcohol. Fatigue, lack of privacy, and limited prospects of leave all propelled soldiers towards the induced camaraderie of alcohol. Its absence or dilution could provoke disorder as much as its excessive provision. Sailors on the Royal Navy ship *Defiance* mutinied in 1794, when their grog rations were diluted from three parts to five parts water.[2]

The dominant experience, however, was privation: desperate shortages of food from time to time, the unrelenting cold, the taxing tedium of constant drilling, the brutality and even horror of campaigning in insurgent places like Italy or Spain, the overwhelming boredom during the long hiatus between campaigns, and the calamity of falling ill and entering a hospital. French troops dubbed hospitals in Spain 'death-houses' (*mouroirs*), which made recovery from wounds and fevers harder and gave orderlies free reign to strip the delirious of their papers, money, and any other valuables.[3] But the truly unwelcome guest afflicting armies was that the French called was *nostalgie* or home-sickness, at its extreme a debilitating condition that worried many commanders and took an unknown toll on military effectiveness. The letters to and from home were, in a sense, the best available treatment for this pitiful malady.[4] Serving French soldiers from 1807 had some hope of a happier life upon the return home, when Napoleon introduced 'rosière weddings' which offered veterans a state subsidy to get married.[5]

The prospect of marriage to a Frenchwoman when the wars were over fired up Napoleon's troops on their long campaigns. But for soldiers in the Russian army, the chances of returning home were as remote as getting promoted. The wives of conscript soldiers were treated as widows. They often remarried with the blessing of the Orthodox Church, while their original menfolk who survived found 'home' in barracks or garrisons on the frontiers far away from their old homes. This arrangement suited Russia's communal villages (*mir*) fine, as no subsistence economy needed maimed and middle-aged veterans burdening their production. Better conditions were purported in the Militia (opolčenie), which was created in 1806–1807 and revived in 1812. It recruited about one-quarter of the million men between 1812 and 1814. Unlike normal Russian conscripts who normally served under their noble lords, the militiamen had leave to return home after temporary service. But post-war evidence suggests that many 'temporary' militia were incorporated into the army, and overall numbers of opolčenie were small compared to soldiers.[6] Soldiers who could cling to mementoes from home treasured these intensely. A Prussian officer campaigning in the War of Liberation in spring 1813 was cheered immensely when his mother sent him sausages and butter which he shared with his unit, and was emboldened to ask for works of literature to be sent, too.[7] The 15,000 Spanish troops serving in Denmark in

1807–1808 were comforted in a cold climate by supplies of cigarettes and wine, much to the amusement of the pipe-smoking and beer-drinking Danes, and by the presence of camp followers.[8]

Abstract motives would weigh little against the emotions of *nostalgie*. Of all great commanders, Napoleon mastered the blend of propaganda and policy to improve morale. Napoleon's officers were well paid and accustomed to relying on the state exchequer for their salaries, unlike the British army where attitudes persisted that officers should be of independent means and not solely reliant on their salaries.[9] Morale rose before the Battle of Austerlitz as soldiers lit torches and cheered for Napoleon as he rode by. Napoleon awarded 'victory pay', or two days of double wages for soldiers in units which had been involved in a major victory. But even charismatic warlords could not alter the rigours of environment and logistics. Political propaganda exalting 'volunteers' over professional soldiers – such as in France in the early 1790s, or Spain after 1808, could not break the reality of volunteers deserting just as assuredly as conscripts.[10]

Soldiers' morale depended on three kinds of motivation, the coercive (discipline), remunerative (pay, plunder, promotion), and normative. Normative motivations – psychological, social, and emotional reasons for cohesion, including honour systems – were the most intimate.[11] Men's normative motivations were not just modern, but were also shaped by honour, religion, and superstition. Volunteering for armed service, as Ilya Berkovich has explained, was profoundly individualistic, which by its nature questioned existing hierarchies.[12] Charismatic leaders in revolutionary situations had greater facility to offer remunerative and charismatic motivations, as the upheaval in Spanish America showed. The loyalty of men serving both royalists and Patriots was dictated by pay and promotion: *soy de quien me paga*.[13] The *caudillo* had to master political upheaval as well as warfare. Contemporary writers stressed the role of personality, or charisma, in the cause and success of caudillos. But structuralist factors enabled the strongmen to rise to power in the first place, as they filled the vacuum of inadequate political institutions.[14] Arguably, Simón Bolívar, the most famous of the revolutionary generals, displayed both remunerative and normative elements of *caudillismo*.[15]

Most European and American societies offered serfs, slaves, and subjects little legal redress to right wrongs done to them. They could curse their tormentors, a phenomenon associated with witchcraft in Europe and syncretic religions in the Americas. Or military service itself offered release and allure. Gunpowder was still associated with the power of the occult in some Early Modern societies, offering a further mystique and terror to those uninitiated to the noise and smoke.[16] A British private fighting in the Walcheren campaign in 1809 recalled his picket duty on 14 August, the noisy terror during the assault on Vlissingen: 'the roaring of guns and mortars, the hissing of rockets, shot and shells, the chiming of bells, the noise of the people trying to extinguish fires, but above

all, the heart-rending cries of the poor women and children, beggars description'.[17]

The psychological stress caused by being targeted by artillery usually outweighed its physical impact. Oblique (or flanking) fire was particularly disconcerting for targeted infantry, even if skilful commanders mitigated the risk by staggering their lines.[18] Bombardment from the sea, like at Vlissingen, or during the siege of Gaeta (1806) was even worse. The French capture of the Neapolitan port of Gaeta in July 1806 took more time and casualties to achieve because the city's outnumbered garrison was supported by the fire of 4 British frigates and 30 gunboats. As one veteran recalled: 'always sure of their stores by sea, (the British bombardiers) so little spared their ammunition that since the commencement of the entrenchments without counting fire-pots, grapeshot, etc., they sent us more than 130,000 cannon-balls and bomb shells'.[19] The impact of so many unexploded rounds created dirty work for black troops in the Neapolitan service. Black troops recruited from the lost colony of Haiti in 1803 were transferred in 1806 to the new satellite Kingdom of Naples, where they served as the Royal African Regiment and were put to the most dangerous task involving explosives. During the siege of Gaeta in July 1806, they were deployed to recover live cannon-balls and shells fired from the British vessels defending the city from the sea. With ammunition in such short supply, the black soldiers were paid for each explosive they handed in, but untold numbers were killed in their attempts to defuse the live rounds.[20]

Otherwise gunpowder was used symbolically to assert military and community cohesion. American Patriots fighting Loyalists typically celebrated victories with a 'feu de foie' (fire of joy), the mocking term for celebratory gunfire which exasperated Continental army commanders concerned at the waste of ammunition.[21] The gunpowder that Patriot Spain's new British allies shipped to Cádiz in early June 1808 was used by the *gaditanos* to celebrate a saint, much to the chagrin of the level-headed Admiral Collingwood.[22]

Men were superstitious. They cherished saints and cults, and took portents seriously, despite the laboured efforts of eighteenth-century monarchies to 'enlighten' the people. Supernatural apparitions were famously enlisted to help the Spanish Patriots during their resistance to the French siege of Zaragoza, and the loyalist Virgin of Los Remedios banished the insurgent Virgin of Guadalupe at the gates of Mexico City in 1811. José Tomás Boves, royalist guerrilla chief in Venezuela, terrorized the imagination of Patriot refugees camping out in rural Aragua. Nocturnal tree toads croaked sounds resembling 'Bo-vez' that echoed in the woods where women and children were trying to sleep.[23] Animals were long regarded with superstition. Russian artillerymen deployed to await invasion in 1812 were alarmed by a hare running out of a bush and running towards their infantry line. Hares were associated with

cowardice, meaning desertion in the military context. Ilya Radozhitski recalled how his men:

> began to wave hands and run after the 'deserter'; the frightened animal, with his ears pressed down, turned towards our battery. Here everyone rushed towards him with everything they found at hand and the poor hare got under the cannoneer who intentionally fell and killed him ... We had the hare cooked and as we ate him, we laughed that we were probably eating some high-ranking enemy person whom a witch had turned into a hare, the symbol of cowardliness.[24]

Desertion

Whereas superstition and the supernatural informed behaviour, there remained the tangible coercion exercised by officers. Coercive motivation involved punishing insubordination, especially desertion. The British army executed soldiers convicted of some of the most extreme cases of desertion, but execution for cowardice does not seem to have occurred ever.[25] Absconding could be camouflaged by 'accompanying' wounded comrades to dressing stations and hospitals, by cavalrymen secretly wounding their horses as an excuse to fall out at the point of battle, and by escorting prisoners to the rear (for this reason this task was usually given to farriers who were not expected to charge into battle).[26] Absconding was easier to achieve in irregular units. The mounted irregular cavalry (blandengues) in the South American pampas proved impossible to discipline or command except at the hands of respected local men. But a blandengue returning without permission to his farm could take the field again with short notice; and no other force possessed equal local intelligence of topography and populations, to say nothing of its famous prowess in close-contact fighting (the 'entrevero').[27]

For regular armies serving in foreign climes, by contrast, desertion presented different problems. Russian units experienced peaks in desertion when they received orders to return home, since conscripts knew that their chances of flight would recede once back on Russian soil.[28] Russian army soldiers conversely found more relief in the stranger and softer climes of central Europe. Central Europe filled with deserters according to the intensity of campaigning. The Prussian troops' pointless marching in the build-up to the battle of Jena tired them out unnecessarily. One Prussian officer remarked how his unit, which had suffered no incidents of desertion at the start of September, suffered 23 cases within a week due to excessive marching.[29] There is little evidence that volunteer soldiers were less prone to desertion. Catalan home-defence volunteers (known as *miquelets*) enjoyed better conditions of service than the conscripts of

the Spanish army. But in 1795, two years into the war with neighbouring Revolutionary France, they were subjected to a severe code of discipline, including 50 lashes for moving more than 100 paces from their battalion without permission.[30] When Britain's all-volunteer army campaigned in Iberia 13 years later, the appeal of desertion proved equally enticing. The Duke of York, British Commander-in-Chief, estimated that a tenth of recruits absconded.[31] As one Peninsular War veteran commented, 'the very romance connected with the undertaking, and the thrilling interest that existed in listening to these adventures, strengthened in my mind my desire to share in their experience'.[32] Desertion also offered a prospect of escape from shame. A British sergeant robbed his company treasury when he was pay-sergeant and drunk at the time. The man confessed to his comrade that he wished to desert, as he believed that 'his credit would be forever destroyed in the regiment, and he could not endure remaining with the battalion afterwards'.[33] Many British troops captured in the Rio de la Plata (1806–1807) accepted bounties to serve in the Spanish army, and many more slipped away into civilian lives in Buenos Aires and Montevideo. As one British merchant remarked: 'the necessaries of life (here) are cheaper than in almost any other place. (The deserters) are mostly very fine men, and have the grace to show some embarrassment at facing the English officers'.[34]

When the primary group began to fail, soldiers deserted. Desertion was a major problem facing all armies of this period. 2.9% of the British rank and file deserting every year between 1807 and 1815, an average of 5,574 a year.[35] A study of two Napoleonic departments in Westphalia – the Fulda and the Werra – showed recapture rates for deserters in July 1808 at 9.4% and 8.8%, respectively.[36] Desertion was such a common feature of armies that only unusual examples tended to create disorder. Irregular units, by their very nature of organization and operation, were prone to committing temporary acts of desertion. US army regulars campaigning against Ohio Indians in the early 1790s did not try to discipline the ragtag Kentucky and Pennsylvania militiamen they had been given out of fear that they would mutiny or desert.[37] The Argentine frontier cavalry (blandengues) were prone to desert for individualistic reasons (women, farm matters, adventure), but their decision was seldom premeditated. They were also likelier than regulars to return to the field of their own volition. Punishments were accordingly lenient, harsher punishments being imposed only when deserters transgressed in other ways, especially in cases where they defected to Indian frontier tribes.[38] But the nature of regular units necessarily made desertion deviant. In most cases, the comrades deserters left behind pitied or resented them, not least because the act of desertion deplored the suffering and comradeship of the primary group.[39] Deserters were thus ostracized for having failed to sustain the emotional, supportive, and material needs of the other members of the primary group. British rifleman Costello decried men who deserted

before battle, the 'sulkers and poltroons', being pleased that there were few of them in his regiment.[40] A British sergeant wrote of a time when a deserter returned to the regiment after 6 months, was given 300 lashes for his actions, and afterwards his comrades ostracized him and 'would scarcely speak to him at all'.[41]

In extreme cases, such as when other crimes had been committed or values transgressed, deserters were executed. Deserting in order to defect to a hostile enemy exposed the deserter to execution upon being captured by his original side. Royalist counterinsurgents in Mexico routinely executed deserters within 24 hours of recapture.[42] But even in instances of defection practical considerations swayed commanders, such as in the naval engagements of the War of 1812. Royal Navy captains sometimes encountered British deserters on US ships they seized. But such was the need for manpower that most of these unfortunates were recycled into British service.[43] The sea, in any case, offered no option for free desertion short of mutiny, defection, or landfall. A sailor aboard a ship off the Cape of Good Hope in 1793 was traumatized to see a group of men from a neighbouring warship desert their vessel by lowering themselves on to the gratings which were being washed overboard. Mariner Nicol was horrified that no ship would rescue the deserters:

> Four or five men had slipped down upon the (gratings), cut them adrift, and were thus voluntarily committed to the vast Atlantic, without a bit of biscuit, or a drop of water, or any means of guiding the gratings they were floating upon, in the hope of being picked up by some vessel. They held out their arms to us, and supplicated, in the wildest manner, to be taken on board. The captain would not. He said: 'I will not; some of the stern ships will pick them up'. While he spoke, these unfortunate and desponding fellow-creatures lessened to our view, whilst their cries rung in our ears. I hope some of the stern ships picked them up. Few things I have seen are more strongly impressed upon my memory, than the despairing looks and frantic gestures of these victims in quest of liberty.[44]

On land, however, deserters could not escape censure for their actions. Two white soldiers who had deserted to the slave rebels in Saint-Domingue were included in a massacre of prisoners of war on 14 November 1792 because, the colonial press crowed, 'they had been barbarous enough to join the slave brigands ... and to stain their hands with the blood of their brothers'.[45] When the Haitians were finally victorious, at the Battle of Vertières (1803), the taboo of white defeat was broken, and several Polish troops defected to the Haitian side.[46] Psychopathy and extreme criminality could also condemn a deserter. A recaptured Habsburg cavalryman was executed by his own side during the 1809 campaign because he had rampaged in local villages.[47] But in most instances, the body

of a recaptured deserter was too valuable to be ended in this manner. Evidence from the French Revolutionary Army of the North during 1793-1794 reveals that the death penalty was reserved for soldiers who had deserted to the enemy, recruited for them, or had assaulted superiors or government agents. Desertion 'to the interior' was punished in a similar fashion to theft and insubordination: with prison sentences often accompanied by hard labour.[48] In the Napoleonic Kingdom of Italy, where special military tribunals were established in 1808, most recaptured deserters were sentenced to hard labour. The death penalty was reserved for deserters found guilty of being ringleaders, of having stolen arms or a horse, of having defected to the enemy, or of having fled abroad more than once. Otherwise moral pressure was employed. Giovanni Bovara, minister of religion, issued decrees instructing bishops and priests to preach the importance of the army and of conscription.[49] In several cases, disapproval of deserters from within the ranks eased the efforts of the hierarchy. Condemnation of deserters became common in the diaries of soldiers, with one comparing deserters to 'venom expelled from the body'.[50] But desertion remained a way of life, as soldiers lacking shoes, food or pay, and worried about their family's welfare, needed little encouragement to desert.

Experience of Campaign

The unusually well-documented experiences of the British and French armies led historians to contrast their experiences. Historians used to contrast the desperados driven by drink and unpopularity to join the all-volunteer British army with the civic virtues of French army conscripts who necessarily represented the full spectrum of their society. Thus 'iron officers' were supposedly needed to discipline the 'scum' of the British Army, whose recruits were less independent and 'humane' than the French soldiers. Certainly, Arthur Wellesley, later Duke of Wellington, still fresh in his command in Spain in 1809, noted discipline as one of the most serious issues with which he had to grapple.[51] Wellington famously proclaimed his men 'the scum of the earth'. But he followed his remark: 'it is wonderful that we should have made them the fine fellows they are'.[52] Recent research, especially by Edward Coss, has shown that many volunteers were actually skilled artisans driven to despair by industrialization.[53] Army service was a way to escape an impoverished life. It was an opportunity for young men to acquire a substitute for the independence and manliness which the demise of skilled trades was closing off to them in civilian life.

Campaign life was gruelling, especially when troops were poorly led. Napoleon's troops were experienced and efficient during the War of the Fourth Coalition, in contrast to their Prussian opponents.[54] The Prussian army had decayed since its textbook excellence during the invasion of the

Netherlands in 1787. The Prussian high command had degenerated into what Dennis Showalter called a 'junta of septuagenarians' that were clinging as much to their reputations as to their past glory, a sharp contrast to the French high command whose average age was well under forty. Prussia's army could be described as a reliable but rusty tool. As Karl von Clausewitz put it, 'behind the fine facade all was mildewed'.[55] The fact, if not the scale, of Prussia's defeat in the Fourth Coalition should not have come as a surprise. The Prussians' defeat at Jena was caused in part by their hasty invasion of Saxony before Russian support could arrive in force, and partly by French advantage in terms of trained replacement troops.[56] Once battle was joined at Jena in October, a Prussian officer called Rüchel took four hours to cover six miles to the battle, but by that time it was already too late for him to fight in the battle alongside allies as they had already been defeated.[57] The Prussian army was constrained by a complex system of rules that no longer functioned. By contrast, Marshal Davout's 30,000 troops had managed to defeat the Prussian Duke of Brunswick's 70,000 men at Auerstädt largely by superior manoeuvre alone. These decisive Prussian defeats at Jena-Auerstädt were accompanied by a demoralized mass surrender at Magdeburg. Prussian fortresses fell to the invading French one by one, with only Lübeck, commanded by Blücher, and especially Kolberg, commanded by von Gneisenau, showing any fight.[58] The surrender of Prussian cities had a cumulative effect, emboldening the French and demoralizing the Prussians. But what worked for the French in central Europe would prove ineffective in Spain. The intense two-week siege of Lleida in April–May 1810, for example, involved the French killing of about 500 civilians through howitzer fire, and even a parade of captured Patriot troops in front of the walls. But the defenders were not demoralized and yielded only at the last moment.[59]

The British army's experiences were documented across Europe, Asia, Africa, and the Americas.[60] The Peninsular War was the greatest campaign in terms both of numbers of British troops deployed and trials of hunger, fatigue, and climate. Rifleman Harris wrote how he had 'seen officers and men hobbling forward, with tears in their eyes from the misery of long miles, empty stomachs, and ragged backs without even shoes or stockings on their bleeding feet'.[61] Another soldier wrote how in the march from Albergaria-a-Velha, 'the heat was so great that we were unable to keep together', men falling by the wayside 'or straggled behind, unable to climb the hill', 'two men belonging to the Foot Guards fell down dead, and one of the 50th, from heat and thirst'.[62] Soldiers marched for 'six and twenty miles each day', and even up to forty miles a day, and these long marches were performed in threadbare uniforms.[63] An anonymous Highlander wrote how it was 'impossible to describe the painful state that some of those shoeless soldiers were in, crippling along the way, their feet cut or torn by sharp stones or brambles'.[64] The soldiers wore whatever they could for comfort, such as William Brown who wore a

Frenchman's trousers.[65] The men were described as being 'without any distinguishing mark of uniform'.[66] Tattered uniforms were exposed to infestation by their environment. One British sergeant recounted how soldiers baked their tunics in ovens to remove lice.[67]

The most extreme suffering, for soldiers and civilians alike, occurred during 'scorched earth' retreats. The other extreme of Iberian heat was Russian cold. The Imperial troops retreating through western Russia over the winter of 1812–1813 succumbed to the multiple agonies of cold, hunger, and disorientation. A Corsican officer stumbling with his unit through Lithuania wrote that:

> The cold continued as bitter as ever, to the point that it was impossible to remain on horseback; but on dismounting to walk, one felt so numb that one could neither move forward nor remount. On foot, crushed with exhaustion and the need for sleep, I found it difficult to overcome the urge to lie down at the roadside, which would certainly have been fatal. Mirage-like impressions continually confused me, and yet I was not hungry ... on the march, I had great difficulty in preventing my men from stretching out and sleeping by the roadside; sometimes I failed and those who slept in the snow never woke again.[68]

The hot hell of central Portugal was hardly better for the invaders. The Anglo-Portuguese retreat in 1810 to fortified earthworks (Torres Vedras), which had been constructed about 40 kilometres north of Lisbon, certainly proved Wellington's peculiar defensive genius. A sophisticated network of fortified villages, optical telegraphs, cheveaux de fries, mined roads and bridges, and even the provision of grenades, blocked any hope of a land army breaking through to Lisbon between the river Tagus and the Atlantic. Gunboats completed the British defences at the flanks.[69] Even before the parched invaders could reach this far, they had to contend with Wellington's genius in active defence. Wellington manouevred his outnumbered Anglo-Portuguese army brilliantly, maximizing its defensive firepower via his use of reverse slopes and better infantry drill. The allies gained tactical victories against the invading French army of Marshal Massèna, such as the 27 September 1810 Battle of Buçaco. But the invaders were really defeated by scorched earth. Wellington had ordered the evacuation of all civilians along the invasion route in central Portugal, and the destruction of all chattels that could not be carried. By the time the starved, parched, and diminished troops of Marshal Massèna reached the Torres Vedras defence, their invasion was definitively defeated.[70]

Food and Soldiering

When Napoleon decided to invade Russia, he organized depots of supplies stretching over 300 kilometres between Danzig and Warsaw.[71] But even

these elaborate preparations would prove inadequate for the rigours of the 1812 campaign. In fact the only reliable food supplies could be secured only for garrisoned troops, or for armies with long-term arrangements with food producers. In Valencia, Marshal Suchet made a deal with local rice growers, protecting their crops from partisans in exchange for them providing his army with food. In friendlier and wealthier territory, General Blücher ordered his Prussian forces garrisoning the North Sea coast in 1796 to avoid the need for expensive billets and unreliable logistics by cultivating their own potatoes: 'the whole commissariat can go to hell!'[72] The long-term presence of troops, especially in frontier or newly annexed areas, led commanders to cultivate military farms. In particular US military fortresses established in the vast areas gained by the Louisiana Purchase (1803) were garrisoned by soldier-farmers. In the post-war era, Fort Smith in Missouri Territory reached not just self-sufficiency but also a surplus in corn, vegetables, and hogs.[73] At the other end of the Americas, Indian tribes in Rioja province at the feet of the Andes stayed close to their own food sources, and lived off carob and wild honey when campaigning across their sparsely populated environment.[74] But mobile warfare on the Napoleonic scale made local sources of production useless.

Armies, to quote Napoleon's aphorism, really did march on their stomachs. Food was usually scarce, and near-impossible self-discipline was required not to devour an entire day's rations at breakfast. Russian soldiers subsisted on miniscule pay, and a diet of flour and groats, supplemented by bits of meat and vodka when on campaign. This slender diet proved survivable as Russian troops retreated on to their supplies during the great invasion of 1812, laying waste to land abandoned to the Imperial invaders. Tsarist War Minister Barclay de Tolly imposed a massive scorched earth policy ahead of the march of the 600,000-strong Grande Armée. The civilian population provided the Russian forces with intelligence on French movements and whereabouts, helping to cripple the invaders' attempts to requisition resources and live of the land.[75] Within days of crossing into Russian territory, the bottleneck of logistics forced desperate hunger upon the invading masses. Jakob Walter recalled how three days into the invasion, the Lithuanian town of Panemune was:

> stripped before we could enter, and so were all the villages. Here and there a hog ran around and then was beaten with clubs, chopped with sabres, and stabbed with bayonets; and, often still living, it would be cut and torn to pieces. Several times I succeeded in cutting off something; but I had to chew it and eat it uncooked, since my hunger could not wait to boil the meat.[76]

The forces that launched irregular action against the Napoleonic invaders were usually squadrons of light cavalry led by Russian officers and supported by Cossack regiments.[77] The Cossacks were used to realize

Kutuzov's aim of cutting off the French supply lines, with the promise that Cossacks could keep loot from the Grande Armée helping to swell their ranks to around 20,000 horseman. The Cossacks had no peers in their tactics of luring, harassing, and skirmishing.[78] Once the Imperial troops reached the old Tsarist capital, the spectacle of its abandonment and torching by the retreating Russians unleashed the instincts of the invaders. A French sergeant in the vanguard recalled why his comrades disobeyed an order to refrain from pillage: 'as soon as it was known that the Russians themselves had fired the town, it was impossible to restrain the men'.[79]

But the real horrors of the campaign in Russia took place during the retreat over the winter. Men were reduced to savages, feeding off horseflesh, at best half-cooked at the point of a sword, whilst countless victims went mad with cold and hunger, especially the women and children camp-followers accompanying the retreat. The best widowed camp-followers might hope for was to be taken on by another soldier. The 'recycling' of women perpetuated the subordinate position of women, who were seen as objects to wash and care for the soldiers. But in conditions like the retreat in Russia, or the guerrilla-dominated Spanish countryside, abandoned camp-followers faced little alternative.[80] The worst a widowed or separated camp-follower could expect in hostile country, whether in Russia or Spain, was a gruesome death. A Spanish *cantinière* (canteen woman) who in 1809 returned to Los Arcos to join her husband was too heavily pregnant to follow the army. When Patriot insurgents passed through Los Arcos after the French had left, they murdered the woman and her husband and hung the dead infant around the father's neck. The return of French troops unleashed indignation and a wave of pillage as retribution.[81]

Such conditions escalated tensions with the local populace.[82] Suffering soldiers from both the British and French armies saw 'booty' as their right. The physical and emotional burden of war made soldiers desperate for a warm meal and excesses of wine, pitting them against the local populace.[83] Poor logistics frequently diminished what in most armies were high-calorie rations. Soldiers in Northern European and North American armies were generally afforded more meat than their counterparts in Spanish-American and Mediterranean climes. US soldiers invading Canada in 1812 were given 'one pound and a quarter of beef, or three quarters of a pound of pork, eighteen ounces of bread or flour, one gill (quarter-pint) of rum, whiskey, or brandy', and on the march were expected to carry three days' worth of these rations in their knapsacks.[84] Napoleonic rations offered a similar calorie amount but comprised much more of carbohydrates (more bread and rice) and less meat protein. In reality, even these were insufficient for Napoleon's legendary forced marches.[85] When campaigns transited prosperous regions like southern Germany in 1805, requisitioning could feed soldiers enough without

alienating civilians excessively. But mountainous and parched regions escalated the suffering of soldiers and pillaged civilians alike.

Campaigning in Spain presented soldiers with the worst logistical situation. Spain was barely self-sufficient in foodstuffs, and even less in wartime, requiring grain imports from the Levant, America, North Africa, and even France. The depopulation of many rural and urban areas following the French invasion crippled Spanish output even further.[86] Approximately 80% of Spain did not possess the resources to support a professional army.[87] Even the best mode of conscription was useless in such conditions. All armies, not just the French, relied upon living off the land in order to compensate for insufficient supply trains. The depot system, characterized by immobile baggage trains stretching for miles and requiring masses of troops to protect, was particularly unsuited to Spain. The rugged and treacherous terrain of the Pyrenees acted as a funnel, ensuring that the French movement was restricted to a finite number of passes.[88] Imperial troops, so used to the ample food, secure communications, and docile populations of Germany, Bohemia, and Poland, could count on none of these in Spain. By July 1812, French forces amounted to 356,000 distributed between 6 commanders. This huge force lessened somewhat by the time of the Russian campaign, could not bring its combined might to bear on the substantially smaller Anglo-Portuguese army.

Campaigning in guerrilla zones beset soldiers with the twin sufferings of anxiety and hunger. Joseph Vachin, a Grande Armée conscript, described the shortages as follows: 'on one occasion I spent six days with only half a pound of biscuit and some potatoes.'[89] The equally forbidding Alps offered little respite. Bavarian soldier, Josef Deifl, during the pacification of the Tyrol recalled being 'as hungry as a church mouse', as he could feed himself only from unripe potatoes dug up from farmland he traversed. Rests at inns were relished with mouth-watering delight, as only there could cheese, butter, and bread be devoured.[90] Protracted war in insurgent environments did not yield the riches of war of Silesia or the Italian provinces, but assumed a character approximating that of the Russian campaign.

Some of the best-documented evidence of hunger and campaigning comes from memoirs of the Peninsular War. Alongside long marches and poor uniforms, British soldiers in the peninsula suffered constant hunger. Despite his legend, Wellington never established adequate logistics for his troops.[91] Edward Coss's research has shown the poor calorific and nutritional value of Britain's Peninsular Army, worse than typical rations during the English Civil War, a Venetian galley oarsman in the fourteenth century, and even a Spanish galley slave of the sixteenth century. The British diet averaged at roughly 2,466 calories, far below the estimated 7,000 calories a day which a soldier needed for a day of extreme marching and exertion.[92] British sailors, by contrast, could expect, a daily ration totalling almost 5,000 calories.[93] Poor diets dominate soldiers' memoirs.

Sergeant Lawrence recalled watching a desperately hungry comrade, corporal Burke, buying bullocks' heels and frying them over a pan without cleaning or skinning them, gnawing 'off the portion he thought was done', then 'putting the underdone part closer to the fire'. The more men were satiated, the more they felt human; by the same token they became more bestial as hunger overwhelmed them. Corporal Burke died the next day, having suffered all night from severe food poisoning.[94] Edward Costello's friend, Tom Crawley, likewise suffered a bout of food poisoning having eaten army rations, an indicator of the quality of the food.[95] Private William Wheeler of the 31st wrote how his regiment marched for days on empty stomachs with 'no hope of getting some more bread until we could gain some place where some Commessarit [sic] was stationed ...'[96] Donaldson described the meat he was given 'as tough and stringy as a piece of junk' owing to the bullocks being unfed and marched to exhaustion, and another soldier his ration of meat 'carrion'.[97] Similarly, Private Hemingway wrote that in the three days of hard fighting the army faced, they had 'not put a morsel [of anything to eat into our] mouths' nor a 'mouthful of water'.[98] Lack of clean drinking water and consumption of brackish or contaminated water were responsible for many diseases, notably dysentery. The presence of extreme hunger and thirst devastated group cohesion. It often broke social bonds, such as comrades hoarding, saving the best part of the rations for themselves, or hiding the bread to eat it later in solitude. One major recalled that the daily allowance was so small that 'I often finished the whole dish at a sitting'.[99]

These dire situations forced soldiers to turn to robbery and plunder to feed themselves and ensure they could continue on the march. Sometimes the danger of getting detached from the body of troops offered fleeting opportunities to find food. Russian officer Kotzebue who got lost scouting woodlands near Polotsk in summer 1812 'heard geese cackling in a farmyard – things not usually found where the French have halted'.[100] In Spain, British soldier Lawrence wrote of stealing bread from a Spanish housewife, amusing her with 'Peninsular tales' as others plundered her food on command. Lawrence also recalled an incident involving the theft, butchering, and eating of a pig. A sergeant offered 16 dollars for the pig from the lady in whose house Lawrence was billeted, but the lady refused, wanting 18. The sergeant tasked four men with stealing the pig. They did so, and cut off a quarter 'for their own use and brought it back to our lodgings', offering Lawrence a taste of the pig.[101] A soldier of the 71st remembered stealing from some drunk soldiers he had never met before, sharing the food with his close friend Donald.[102] Undernourished and ill-clad men discovered that in order to survive on campaign and on the battlefield they had little choice but to rely on each other. Men plundered from civilians, and even from other soldiers, but more often than not, shared their plunder with their companions. Wellington was frustrated by his officers' failure to restrain rampaging Anglo-Portuguese

troops storming Badajoz in 1812. But privations had made the soldiers uncontrollable.[103] Harris sold his last shirt to buy bread to share with his comrade, writing as if it were a common occurrence, and Costello who found £1,000 after the Battle of Vitoria (1813), shared the loot with his comrades.[104] Sharing loot bonded soldiers as a reward for hardship and exalted the provider.

Small groups also bonded in suffering. Jakob Walter, a teenage malaria victim in the Mecklenburg marshes, led an escape from hospital with four fellow sufferers who had found the hunger and mortality unbearable.[105] When epidemics incapacitated large numbers of battalions, the solidarity of fellow sufferers pulled men through. The British capture of Vlissingen (Netherlands) in August 1809 was followed a few days later by a mass contagion amongst the troops. One veteran watched 'whole parties of riflemen in the street shaking with a sort of ague, to such a degree that they could hardly walk – so great a shaking had seized upon their whole bodies from head to heel'.[106] The disease was Walcheren fever: a mixture of typhus, typhoid, and malaria. It was caused by the marshy climate of the island and poor field hygiene. Symptoms included headaches, constipation, nausea, and pain to the back and legs, which were usually followed by crippling fevers.[107] As hospitals overflowed, comrades survived or died together. One officer noted, 'every evening about dusk a string of eight to ten fine fellows were carried to their graves! The deaths were so numerous that a corporal and eight men only attended each funeral.'[108] The situation was so severe that naval surgeons were sent ashore to aid the overwhelmed army surgeons.[109] Some treatments tortured the patients with bleedings and the attitude that excessive sweat, vomit, and defecation, cleansed the sufferers' toxins, and other treatments soothed them with port wine and Jesuit bark (quinine). An army doctor remarked that even soldiers who appeared to pull through the fever were almost certain to relapse into malarial agues. They never regained their former health and strength.[110] Soldiers withdrawn to Britain continued to fall ill and to infect each other as well as their families. Rifleman Harris spent eight months recovering with his family, 'six of which I lay in a hopeless state in bed'. When he left and travelled to Hythe after his recuperation, he was admitted to hospital, where he remained for 28 weeks. Such was his experience of the Walcheren fever that even years later he claimed to 'feel the remains of it in damp weather'.[111] According to one estimation, almost 20% of all line infantry in Britain during the winter of 1810–1811 were incapacitated by Walcheren fever.[112]

Healthy soldiers also bonded around provisions. Billeting gave them opportunities to take advantage of their civilian hosts. Thirty Napoleonic troops crammed into a barn attached to a family house in Hamburg were made to feel unwelcome whenever they crowded around the kitchen after returning from their daily drills. But Sundays proved their relief. The whole family left every Sunday in order to visit grandparents, which gave

the soldiers several hours to invade the whole house and enjoy its comforts.[113] On campaign, the administration of small groups of soldiers – the squad, ordinaire, or mess – bonded fighting men together. This mess group in the British army was solidified when Wellington issued tents to the men in 1813. Due to the size of the tents, and their transport by mules, the old cooking kettles that could serve ten men were unable to be carried, and so a lighter kettle was introduced. The lighter kettle served six men, creating the smallest primary group size of men who received rations together and stood beside each other in march and combat.[114] Subplatoons of men fighting and living together were the norm in armies. Russian army platoons were divided into squads (*desiatki*). They received their supplies from platoon-leaders who appear to have been elected by the ranks for six-month tenures, which demonstrates that even the epitome of an old régime army relied on consenting norms for its daily operations.[115] Normative behaviour transcended the political make-up of the army. At the other political extreme, the French Revolutionary Army of the North, the mess group was larger than most, at 14 to 16 men. But the *ordinaire* ensured normative motivation as much as mess groups in other armies.[116] The men motivated one another in this primary group, no-one wishing to let another down for fear of rejection.

Coercion

Even coercive motivation could overlap with normative. Flogging, in the words of one British sergeant who recounted his lashes, may have prevented men from 'committing any greater crimes which might have gained' them 'other severe punishments', but it also disrupted the primary group's effectiveness. The 'Bloody Code', a system of criminal law in Britain from 1688 to 1815, prescribed 225 offences as capital crimes. But magistrates or juries often refused to convict suspects as a consequence of the mandatory penalties.[117] The long-standing equality before the law of almost all British subjects prevented capital and corporal punishments from dividing opinion as they had in continental monarchies whose societies and armies were distinguished by more recent aristocratic exemptions from 'common' punishments. When Joseph II of Austria before the wars had made the aristocratic orders in his empire theoretically subject to the same punishments as plebeians, the outrage was shared by the emperor's mother herself.[118] But wartime pressured regimes to moderate physical punishments in order to remove one of the causes of draft-dodging. When Prussian statesmen embarked upon reforming their army after the defeat of 1807, the abolition of corporal punishment was accepted as a precondition for universal conscription.[119]

But Britain's volunteer army retained corporal punishment. The postwar persistence of corporal punishment in the British army and schools might suggest that flogging was less demoralizing for the British soldier.

William Lawrence was sanguine at his sentence of flogging, 'it is amazing to think of four hundred lashes being ordered on a man as young as I was, one who had undergone all the privations of a most bloody war, for a first offence, which could have been overlooked or dealt with by a severe reprimand'. Lawrence was in hospital for weeks, and was transferred from the Light into the Grenadier company, shattering the primary group bonds that had sustained him until then.[120] Another British soldier described the shortcomings of coercion, writing how those who had been flogged had their spirit broken, and some turned to crime, others losing their 'honour and character'.[121]

Flogging weakened morale. One veteran wrote how it took between six weeks and three months to recover, which removed a man from the line, affecting his self-esteem and calling into question his place in the primary group.[122] A veteran sergeant later recalled flogging with disdain:, 'once you flog a man, you degrade him forever'.[123] Discipline did not motivate the soldier, but rather broke him. Wellington voiced his own concerns in 1809 when he complained about 'the state of discipline of the army, which is a subject of serious concern to me'.[124] But sometimes loyalty to the mess group exceeded fear of flogging. Flogging was seen as a badge of honour when it was inflicted on a soldier who had stolen food in order to substitute meagre rations.'[125] It was hard to fear harsh discipline when the alternative was starving to death. Coercive discipline could thus never to be the prime motivator for soldiers' morale.

Combat Motivation

Campaign life was tedious, repetitive, and incredibly harsh. A soldier's mates kept him going when dire circumstances forced him to plunder the populace. But in combat, everything changed. When on campaign, the greatest enemies to the soldier were discomfort and boredom. Soldiers tended to welcome the prospect of battle as preferable to the miseries of cold, hunger, campaigning, and the tense boredom of waiting.[126] In combat, the overwhelming presence of fear concentrated the mind on immediate needs.[127] Clausewitz famously argued that stationary troops grew demoralized, whereas a march made them insensible to fear. The desire to prove oneself to the primary group, to adhere to the group's standards resulted in unflinching behaviour during combat. A soldier who vacillated risked censure from his comrades.[128] Combat posed a challenge for a man to prove himself, and was a dare.[129] British rifleman Harris told his comrade that 'If you see any symptoms of my wishing to flinch in this business I hope you will shoot me with your own hand', and after the battle when his other comrades heard of this statement, they 'had great respect' for Harris.[130]

Memoirs reveal a fear of being ostracised by comrades. A soldier called Mayberry was shunned by his comrades for stealing money, receiving 700 lashes and a demotion as punishment. At Badajoz, Mayberry

stormed the breach and having 'obliterated his disgrace', he was told to retire to the rear, but said, 'No going to the rear for me. I'll restore myself to my comrades' opinion, or make a finish of myself altogether'.[131] Similarly, a private called Kit Wallace, 'who had no friends', and was 'often called a coward in joke', reacted angrily when he was placed at the rear rank in battle. Wallace resented this slight on his character. He rushed to the front rank, exhausted all his ammunition in hard combat, called for more, and shouted:, 'Now am I a coward?'[132] Lawrence joined the forlorn hope (first wave) at the siege of Badajoz, mentioning that his friends, 'Pig' Harding and George Bowden, were also there, suggesting that bonds of comradeship outweighed fear of death.[133] Soldiers desired to appear unflinching in order to escape shame. Private Wheeler wrote of how when a 'round shot' passed near his head, he felt the pain a long time, and 'it was with difficulty' he 'could perform' his duty, but did not wish to complain of it, 'lest any of my comrades laugh at me'.[134] The consequences of not performing expected duties on the battlefield, and violating the primary group's norms, were dire, as a soldier's reputation would be shattered in the eyes of his comrades. Indeed, an anonymous soldier recalled that 'a man may drop behind in the field but this is a dreadful risk to his reputation'.[135] Individual agency or heroism was necessarily confined to what could be demonstrated in close formations that marched and fired on command.[136] Saxon troops campaigning under the Holy Roman empire against the French in 1793–1794 were expected to behave with bravery (*Tapferkeit*) and stubbornness. Comrades testifying to another's bravery was vital. If a soldier had no witnesses, or simply did not distinguish himself, then exhausting ammunition, or plundering or capturing enemies could serve the same function.[137]

Soldiers strongly desired to remain with their comrades, even when wounded. A veteran recalled a comrade suffering from a musket wound in his thigh who refused to 'quit the battlefield, he limped on under fire with naked feet and blood streaming from his wound, and thus marched on for several miles over a country covered with a small flinty stone'.[138] One soldier wrote of how he was wounded at Badajoz, but felt the anguish of being separated from his comrades even more than his physical injuries.[139] When a soldier was taken away from his comrades due to wounds, there was a strong desire to return. Combat theorists have observed how there are 'indications of guilt feelings among men who were out of combat while their comrades were still fighting'.[140] One soldier wrote that 'there was in those days a chivalry, an *esprit de corps* amongst officers and men never to be absent if possible. When there was a chance of a brush with the enemy it was a point of honour not to be detained by any trifling illness'.[141] Another soldier, having been taken ill after the battle at Ciudad Rodrigo in January 1812, attempted to keep up with his battalion but fell out and collapsed, and was taken to a hospital. He left the hospital, and later a depot, before he had recovered, in

order to rejoin his unit, being 'delighted' at the prospect.[142] Similarly, Lawrence, having suffered wounds at Badajoz, returned to his company despite his wounds not being fully healed, and fell ill once again due to this, staying in hospital for seven months, missing action at Salamanca, Madrid, and Burgos. This urge not to leave the regiment was also evident in one private's letters. After having been wounded and with the possibility of being invalided off to England, Wheeler wrote that 'As much as I desire to see my dear native land [...] I would rather rejoin my Regiment again and taken my chance with it'. He continued: 'When this long protracted war is over, if fortune should favour me I should have the proud satisfaction of landing on my native shores with many a brave and gallant comrade, with whom I have braved the dangers of many a hard fought battle'.[143] Post-war romantic flourish appealed to readers of autobiographies. But such emotions of comradeship were real all the same.

Encountering Foreigners

The primary group could also close ranks against foreigners. The Prussian defeat at Ligny during the Waterloo campaign of 1815 was in part caused by the lacklustre performance of some 1,000 reinforcements who came from the newly annexed Rhineland. Having only served in the French army before, these soldiers lacked any regimental or patriotic feeling for their new Prussian overlords and their performance suffered accordingly.[144] Even foreigners who were allies rather than overlords presented problems. Allies did not conform to the strict group norms that dictated the conduct of the primary groups. Before the Anglo-Spanish effort at the Battle of Talavera, British views of the Spanish army had been favourable. But as the confidence in the Spanish army decreased, despondency and contempt increased. Allies were not supposed to be a threat to the primary group. But by showing poor conduct, confidence was lost as they were seen as a liability. To a large extent British soldiers' alienation from both Spanish and Portuguese allies was determined by their feeling of being Protestant outsiders clubbing together in Catholic societies. This feeling ironically led to sympathies being expressed for the French enemy during parleys between actions, and in subsequent memoirs.[145] The Spaniards repaid their allies in kind. British dead, either military or civilian followers, in being Protestants were not allowed to be buried in hallowed cemeteries. A common ruse was therefore to claim the dead body was Irish, as Spaniards assumed all of Ireland was Catholic, Catholic Masses having become permissible to the British army as a whole in 1806.[146] For all the guerrilla claims of fighting a Spanish 'people's war' against Napoleon, Patriot forces were aided not just by the Anglo-Portuguese but also by several foreign deserters from the Imperial side. In summer 1809, some German grenadiers enlisted in a Spanish regiment

brawled with Spanish comrades in Gijón. A parish priest from nearby Tarna complained of the Germans' 'insolent behaviour, stealing blankets from civilians, rustling cattle, and some even openly molested women in the streets, despite my presence'.[147]

Often civilians stuck with the demands of armies did not distinguish whether they were allies or enemies. Soldiers traversing pacified areas still feared enemies in their midst, leading to mutual alienation from civilians. French colonel Conrad Marnier expressed this fear of civilians vividly in his recollections of the Peninsular War in Spain: 'we knew neither truce, nor rest; but always the fear of betrayal day and night, at any point, at any bend of a trail, even while we were in bed. We had to be on alert for everything and everyone, even the host who offered his house to us'.[148] The Iberian Peninsula was not the only theatre where occupation troops feared civilians in their midst. The Bavarian soldier, Josef Deifl, rested his unit at an inn in the Tyrol during the Hofer revolt of 1809. The landlord took the order and asked them to sit outside. Once the food failed to arrive, Deifl suspected an ambush and rapidly left the square. During a later rest in a different village, it was the turn of the civilians to be alienated. After Deifl had given his order, he refused to wait long outside. He invaded the kitchen, alarming the innkeepers' family who were innocently preparing his order for breakfast.[149] Sometimes the barriers were religious. James Wilmot Ormsby, British army chaplain, related his frustration with Spanish intolerance towards non-Catholics, including how only repeated begging would get nuns in a convent to look after British sick, how obscure land plots had to be found for cemeteries, and how Irish soldiers, on the other hand, would be welcomed as if they were family merely for their Catholicism. During the British stay at Salamanca in November 1808, Ormsby admitted that several Spanish religious came to witness his sermons out of sheer curiosity. The spectators complimented him on his composure and regretted how his fervour was so wasted.[150]

The enemy on campaign was always the cold, hunger, fatigue, boredom, and ungrateful civilians. Elzéar Blaze, a French sub-lieutenant campaigning in Spain, recalled the miseries of his alien environment:

> The transition from St. Jean de Luz to Irún is as great as from Calais to Dover, and yet the Bidasoa is but a rivulet ... What a difference (from) our quarters in Germany ... Instead of the most scrupulous cleanliness and the kindness of the people behind the Rhine, we had to encounter the nastiness and sour looks of the Spaniards. Though accustomed to the climate of Poland, we felt cold in Spain. In Biscay and Castile it is impossible to have a fire in winter: nobody has the least notion that a door is made to shut. A floor (covering), a carpet, are unheard-of luxuries, the trade of a chimney-sweep unknown, for there are no chimneys. In the kitchens you see a hole at which the

> smoke escapes when it can escape at all ... In Spain the comfortable is unknown, perhaps disdained.[151]

One Mexican traveller was astounded by the poverty of Castilian village dwellings: 'front-doors tied with string, roofs touching the ground, nearly all houses are made of earth with a floor beneath street-level ... their residents share this space with the hog, hen, dog and cat'.[152] Such austere shelter added to the already devastating consequences for soldiers' morale. Solutions such as billeting practised widely across mainland Europe were simply not as applicable in Spain. The absence of regular rations, sporadic pay, fatal disease, and an unforgiving climate all culminated within the Iberian Peninsula to produce an unbearable quagmire. Even drink offered northern European soldiers little relief, as memoirs reveal fetid water and the absence in Spain of morale-boosting beer.[153] Given the paucity of shelter, and the typical abandonment of settlements on the approach of campaigning armies, the capture of an enemy soldier seemed like the relic of a lost world of civilization. The actual enemy appeared human and an equal, even after moments of combat. Despite David Bell's argument of a demonization of the adversary, the situation remained very mixed, as modes of gentlemanly conduct, and even comradeship, could be shown to prisoners-of-war.[154] Memoir literature shows patterns of the persistence of traditional attitudes towards the treatment of captives. A wounded Frenchman captured by the Prussians in 1794, Blücher recalled, had refused all comfort and food from his captors. Rather than being left to starve, a Francophone subordinate enquired about the captive's torment, discovering that his family had been victims of the Revolution and that he had lost the will to live. This confession eased the man's plight, who then accepted comradely comforts from his erstwhile Prussian enemies.[155] Russian officer, Moritz von Kotzebue, was captured in western Russian during the early stages of Napoleon's invasion of 1812. During his long and parched march westwards towards captivity, his French escort shared with him his precious supply of brandy, and refused to take any payment for the favour. Kotzebue handed him a short note that he had written in Russian testifying to his kind conduct, hoping that this would protect him if a similar fate befell the Frenchman at Russian hands in future.[156] A captured enemy normally ceased to threaten the primary group, so his right to life as a captive, even to comradeship, was generally accepted.

But extreme conditions led to the routine killing of enemy captives, or of their neglect. Thousands of wounded Russian troops abandoned in Moscow in 1812 died under French captivity because of disease and hunger, and probably about a thousand burnt to death or were suffocated in the conflagration started by the retreating Tsarist army.[157] Guerrilla fronts amidst strained logistics like Spain, or the capture of soldiers who had previously been imprisoned and released in return for a vow not to

take up arms again, such as at Jaffa in 1799, led to officers ordering the killing of prisoners. More generally, the overwhelming melée of pitched battles, rumours of reprisals, and the cataclysm of retreat in extreme environments, all led to the value of captured human lives falling below that of a bullet or the thrust of a bayonet.[158]

Quick-witted defeated soldiers did their best to avoid prisoner status altogether. A wounded Prussian cavalryman avoided capture by being passed off as 'cousin of the hostess' of a house in French-occupied Lübeck.[159] Otherwise prisoners could expect to survive and to reach their destination of confinement, whether hulks, forts, camps, or residences. Their treatment ranged from cruel to benign, depending on the rank of the captives and the circumstances of their host. There were no international conventions on the treatment of common soldiers beyond their right to return home without ransom once peace was concluded. Whereas captive British officers held in western France in the 1790s were well treated, common soldiers suffered captivity in disease-ridden, airless buildings, supplied with appalling food. Prisoners allowed recreation in local towns were subjected to further restrictions. High prices caused by the *assignat* financial crisis led local authorities to prohibit the sale of bread to foreign prisoners during the winter months.[160] But the end of the Terror in 1795 relaxed conditions for prisoners of war, as French communes did not have the resources any more to impose strict confinement.

Even worse conditions confronted Napoleonic troops who had surrendered to the Spanish Patriots in the first weeks of the Peninsular War in 1808. They spent eight months imprisoned on barges in the bay of Cádiz, mixed up with naval prisoners of Admiral Rosily's squadron, and the hellish conditions led the captives to describe the vessels as 'maritime coffins'. No fewer than 1,800 men were crammed onto the vessel *El Vencedor*. The unbearable heat, overcrowding, and inadequate food, made many men succumb to disease, commit suicide, or go insane. Colonel D'Eslon recalled his captivity as 'monotonous days, always the same things to do: get up, take a stroll above deck, examine the contours of the bay, lunch, play, talk politics, dine, read, to bed, get bored to death; this is our experience'.[161] An expected exchange with Patriot prisoners never happened, and from 1809 some 18,000 French captives were transported to the uninhabited island of Cabrera, south of Mallorca. Insufficient rations condemned most prisoners to a slow death, hastened by disease, and even episodes of cannibalism. Only some 3,000–4,000 survived the end of the Peninsular War. The cruel neglect by Patriot authorities in Mallorca even elicited censure in the local press. In August 1813, the *Diario de Palma* declared: 'Humanity cries out in to see three thousand or more men abandoned on a deserted and uninhabited island, in the open, naked and starving ... Religion forbids it ... yet Cabrera is the tomb of the prisoners. Is this believable in Catholic Spain?'.[162] But Spain, more than any other theatre of operations, could show little mercy to the invader.

Marginal economies elicited little sympathy for captured enemies. The poor economy of Norway during the Dano-Swedish war (1808–1809) could barely sustain prisoners of war. Many put to agricultural work managed to escape over the border into Sweden and reappear in enemy ranks. So the authorities confined them in the Akershus fortress in central Oslo, from where the Swedes were rented out as slave labour to the propertied classes. The large 'Swedish walls' (*Svenskemuren*) around Oslo, some of which are several kilometres long, are the fruit of military slave labour.[163] More prosperous regions afforded captives easier conditions. Prussian soldiers interned after Jena in the wealthier environs of Verdun faced a gentler regime, albeit marked by the boredom of repetitive bacon-and-cabbage soups for lunch and milk broths for dinner. Their captive officers used their greater privileges to relieve their own frustration by visiting tearooms and indulging in hijinks.[164] Parole was usually offered to officers, and licensed free movement often to well-behaved soldiers. But either privilege could be withdrawn when authorities suspected their abuse. Some American officers interned at Halifax (Nova Scotia) in 1814 were allowed out on licence. But they were suspected of sending information home without permission and were removed to a bleaker location and confined.[165] The pull of home remained strong for captives. But home could mean many things, as civilians coping with the passage and billeting of soldiers contended with upheavals of their own.

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4 Living with Armies

The mobilization of millions strained the experience of battle and campaigning to an unprecedented degree. But the passing and stationing of armies also affected non-combatants in an equally unprecedented manner. As French Revolutionary armies from 1794 advanced beyond the Rhine, Alps, and Pyrenees, civilians found themselves subjected to pillage and worse. Certainly, some elements in the population welcomed the French Revolution. A minority of Jakobiner, Giaccobini, and more traditional protesters turned the pressure of French ideas into activism. In Belgium, extreme radicals (Vonckists) of the Belgian Revolution of 1789–1790 had looked to the example of Paris. But they were held in check by Statists, and Belgian Jacobinism itself was curtailed by the alienation caused by the behaviour of French troops. Communities in the Belgian department of the Dyle resented French troops who were billeted in the homes of draft-dodgers.[1] Coercion explained most of Belgium's allegiance to the French state in the years before Napoleon placed it on the privileged side of his customs barrier.[2] The early 1790s witnessed the growth of Revolutionary clubs across southern Germany, and the planting of liberty trees in the Black Forest and Stuhlingen.[3] A failed harvest in 1793 in the Rioja region of Spain politicized bread riots at a time when the Spanish Army was fighting in the Pyrenees. Hundreds of hungry Spanish peasants marched from village to village offering *vivas* to liberty, equality, and to the French Assembly.[4] At Mainz, the reception of French Revolutionary ideas was perhaps the most developed outside of France. The Mainz 'Clubbists' harnessed local grievances over rural access to manorial forests and game, creating social support for a revolutionary government which the siege artillery of the First Coalition would suppress in July 1793.[5]

But to a large extent, French ideas were spread at the point of French bayonets. Of the four major revolutions beyond France in the 1790s, the Belgian, Haitian, Polish, and Irish, only the distant United Irishmen revolt of 1798 drew any substantial nourishment from French ideals, while the Haitian revolution turned the rhetoric of Revolution against

France's slavery empire. Even in Ireland, most parts of the country were unaffected, and several insurgents had only the vaguest notions of the ideals of the French Revolution. For civilians actually caught in the path of French armies, counter-revolutionary slogans inciting resistance to invasion usually made more sense. Clerics in Spain preached holy war against the godless French in 1793.[6] Once French Revolutionary troops surged into foreign lands, civilians had even more cause to resent being occupied.

The wars that began in the 1790s defined modern military occupation. The French Constitution of 1791 proclaimed that the French nation alone was 'sovereign', pending the 'liberation' of the rest of mankind. Invaders and insurgents threatening the security of the pristine republic were thus dealt with harshly. In 1793, the Jacobins decreed the shooting of captured foreign invaders, with a rhetoric of ideological indignation remote from eighteenth-century norms. It appears that some 8,000 Spanish prisoners were shot during the War of the Pyrenees as a consequence of this decree, and in May 1794, the Convention ordered that no British prisoners were to be taken. But in most instances, these decrees were ignored by local commanders.[7] At the same time, the French Constitution renounced the right of conquest. The French armies were supposedly liberators whose every advance spread the benefits of liberty, equality, and fraternity, and affirmed French national superiority over all others. This condescending liberation confused the subsequent legal context of French armies campaigning beyond their borders. A traditional 'conquest' gave the conquerors the right to govern their new territory as they saw fit, whereas an 'occupation' assumed that local laws and traditions remained the same.[8] In some cases, such as Belgium, which French armies overran in the wake of the battle of Fleurus, local elites welcomed annexation into France as a means of escaping the chaos of military occupation.[9] Similarly, Rhinelanders acquiesced to Napoleonic annexation because it meant that a tolerable system of conscription and rule by civilians would replace the chaos of French Revolutionary despotism in the 1790s.[10] Civilians in Europe and the Americas thus became test-beds for two modern notions of liberation and occupation. What the French Revolutionaries understood as 'liberation', the victorious Allied powers in 1815 would understand as 'occupation'. The Allied occupation in France, as Christine Haynes has recently argued, was novel in its use of military presence to ensure a form of 'total peace' to replace the trauma of total war.[11]

French Revolutionary attitudes towards civilians had been hardened by the ruthless pacification of the Vendée insurrection.[12] The military coup of Fructidor (1797) established a security and surveillance state in France, whose claim to legitimacy was based not on the last vestiges of the Revolution's liberalism, but on restoring and maintaining order.[13] Soldiers who had behaved brutally in suppressing disorder within France

could be expected to restrain themselves even less abroad. In theory, the 1796 French Penal Code punished soldiers' excesses severely, but in practice their officers on the spot were often indulgent.[14] The same year that the Penal Code was passed, Napoleon's troops committed a notorious atrocity suppressing the Piacentino insurrection in northern Italy. Napoleon's order to burn the village of Binasco to the ground and execute 100 of its inhabitants was reported using language resonant of the Vendée: 'Let the terrible example of Binasco open their eyes: its fate will be that of all towns and villages that persist in rebellion'.[15] Sacking and massacre were hardly new in warfare. Despite Napoleon's considering Binasco a template for exemplary action applicable to all instances of anti-French unrest, massacre hardly needed new lessons. Nor was it a uniquely French characteristic either (as Russian actions in Warsaw in 1794 showed). Nor was violence the only suffering. Even allies could impoverish civilians with demands for supplies. Requisitioning proved little better than organized pillage from the villagers' perspective. In the campaigns in southern Germany in the 1790s, villages and towns along rivers and army roads (*Heeresstraßen*) suffered more than remoter mountain settlements. Habsburg troops marching through Swabia in 1794 reimbursed communities at pre-war prices. But the war had raised prices by some 13%, which meant that Austrian troops were effectively profiting from civilians. As the movements of allied armies persisted and grew in size, villagers took direct action, as incidents grew of inhabitants raiding neighbouring villages for transport and food to hand over, and even raiding noble estates.[16]

The passage of armies across Europe produced unprecedented tensions in terms of billeting and logistics. When the Russians joined the war in 1799, the passage of their armies into Germany, Switzerland, and Italy presented a wealthier landscape enticing to the troops and alarming to the locals. Local civilian recollection distinguished Russian soldiers as being peculiarly destitute. A testimony from Württemberg during Suvorov's 1790s campaign recounted how the Russians had a 'terrible appearance' and 'drank brandy as if it were water'.[17] Inadequate bread rations reduced even Russian officers to starvation. South German and Swiss civilians annoyed by Russian plundering were frequently also alarmed by the habit of Cossacks to ride naked during warm summer months.[18] A British spymaster active in Swabia and Switzerland reported Allied disgust at the Russians 'robbing, stealing, and maltreating inhabitants of the country with impunity'.[19]

But it was the range of French armies, combined with their logistical demands and indoctrinated contempt for the old order, which seriously exposed Italian, German, and later, Spanish civilians. Both Italian and German territories presented French armies with intact clerical properties and traditions. After French Revolutionary troops occupied the Rhineland in 1794, Cologne cathedral was closed for services and

ended up being used as a stable, magazine, and a prisoner-of-war camp. Military disdain for religious property was nothing new. Joseph II had added insult to injury during the Austro-Turkish war of 1788–1791 by billeting troops in monastic buildings that his policies had emptied.[20] But the violent dechristianization of Revolutionary France was nothing like eighteenth-century Erastianism. Violent anti-clericalism followed on the French soldiers' heels. Legal equality was imposed on Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish populations in Germany, but all religions suffered expropriation and secularization. As one historian observed, 'toleration revolutionary-style turned out to mean the equal right to be persecuted',[21] and French behaviour in Italy was even worse. The French invaders saw Italy as overflowing with churches and clergy, and concluded that the corruption of Italian life stemmed from the Tridentine Church itself.[22] It is unclear whether French anti-clericalism in Italy was motivated by a general hostility to Catholicism, as Michael Broers has held, or a knee-jerk hostility towards the Church's counter-revolutionary attraction, as Stephen Englund has argued.[23] But the effect on pillaged villagers was the same regardless. Churches north of the Alps, especially sumptuous Catholic ones, were targeted with equal rapacity. During the 1796 campaign, German villagers called the French hordes 'God robbers' (*Gottesräuber*).[24] Anything linked to the Church was vulnerable to a generation of dechristianized French troops hungry for loot. An eyewitness at the Demming rectory in southern Germany recalled French soldiers stopping at nothing in their search for cash and valuables 'searching every corner of the house, digging up the graves of the dead, poking privies with sticks, rummaging through manure, and digging their hands into the pockets of people'.[25] Even French troops complained at the anti-clerical excesses of some of their officers during the occupation of Rome in 1798.

In several invasion zones French troops had the effect of igniting underlying social unrest. As French troops overran Switzerland in 1798, imposing a short-lived and centralized Helvetic Republic, hostility to the invasion was compounded by a civil war between the anti-Revolutionary Catholic minority and its Protestant neighbours. The plunder of their troops was accompanied by a kind of Swiss *sans-culotte*. Ulrich Hegner, resident of Winterthur, remarked the plunder accompanying the French occupation of 1798: 'a dozen bumpkins in old rags, an armed posse in old uniforms ... followed at the end by ragged-trousered men armed with clubs, followed by their womenfolk carrying baskets and sacks poised to plunder whatever came into their hands'.[26] Villagers in forested and mountainous locations surrounding cities such as Winterthur were not as defenceless against such plunder. Not only were soldiers less likely to brave remote and increasingly guerrilla-prone roads, but those who did tended to be visible from afar, offering advance warning for villagers to flee with their valuables into the trees and hills.[27]

The Fear of Invasion

The intrusion of huge armies into civilian life produced suffering not witnessed in Europe since the Thirty Years' War. Suffering and outright atrocity, as the Egyptian campaign showed, could plumb greater depths when logistical problems were sharpened by cultural prejudice. The rise of Napoleon, the master of making armies live off the land, was key to heightened fears of the French war machine. Even though Napoleon was defeated at sea by the British at the Battle of the Nile (1798), he managed to extricate himself from Egypt and famously exploit political turmoil to become Consul and then Emperor of France. The rise of Napoleon, and his famous ruthlessness in campaign, resonated with a British public opinion in particular. Britain enjoyed one of the most developed print cultures in Europe. As early as the 1740s, the twin threats of French invasion and Jacobite rebellion forged print culture with a marked Francophobia which was easily reignited by the time of renewed Anglo-French war in 1793.[28] Tory Prime Minister, William Pitt, alarmed at Jacobin radicalism, called the conflict a 'war to protect property'.[29] His government sponsored a popular reactionary movement called the 'Volunteers' who burnt copies of the *Rights of Man* and effigies of Tom Paine, the radical philosopher who had fled to France in 1792. In 1794, the Westminster government suspended time-limits on detentions (*habeas corpus*), expanded the definition of treason, and in 1799, nascent trade unions were outlawed in the Acts of Combination.[30] Naval mutinies in the spring of 1797 at Spithead and Nore, on the south and south-eastern coasts of England, immobilized invasion defences for eight weeks.[31] Coming merely months after French forces had almost reached Ireland, and after they had successfully, though briefly, landed in Wales, the threat posed by the mutinies was clear. Nor were naval defences the sole concern. Scottish militia rioted in 1798, angered like their earlier counterparts in Ireland, by the extension of militia balloting into areas hitherto exempt from it.[32]

Britain faced an invasion scare during 1796–1798 when the French attempted to land forces in Ireland, and when General Bonaparte amassed troops on the French coast prior to being sent on the Egyptian campaign. The year 1797 produced the only French landing on mainland Britain at the small-scale battle of Fishguard. Elaborate French plans to march across Wales, burn Bristol docks, and, mysteriously, to raise popular risings in Liverpool and Cheshire, remained fantasies.[33] Thus the failure of the French to land in Ireland in support of the United Irishmen and their beachhead defeat in Wales spared Britain the experience of invasion hordes that were sweeping over Germany and Italy. Whereas clerics and princes in mainland Europe propagandized resistance to the French hordes, in Britain anti-Revolutionary sentiment turned against the threat rather than the reality of invasion. The British Volunteer Corps was labelled by its leading historian as 'probably the most popular

movement in Georgian Britain'.[34] The invasion scare of 1803–1805 saw its numbers swell to 380,193 men across the country. Its sloganeering of 'Church and King' was accompanied by the dissemination of patriotic caricatures which reached a wide audience. Old enemies were replaced by Bonaparte, or as one pamphlet in 1803 claimed: 'The Pope is not the enemy, nor the papist priest, nor even Tom Paine, but Bonaparte'.[35] Even during the Peace of Amiens (1802–1803), the British government financed a propaganda campaign against the new First Consul, enlisting French émigrés, British journalists, spies, and counter-revolutionaries.[36] Once war restarted and a French invasion of England seemed likely between 1803 and 1805, a sense of foreboding gripped British public life. On 24 May 1803, Napoleon decreed the formation of a Franco-Dutch invasion flotilla, and within two years enough craft had assembled between Antwerp and St. Malo to transport 150,000 men.[37]

The explosion of pictorial satire and propaganda, and the patriotic caricatures of Gillray, led the population to internalize the threat of French invasion.[38] More cartoons were published in 1803 (the start of the invasion period), than in any other year before 1815, making invasion caricature a part of everyday society.[39] This warning can be seen in the majority of cartoons, especially those featuring the fictional character, 'John Bull'. John Bull was portrayed as possessing supposedly British characteristics: independence, courage, and patriotism.[40] Invasion cartoons and broadsheets rarely showed a heroic depiction of any British political figure like Addington or Pitt, which suggests that the propaganda had the measure of its audience.

The threat of invasion energized British policy-making and everyday civilian attitudes. The leader of the opposition peace faction, Charles James Fox, believed that the threat of invasion was being exaggerated for political reasons. But even he recognized the near-hysteria of 1803: 'the people were terrified on a scale never exhibited before'.[41] By the end of the year, German troops from enemy-occupied Hannover garrisoned two locations on the south coast of England. The presence of the 'King's German Legion' on British soil met with opposition from radicals. Journalist William Cobbett spent time in prison for calling the king 'corrupt' for stationing 'foreign' troops in Britain.[42] But the everyday experience of friendly German troops appears to have been benign, if the inspiration for Thomas Hardy's short story of 1890 (*The Melancholy Hussar*) is anything to go by. The stationing of foreign mercenaries on British soil was not, as William Cobbett feared, an oppressive threat to hard-won British liberties, but rather a benign experiment in transnational bonding.[43]

Amidst the invasion press campaign, flash telegraph lines constructed between south-east coastal towns and London accelerated intelligence sharing and government plans to evacuate gold and powder from London.[44] The mayor of Folkestone, a likely invasion zone, commanded

every inhabitant to 'bring all they possess, whether sword, gun, spade or shovel' to resist the invader. Such volunteers equipped with household items could hardly have been expected to defeat Napoleon's 'Army of England'.[45] Fear was a common sentiment throughout 1803–1805, especially in England's southeast. Invasion scares in 1801 and 1805 alarmed policy-makers into planning defensive sites in Kent, removing people, animals and food, and destroying anything of use to an invading army.[46] Tales of French oppression and atrocities taking place across the Channel, and rumours that the enemy had landed on the Kent coast quickly gained ground among the credulous and frightened.[47] Reverend Dayrell, a vicar in the Buckinghamshire village of Stowe, described accounts of several false invasion alarms throughout the month of October 1803.[48] The effects of fear were noticeable even in the absence of any invasion itself.[49] A correspondent in Chichester wrote in August 1803 that she believed an invasion would happen imminently because of the increased evacuation preparations in her village.[50] Handbills depicting a manly John Bull keeping the French hordes at bay implied the vulnerability of women, the archetypal civilian, who would fall under the path of the invader. Masculinity was a fragile quality that was wont to decay unless stirred into action in defence of women, whom writers and cartoonists usually depicted as passive victims of invasion.[51] Certainly, the European experience of French occupation reveals women to have been more victims than agents of war.

Gender

For most eighteenth-century thinkers, women only existed in relation to men, as wives, mothers, and daughters with no direct claim to the public sphere of life owned by men and operated by the state. The enlightened Spanish monk, Benito Jerónimo Feijóo, defended women as intellectual beings whom a lack of education trapped in the private sphere of the family.[52] But few women entered the public world of their brothers and fathers. Rather the public sphere entered the private via the political upheaval of the 1790s. Governments invoked private emotions of pride, grief, and stoicism in detaching women from their conscripted menfolk, or in burdening them with billets of soldiers. French Revolutionaries scrutinized the old regime private lives of their citizens, at times violating diplomatic immunities in order to uncover incriminating conspiracies by foreign agents. Women mobilized during the 1793 *Levée* were publicly celebrated for their private self-sacrifice. The intrusion of the masculine public sphere into the feminine private sphere reflected a wider effort by regimes at war. British counter-revolutionaries 'invaded' the hitherto inviolable correspondence and coffee-houses used by radicals. Vienna established a secret police force that used informers to report on disaffection, especially in its restive Hungarian territories. Napoleon constructed

a police state that also mastered public relations. Napoleon's bulletins acted as a monologue to keep rival sources of power in their place. In 1805, Napoleon instructed police chief, Fouché, that bulletins should not be read out by priests in churches – '(for) it gives them the right to comment and should news be bad, they will not fail to remark on it' – and somewhat later instead instructed that prefects should post the bulletins on the doors of churches. And the clergy in Spanish America regularly fell under the suspicion of vice-regal authorities. Their flock-pleasing jibes against *gachupines* (Spaniards) were suspected of having political motives.[53]

But military upheaval invaded further still, as troops across Europe and the Americas perpetrated violence and transient sexual relations. Hispanic cultures famously valued *machismo*. Popular leaders were machos who were expected to inspire followers and seduce women, even while they hypocritically defended their sisters' honour and insisted on marrying virgins. The Spanish-American independence story is drenched in a macho historiography dealing with command, bravery, vision, martial prowess, and womanizing.[54]

But Napoleonic troops occupying central Europe also displayed a form of *machismo*. Historian Michael Hughes has argued that masculine 'honours' included the conquest of local women, either via seduction or rape. The dubious prowess of sexual conquest formed a plank of the French military honours system, a visceral reward for conquest and a currency of primary group solidarity.[55] A French sergeant later recalled his ambition when reaching Moscow in 1812: to seek warm quarters and 'conquests of another nature: such is the French soldier's character – from war to love, and from love to war!'[56] Ute Planert has argued that the rape of women served not to subject the female sex, but to humiliate and disempower the male enemy in a traditional values culture.[57] Wives imprisoned in Mexico because their husbands were thought to be insurgents often appealed to be released by claiming they were suffering 'injustices', a deliberately abstract term which both appealed to the better nature and self-image ('justice') of the colonial authorities, and prudently obscured the exact details of their trauma.[58] Rape of women is hinted at in German-language memoirs, and appears to have increased after the French invasions of 1796. But its exact incidence is hard to canvass, given that rape victims tended to be silenced by shamed village communities and psychological trauma, a stigma which was also handed down to the children ('Husarenkinder') born out of affairs or sexual assault.[59] In a village in the French-occupied Prussian Altmark, local girls vowed never to have amorous relations with Napoleonic soldiers, 'nor even to dance with them'.[60] The rape of men appears nowhere to be mentioned, even though at least one memoir from Spain related in passing the abuse of teenage sailors in the Spanish navy.[61]

The grey area between seduction and assault had the same effect in involuntary pregnancy. Poorer and destitute women were driven into becoming prostitutes, often with the connivance of collaborationist authorities. Sometimes local authorities channelled Imperial troops towards districts inhabited by prostitutes and destitute women.[62] Society daughters of wealthier fathers faced no such choices, and sometimes married French officers of an equal social standing of their own free will, even defying family authority in the process.[63] The agency of women from bourgeois and higher backgrounds was not confined to human relationships. Between 1811 and 1815, a Patriotic Society of Ladies of Ferdinand VII linked society women in Cádiz and beyond which collected donations to fund uniforms for the Spanish army. This society's fame became transnational by maintaining correspondence with admirers in Britain.[64] But the entropy of war plunged many more Spanish women into prostitution. An officer in the King's German Legion recalled the abject state of one mountain village he traversed, which was a veritable 'Sodom and Gomorrah, where the girls and women of the higher as well as the lower classes were practically all disreputable. Pure virgins were rare'.[65]

The crisis point usually came when large numbers of troops had to be billeted for a campaign. Local authorities seeing the back of troops could normally count themselves relieved, not expecting to see the same men return. But when Jakob Walter's Württemberger regiment over the winter of 1811–1812, found itself in Fürstenwalde (Brandenburg), the same city which it had helped conquer in 1807 during the war against Prussia, the attitudes of the troops were mixed because: 'several women found their once beloved soldiers, although several men were hiding for good reason and did not wish to be found for fear they would be called a father'.[66] Where local authority evaporated in the face of conquest, destitute women were forced by circumstances to comply with soldiers' demands. Sergeant Bourgogne uncovered two demure sisters in Moscow as 'caged birds' whom he chose to remember as having rescued from the custody of a dishevelled Russian drunkard. A fellow sergeant locked them in a room filled with looted luxuries and set them the task of washing his unit's clothes.[67]

French troops were not the only army committing sexual assault, even though their greater range of operations carried this reputation. Other armies left accounts of soldiers seducing, raping, and exploiting women, which were usually prettified in memoirs. Confected 'chivalry' colours several British accounts of campaigns in Iberia, where accounts by soldiers recall 'liberating' nuns from the supposedly devious hands of Mother Superiors and priests. Equally, Russian officers' memoirs indulge reminiscences of their 'military tourism' during the 1813–1814 campaign, including the seduction (or coercion) of Polish, German, and ultimately French women.[68] Furthermore, large bodies of troops produced

tensions, irrespective of whether the soldiers harboured friendly or hostile attitudes.

But women also proved to be agents of war as well as its victims, mostly as camp-followers. Commanders usually viewed the burgeoning presence of women following soldiers as a logistical problem, despite the provision of generous conditions in some armies. Wellington forbade his officers from transporting personal possessions on scarce wheel transport. Lumped alongside personal possessions, wives were limited by number when it came to following the armies into battle. The Peninsular campaign represented the largest land effort of the War for the British. But other armies tried to dispense with camp-followers sooner. On 30 April 1793, the French National Convention voted to expel all 'useless women' from camps and garrisons, limited women's numbers to four per battalion and outlawed female soldiers. Women were, supposedly, overrunning military encampments; they were spreading confusion, enticing men from their service, seducing them into counter-revolution, and sapping their ardour, as during the surrender of Verdun in August 1792. Women's political clubs were banned, the unpopular former queen, Marie-Antoinette, executed, and feminists persecuted. By the end of 1793, Etta Palm would be in exile; Théroigne de Méricourt incarcerated in a madhouse; and Olympe de Gouges guillotined.[69] The French Convention reverted to tradition, viewing women either as helpmeets or burdens. Three months later, when the Convention's governors on Saint-Domingue emancipated any rebel slave who joined their army, they grudgingly extended the offer to slaves' wives and children, but not to their informal companions. The French thus controlled army dependents, whilst also subjecting black women to European notions of family structure and to the agency of their menfolk.[70]

Evidently, the problem of dependents persisted in most armies. Officers usually enjoyed special consideration. The Spanish army operated a 'Monte Pio' system of officer widows' pensions. The female next-of-kin of officers killed in service received part of the deceased officer's salary until the widow either remarried or became a nun.[71] But soldiers' wives fared worse. Soldiers were sometimes married in the field, the product perhaps of a general view that the presence of unmarried companions promoted desertion.[72] During the War of the First Coalition army, chaplains assigned to the Saxon army campaigning around the Rhineland married no fewer than 45 pairs, and baptized some 15 babies.[73] The Prussian army granted comparatively generous benefits for soldiers' wives. Prussian army wives had the right to occupy nearby barrack accommodation whenever their husbands were called away. Other German armies were slower to match the militarized Prussian welfare. Saxon involvement in the War of the First Coalition led to the state paying one-off payments to the wives and children of soldiers left behind, but this was conditional on private donations being made first. The Prussian army itself started

sending women away from accompanying armies after the defeat in the Fourth Coalition.[74] Even in peacetime, the Prussian forces ordered to transfer a headquarters to Lingen found themselves encumbered by 'Weiber' (wenches), as Blücher complained:

> Autumn fevers are the least of our problems ... the womenfolk and children are especially annoying. Each company and each squadron has at least thirty wenches and daily the enlisted soldiers are getting married because the girls in this region have money and His Majesty gave orders to issue wedding licences. We cannot prevent the wenches from following their menfolk their husbands ... but where should they and their children go? The commissariat will not pay for their transportation.[75]

A tiny minority of women also engaged in combat. In most cases, the popular examples of women soldiers in the French Revolutionary army fitted a tailor-made mentality of these women being the exception that proves the rule of female unsuitability for war. Women soldiers dressed as men were much popularized in several operas and plays that produced themes of patriotism, romantic love, and hints of disguise enabling homosexual as well as heterosexual advance.[76] Even such stereotypically traditional societies as the Spanish empire offered women opportunities to subvert gender roles. Spain's vibrant carnival scene turned authority upside-down, often giving women a key role in displaying this symbolism. Once war overran Spain from 1808, accounts of female fighters and cross-dressers on the Patriot side were partly real, and not entirely fabricated. Cross-dressing soldiers were not unheard-of even in Early Modern Spain; but the demands of the 1808–1814 probably increased this phenomenon.[77] Whereas war could subvert gender roles, it changed class and ethnic distinctions only temporarily. When a group of women were detained in Tamazula de Gordiano (Mexico) under suspicion of having sons who were insurgents, the solidarity that grew in an overcrowded cell between a well-to-do white woman and a mestizo single mother got cut short once the white woman managed to enlist outside contacts and a sympathetic hearing to secure her own bail.[78]

In fact, a particular class of women occupied a central role in logistics in the French and Imperial armies. A formally constituted female force, which was neither combatant nor ordinarily civilian, proved essential in the French army on campaign. The 'canteen women' (*cantinières*) were entrepreneurial sales women. They often commanded matriarchal respect over the troops ('Mother' Dubois, as once French sergeant remembered the married *cantinière* attached to his unit).[79] Yet they were fundamentally entrepreneurial rather than motivated by the sort of 'womanly' self-abnegation implicit in contemporary memoirs written by

men. They also plundered both friendly and enemy towns and cities when needs must.[80]

Other women took active support roles resisting French imperialism. Spanish women in Spain passed on intelligence and helped Patriot resistance. Vitoria-Gasteiz was heavily garrisoned by Napoleonic troops from 1807 to 1813, with all the attendant restrictions on public gatherings, taverns, and movement. But the passage of women as cleaners, labourers, and traders attracted little notice from enemy troops, and it is likely that the illicit smuggling by women of information aided the Patriot guerrillas in their victory at Arlabán in May 1811.[81] But the general experience for women and civilians in general as the Napoleonic empire reached its zenith was penury caused by repeated demands for provisions and billets, to say nothing of the conscription of their menfolk.

Imperialism and Civilian Suffering

It has traditionally been argued that Napoleon's defeat was caused by his incomprehension and underestimation of logistics.[82] His strategic failure to organize sufficient logistics in his defeats in Russia and Spain is well-known. But Imperial success in feeding off civilians in the rest of Europe does not detract from the economic calamity. During the Imperial Ulm campaign of 1805, Bavarian towns and cities along Napoleon's projected advance were forced to provide huge stores of food in order to facilitate the Emperor's 'leapfrogging' movements that were designed to avoid wasting time by pillaging the countryside. What worked for military operations proved disastrous for civilians. Some 450,000 soldiers were concentrated in southern Germany in 1805. As Bavaria changed from domination by France into an alliance with it in 1806, local authorities alienated civilians by reimbursing them for requisitions and forced loans with hated paper currency. During riots at Biberbach, protestors produced a protest verse 'Behold the amazing creature in our midst that eats gold and silver and shits paper!'[83] Paper currency, which had already served in France and Spain to monetize public debt, continued to provoke mistrust across the west for being associated with theft and fraud. Villagers in the 1790s in both the Vendée and northern Italy rejected their French occupiers' use of paper currency for food and services, and ended up being pillaged as a consequence.[84] The First Venezuelan Republic (1811–1812) collapsed in part because the revolutionaries alienated villagers by paying for confiscated supplies with paper currency.[85] Towards the end of the war, the Russian officer Kotzebue overstepped his authority by arresting Russian subjects on East Prussian soil who had controlled a network of forged banknotes.[86] The twin pressures of Imperial requisitioning and the Continental System ravaged Germany from the Rhine to the Niemen.

Further west in Germany, the case of Hannover was distinct as a sort of imperial playground: a rare British dynastic interest on the continental mainland and source of Hessian mercenaries for the British army, a French enticement to Prussia during the latter's long neutrality, and the base of the recruitment for both Britain and the French empire. In May 1803, French troops overran Hannover and the small Hannover army was disarmed by agreement with the occupiers. Recruitment immediately began for an exiled force called the 'King's German Legion', to continue the fight on the British side, and over 15,000 men would be raised over the course of hostilities.[87] Once French troops returned to occupy the Electorate in 1806, it became subject to heavy conscription for the Imperial side, as part of the new Kingdom of Westphalia. Whilst Hannover men of military age were dominated by the experience of army service, the rest of the Hannover population felt the force of occupation. The French invasion of 1803 led to ad hoc requisitioning but was quickly replaced with an onerous monthly tribute to the French occupiers. By 1807, the food consumed in Lüneburg was only three-quarters of the quantity of 1801, owing to the price spiral caused by the French presence. The rise in the cost of living led to dietary deficiencies that rendered the population more susceptible to disease, and mortality rates for the poor rose accordingly.[88] The initial local welcome offered to the French in 1803 by small groups of 'Jakobiner' was soon forgotten. Yet there were few warm feelings left for Elector George, whose Royal Navy blockaded Hannover's estuaries and coastlines, placing greater dependence on smuggling and depressing the economy.[89] The Imperial conquest of Prussia during 1806–1807 gave French troops the excuse to occupy Hannover, which in itself was resented by subjects of the Electorate, given that they believed they were never aligned with Prussia. But their British attachment made them guilty by association, and in October 1806, Napoleon imposed extraordinary reparations of 9.1 million francs on Hannover, and a monthly subsidy thereafter for the upkeep of the French garrison.[90]

The largest force, Napoleon's Imperial Army, logically produced the most tensions with civilians across Europe, especially when it projected its prejudices. The heady mix of political arrogance and military victory bred in the French core of Napoleon's army a particularly rapacious behaviour. Michael Broers has shown how relations between French officials in Napoleonic Italy were marked by contempt for 'effeminate' Italian noble families who refused to offer French-style leadership. Thus a 'subaltern' Napoleonic Italy was created, with French garrisons demanding payment for their manly 'honour' defending local elites.[91] Hannoverian civilians suffered a peculiar degree of rapacity during the French invasion of 1803 because the belief was endemic that Hannover was an English province, and French soldiers were even surprised to hear German being spoken.[92] Imperial garrisons in Holland viewed the mercantile Dutch

with suspicion. But it was perhaps Spain above all other countries where civilians suffered the most enduring prejudice as being cruel and barbaric, promoting a cycle of violence which exacerbated their suffering.

Spain, amidst its internal upheaval caused by Prince Ferdinand, jealous heir to the throne, had originally been a French ally. The Treaty of Fontainebleau, signed in October 1807, permitted the entry into Spain of large numbers of Napoleon's troops in order to prosecute the Franco-Spanish war against Portugal. But the presence of 'friendly' French troops over the winter burdened civilians just as much as when they turned hostile the following summer. By spring 1808, the Basque town of Vitoria-Gasteiz had turned into a French military camp. Tensions rose amidst billeting, sexual assaults, and the growing scarcity of food, to such a degree that the French commander ordered his troops to move around in large groups for safety.[93] The coup at Aranjuez which brought Ferdinand to power unleashed pent-up popular hostility towards wartime restrictions. Worried elites mounted vigilante patrols, whilst also annulling the former dictator Godoy's hated taxes on wine and prohibition of bullfighting.[94] Once war formally started, the French invaders' billeting crisis grew even worse, as Spanish civilians refused to provide food and shelter, and in remote places often sabotaged both by abandoning their homes and taking to the hills whenever hostile troops approached.[95] The presence of thousands of refugees in Zaragoza during the French assault in February 1809, who in turn accounted for about half of the 53,813 Spaniards killed in the siege, certainly conferred upon the city a fitting sobriquet of 'people's war', to say nothing of the thousands of subterranean survivors of hunger and disease who endured two months of siege, and emerged into complete devastation when the city finally surrendered on 20 February 1809. But town-dwellers, unlike countryside dwellers, had nowhere to run to once they were besieged. They were caught between opposing armies. Even Zaragoza's defence comprised mostly regular troops.[96] Areas like Catalonia faced the double threat of mountain partisans and Royal Navy assaults on French convoys braving the coastline.[97]

As deep war swayed across Spain in 1810–1812 hunger grew worse, turning to outright famine in 1812, especially in Josephine Madrid. The diarist, Mesonero Romanos, recorded 'the poor dying on the streets in broad daylight, survivors contorted in agony, and several even now refusing the alms offered to them by passing French soldiers'.[98] The price of wheat more than trebled, and people resorted to eating food formerly reserved for animals such as carob and acorns. The starving poor preferred to endure suffering out of peer pressure and a desire not to be rewarded by the agents of their torment. Even city officials went unpaid and several set up as small shopkeepers or even artisans in desperation. The Josephine police force (Milicia Civica) was hard pressed to maintain order in the capital.[99] In French-occupied Asturias during 1811, orphanages witnessed a rise in the admission of not only abandoned and

illegitimate children, but also children rendered destitute by the march of their soldier fathers.[100]

Local vagaries sometimes worsened the food crisis. A Spanish interpreter either accidentally or maliciously sowed discord between British officers and their Spanish hosts on whom they were billeted near Ciudad Rodrigo. British officers offered to pay for food, Spanish hosts offered to give, but the interpreter gave Spaniards' the impression that the British were out to steal.[101] The court-house of San Guillermo in Cantabria, Spain, had to accommodate a billet of French troops during the Napoleonic occupation. Hungry troops were rebuffed by the host when they asked for fat to make soup, and were rebuffed in the rest of the small town. Returning to their lodgings they discovered pots of fat, and made soup. When their host found them eating his secret stash he deflected the troops' anger by telling them that the fat was 'thieves lard' (manteca de ladrón). The host was the local executioner, and he claimed to distil ointment out of the condemned men's body-fat. The involuntarily cannibalistic troops were suitably disgusted to drop the matter.[102]

Napoleonic control of Spain reached its zenith in January 1812, during the siege and subsequent capture of Valencia by Marshal Suchet. But the logistical situation remained perilously stretched.[103] In order to satisfy the famished conscripts required to expel tremendous energy on a daily basis, the Josephine regime increased the intensity of requisitioning from the local populace. In the early stages of the Peninsular War, French requisitions were often negotiated with local authorities. Marshal Suchet recalled how his commanders deliberately exaggerated their troop strength in order to cow civilian populations and lay claim to more supplies. But civilians grew wise to this ploy. A detachment of Imperial troops in January 1809 marching from Calatayud to a nearby village demanded food and forage for 1,000 men. But the mayor calmly replied that he would hand over supplies for 780. The embarrassed French commander accepted because the Spanish authorities had accurately ascertained the exact number of troops.[104] Consequently, as the availability of food decreased, the nature of Imperial occupation degenerated into what one historian called a 'war for food'.[105] Over-zealous requisitioning embittered previously compliant local populations and raised the appeal of the guerrillas. Spanish cities were starved. A British officer reported witnessing civilians 'deserting daily to the guerrillas' from Madrid, as the garrisons and civilian population competed for insufficient supplies from the guerrilla-ridden countryside.[106]

A hostile occupation during or immediately after hostilities produced tensions of violence and insult. French troops occupying Prussia after Napoleon's victory at Jena were reported to be committing widespread excesses and hostage-taking. The aftermath of Jena and Auerstädt proved costly to civilians in the path of defeated and pursuing armies. One Prussian officer remarked his relief at reaching Mecklenburg, where

he gladly paid for local butter and sausages. His French pursuers by contrast, simply plundered.[107] The disaster proved so humiliating that one famous Prussian veteran later claimed to have participated in a derailed plot to assassinate the Emperor.[108]

The occupation of Berlin hit local authorities especially hard. The already excessive burden caused by hosting friendly troops was overwhelmed by French officers who held ostentatious balls at local expense, accommodated their families, and who, local authorities reported, 'appear not to want to retain even a basic level of sociability with the Berlin population'.[109] Berliners faced mass billeting in February 1808, as the French military authorities emptied the barracks in order to replace their dire straw mattresses. Even though the barracks were gradually reoccupied, in several instances the French authorities deliberately persisted with billeting as a reprisal for non-cooperation from civilian authorities regarding provisions.[110] In April 1812, a Prussian officer wrote how 'Berlin is full of Frenchmen', and that his aunt's house was suffering from billeting.[111]

The Prussian countryside faced similar depredations. The persistent shortage of horses facing the French cavalry and supply units was a legacy of the demise of stud-farms during the Revolution. The price was now paid by the occupied Prussian population. The heavy cavalry (*curaissiers*) in particular needed new steeds from the stud-farms in Germany and Poland.[112] French despoliation of stud-farms turned into a general seizure of horses. Agriculture in occupied Prussia was impeded and made worse by a cattle disease which spread around the Neumark and Kurmark countryside over the winter of 1807–1808, because French troop movements rendered quarantines ineffective. By January, local authorities despaired at the excessive billeting of French troops in Prussian villages, and the exhaustion of all hay stocks.[113] In April, the Prussian authorities prohibited the slaughter of oxen until they had completed sowing tasks, and by May it was estimated that one-third of Prussia's cattle and horses had been lost since the start of the French occupation.[114] Livestock activity was also affected by the decreasing availability of animal feed. By October, the crisis had worsened owing to the spread of foot-and-mouth disease.[115] The Prussian authorities faced a crisis communicating with districts under French occupation, as their letters were regularly intercepted by French troops, creating 'serious consequences for the whole state'.[116] Imperial arrogance reached its peak in 1812, given unrelenting pressure on the resources of the countryside caused by troop deployments and on the Prussian treasury in terms of the indemnity.[117] For example, a Prussian bailiff unable to understand French faced the arrogance of the French Grande Armée during its Russian campaign when a dragoon division was sent to tear down the unfortunate man's mansion rather than belabour their request for additional materials.[118] Several killings by French

troops of civilians in East Prussia were registered, usually when the troops were challenged when stealing horses.[119]

Resentment at occupation in Prussia revolved around humiliation. A wounded Prussian officer who reached Berlin resented how the self-proclaimed patriotic authorities of 1806 were now pro-French.[120] The first victorious troops to parade under the Brandenburg Gate, which had been completed in 1791 to honour Frederick the Great and the Junker tradition, were Napoleon's in 1806, not Prussian.[121] In Spain, by contrast, where Patriots never gave up the fight, the absence of feelings of humiliation allowed for a surprising degree of coexistence between occupiers and occupied. In areas of protracted conflict, civilians could hardly distinguish between the depredations of the Imperials or the Patriots. Landowners in the guerrilla zone of the Serrania de Ronda (Andalucia) complained how, having been economically devastated by the French in the invasion of 1810, they were now being finished off by the demands made by the Patriots.[122]

But in urban environments occupiers and occupied usually observed a *modus vivendi*. Officers billeted on private homes or in rooms above inns sometimes found themselves using the same premises as their 'bandit' enemies, dining, washing, and relaxing, each unaware of their enemies' presence. For the occupiers, the role played by an outwardly friendly innkeeper or madame could make a huge psychological difference, preparing a modicum of French comforts alongside a sanitized version of Spanish, Balkan, or German culture and food. In other theatres, the ability of foreign officers to communicate with locals eased relations. Several Russian officers came from Baltic areas of the Tsar's empire, so their ability to speak or understand some German eased their relations with Swiss and German hosts during Suvorov's campaign.[123] Hamburg residents subjected to Imperial billeting from 1806 eased their relations with officers for two reasons. Several householders had some knowledge of French because of the émigré era (*Emigrantenzeit*) of the 1790s, and some Imperial officers were Dutch who could communicate via a shared *Plattdeutsch* dialect.[124]

An overwhelming troop concentration banished and alienated civilians, however. The British army's grim retreat to La Coruña over the winter of 1808–1809 pushed relations with nominally allied civilians to breaking point as troops stripped villages bare and destitute villagers committed violence against stragglers.[125] Royalist troops stationed in Tacubaya on the edge of Mexico City in the summer of 1813 stole horses, fruit from orchards, and market-goods. A vegetable seller who chased a soldier who had stolen onions was beaten with her own produce.[126] Between November 1807 and June 1812, some 300,000 troops of all nationalities passed through Salamanca. But when in October 1812, the village of Arenys de Munt (Gerona) experienced the 11-day occupation and plunder by the French of all its houses, all relations broke down.[127] A

modicum of coexistence could exist only in smaller garrisons or bigger towns. Occupiers and occupied exchanged food, culture, amusements, fashions, and ideas, fraternizing with apparent normality.[128] The problems attendant on billeting soldiers produced not just a logistical and civil-military crisis. Barracks often functioned as factors in local economies, as there was collaboration between army, private, and public institutions in order to supply and repair the buildings, and a custodial staff to manage day-to-day operations. At times, barracks hosted shops and workshops, catering to the soldiers or providing spaces for entrepreneurs. Civilian small-scale commerce managed to thrive around militarized spaces, competing with local commerce, and encroaching on space reserved for troops. Gendarmes, who were usually single men and veterans of the Grande Armée, were organized in six-man units, typically cavalry. They were housed in barracks and recycled frequently as a form of 'colon' and instrument of colonialism. They had to serve away from their areas and had to possess at least three campaigns of military service.[129] Gendarmes, who had been respected for ending rural unrest within France in the later 1790s, were hate-figures beyond French frontiers.[130] But they too needed to be provisioned, which stimulated activity in urban areas. Equally, the movement of troops offered civilians opportunities as well as burdens. Urban areas benefitting from garrisons indirectly burdened the countryside from where the troops were sustained. But even rural populations could benefit. Battlefield corpses could be looted, armies were supplied by sutlers, landowners could profit from inflated food prices, and the landless could take advantage of the upheaval to manorial rights caused by French troops and policies by poaching, seizing wood, and asserting other grievances.[131] The cost, of course, was borne by the society, not by the 'liberators'. Soldiers seized mules and carts, and abandoned them far away from where they were needed, ruining markets and businesses. The Düsseldorf writer, Heinrich Heine, fondly recalled his childhood encounters with the good-natured French officer 'Le Grand' who could master only monosyllabic demands of his German hosts ('Brot', 'Bier'). But the Continental System which Le Grand's imperialism enforced helped cause the collapse of the business owned by Heine's father.[132]

By 1808 Hamburg was the nexus of French occupation, both as a major port and communications centre for northern Germany. It also served as the centre for imposing the Continental System, from which the Hanseatic port was suffering immensely. Its sugar refineries, for example, would decline in number from 435 to only 40 during the years of Blockade.[133] Almost 200,000 troops and administrators were allocated lodgings in and around the city, radically transforming the urban environment.[134] Whereas civilians feared common soldiers as harbingers of theft, violence, and poor hygiene, officers could present challenges of a different nature. French officers tended to request luxurious items from

housekeepers, imposing upfront costs on civilians which were often not reimbursed adequately. A stationary unwelcome guest presented similar burdens to passing French troops who cheated civilians by signing receipts with assumed names or staging bar-brawls between themselves in order to eject themselves from restaurants without paying their bill.[135] Embittered and traumatized officers could also simply tyrannize their reluctant hosts. A family in Hamburg obliged to billet a long-serving French officer, whom the daughter later recalled as 'Monsieur Louis', soon discovered his sociopathic qualities. His anger was stoked by the host family starting dinner without him, by insufficient straw in his mattress, and ultimately his anger boiled into a row which drove the women from the house amidst his threats to 'do in' the head of household. The householder, who was bigger than Louis, confronted Louis, pinning him against the wall, and ridiculing his pretension of behaving like an officer. Louis promised vengeance from his superiors, but the German reached the commandant first, and the French military authorities tacitly sided with the long-suffering civilians: 'Oh, I know him well. He's a rowdy one!', before allocating him billets elsewhere.[136]

Civilians and Wartime Blockade

Napoleon's economic war against Britain, his 'Continental System', was waged between the defeat of Prussia in 1806 and the general collapse of his empire in Europe in mid-1813. The Berlin Decree of 1806 banned all commerce and imports from Britain into Europe. Napoleon's policy targeted what he called 'this policy of England, worthy of the earliest stages of barbarism, which has profited that power to the detriment of every other nation'.[137] But Napoleon's grand aims to crush Britain proved unrealistic. Britain's naval strength was never higher throughout the Blockade, with total British tonnage in large ships one-third greater than the rest of Europe combined.[138] Britain's victory at Trafalgar had not entirely removed the threat of French invasion. The annexation of Antwerp, gave France a naval base where a fleet might shelter north and east of Brest, and a location to start rebuilding French naval strength.[139] But the revival in Napoleonic naval power did not seriously challenge British supremacy at sea, which denied the French empire realistic chances of intercepting vessels and enforcing the blockade, especially along exposed coastlines.

Louis Napoleon, Bonaparte's long-suffering brother and King of Holland, observed that one might as well try to prevent the skin from sweating as to stop continental trade with Britain.[140] Holland and Amsterdam in particular faced economic catastrophe. The Blockade crippled Dutch maritime industries and colonial trade, and catalyzed Holland's loss of status on the European and world stage. Dutch trade in 1811 had shrunk to less than a quarter of its levels in 1780, with the number of ships registered in its ports falling from 2,400 in 1805 to 210 in 1810.

The Dutch economy imploded on the loss of its vital trade. Amsterdam and Rotterdam experienced mass migration and unemployment, with approximately 30–40% of people living in Amsterdam needing poor relief.[141] The situation was equally dire in the rest of the Napoleonic coastline. Bordeaux, with its Atlantic markets cut off by the British blockade, became a shadow of its former self. In 1808, the American consul in the city reported 'grass growing in the streets' and 'its beautiful port deserted except for two fishing schooners and three of four empty vessels which still swing to the tide'.[142] Even more severe was the situation in French-occupied Catalonia. The British reduced French overseas trade to a shadow of its former self. Once Spain became the seat of war between the terrestrial and maritime hegemons, Spanish commerce under French occupation was devastated. In April 1808, as many as 142 vessels remained docked at Barcelona. But by July of that same year only eight remained.[143] British amphibious warfare on the south-western coast at Cádiz has been likened to an 'aircraft carrier'.[144] The ability of British naval forces to resupply and defend coastal cities made the task of the Napoleonic empire to control seaboards even harder. Cabotage sea traffic could only proceed under the cover of night, and during the day captains tried to shelter within range of shore artillery in order to avoid being seized by the British navy.

Relief for merchants and consumers came from contraband. Europe's exposed coastlines had always provided opportunities for smugglers. Spain's late-eighteenth-century army, for example, included three regiments of light infantry and two of light cavalry tasked with suppressing smugglers and Barbary corsairs operating along the extensive Mediterranean coastline.[145] The Spanish navy imposed blackouts on coastal shipping in the face of the British blockade, which had the effect of enabling the activities of seaborne smugglers.[146] The crushing British naval victory at Trafalgar in 1805 prevented any rival fleet from seriously challenging Britain's counter-blockade. European coasts were therefore the scene of smuggling on a grander scale, with all its attendant wrongdoing and unofficial (sometimes even official) connivance. Napoleon closed off British trade in one location, but British naval superiority opened it up somewhere else. After British trade with Livorno fell as a consequence of the Continental System, it rose elsewhere in other port cities such as Messina and Palermo. In particular, Britain's development of Malta as a commercial hub saw maritime activity rise year-on-year until 1809, when it peaked with the entry of 303 ships into its ports.[147] The Continental System proved more of a nuisance than a menace for Britain, in contrast to less economically developed parts of Europe and its empires.[148] A soldier's wife based at Boulogne with Napoleon's Army of the Coasts wrote how the British taunted the invasion fleet in naval skirmishes by firing sea-biscuit as well as shot at the French vessels in a ploy to demoralize the blockaded enemy.[149] The *Ersatz* commodities of continental Europe

were unknown in Britain, despite some attempts to mitigate imports, such as the £3,000 invested in Scotland in 1811 to cultivate flax and hemp for naval use.[150] By contrast, daily life in continental Europe was more seriously affected. Illicit trade spawned what Michael Broers has called 'smuggler republics'. These naturally sheltered, highly lucrative, contraband strongholds undermined the System and granted the British a welcome market, while war with Spain opened up new opportunities in the Americas.[151]

Civilians made the pressures of war more bearable by profiting from illicit commerce. Britain's reach of contraband across the friendly Mediterranean mirrored similar efforts in enemy waters on the other side of the Atlantic. Hostile contraband had been rife along the Caribbean coasts during the Anglo-Spanish hostilities of 1795–1801 and 1803–1808. Only during the two years of peace in between did Spanish products, especially Catalan cotton, outsell British equivalents in New Spain. But locals still preferred British products, and smuggling and the abuse of Spanish concessions to neutral shippers during the brief peace allowed the British to dominate again once war resumed and Spain's naval power was downgraded after the battle of Trafalgar.[152] Thereafter British naval incursions into the western and southern Caribbean yielded a market for tariff-free products, especially in the economically depressed coastal communities around Veracruz. After 1805, the consumption of contraband became the norm, a new 'moral economy' that overwhelmed the Spanish authorities.[153] A British traveller noticed how contraband triumphed even where force of arms failed. Even though Viceroy Liniers defeated the British invaders off the River Plate, their vessels lingered off Montevideo and Buenos Aires, instigating an underworld of blockade-running and payoffs for corrupt authorities: 'the system of smuggling is so organised here that it is nearly a certainty that any vessel permitted to remain in harbour a week clears her cargo, even though the Viceroy should dispatch his principal officers aboard to watch it'. Thomas Kinder concluded that 'the profit to the Officers is so great that Spanish integrity cannot withstand it'.[154] Illegal tariff-free imports defrayed some of the burden caused by war to Spanish-American consumers. By the 1790s, Spanish America had become militarized to an unprecedented degree, with defence expenditure for the first time having outstripped the ability of the local tax base to finance it. Even Pacific-facing regions immune to international threats were militarized. Peru was divided into three zonal commands in response to the Spanish empire's war with France in 1793.[155]

In Europe, communities along the North and Baltic Sea coasts routinely violated the Berlin Decree in the wake of Britain's decisive action against Denmark. In August 1807, Britain seized control of the considerable Danish fleet. The British landed troops on Zealand eight miles north of Copenhagen, and besieged Copenhagen. An infantry brigade commanded by the Duke of Wellington defeated a counterattack led by

Danish militia on 29 August and Copenhagen was subjected to a terror bombardment lasting three days, including Congreve rocket fire, which killed almost 200 civilians. The destruction of urban areas was nothing new. Artillery had reached the stage where it could level a city, but not devastate a country.[156] In 1793, the Rhine town of Breisach had been totally destroyed by bombardment and riots destroyed the Caribbean port of Cap Française.[157] But the bombardment of Copenhagen and associated neutralization of the Danish fleet changed the nature of Baltic and North Sea relations for the rest of the war. Privateering became the only economic activity above subsistence level in Denmark-Norway, attracting blockaded seamen and even peasants into a risky but high-margin business. Their task became precarious indeed from 1809 after the British captured Anholt, a tiny Danish island in the Kattegat. Anholt became the sole British base in the Baltic, providing support to merchant shipping and the Royal Navy. Not only did it provide a supply of fresh water, but control of the lighthouse also helped ward merchant ships away from reefs, and when ships were beached, or a crew was stranded. The Royal Marine garrison repulsed a Danish attempt to recapture the island in March 1811.[158]

British ruthlessness against Copenhagen mirrored French ruthlessness against Lisbon, Portugal having been dragged into a climate of enmity against France since Anglo-Spanish pressure to bolster the Pyrenees front in 1794.[159] The war with Portugal in 1807 led to the capture of the port of Lisbon and the closure of British markets there, until British forces the following year cleared Portugal of French troops during the opening stages of the Peninsular War. In the rest of Europe, the popularity of British goods and the reliance of economies both on the continent and in Britain resulted in a roaring trade in smuggled goods spread across Europe's northern coastlines. Crucial to the success of the smugglers were British naval operations off Heligoland, the tiny island in the North Sea that the British captured from the Danes in 1807. Heligoland then became, in the words of one naval historian, 'the Warehouse of Europe'.[160] Merchants carrying British goods sold their cargoes at Heligoland and then smugglers, often falsely flying neutral colours, carried the goods on to the European coastline, regularly in convoy under the protection of the Royal Navy. The wealth that this trade offered to merchants was so lucrative that officials could easily be bribed. Plenty of customs agents had no qualms faking half-an-hour's sleep in return for a bribe worth their annual salary. Despite contraband trade brazenly booming around Heligoland in the North Sea, the confiscation of the goods coming into Northern Germany never rose above 5% of the total.[161]

The smugglers' paradise between Heligoland and the Schleswig and Holstein coasts had free reign until the winter of 1810–1811, when Napoleon annexed the German North Sea coastline, and garrisoned the Schleswig port of Tönning where most illicit goods had been landed.

Annexation into Napoleon's 'outer empire' tightened up the control of ports and beaches, sending the North German economy into a deep recession. The number of Napoleonic customs agents peaked in 1812 at around 35,000. But such efforts punished continental consumers far more than they inconvenienced the British. Meanwhile, British smuggling interests were displaced to Gothenburg, the island of Fotö, and the wider Baltic.[162] Gothenburg was even called 'Little London' in some circles, reflecting its status as the centre of British trade with Western Europe.[163] The Baltic remained a key region for British trade, accounting for 33.56% of global exports on average during 1802–1812, with a surge from 1811 in the wake of Russia's decision to leave Napoleon's Continental System.[164] Between the Treaty of Tilsit in 1807 and 1810, Russian external trade had fallen by 43%.[165] The Continental system was despised in Russia for the disruption of Russia's highly profitable trade with Britain, which badly impacted on the Russian economy and lowered the incomes of nobles, merchants, and serfs alike.[166] The elimination of most of the Danish fleet in 1807 confirmed the Russians in their calculations. The display of overwhelming British naval power helped persuade Russia against seriously embargoing British trade, despite Napoleon's insistence and his attempts to dominate the Baltic by launching what would turn out to be an indecisive Franco-Danish war against Sweden.[167]

Thus the events of 1807 confirmed a dynamic which would persist until mid-1813. The degree of economic misery facing civilians was in inverse proportion to the value of illicit trade with Britain. Iceland, whose Danish governor in vain resisted British attempts to break Copenhagen's trade monopoly, underwent turmoil when an adventurer and escaped prisoner, Jørgen Jørgensen, in 1809 proclaimed a short-lived Icelandic Republic.[168] Yet despite the wide-scale corruption of men tasked with implementing the system (and the blasé attitudes of some sovereigns), the smuggling operation was not without risk. The Danes, for example, after having lost their fleet to the British pre-emptive naval strike, adopted a maritime strategy of using gunboats to raid trade convoys as they passed through the Danish straits. The waters between Sjælland and Bornholm were a favoured hunting ground of Danish privateers. The strategy was helped by Britain's refusal to concentrate its global naval power in the Baltic, despite London's reliance on naval stores (especially timber and hemp) from northern European markets.[169] Unglamorous convoy duties clashed with the Royal Navy's tradition of aggressively annihilating enemy fleets, and over a quarter of its ships were deployed outside of European waters during the Napoleonic Wars.[170] As the British were never able to completely close off the Baltic Sea, they could not enforce their counter-blockade, and landings by smugglers along the North Sea coast, especially at the Hannoverian port of Cuxhaven, continued.[171] British merchant captains usually kept in convoy with the Royal Navy, aiming both to avoid capture and to secure the high profits of their own blockade-running. But

the risk that goods would be seized in port declined sharply as the Baltic ports broke ranks with the Napoleonic empire from 1812 onwards.[172]

The blockade also boosted piracy from Danish and Norwegian coastal communities that launched gunboats against British seaborne trade. At the 1807–1809 height of the Anglo-Danish 'Gunboat War', privateers acquired a double-edged reputation as 'patriotic' pirates. On the one hand, they were hard-drinking, womanizing, and ostentatiously wealthy amidst general wartime impoverishment. But on the other hand, they repaid investors, stimulated local economies, and offered a lifeline to Copenhagen's treasury which received a portion of loot via prize levies and other special taxes.[173] This illicit revenue defrayed some of the costs caused by unemployment, industrial stagnation, and declining living standards, albeit not in an even fashion. Even so Denmark in 1811 defaulted on its interest payments for loans to the government.[174] Norway suffered famine and unrest as its essential trade with British markets was devastated and villagers unable to access the black market subsisted on bark-bread. Henrik Ibsen's 1862 poem, *Terje Vigen*, relates the tragedy of a man who rowed from Norway to Denmark in search of food for his starving family, and who is captured by the Royal Navy and imprisoned on a hulk while his family dies and he is forgotten. Danish Altona and Flensburg in particular were sustained by black market trade amidst general economic collapse after 1810.[175] Napoleon's Continental System, as Alexander Mikaberidze has observed, criminalized coastal communities.[176] Entire families were dedicated to small-scale economic fraud, as demonstrated by the involvement of fathers, sons, and brothers in these types of activities. It was a survival criminality by humble men and women who, on foot or by donkey, transported small amounts of basic items for personal consumption or distribution in the neighbourhoods, whose residents tended to be complicit. The consequences of impoverishment could be far-reaching. The Basque region of Spain, which had already suffered declining trade with Spanish America as consequence of British enmity, was so devastated by Napoleonic occupation from 1808 that it supported Spain's most aggressive guerrilla movement.[177]

The town of Mandal on the southern tip of Norway illustrates how settlements at the mercy of the Royal Navy managed to subvert both the British and Napoleonic blockades. As a local historian noted, the star blockade-runner was the St. Jørgen, whose crew spent ten pounds purchasing falsified French paperwork at Liverpool, disguising their destination as Bordeaux, and managing to ship Cheshire salt and tobacco from Liverpool back to Norway. Despite being stopped by a Danish vessel on the return the St. Jørgen was allowed to continue unmolested, which suggests that the Danish crew were either untrained or uninterested in exposing the subterfuge. The ship invoiced their client £562 for the goods themselves, various insurance and harbour fees, £21 for a British trading 'licence' and £10 for the charade of the Bordeaux 'licence'. Despite

extensive English documentation and invoices from British harbour authorities being hidden away on board, after a 'thorough search' by the local harbour master and customs officials in Mandal, the cargo and all the associated paperwork were deemed as being all in order.[178] Successful blockade-runners carried documentation from both sides, and highly bribable customs agents had no qualms overlooking the offending ones in order to hold up the correct ones.[179] The double-dealing of Norwegian seafarers was in any case minor when compared with the more lucrative trade of financiers like Gabriel-Julien Ouvrard who profited from a maritime network of smuggling between enemies.[180]

The Norwegian south thus lived in a neverworld. The British bombardment of Copenhagen effectively severed Norway's sea communications with the metropolis and led to de facto self-government.[181] The bombardment of Kristiansand by three Royal Navy ships on 11 September 1807 provoked the military authorities into various countermeasures. Various small artillery batteries were built along the coast and the shipyards at Kristiansand were set to work building more gunboats. Church spires and other navigation landmarks identifying likely urban targets were disguised or camouflaged with tree-branches. Lighthouses and watchtowers were revitalized and equipped with optical telegraph systems. These were manned by local farmers and 'beachcombers', whose diligence and literacy left accurate records of the passage of enemy ships. Despite the various mixed impacts of the blockade on the local economy, there were soon more merchant ships registered in Mandal than before the war. Most local people managed to take some advantage from the flourishing black economy. In fact, records suggest that Norwegian villagers suffered more at the hands of their Danish overlords than the blockade. Demands to provide billets to Danish-Norwegian soldiers and sailors led to complaints that the Danes ate too much and were delinquent in providing reimbursement.[182]

The outbreak of war with Sweden in 1808, and the growing French pressure by 1812 to tighten control of ports and beaches, obliterated most of the earlier economic gains. The 'double blockade' of British hegemony at sea and French hegemony on land depressed the economy, especially in Jutland and Schleswig. Anti-French feeling grew, pitting popular smugglers against unpopular customs police, while the smugglers and draft-dodgers holding out in the newly annexed marshlands of northern Germany and southern Denmark were seen as popular heroes at least as much as dangerous fugitives.[183] Further south in the new Kingdom of Westphalia, the proceeds from smuggling had a similar effect. Throughout 1810, Westphalian officers made money on the side via the open secret of trading in smuggled 'colonial' products.[184] The army also largely enjoyed impunity and barracks could become a centre for black-market profiteering. Scarcity was somewhat fictitious: any item could be found on the black market for those who had the money

to pay for it. The open flouting of the customs blockade would lead to a festive bonfire of customs receipts and attacks on customs officials as the Napoleonic empire collapsed in 1813. In January 1813, Solingen was the scene of a workers' uprising fuelled by economic suffering and the ongoing burden of conscription.[185] But civilians had one more great trial to survive which began the year before, when the Imperial invasion of Russia unleashed the greatest weight of armies and attendant suffering yet witnessed in Europe.

Total War, Total Suffering

Urban populations suffering sieges, or even just occupations, endured experiences approximating total war. Mainz in 1793 was bombarded by assorted German besieging forces. The shelling targeted not the defending French garrison, but the civilian population, whose authorities had recently agreed union with France. The besiegers behaved thus in order either to sow discontent between the population and the French garrison or perhaps to punish a city which in March 1793 had birthed Germany's first democratic republican experiment.[186] The French Revolutionary recapture of royalist Lyon in 1793 was followed by an official communiqué in the wake of the siege: 'the city of Lyon no longer exists'. Much of the city of Hamburg was simply destroyed during the French suppression in 1813 of its revolt.[187] The fall of Warsaw in November 1794 led to Russian troops allegedly killing anywhere between 12,000 and 20,000 Poles in the space of a few hours.[188] Ideology cut across military and civil lines that inevitably led to direct conflict between the two, in a new chapter for modern warfare. Violence between military and civil populations increased during this era.[189]

At the height of Napoleonic imperialism in 1812, civilians across Europe were seized with a general malaise caused by occupation and food shortages as well as despair that a generation of war still had no end in sight.[190] The Spanish Patriot capital of Cádiz lay under siege for more than two years between 1810 and 1812. Anglo-Spanish control of the sea kept the city and its garrison amply supplied. But overcrowding in the city became intolerable, especially when its endemic yellow fever reached epidemic proportions. French batteries positioned across the bay at Chiclana, Santa Maria, and Puerto Real fired at a hitherto-impossible eight-kilometre range into the city. Damage and casualties were slight. The heavy shells sacrificed shot for range, and thus carried little explosive power. The guns' great range and clear sightline across the bay gave the Patriots the opportunity set up an early warning system. Church bells rang whenever flashes from the enemy batteries were spotted across the bay, giving civilians almost a minute to seek shelter. Bell-ringing saved lives as well as performing their traditional role of using noise to project a sense of community within and defiance without. But by 1812, cabin

fever had set in. The French guns had gained increasing range, now subjecting most of the city to bombardment. Local women made fun out of these puny projectiles. But the wealthier classes moved to take lodgings in the city's remaining safe southern fringes. Relief came when the Allied victory at Salamanca on 22 July 1812 forced the French to lift the siege, although not before a spectacular effort on the final day before the guns were spiked. Civilians finally got the chance to cross the isthmus, and enjoy space and fresh air. They returned home with tufts of grass as symbols of their liberation. But elation was short-lived as travellers sensed the even worse devastation that the Imperial occupation has wrought throughout Andalucía.[191]

Elsewhere in 1812, in Spain and throughout the rest of Europe, civilian suffering was at its worst. Napoleon's build-up of Imperial troops for the Russian campaign of 1812 confronted civilians with the passage of armies, and they did their best to keep cold and hungry soldiers at arms' length. The flags and liveries of the troops mattered very little in extremis. The first horrors suffered by civilians in the western reaches of the Russian empire in summer 1812 were caused by Tsarist rather than Imperial authorities. The aide-de-camp to the architect of the 'scorched earth', Barclay de Tolly, carried out mass requisitions of horses in Vilnius, the forced evacuation of men of military age, of suspected profiteers, and even the execution of 27 dissidents. Waldemar Löwenstern grimly recorded his commission: 'scenes of devastated families had passed before my eyes: of fathers of entire families, taken from their wives and children; of poor Jews, seduced by greed, in chains ... The dreaded word was pronounced for twenty-seven individuals'.[192] Civilians who endured Tsarist excesses could expect no reprieve from the Imperials. Within days of crossing into Russian territory, the bottleneck of logistics forced desperate hunger upon the invading masses.

But the real horrors came months later, during the Imperial retreat through western Russia. Within months the emaciated and dishevelled Grande Armée survivors would retreat across the same ground, inflicting the most abject suffering on civilians in their frozen path. Survivors who reached Vilnius in early winter 1812 thought that they were approaching a 'friendly' city. But the terrified inhabitants facing being overwhelmed bolted their doors all the same, after protecting what they could from pillaging and disease. Archaeological evidence unearthed from a mass grave in Vilnius in 2001 revealed that around a third of the retreating Imperial troops were afflicted with typhus-carrying lice.[193] Civilians in more exposed settlements sometimes managed to keep the multitude at bay. A Jewish household in rural Lithuania proved welcoming and hospitable to a small number of French officers, hoping that their sudden guests would protect their property and keep their comrades at bay.[194] The Jewish minority throughout western Russia and Poland had special cause to be wary. Amidst general poverty, Jews were prolifically running small

village stores that, combined with their distinctive appearance and object of local disaffection, made them easy targets for marauding soldiers and overzealous officials. Memoirs from both sides during Imperial army's retreat are laced with comments about Jews ranging from exotification to outright hostility.[195] The persistence of billeting thus placed civilians in harm's way. A detachment of French troops billeted on a Jewish family in Vitebsk in summer 1812 held the wife and two daughters of the head of household hostage in order to make sure that the latter returned from an errand to get provisions.[196] Jakob Walter, a teenage Württemberger who kept a diary during the Russian campaign, used animalistic references to describe a Jewish man he kidnapped as a guide, and relished how his squad imprisoned a Jewish householder in their billets in order to ensure that his wife supplied them with the best food.[197]

A British officer serving in the Russian army reported horrors, including civilians wreaking revenge upon some 60 half-dead Imperial troops whose brains they struck out with repeated blows to their heads, wounded men roasting and eating the flesh of a demised comrade, and a half-frozen camp-follower paralyzed with terror at having given birth to a child which was then stolen from her.[198] The dead, General Wilson remarked later amidst the carnage west of Minsk, 'are to be envied'.[199] Memoir accounts from the Imperial side recounted similar horrors and privations, without obvious motives to embellish or titillate.[200] As the Imperial troops retreated across the Niemen and into Prussia, timid King Frederick William was persuaded to act. Following the French defeat in the winter of 1812, Prussian Marshals and force commanders, seeing the opportunity to fight back against a weakened French army and state, began to raise militia units to mount irregular resistance. This activism forced Frederick William to declare war on France in order to regain authority and legitimacy that was slipping away, as his commanders acted without his approval. Prussian officers grew embarrassed at the crisis in Berlin in February 1813, when Russian troops occupied the city as allies of the Prussian army since the December 1812 Convention of Tauroggen, but where civilian authorities awaiting the King's final declaration of war continued to see the foreign troops as intruders.[201] On 16th March 1813, the King finally made famous appeals to the people as well as the army, showing a change towards inciting a 'people's war' in the name of Prussia or Germany as a whole. When Prussian Marshal Blücher entered the Napoleonic satellite of Saxony, he issued a proclamation to his troops demanding they treat civilians lightly as Saxony would 'soon be our ally'. At the end of March Prussian troops occupied Dresden.[202]

While courts and commanders forged the Sixth Coalition (1813–1814) against Napoleon, civilians caught in the path of French retreats and Allied advances suffered the suspicion and plunder of troops surging through their villages, towns, and farms. One French officer recalled sealing off a village where they billeted and threatened to burn down

the buildings the moment the Prussian civilians tried anything underhand.[203] Famished civilians recognized only the nature, not the nationality, of soldiers. Marauding Cossacks plundering villages east of Poznan in the winter of 1812–1813 suffered reprisals from local civilians. These ironically excited the pity of their Imperial enemy. In one incident, some Imperial scouts rescued 20 Cossacks who were being set upon by a group of enraged Polish villagers.[204] Just as civilians had learned to despise the colours of any nation, so had the colours repaid them in kind. Anglo-Portuguese troops storming San Sebastián in September 1813 looted, killed, and raped civilians to an extent that was shocking even for the time, when stormed cities, whether enemy or allied, were considered 'fair game'.[205] Siege warfare was an exercise in extremism for soldiers and civilians. Besieged troops and civilians had nowhere to go. The besiegers, meanwhile, were fatigued by painstaking trench-digging and rain, conditions in which the diggers envied their comrades standing guard, even though they were exposed to enemy fire.[206]

In March 1813, the press in Berlin launched an appeal to readers to share their stories of suffering for a compilation called *New Germany* (Das neue Deutschland): 'Airing grievances alleviates pain, now that this is allowed ... Who has not suffered under France's yoke? Each town and village, with her rapacious taxes and requisitions'.[207] As Allied armies pushed westwards, the moribund Napoleonic customs regime was subjected to mob violence. Italy, Berg, Holland and parts of Germany, throughout 1813 witnessed violent revolts and attacks on French gendarmes and customs officials.[208] Grebenstein (Westphalia) witnessed violent charivaris, including attacks on officials of the demised Confederation regime, and attacks on the shops and the property of Jews.[209] The French emancipation of Jews tuned them into accomplices of foreign oppression in German opinion. The turn-of-the-century bandit-hero in the Rhineland, Schinderhannes ('the Knacker'), was anti-Semitic, and the association of inflationary paper money with Jewish money-lending increased his legend and reinforced the general Anti-Semitism of anti-Napoleonic Europe.[210]

Areas of Germany still under Napoleon's grip were fortified for siege and battle. Marshal Davout followed orders to hold Hamburg, which led to the expulsion of thousands of civilian mouths, levelling of large areas of the city's suburbs for the sake of free-fire zones, and the burning and pillaging of several surrounding villages besides. Scorched-earth tactics were also enacted in the environs of Leipzig, in accordance with the nearby Battle of Lützen. Local villagers were ordered to evacuate their homes, in some instances to destroy them and to seek refuge in Leipzig. Other homes spared scorched earth were destroyed anyway in the artillery duels accompanying the three-day battle. Some 60 villages were destroyed. Civilian suffering, including hunger, homelessness, and disease, persisted as liberating Russian and Prussian forces also required

billets and provisions. Almost half-a-million troops from 12 nations were concentrated around Leipzig, for what would prove the largest battle of the wars of 1792–1815. Once civilians were liberated from the task of feeding and sheltering the living, there remained the task of dealing with the tens of thousands of dead. For several weeks, local civilians and prisoners-of-war cleared the ruined fields and villages of corpses. For weeks after the battle, several hundred wounded died on a daily basis in makeshift hospitals, and a typhus epidemic over the winter killed 10% of the civilians in Leipzig and surrounding area.[211] As Allied armies pushed westwards, German civilians got no respite even when they were spared battles. An eyewitness near Minden reported how the Allied troops 'stole cattle and grain. The meat was eaten raw ... whole roads from Minden to Oldendorff are so full of Russians that farmers could not hold on to any feed, cattle or foodstuffs, and their fences and all loose wood has been stripped for use in camp-fires'.[212]

As a consequence, civilian relief committees sprang up throughout Germany, and even abroad. The Crown Prince of Sweden made a large donation and the Committee for Relieving the Distress in Germany, founded in London in 1805, reconvened in January 1814 in order to direct public donations (including those raised at taverns and coffee shops) 'to send immediate succour to the places in the greatest need'.[213] These relief efforts relating to northern Germany followed a longer tradition further north in Denmark-Norway, where popular subscriptions had flourished since 1807 after some 5,000 Norwegian and 2,000 Danish seamen had been imprisoned on British prison hulks.[214] These efforts, combined with a lack of rancour on the part of the British towards any captives who were not privateers, meant that Danish-Norwegian prisoners were probably the best treated captives of the era, enduring conditions and rations on prison hulks which were not far different from Danish naval ratings.[215]

The suffering inflicted on civilian populations in Hamburg and Leipzig during the campaigns of 1813–1814 excited a new culture of patriotic sensibility, infusing German art with the theme of liberation. Whereas German military memoirs were detached from the devastation of the countryside and towns, German civilians created a sense of nation amidst the post-war ruins. Northern Germany, especially Prussia, which had been longest at odds with Napoleonic imperialism, felt this sensibility more than Bavaria, which had been more sympathetic to Napoleon and wary of Austria.[216] Arminius the Great (*Hermann der Große*), the first-century German chieftain whose forces destroyed three Roman legions, was invoked in the German press.[217] Anti-Napoleonic feeling influenced Dresden's artistic and militarist Pan-Germanism at the end of the war. As the Allied powers liberated Germany from 1813, artworks plundered by the French were restored not to royal houses, but to national museums.[218] German cultural reactions to Napoleonic Imperialism, coming in the wake of Prussia's sudden westward expansion, awakened

notions of the 'Third Germany', or those German powers which were neither Prussia nor Austria. Germany's art scene was permeated by veterans of the Napoleonic wars, such as Georg Friedrich Kersting, as early as 1813. Their subsequent 'war propaganda' invoked themes concerning the 'unity' and 'fraternity' of a shared community, or *Volksgemeinschaft*.[219] Such cultural nationalism proved harder to stir in Spain, where victory had been accompanied by even greater devastation alongside an ongoing fight for legitimacy. King Ferdinand re-entered his capital in May 1814 amidst popular attacks on the symbols and persons associated with the Patriot liberals and fugitive Frenchified collaborators. But Ferdinand remained wary of his subjects after his six years of internment in France. The King was escorted by 6,000 infantry, 2,500 cavalry, and 6 guns. Ferdinand, who had been feted in the streets in March 1808, was timidly leaving nothing to chance.[220]

But more widespread sensibility followed the material demands and trauma of war. A German mercenary in British service later released from French captivity was struck as he wandered through the fields surrounding Leipzig on his search for home in 1814. Krüger recalled the 'countless corpse-hills, barely covering the already-rotting limbs of the fallen'.[221] Thus the civilian experience of living with armies bestowed upon the post-war generation a new political sensibility. Subscriptions to rescue ruined communities influenced post-war municipal reforms and transnational charities, such as Britain's Society for the Friends of Foreigners in Distress.[222] The impact of a kind of total war led diplomats during 1814–1815 to strive for a kind of total peace. For generations in the nineteenth century, the Wars of 1792–1815 were referred to as 'the' war, or the 'great' war. But they were also remembered as wars of liberation. Starting with Saint-Domingue/Haiti in 1791, and continuing into the 1820s, these wars wrenched power from empires and led to the rise of new ones.

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5 Living with Empires

Empires rested on networks of coercion and collaboration, both in their long-standing trans-Atlantic varieties as in their short-lived Napoleonic versions. Empires were the norm of western politics, and they provided agency also for smaller powers and non-state actors. Despite this multi-faceted upheaval, scholars of late-eighteenth century and early-nineteenth century European diplomatic relations have mostly been preoccupied with explaining the actions of the Great Powers. Only recently has the study of lesser powers come into view, as well as the influence of non-state actors as part of a 'new political history'.

Imperial rivalry in the eighteenth century saw Russia challenge Spain in northwest America, and Britain challenge Spain all over the world. Spanish policy-makers held a mixture of fascination for, and fear of, Britain's successful commercial rivalry in the eighteenth century, holding Britain up as an example for comparison for any imperial project. Spanish Florida and British Georgia formed a forgotten frontier, even though it was the most extended border between the empires between the Aix-la-Chapelle peace of 1748 and Treaty of Paris of 1763. 'La Florida' in Spanish eyes included all parts of present-day United States of America and Canada and the Caribbean which were not formally part of New Spain. This expansive claim dated from the Treaty of Tordesillas (1494). There was thus a 'little Florida' and a 'big Florida'. But Florida was of limited interest for Spain. There was no gold, silver or other raw materials. Only the British, who saw in the swamps of Georgia an opportunity to create what would turn out to be a final Anglo-American colony designed for humble farmers, obstructed the breezy Spanish claim to 'big' Florida. Indeed, the idea of Spanish interests ranging from Labrador to the Tierra del Fuego seemed ridiculous when even 'little' Florida never boasted a settlement with more than 2,000 souls.

Not for the last time, disputed borders gave individuals rather than governments opportunities to control commerce and influence local policies. Caleb Davis, for example, was a sugar and rum trader who operated

between Jamaica and Savannah. He financed the debts of the governor of La Florida. Such shady private finance of a public office was harder to achieve in areas firmly under Spanish control, like Cuba. Informal relations flourished between antagonists, especially along seaboards, even when they were formally at war. The British naval blockade of France did not interfere with fishermen, who plied their trade without interruption and even sold their catches to enemy seamen. The inhabitants of Concarneau (Brittany) used the cover of night to send out ships carrying grain to sell to the British ships blockading the coastline around Finisterre.[1] British Vice-Admiral Saumarez employed local connections and the British consular service to arrange the purchase of fresh water and meat from Sweden during the bloodless Anglo-Swedish war between 1810 and 1812.[2] The Royal Navy sourced naval timber from hostile coasts for its garrisons in Sicily and Malta.[3] The war of 1792–1815 produced as much decision-making on the periphery as it did in the chancelleries and palaces of the capitals. It also produced an explosion of organized challenges to state power, as revolts in the Caribbean and the Americas would show.

The advent of revolution inspired radicalism amongst the slave, mixed-race, and free-black populations in many Caribbean colonies, notably Jamaica and Saint-Domingue, but also Grenada, Saint Lucia and Saint Vincent, and some coastal regions of the American mainland, especially present-day Venezuela. The slave insurrection in the French colony of Saint-Domingue in 1791 grew into the first successful revolt against white European rule and the Atlantic world's slavery system. This slave rebellion at first was launched against French colonial control in 1791. The rebel leader, Toussaint Louverture, was not a slave, nor was he an advocate of independence for most of the 1790s. Rather in the wake of the first slave risings in Le Cap in 1791, Louverture was an agent of the Spanish who from their neighbouring colonies were seeking to exploit the chaos by seizing Saint-Domingue. This mission evolved into leading the former slaves, but even then Louverture as governor recognized the sovereignty of Paris. The French Revolution, after all, had abolished slavery, the Girondin leader Brissot having pressed for this emancipation.[4] For several months, Louverture waged a brutal civil war against the former slaveholding planters. While France's main slave colony imploded, the European war intruded on this sugary hell. Saint-Domingue, enslaved or free, was a French possession, and therefore a prize target for Britain after the Anglo-French war began in 1792.

Historians for a long time tended to view the black and Indian populations of the Americas as 'apolitical' in the wars of empire and independence,[5] or even ignored them altogether.[6] But Indian challenges to the Bourbon rule were recent and ongoing. Mexico's last native polity, the Cora (or Naayari), fell to Spanish forces as recently as 1722.[7] Revolts against Spanish oppression – most notably Túpac Amaru II's

revolt in Peru in the 1780s – were ongoing, and Indian populations at the northern and southern extremes of the Spanish empire, to say nothing of Portugal's green frontier in the Amazon, were never conquered. Low-intensity hostilities continued in disputed territories. A quasi-war between British Canadian and American forces played out in Ohio territory in the early 1790s, with the British side using Indians as proxies. The Indians exploited the advantages of irregular tactics, especially as fledgling US forts in the area seldom boasted more than 200 men.[8] The Spanish-American victors of Buenos Aires defeated the British invaders in no small part because local Indian tribes, with whom they had enjoyed a treaty of cooperation since 1790, patrolled the coasts of the River Plate, allowing the criollos to concentrate on defending the city.[9]

Pre-Columbine and black populations also had their own agency. The French and Haitian Revolutions inspired a separatist revolt in the Captaincy of Bahia (Brazil) in 1798 that won support from slaves and free men alike. Indians continued to play powerful symbolic roles that the War of the Atlantic World made political. The apparition in 1531 of the Virgin Mary as Our Lady of Guadalupe spoke Nahuatl to an ordinary Indian, Juan Diego. José Servando Teresa de Mier, a Mexican priest and independence activist, gave a sermon controversially dating the apparition to the time of Jesus. During a later stay in Spain, Mier was charged by the Church hierarchy for failing to deny that Guadalupe was anything more than a fable.[10] An Otomí woman born in 1701 in the mining town of Fresnillo (New Spain) became a charismatic Carmelite nun who dedicated her life to good works. After smallpox killed her in 1762 she was biographized by Jesuits. They published her *Carta Edificante* which was distributed to indigenous communities as the first free textbook in Mexican history into the independence war and beyond.[11]

Whereas the Americas contested European imperialism, Europe itself would be subjected to the imperialism of Napoleonic France. Napoleon was always a warlord, but his empire rested on more than brute force.[12] Much of his imperialism was recognizable: the conquest of Europe and the world harked back to the well-known legends of Charlemagne and Alexander the Great.[13] But the Napoleonic drive towards bureaucracy and reforming laws made as much of an impact on everyday life as conscription. Local elites became assimilated to Napoleonic rule, either in territories which were annexed to France, or in satellite states ruled by French-style constitutions and, later, Bonapartist dynasties. Historian Michael Broers has argued that Napoleonic Europe can be divided between an 'inner' empire of closely integrated economies and elites, and an 'outer' empire where Napoleonic rule was constantly contested.

The inner core comprised most of France (aside from the more rural areas of the west), the Low Countries, northern Italy, and the most western and south-western of the German states. Germany beyond the Rhineland and liberal southwest was caricatured in eighteenth-century

French culture as a coarse and ponderous backwater of principalities and city-states, as was parodied in Voltaire's *Candide*.[14] British views of 'deep' Germany were scarcely more flattering. Hannover had indeed often been derided in the eighteenth-century British press as a dreary absolutist backwater with few natural resources and an expensive standing army. Henry Stutzer, a post-war traveller, recounted the territory's sandy and infertile soils, appalling roads, and absence of modern facilities beyond the city of Hannover.[15] Amidst this general disdain and condescension, Napoleonic imperialism sought to create a new elite without the feudal power of the pre-Revolutionary era.[16]

Napoleonic Italy experienced three alternate forms of subaltern state: the annexed region in the north west, the quasi-autonomous state of Naples in the south, and the satellite Kingdom of Italy in central and north east Italy.[17] The infamous north-south divide in Italy was born in this era[18], and the benefits regarding Napoleonic rule in the north were real. The agriculturalists of the Po valley proved loyal, as previously the Habsburg and Savoyard monarchies had restricted their production. But now they were free to expand and trade more freely. As with several German satellites, the Kingdom of Italy gained a system of electoral colleges, which made judicial appeal easier.[19] Despite Napoleon's stated aims, ruthless pragmatism overrode ideology at every turn, abolishing the feudal order here, but tolerating it there, all in order to secure conscripts for the Imperial army. He was, as one historian aptly put it, a political chameleon.[20] His rise to power in France displayed his tendencies for ruling with a sort of 'liberal authoritarianism'.[21] Napoleon favoured surveillance and the use of arrests and deportations to 'encourage' order in his dominions.[22] The 'inner-outer' model of Napoleonic imperialism which resulted thus conformed more to habit rather than design.

France was not the sole progenitor of imperialism in Europe, nor were territorial changes always the result of war and conquest. The ancient complex of territories of the Holy Roman empire were consolidated in 1803 by the 'Assault of the Knights', in which larger powers in the empire had annexed the empire's smaller enclaves. The Assault ushered in a 'revolution which began Germany's nineteenth century', in the words of a leading German nationalist historian.[23] The army of the Holy Roman empire (Reichsarmee) dissolved into independent national contingents, the largest of which was the Austrian army. Holy Roman Emperor, Francis II, tried in vain to persuade a number of German states to reverse this annexation. In the end, Francis II himself dissolved the bond linking the Habsburgs with the empire in 1806, out of fear that a triumphant Napoleon would try either to seize the Imperial crown for himself or place stooges in the Imperial electoral college.[24] Napoleon's 'mediation' of central Germany in 1806 into a confederation of French client states (the Confederation of the Rhine) thus exploited circumstances which

were not entirely of his own making, but which would have dire long-term effects on France's position in Europe.

Prussia, too, during its long neutrality of 1795–1806 endeavoured to advance its interests by exploiting the momentum of other powers. Prussia's peace with France in the 1795 Treaty of Basel has often been seen as being diplomatically short-sighted and a product of economic crisis. But Prussia's peace was nonetheless understandable seen from the point of view of Berlin. Britain's offer of subsidies seemed to repeat the demeaning position of Prussia during the Seven Years' War and also to turn Prussia into a vassal of British interests.[25] During the decade of neutrality, Prussia's military reputation did not suffer; if anything it was enhanced by Austria's repeated defeats. Neutrality also offered Prussia a glacis behind which the looming question of internal reform could be shelved (it was hoped) indefinitely.[26] The 1801 Peace of Lunéville saw the French reward Prussia's benevolent neutrality with awards of territory in western Germany. But this shifted Prussia's centre of gravity towards France. Ultimately, Prussia's fence-sitting could not continue indefinitely, and reformers realized the need to meet a likely French threat in the near future. The military theorist, Gerhard von Scharnhorst, understood that the French were no longer an armed horde.[27] His insights would have been shared more broadly, as Prussia, unlike such other absolute monarchies as Spain, enjoyed virtual total freedom of the press.[28]

Prussian encroachments westwards added a third power looming over the small electorate of Hannover in northern Germany. Hannover, in personal union with the British monarchy, was not even invited by London to send delegates to the Amiens peace talks. Successive Westminster governments routinely saw the king's role as Elector of Hannover as entirely separate from his British commitments.[29] Once it became clear in the early eighteenth century that the House of Guelph was not going to spring a Catholic monarch on the British, the Westminster parliament accepted the 'Georgian' dynasty in return for ruling out British support for any Hannoverian expansion within the Holy Roman empire.[30] A late-nineteenth-century Hannover writer condemned the British for having treated the Electorate as nothing more than a recruiting ground.[31] In 1803 London failed to give the Electorate clear instructions as to whether its small army should resist the French invasion following the resumption of Anglo-French hostilities. In the event Napoleon sent only a small invasion force, anticipating at most token resistance. The gamble paid off. Most of the French actions involved hunting British subjects. The French eventually agreed to permit the Hanoverians to continue garrisoning eastern parts of the Electorate and to avoid prisoner-of-war status. Napoleon withdrew his troops in October 1805, according to the agreed two-and-a-half-year deadline, leaving behind in the Electorate a devastated treasury.[32]

But Hannover's role as a flashpoint for greater powers was not yet over. In March 1806 Prussia, with the agreement of France, occupied the Electorate of Hanover. In theory the Prussian occupation was mild, but the presence of troops who happened to speak the same language raised tensions with locals just as surely as French-speaking troops had done. The Prussian occupation of the Electorate threw British policy into turmoil. Foreign secretary Castlereagh deemed a Prussian occupation less pernicious and a potential sop to Berlin, which Britain since 1795 had been trying to coax out of its neutrality. A French occupation, by contrast, would probably lead to Hannover being incorporated into Holland, and would certainly see a French stranglehold over the rivers Elbe and Weser.[33]

In Britain, the peace faction of parliamentarians known as the Foxite Whigs were frustrated by the Hannover question.[34] But the same question now also complicated British relations with Prussia. Under pressure from George III, the British in alliance with Sweden declared a quasi-war on Prussia.[35] There was a brief naval conflict between Britain and Prussia in 1806, which amounted to a British blockade.[36] This British blockade of the north German ports and embargo of Prussian goods leaving the rivers Elbe and Weser worsened living standards in the occupied Electorate. Napoleon could feel satisfied witnessing both British and Prussians being cast as villains. In fact, the Prussian king had inflicted a spectacular humiliation on his own kingdom. The original French invitation for Prussia to annex Hannover had been rejected by Foreign Minister Hardenberg who knew it was a trap. But Hardenberg's circumspection made no impression on his timid king, who was a frustrated at Britain's 'purse-dangling' towards prospective allies on the continent whilst it embarked on adventures in the Americas.[37] An enraged Napoleon in return made a harsher demand: Hannover should be annexed and its ports closed to British trade, and Hardenberg removed from office. The trap was sprung and Frederick William walked straight into it. Prussia had been lured into a disastrous path. Napoleon's ambition knew no bounds, as his earlier campaigns across the Mediterranean demonstrated.

Beyond Europe

The French Directory's invasion of the Ottoman territories of Egypt and Syria (1798–1801) aimed to disrupt Britain's trade with India and, probably, to get rid of the internal threat posed to the Revolution by Napoleon. In the wake of his successful Italian campaign (1796–1797), Napoleon had become a magnet for his soldiers and for bulletin-reading French public opinion alike. The campaign of 1798 ended in Anglo-Ottoman victory, defeat for Napoleon, and the withdrawal of French troops from the region. But it was also a defeat for the Directory, as Napoleon manipulated the defeat in order to overthrow the government and make himself

the leading politician in France. The French invasion of Egypt had aimed both to attack the British empire and also to secure France new colonial elements. It was marked by a cultural superiority complex that featured in all western empires.

Condescending colonial attitudes were not exclusively a product of the Enlightenment. For centuries the Spanish monarchy's insistence on purity of blood (limpieza de sangre), meaning the absence of non-Christian ancestors, kept major offices out of the hands of American-born whites (criollos). Since relatively few Spanish women emigrated to the Americas, the Spanish monarchy suspected 'tainted' blood even amongst its outwardly white subjects across the Atlantic.[38] In the slave island of Saint-Domingue, the white plantocracy (again, mostly men) felt superior to the large population of free blacks who revolted in 1791. It would not even have countenanced being compared with the bottom of the colony's racial trinity, the enslaved blacks who were incited to destroy the symbol of white slave-ownership, the port of Le Cap, on 21 June 1793.[39] The decisive British defeat of the Maratha empire in India at the Battle of Assaye in 1803 was also coloured by racial prejudice. Arthur Wellesley, later Duke of Wellington, entered into battle rashly at Assaye and contemptuously refused to withdraw against an enemy he considered racially inferior.[40]

As sociologists have observed, people across times and spaces cling to their own culture when they stand at its boundaries, such as when they encounter other cultures, other ways of doing things, or merely discover contradictions in their own culture.[41] The French troops who invaded the Ottoman territories of Egypt and Syria (1798–1801) felt affirmed in their western culture of the Enlightenment, even as their camp-following scientists and antiquarians uncovered the Pyramids and the Rosetta Stone. The French invaders projected orientalist views on Egypt, either as a timeless polity which had helped spawn science and civilization, or as a corrupt state under the thumb of Oriental despots. In any case, Egypt was rooted in the past, not in the modernity of the Enlightenment. These condescending attitudes were replicated towards the later Napoleonic empire, too. French elites administering Italy imagined that they were picking up the torch discarded long ago by Rome. Yet any debt they held to Italian history existed so far in the past that contemporary Italians were seen as entirely separate from their history, just like contemporary Egyptians and Syrians.[42]

This imperialism nurtured an arrogant view that the French had a duty to spread the Enlightenment and Republican values across Europe and beyond. In the words of General Masséna, 'only the efforts of France can stop Europe from falling back into the barbarism into which her enemies are plunging her'.[43] Extended to Asia, the armed mission of Enlightenment was, in the words of one historian 'the most extraordinary example of French arrogance'.[44] Russia, equally, was deemed ripe

for exploitation as a backward, semi-civilized country in the thrall of feudalism and vulnerable to conquest by enlightened armies.[45]

French imperialists, rather like American settlers who expanded the western frontier of the United States, saw themselves as victims even as they subjugated foreign populations and tribes. Napoleon's troops directly or indirectly instigated most of the suffering and violence that swept across Europe. But their letters, especially those from the protracted campaign in Spain, reveal soldiers as victims of treacherous villagers and agents of righteous reprisals against their civilian tormentors.[46] The campaign in Spain also made the French conquerors feel like victims. Memoirs affirming the Spaniards as fanatical, ignorant, and savage cast Napoleon's army in the role of noble losers.[47] As General St. Cyr remarked: 'Far from blaming the efforts of the Catalans, I admired them; but as they often exceeded the bounds of reason, their heroism was detrimental to their cause. Many times, it caused the destruction of whole populations without necessity and without advantage'.[48] The Egyptian campaign had witnessed similar responses. Reports of the torture and decapitation of French emissaries sent to achieve the surrender of Jaffa in March 1799 led Napoleon to order reprisals. When the city was stormed, Napoleon gave his men two days' and nights' liberty to commit atrocities, and he also ordered the execution of about 3,000 prisoners, many of whom were bayonetted in order to spare ammunition.[49] Under the occupation French attitudes of indignation extended even to their collaborators. The French occupiers assumed that Egypt's Coptic minority had suffered 'decline' under the Ottomans through starvation and retrograde policies, although their statistical calculations came from ancient sources and were thus unreliable.[50] This view allowed the Copts to take advantage of their supposed French liberators. The Copts controlled the new French administration's taxation system, and denied the French any access to their files.[51]

The Napoleonic invasion in Egypt had long-term consequences, even though the British recaptured Alexandria in 1801 and kept the city within its political sphere for the subsequent 150 years. French cultural penetration continued after Napoleon's defeat. The vacuum of power opened the door for Muhammad Ali to take power, who planned to create his own dynasty separate from the Ottoman empire.[52] Some historians have seen goodwill in French policies towards Ali.[53] But French calculations in the eastern Mediterranean were as self-interested as in Europe. France supported Ali because he sought to Westernize Egypt's administrative culture and because French interests were not aligned with the Ottoman empire.[54] Egypt proved a pawn of a European empire as assuredly as the Qajar state in Persia further east, which was manipulated by both Britain and France, and defeated in a war with Russia.[55] The stated progressive aims of imperial powers seldom stood up to scrutiny. Napoleon's forced 'regeneration' of Spain in 1808 unleashed not only violent resistance from

Patriots, but also a transcontinental challenge to Spanish imperialism on the other side of the Atlantic.

War and Empire in the Americas

The origins of Latin America's war are to be found in attempts in its metropolitan motherlands to exert tighter control. In most respects this was a Spanish-American, rather than Luso-American crisis. Marshal Junot's invasion of Portugal in November 1807 might almost have captured the Braganza dynasty and thereby unleashed in Brazil the sort of crisis that afflicted Spanish America after 1808. But the Braganza dynasty managed to avoid the terrible dilemma which had faced the Danish government the previous summer, and which Ferdinand of Spain failed to challenge the following year. As French troops entered Lisbon, they were perplexed to see the city population cheering towards the sea, and to hear a 21-gun salute answered by another out in the bay. In fact, the entire Portuguese royal family was evacuating its capital in the nick of time. Twelve Portuguese naval vessels were accompanied by various merchant ships, and escorted by an even larger British force. Some 10,000 aristocrats, ministers, priests, and servants accompanied the Braganzas, destined for Rio de Janeiro.[56] The Portuguese empire would thenceforth be governed from Brazil, leaving Portugal largely in the hands of its British allies. Portuguese villagers were reminded who the enemy was once French troops made demands for money and lodgings, disbanded the Portuguese army, and imposed anti-clericalism. By the following summer a general uprising against French troops and collaborating authorities mirrored what was happening over the border in Spain. But Portugal's insurrection did not produce the same revolutionary upheaval, given that the Braganza dynasty, unlike the captive Spanish Bourbons, was safely ensconced in Rio de Janeiro.[57] Even though Brazil witnessed revolutionary conspiracies and slave revolts throughout the 1792–1815 period, they did not turn society upside-down, nor did they take place in a vacuum of legitimate authority, unlike the agony in Spanish America.[58]

Eighteenth-century Spain was a 'military monarchy'. The Bourbons had won power via military force early in the century, and had thereafter used the army to bring Spanish regions to heel as well as much of the old nobility. In 1793 the army's separate tribunals were granted exclusive and absolute powers to try all civilian criminal and civil cases that in any way affected members of the army caste. This privilege meant little for serving soldiers but a great deal for officers. Centralization in turn meant that army officers grew ever more accustomed to looking towards the centre of power. Napoleon in 1808 thus calculated that his takeover of Spain from the centre would get the Spanish army on his side.[59] Napoleon interloped to an unprecedented degree in the Bourbon family feud of 1808, enabling him to spring his trap at Bayonne.[60] This family

feud raged not just over Spain, but over the vastness of Spanish America, too. In 1800, Spain and her Americas shared the same King, the same godless enemies, the same rational, Bourbon administrative blueprints, the same reforming clergies, the same reigning philosophies of applied economic and political liberalism, even the same name.[61] It would still have been inconceivable to a resident of either Spain or Spanish America as late as 1807 that the heir to the throne could be arrested at the behest of an upstart, that a military coup could then install him on the throne, and that the new king would go grovelling to Napoleon only to be humiliated along with his deposed parents, and that Napoleon's older brother installed on the Spanish throne with the stroke of a quill. The precarious nature of political power certainly made Spain more vulnerable to Napoleonic intervention. But as with Denmark in 1807, it was the structural fault-line of being caught between France and Britain which enabled this intervention, differences being Spain's greater financial crisis and its dominating position in the Americas. Even so, the immediate ramifications perturbed Spanish-American elites above all. Most of the 15 million souls in Spanish America were subalterns, women, the poor, slaves, who existed outside of the formal colonial hierarchy.

It is unlikely that Napoleon envisaged the geostrategic atrophy that his coup against the Spanish monarchy would unleash. But the sudden loss in 1808 of legitimate authority in the global Spanish monarchy pushed Spanish America into autonomy, civil war between royalists and independents, and ultimately definitive separation from Spain. The fact that this process was a civil war rather than just a war between Spain and its colonies tended to be overlooked by generations of Latin American historians, for whom royalists were assumed to be Spaniards and patriots Spanish Americans.[62]

Bourbon Spain emerged from its victory in the War of Spanish Succession to centralize monarchical power over the Peninsula and its American empire. Ferdinand VI (1746–1759) set in trail the 'Bourbon reforms', reducing the power of the Church and imposing more efficient fiscal reforms and Iberian control in the Americas, all with the aim of increasing revenue for the Spanish monarchy.[63] The increasing power wielded by the Spanish monarchy over its American domains has been called a 'Second Conquest'. The expulsion of the Jesuit order in 1767, the onset of costly wars against Britain and France, and the decapitalization of Spanish-American institutions caused by the Consolidation decree of 1804, all created a climate of resentment. This resentment was frequently directed towards Spaniards, but not so much towards rule from Spain. The Bourbon reforms created 'stakeholders' amongst local elites rather than passive victims of predation.[64] But the Spanish monarchy was intellectually undermined by a new force in the late eighteenth-century: the right of insurrection. Both the American and French Revolutions substituted the legitimacy of the God-given Crown for the legitimacy of the people.

Both revolutions proved uniquely catastrophic for the Spanish empire. Admittedly, the intellectual example of the United States of America and France has been overstated. Generations of Latin-American historians, starting with the independence generation itself, liked to depict the wars as the victory of a frustrated Latin-American political society over Spanish 'despotism', and their dependence on political patronage meant that most did not seriously question this premise until well into the twentieth century. More recently, historians have argued that Spanish-American independence was caused less by Spanish-American grievances and more by the external shock of Napoleon's coup against the Bourbon monarchy, which underline the trans-Atlantic experience of the wars of 1792–1815.[65]

Certainly global repercussions of revolutions made the Spanish empire uniquely vulnerable, unlike the Anglo-American revolution of 1776–1783. The United States of America had been birthed into a benign global economic trajectory, and had managed to heal the internal divisions caused by the civil war between loyalists and Patriots between 1775–1783. Probably about 25% of the population of the Thirteen Colonies had been actively loyalist to the British Crown, but only a small fraction of these felt so disenfranchised by defeat as to emigrate to Canada, the Caribbean, or other remaining lands of the British Crown.[66] Historians have been biased towards studying independence in the Americas, as studies of resilient loyalism, whether in Georgia, Cuba or Peru, seem to go 'against the grain'. Besides, the population of the United States of America was still small, with most population concentrated along the eastern seaboard, and a population of slaves of about 700,000 very close in number to the slave population in the comparatively tiny French sugar and coffee islands in the Caribbean.[67] The French Revolutionary Wars, by contrast, stored up more civil strife for Spanish America from without than the American Revolution had for the United States of America from within. They destroyed the family compact (Franco-Spanish alliance of crowns), and Spanish defeat in 1795 was followed by an unholy alliance between Madrid and the revolutionary regime north of the Pyrenees. This destroyed the traditional basis of Spanish foreign policy and pitted its empire hopelessly against British naval superiority.

But Spain also paid a price for its Bourbon reforms, despite having been on the winning side in the American Revolutionary War of 1776–1783 that expelled the British from the Florida frontier. The expulsion of Jesuits from the Spanish empire in 1767 created a generation of exiled ideologues in favour of separation, inspired in part by rancour, the US model and by criollo hostility to the Bourbon reforms. In 1799, the expelled Jesuit Pablo Vizcardo published from Philadelphia his 'Letter to the Spanish Americans', in which he contrasted the brave and self-confident 'English colonies' declaring independence in America with the 'indolence and shame' of the Spanish Americans.[68] The new United

States of America flaunted its distaste for European monarchism, embarrassing the Spanish empire which was facing discontent from criollos seething at the centralizing Bourbon reforms. In 1795, Spain signed a treaty giving the United States of America exclusive equal rights to use the port of New Orleans and the Mississippi River, ceding part of Florida, and abandoning its position at Nootka Sound in the Pacific north-west. The sort of advantages Spain denied to its own American subjects were granted to free Americans with the stroke of a quill. In 1801, Spain ceded its huge Louisiana territory to its French 'ally'. Once Napoleon sold this land to the United States of America in 1803, the geopolitical potential of this insurrectionary Republic was as plain as its intellectual and commercial challenges.

The expanding United States of America thus posed a new threat to Spain's much larger American empire along with the usual rivalry along the Pacific of Russia and Britain. The insurgent Republic now bordered the northern reaches of the Spanish empire, even if the lack of settlement and the presence of assertive Indian tribes made this point of contact nominal for the time being. Spanish military garrisons across the far north were sparse. Catholic mission stations in California ruled their Indian congregations as they pleased. Forced labour and other abuses persuaded many Indians to resist baptism, and even to rebel against the missionaries.[69] Junípero Serra (1713–1784) was an austere Franciscan priest who established dozens of mission stations in Upper and Lower California. He has been venerated by some and condemned for his treatment of Californian Indians by others. But the clerics had things their own way, at least until the late-eighteenth century when a trickle of hardy settlers started to arrive. Settlers fought the climate, topography, and the soil to create a sense of *hogar* (home). *Presidios* (fortified localities) gradually became *pueblos* as the people struggled, mostly on their own, to build communities. They fought among themselves, incursions from Anglo-Americans, and resistance from the Apache, Tephuán, Yaqui, Suma, and Mayo Indians. Meanwhile Spain began to increase its formal military presence in the far north, as around 10,000 permanently mobilized and veteran troops manned fortified bases (presidios). These bases were tasked with countering Indian incursions and, later, American filibusters.[70]

Spanish-American forces were regularly tested in conflict with the British empire. The second treaty of San Ildefonso (1796) brought the Spanish empire into war against Britain. When the last Anglo-Spanish peace had been sealed in 1783, one of the concessions Spain made to Britain was the establishment of a commercial colony to extract valuable wood from a coastal stretch of Yucatán which now comprises Belize. The British presence, known as the 'Wallace' or 'Walix' colony ('Valix' in Spanish), was networked with Britain's considerable naval and smuggling interests in Jamaica. Once war got underway in 1796, the Captain-General

of Yucatán, Arturo O'Neill, seized the opportunity to avenge what the Spanish empire had perceived as British infringements of the commercial concessions of 1783. He dispatched a thousand troops against the apparently puny British presence in 'Walix': a corvette armed with 20 cannons, a small land battery, and a fortified house garrisoned by a handful of troops. But O'Neill needed naval and transport vessels, and his pleas for both met with delays in Mexico City and Havana. By the time ships were pledged in April 1797, the British had got wind of the Spanish plan via the flourishing smuggling network. Walix was reinforced from Jamaica with six fortresses, fifty guns, and three companies of the Irish Brigade. O'Neill doubled his force to 2,000 men, but skirmishes with the British proved inconclusive, not least because the Viceroy ordered naval support away from O'Neill in order to protect convoys elsewhere in the Caribbean. In the end the Spanish forces dug in near Valladolid in Yucatán, where an epidemic in 1798 wiped out most of the garrison, sparing the outnumbered British defenders even further. Once peace returned in 1802, the British had survived in Walix, thereby establishing the British foothold in Central America which would become British Honduras.[71] Living with empire thus meant living with poor communications, the power of non-such actors as smugglers, and, above all, with disease. Of the 35,000 French troops killed during Napoleon's Caribbean expedition of 1801, most had succumbed to yellow fever.[72]

Empires also forged bonds of solidarity according to race and culture instead of obedience to metropolitan policies. The Anglo-Spanish conquest of Saint-Domingue in 1793, was welcomed by the 'enemy' French planters. British Prime Minister Pitt expected a short war in 1793. Whilst poor-quality volunteers in Europe captured Dunkirk and Ostend, but did not march on Paris at a time when the French Revolution was in chaos, the main British effort focussed on French overseas colonies.[73] In Saint-Domingue the British held on, amidst miserable casualties, allied with French loyalists and some black and mulatto auxiliaries. But in 1798 they signed a convention to leave. Over half of the 89,000 British troops deployed died from disease. The direness of yellow fever in the Caribbean was remarked by Alexander von Humboldt during his landfall in 1799 on the Venezuelan coast. The atmospheric heat, in his opinion, exposed a 'Prussian, Pole or Swede' much more than a more acclimatized 'Spaniard, Italian, or even an inhabitant of the south of France'.[74] Haiti was left in the hands of L'Ouverture, albeit nominally under a French governor. Louverture's championing of outright independence came only later, when Napoleon sent troops to the new 'Haiti' in order to revoke emancipation and restore plantation slavery.[75] The French reinforcements ended up suffering the miseries of the British. Despite the French invaders capturing L'Ouverture, in 1804 Haitian independence was complete, after 4,000 whites left on the island were massacred.[76] French attempts at recolonization were so protracted and bloody not only because of the

resistance of the Haitian insurgents. Rather the enforcement of a British blockade from 1803, after French reinforcements had been briefly unmolested during the Peace of Amiens, slowed French counter-insurgency considerably.[77] Thus British belligerence ended up playing in favour of Haitian independence in an about-turn from ten years before. The Haitian Revolution also enhanced US power in the hemisphere. France's Louisiana territory had been mooted as a breadbasket for Haiti; once Haiti was lost, Napoleon sold the territory to the USA without further ado.[78]

The position of incumbent colonial powers thus grew precarious across the Americas. In December 1794 authorities in New Spain imprisoned all French citizens caught on their territory. Mirroring Count Floridablanca's hard-line approach in Spain, the colonial authorities also banned French Revolutionary propaganda and the works of Tom Paine.[79] A pasquinade culture gripped the towns of Spanish America. Graffiti inciting 'liberty' and insurrection daubed the walls of Buenos Aires in late 1794. The following year rumours that French bakers were hoarding wheat led to arrests in the city.[80] In New Spain pasquinades often targeted *gachupines* (Spaniards) despite the joint imperial effort being waged against Revolutionary France. Manuel Toral, an ambitious criollo priest of Huichapan north-west of Mexico City, was investigated by the Inquisition for his false flag activities. Toral led a conspiracy to post pasquinades linking Spaniards to heresy, and for getting an accomplice to send him obscene and atheistic anonymous letters as 'proof'.[81]

To threats from within and from the sea were added threats over land. Some of these were magnified by operating in the debatable lands separating Anglo and Spanish America. Philip Nolan, a Belfast-born horse-trader and resident of Natchez, Spanish Louisiana, in 1800 launched a filibuster into Spanish Texas. He was cornered in Brazos (Texas) in March 1801 by a Spanish force of 120 which killed Nolan and imprisoned his followers. There were obscure British attempts around the same time to mobilize northern indigenous tribes against their Spanish overlords. Peace with Britain in 1802 did not end unrest. During 1804–1806, American explorers mapped the Missouri River Valley, a phenomenon intimately connected to imperialism. Once New Spain erupted in insurrection, American filibusters looked south-west with renewed interest. Filibusters led by Augustus Magee, a US army officer, invaded Texas in 1812, briefly establishing a Texan republic, before facing defeat at the Battle of Medina on 18 August 1813.

But other threats came from within the Spanish empire. At the turn of the new century, a conspiracy in Tepic (New Galicia) to resurrect the Aztec empire under the leadership of an Indian called Mariano 'Máscara de Oro' ('Goldmask') was unearthed by the colonial authorities. The Viceroy, alarmed by the extent of the conspiracy and imagining some British role in it, ordered the arrest of Mariano and his followers.

The prisons ran out of space, and detainees had to be held in convents instead.[82] Rumours panicked authorities, such as in March 1797 when Celaya (central Mexico) was seized by an unsubstantiated fear that local Indian villages would assault the city on Palm Sunday.[83] The sense of crisis in Spanish America was not dispelled by the arrival, in 1803, of the man who would prove to be the last uncontested Viceroy of New Spain, José de Iturrigaray. Iturrigaray's nepotism and corruption would end up alienating not only American-born whites but Spanish residents, too. By the late-eighteenth century divisions were clear even amidst the Spanish-born (peninsular) community in the Americas. Whereas peninsular merchants were generally sympathetic towards criollo interests and the peninsular ecclesiastical and administrative elites were mostly sympathetic towards their motherland.[84] Even Iturrigaray's military policy proved divisive. The renewal of war with Britain in 1803 threatened New Spain with seaborne invasion, especially after most of the Franco-Spanish fleet was annihilated at the Battle of Trafalgar in October 1805. Iturrigaray thus increased the size of his army, and quartered them some distance away from the malarial coasts of Veracruz and Yucatán. Yellow fever was rampant during the rainy season, and nobody, least of all the foreign merchants hurrying through the port of Veracruz, liked lingering in the coastal areas where the disease was at its worst. But sparing the troops meant a defence in depth, especially as even Veracruz was less defensible than Iturrigaray had planned. In 1804, he was handed a report that the city's walls were really 'a simple fence ... ready to be toppled by the first cannon shots'.[85] The vast coastline of Spanish America remained indefensible. At Cumaná (Venezuela), an eight-man squad garrisoned a hospital overlooking the coast, with orders to beat a fighting retreat to the mountains in the event of an amphibious invasion.[86] Even worse, officers awaiting the invasion indulged in all manner of rivalry, as tensions between Spanish and criollo commanders took on political tones.[87]

These tones remained, for now, hot air, and New Spain was spared British invasion. Spain's communications with its American empire were never entirely cut off. The Spanish navy excelled at night attacks, and in using smaller vessels in shallow coastal areas where the larger British ships feared to approach.[88] Merchant vessels thus shepherded out into the ocean then increased their chances of escaping interception by taking a diagonal short-cut across the Atlantic from Cape St Vincent in search of trade winds. Alexander von Humboldt remarked from his Venezuelan tour how 'several merchant ships had chosen the oblique course from fear of privateers, and had had a very short passage'.[89]

Political chaos did not arrive until the summer of 1808, when news reached New Spain of Napoleon's overthrow of the Bourbon monarchy and his appointment of supreme military power to Marshal Murat, Duke of Berg, in the name of the Emperor's brother, 'King' Joseph of Spain and the Indies. Previous attempts to break the political loyalty of Spanish

America from the outside had failed. Indian incursions had been manageable. The Venezuelan revolutionary and French Revolutionary war veteran, Francisco Miranda, failed to get British Prime Minister Pitt's support for a seaborne invasion of the Viceroyalty of New Granada during the Anglo-Spanish hostilities of 1795–1802. Pitt was reluctant to support Miranda's revolutionary republicanism given its likeness to that of the French enemy, and Pitt hoped that diplomacy rather than invasion could prize Madrid away from its abusive alliance with Paris. Miranda, who had believed in Venezuelan independence ever since his stay in the United States of America in the 1780s, had other plans. The defeat of the Spanish navy at Trafalgar on 21 October 1805, augured well for seaborne assaults on Spanish America. In late-1805, Miranda sailed to the United States of America and recruited a band of adventurers to invade Venezuela. But Spanish officials in the United States of America got wind of Miranda's plans and alerted Caracas. When Miranda finally made landfall with a force of assorted North American adventurers, his expedition failed to win support from Venezuelans and was routed with ease. Pitt's death in 1806 and Miranda's escape to London on board a Royal Navy vessel augured a more muscular British intervention against Spain's empire in the Americas. Miranda persuaded Arthur Wellesley, later Duke of Wellington, to assemble a force in Ireland destined to liberate Venezuela. But the main British efforts lay in the South Atlantic, and even the Ireland force ended up being diverted: ironically to Iberia to support Britain's sudden Spanish Patriot ally, much to Miranda's disgust.

Twice the British tried to prize Spain's River Plate territories away from loyalty to Madrid. The Spanish viceroy fled the British amphibious invasion. But Admiral Popham's capture of Buenos Aires in 1806 was reversed by local resistance. The River Plate forged a warrior society as the free population of whites, mulattoes, and free blacks, repelled the British invaders even after the local army garrison had surrendered.[90] The threadbare Buenos Aires militia of the Viceregal period was transformed out of recognition by the enlistment of more than 7,500 men out of a city population of 40,000 to meet the British invasion. Popham's attempts the following year to hold Montevideo failed, despite almost 50,000 troops being committed, and attempts again to control Buenos Aires got nowhere. The criollos, led by a French officer (Liniers) in the Spanish service, defeated the second British invasion in 1807. The whites of the River Plate, whose dominant export trades had already given them the confidence to handle Spanish blockaders and British smugglers on their own terms, now discovered that they were military the equal of old world masters and enemies alike.[91]

In the meantime, the Spanish-American press did its best to present the events along the River Plate as victories uniting the trans-Atlantic Spanish monarchy. The first anniversary of the British defeat was celebrated in the official Mexico City daily as a 'defence of our religion,

sovereign and homeland ... against ferocious Albion, the perfidious cabinet of St. James ... and the insults of Calvinists, Lutherans and other sects'.[92] At this time the *Diario de México* newspaper ran into 7,000 daily copies, in a city of 140,000 souls.[93] The elites of Mexico City, who were associated with the 'El Parián' commercial district, would remain royalist to the end.[94] The anonymous 'Spanish American' author could not have known, given the delay in news crossing the Atlantic Ocean, that Britain and Spain were now allies against Napoleon. By the end of July this news had spread throughout the Americas, and on 2 August 1808, the Mexico City daily published a very different and Anglophile lead confirming the opening of all ports and communications with the British.[95] In April 1809, the authorities in Cartagena (New Granada) defied Viceregal authority by declaring its port open to foreign imports, certifying what had been an undeniable smuggling economy since 1795.[96] Spain's revolt also derailed Britain's plans for a third invasion of South America, which might have been successful given the new presence of the evacuated Portuguese monarchy in Brazil which was hoping to piggy-back on British naval power in order to win territorial compensation in America for the loss of Portugal. But Britain's expedition went to Iberia in support of its newfound Spanish ally instead, and Anglo-Portuguese plots to create a limited monarchy in Buenos Aires got nowhere.[97] Sir Home Popham, a colourful failure largely responsible for these South-American defeats, would disgrace himself further with the failed British invasions of the Dutch coasts around Walcheren in 1809. Only strong political networks kept him from censure.[98]

New Spain was Madrid's most valuable possession, and news of king Ferdinand's overthrow plunged its elites into turmoil. Viceroy Iturrigaray, conscious of his unpopularity for being a protégé of Spain's unpopular and deposed dictator, Manuel de Godoy, tried to temporize between two powerful factions. For a few weeks, after news reached Mexico City at the end of July at Spain's revolution, Iturrigaray managed to captain the loyal revolution that swept New Spain. On 30 July, while Ferdinand was exulted with pomp and ceremony, the Mexico City masses set about burning portraits of the erstwhile ally Napoleon and smashing his busts. But after two weeks the anguished Viceroy began a crackdown, ordering the removal of pasquinades that hard adorned walls in the city streets, however 'plausible' their fidelity to Ferdinand, Iturrigaray believed they might have been.[99]

On the one hand, the criollo-dominated governing council of Mexico City (ayuntamiento) demanded to form a provisional government headed by the Viceroy in the name of the legitimate king, Ferdinand VII. Such a supreme body would confirm with the Spanish tradition of sovereignty resorting to 'the people' in the absence of kings, and that the people would prevail until King Ferdinand could freely exercise his authority again. On the other hand, the judicial authority of New Spain (Audiencia)

was dominated by Spaniards who rejected the criollo position, especially when some of its elements were seeking to make New Spain the seat of the world-wide Spanish monarchy. Sovereignty of the people, the Inquisitor affirmed, was a heresy, while the only constituted 'people' in the Spanish empire who could decide such matters as a provisional government was that people represented by the Cortes (parliament) which had last met in 1789, in other words, the Spanish people. The inhabitants of New Spain, or anywhere else in the Americas, had no right to exceed their colonial status by enacting a provisional government of their own. It was the Mother Country rather than the Americas which was facing the full wrath of Napoleon's invasion, and obedience was doubly necessary given the context of elements in Spain (the *afrancesados*) having treacherously recognized Joseph's crown and Marshall Murat's authority. The fluidity of allegiance in the first weeks was marked. Murat tried to turn José Manuel de Goyeneche, a Peruvian criollo and soldier, into an *afrancesado* agent by sending him from Madrid to the Americas bearing instructions requiring the obedience of the Americans to the new regime of José I. But once Goyeneche reached Seville, the Patriots had triumphed at Bailén, and the Peruvian was charged with a diametrically opposed mission by the Patriot provisional government to continue to America with instructions requiring obedience to the Patriots and Ferdinand VII. Both sides had offered Goyeneche the same incentive: promotion to brigadier.[100]

The chaos unleashed that summer played out weeks later in the Americas because of the time-lag of wind and sail. New Spain Viceroy Iturrigaray ironically offered the warring factions a compromise: 'it's not too late to recognize the regime of the Duke of Berg (Marshal Murat)'. Both Spaniards and Mexicans riotously rejected this disingenuous offer, and Napoleonic designs in Spanish America would indeed meet with negligible success throughout these years. In the end the Viceroy managed to freeze discussions with the proviso that any change must come from legitimate authority in Spain. But he did so with words congratulating the 'patriotism' of the Mexican municipal authorities, enraging the Spaniards and giving momentum to Verdad, spokesman for criollo interests, whose 'loyal' position in reality obscured his interest in independence. Iturrigaray's crisis arrived weeks later. When news reached New Spain of the creation of a Supreme Patriot junta at Aranjuez (Spain), Iturrigaray demanded obedience to this body, contradicting himself that only authority which was 'legitimately' proclaimed by King Ferdinand could hold sway in New Spain.[101] On 15 September 1808, a group of Spanish merchants and criollo bureaucrats deposed Iturrigaray in a coup, replacing him with Major-General Pedro Garibay, who kept the army loyal. Mexico's junta movement was crushed, but the blatantly *peninsular* nature of the September coup fanned popular hatred against the Spaniards, and alienated intrinsically loyalist American elites. It also marked New Spain out from developments in the rest of Spanish

America, where creole elites took control of major cities. In New Spain the revolt against *peninsular* control would take place in the countryside rather than the major cities, mobilizing a popular insurrection out of socio-economic grievances and religious fervour starting in 1810.[102]

Elsewhere in America major cities remained, for the time being, in the hands of incumbents. The Captain-General of Caracas, Juan de Casas, demonstrated none of Iturrigaray's equivocation. He rejected petitions for an autonomous junta in November 1808, arresting several of its signatories, and criollo landowners had no stomach for pressing the matter by calling out the militia. In Buenos Aires Viceroy Liniers turned out his veteran militias to defeat America's first autonomous junta, the patrician junta of Montevideo formed in September 1808 under city governor, Francisco Javier de Elío. The Montevideo junta had plotted to depose Liniers on fabricated charges that he was about to turn the River Plate over to France. In territories now comprising Ecuador and Bolivia, revolts by criollos were suppressed by the end of 1809. Even though the revolt at La Paz in July 1809, had been more radical in appealing for popular support, neither cities nor countryside followed the example. Elites whose loyalism was determined by their profits from slavery and the proximity of military reinforcements overwhelmed the rebel militia with ease. By the end of 1809 the anguished Central Junta in Spain could more or less rest assured that the Spanish Americans really meant it when they protested their 'loyalty' to Ferdinand VII. But loyalty to a captive monarch could easily disguise desires for autonomy, even independence, and much would depend on news from Spain and the attitude of the loyal armies in America. The independence argument was nudged by the attitude of several key liberals in Patriot Spain. They complicated metropolitan policy by expressing sympathy for their American brothers' assertion of popular sovereignty on the one hand whilst rejecting the separatism this implied on the other.[103]

When news reached the Americas early in 1810 of the collapse of the Central Junta and the flight of the Patriot government to Cadiz, the alarmed Spanish Americans set up 'loyal' juntas across the continent. However, throughout much of the historiography on both Spain and its Latin American colonies, a clear binary has emerged, with a strong tendency to study both the metropole and the periphery as two separate polarities.[104] Historian John Lynch criticized how the Spanish-language describes the wars as a 'rupture between Spain and its colonies'; a series of movements for national liberation, in which pre-existing colonial identities challenged foreign domination.[105] But creole elites shared more in common with their peninsular brothers than they did with the mestizo, Indian and black populations occupying lower levels of the ethnic hierarchy. Criollos could aspire to all but the highest public offices, and much private wealth besides, whereas mestizos could at best aspire to become wealthy tradesmen. Mestizos were snubbed by criollos and also

resented by Indians, for whom the mixed-race population was a threat to their ancestral lands, which under Spanish colonial rule they had largely managed to preserve.[106] Spanish-American criollos, like their peninsular counterparts, were well versed in the classics, in studies of Roman law and republicanism, and above all the canon law which governs the Catholic Church. It was this western culture, rather than any championing of pre-Columbine culture, which inspired Simón Bolívar to vow to liberate the Americas during his visit to Rome in 1805.[107] In this sense the Spanish-American creoles compared with the English-speaking and French-speaking whites in the Americas who ended up supporting independence from their metropoles.[108]

Once the Cortes convened in March 1810 Spanish-American delegates were frustrated by the Spanish Patriots' inattention, even though the Americas contributed the lion's share of revenue to the Spanish treasury (as much as two-thirds in 1800).[109] José María Lequerica, a criollo delegate from Quito, in January 1811 made a speech condemning the complacency of his Spanish colleagues, who had reserved only two days a week to discuss American matters.[110] Two weeks later his Peruvian colleague, Ramón Feliú, voiced the wishes of most Spanish-American delegates by proposing a kind of federal Spanish nation encompassing both hemispheres with an equal basis for representation in the Cortes: 'Nobody could claim that one Spanish province is sovereign over another, so equally nobody should claim that a collection of provinces called "Spain" should be sovereign over the other provinces in the monarchy called "America"'.[111] But the Spanish liberals were unmoved. Agustín de Argüelles noted how 'America, hitherto considered a colony of Spain, has been emancipated with equal rights there for all subjects of His Majesty ... no other nation in Europe has been so generous, but the marvellous mutation is not enough to calm our irate American colleagues'.[112]

The legislative Cortes (Parliament) convened in March 1810, and was soon dominated by a well-connected faction of reformers called *liberales*. They proclaimed a single Spanish 'nation' spanning both sides of the Atlantic, which they would codify in a Constitution proclaimed in 1812, and equal rights to the Americans. But sovereignty still resided in Spain. The exclusion of blacks from citizenship guaranteed a blocking majority for Peninsular Spaniards in the Cádiz institutions, as well as opportunities for American independence activists to promise blacks emancipation in return for military service. But Patriot liberals grew annoyed at the continued assertion of sovereignty by American juntas, and by mid-1811 the Spanish consensus held that the Americans were in rebellion. They secured from their British allies nothing better than neutrality in the American revolt. This meant that only Spanish ships and troops, which were sorely needed for the fight against Napoleon, were dispatched in penny packets to bolster the forces of loyalism in this civil war of the

Spanish empire. The American independence juntas, for their part, could often count on the militia, and where this body was weak, like in New Spain (Mexico), rural insurgents performed a more violent equivalent role.

A *Liberal* Empire?

In 1812, Spain proclaimed a radical liberal constitution, the Cádiz Constitution, which produced a unicameral legislature (Cortes) elected indirectly by male property owners and overseen by a weak executive. Local power would be in the hands of elected town halls (*ayuntamientos*), no constitutional amendments were permitted during the first eight years, and all this reform was enacted in the name of the 'people'.[113] In the Americas the Constitution allowed non-elite Spanish Americans, especially Indian communities, the right to establish autonomy for smaller settlements. This challenge to prevailing structures within Spanish politics further became a fundamental point of contention within the creole elites of South America; a fulcrum upon which liberalism triumphed against the absolutist and monarchical edifices which had dominated the Viceroyalties of the colonies.[114] Thus the case has been made that the Spanish-American independence process was a projection of the 'Spanish Revolution' which originated in Napoleon's invasion of Spain in 1808.[115]

One of the paradoxes of Spanish legislators was how their bold attempt to unite both sides of the Hispanic Atlantic actually had the effect of promoting local autonomy in those areas (especially New Spain/Mexico), where the Constitution of 1812 was applied in earnest.[116] Imperial harmony had already frayed in the wake of the Spanish Patriots' cunning pandering to the criollos' caste hierarchy by insisting on racist qualifications for citizenship. This meant that 12 million Spaniards were represented by 36 delegates to the Cortes that opened at Cádiz in 1810, whereas 15 million souls throughout Spanish America got 12 delegates. The Constitution produced a single-chamber Cortes, in a deliberate attempt, like the French Constitution of 1791, to avoid the stigma of an overbearing noble estate ensconced in an upper chamber. But no formal nobiliar estate existed in Spanish America, so the concentration of legislative power into a single chamber in faraway Spain had the effect of frustrating local elites who had been instinctively pro-Spanish while encouraging local and more diverse activism in the lower levels of municipal governance created by the Constitution.[117] Even in Spain itself, free thinkers discovered the legislative mess of the 384-article charter. José María Blanco White, a theological dissenter from Seville, attacked the Constitution for being too abstract and tailored for the liberal class of students, literati, merchants, and officeholders, rather than reconciling the grandees, clergy, minor employees, and landowners as would have been the case in the British system he admired. He envisaged a bicameral

system instead with an upper chamber for grandees and bishops who would then evolve to become citizens rather than the people slaves.[118]

War Against Empire

Insurgent leaders in New Spain did not look forwards for inspiration, or even sideways to the United States, but to the sixteenth century, and the original sin of the illegitimate Spanish conquest of the Americas.[119] Mexico uniquely witnessed a mass rural insurrection against Spanish control. Its first leader was the charismatic priest, Miguel Hidalgo, who was in his late 50s when he declared his famous 'Cry of Dolores'. Hidalgo was known for his intelligent command of philosophy, European and indigenous languages, and for his care for the material rather than spiritual wellbeing of his successive parishes in central Mexico. He raised an irregular force which increasingly gained a reputation for chaos and violence, as rural rebels targeted the lives and property of the wealthy, especially the hated Peninsular Spaniards, with zeal. A mix of racial discrimination, tax grievances, and long-standing disputes over land, gave Hidalgo's insurrection a brutality which exceeded historical rural revolts. Hidalgo exerted a magnetic attraction towards his rural followers, many of whom were indigenous relegated to the bottom of the caste order. Surviving and disbanded members of the Indian arrowmen mobilized in 1810. Initially they were divided between the cause of royalism and independence. But they soon gravitated towards supporting the latter once hopes spread that Hidalgo would protect Indian lands, and once the flight of Europeans from Zacatecas and other mining settlements emboldened them to the independence cause.[120]

Hidalgo's ally, Ignacio Allende, organized a disciplined army. The insurgents won local victories in the autumn of 1810 thanks to surprise, overwhelming numbers, and the use of terror. On 28 September 1810, both combatant and non-combatant royalists besieged in the granary of Guanajuato were massacred, probably after one of their number had opened fire on the insurgents under a flag of truce. The granary was akin to a fort, and unfortunate symbol of suffering in recent famines in New Spain. News of the massacre frightened criollos across New Spain to side with peninsulares. When the insurgent forces of Hidalgo and Allende reached Mexico City on 1 November 1810, they found the capital fortified against them, and even some slaves armed, and a celestial leader of royalism in the form of the Virgin of Los Remedios to combat Hidalgo's Virgin of Guadalupe. The capital rejected surrender and the insurgents retreated, their Indian soldiers dissolving ahead of the royalist counteroffensive.[121]

Hidalgo's Indians terrified Mexico's criollo elites into loyalism. The bishop of Guadalajara condemned the excommunicated priest for wanting to 'surrender to the Indians the land and wealth of this kingdom,

exposing it to the slavery of the first maritime power arriving at our coasts. Our fatherland will end and our holy religion banished forever'.[122] Ironically, the arguments in favour of 'order' and recognizing formally constituted power which loyalist clerics made in Spanish America were the same as those employed by clerics collaborating with the Josephine regime in Spain itself, especially in Andalucía in the wake of its conquest early in 1810.[123] Loyalist counterinsurgency in the Americas matched the insurgents in brutality, as frustrated regular troops managed to disperse the rebels but seldom defeat them decisively in pitched battle.[124] Bishop Cabañas discovered this to his cost. In November 1811, the convoy in which he was travelling from Mexico City to his see at Guadalajara was raided by three Patriot bands. One of these was led by the rebel priest, Father Correa, who let the bishop continue his journey with a personal entourage in return for all the baggage Cabañas had abandoned on the road when he fled into the woods.[125] Correa's conversion to the insurgent cause had been caused in large part by the casual brutality royalists inflicted upon civilians in their path.[126] But his ecclesiastical subordination towards Cabañas doubtless moderated his behaviour towards the captive. Meanwhile, Patriot Spain's executive (Regency Council), interpreting the situation separated by 5,000 miles distance and 2 months' time-lag, tried to persuade the American juntas to recognize the continued sovereignty of Spain, offering blanket amnesties for perpetrators of excesses.

In August 1813 the Peruvian delegate to the Cortes of Cádiz, Felín, complained of the nonsensical brutality of the royalist counterinsurgency: 'settlements helping or even communicating with the insurgents in any way are to be decimated ... but what about a faithful father who talks to his insurgent son when the latter happens to pass through his village. Must the father die?'.[127] But in practical terms amnesties were in the gift of local commanders, and they were not always respected or accepted when offered. José de la Cruz, royalist commander in western Mexico, was notorious for summarily shooting insurgents after they surrendered.[128] Juan Nepomuceno, an insurgent officer resisting the royalist onslaught in Jalisco in 1815, rejected an offer of amnesty out of a mix of conviction and prudence:

> There are historical precedents for kingdoms becoming independent, most recently with the Anglo-American nation. The United States achieved its independence with the help of Spain. Why was this independence justified and ours is not? Did Spain itself not free itself from seven hundred years of Moorish rule? Why should we not have the right to recover our kingdoms and resist foreign government?

In the case of Nepomuceno, what clenched his rejection of the amnesty was intelligence of the rampaging ruthlessness of the royalists who

'passed through a ranch at La Quesera and shot 33 women, 2 children, and 21 labourers who had returned with their baskets of maize ... and other outrages have been reported in the canyon of Jalpa'.[129]

The nineteenth-century Mexican conservative, Lucas Alamán, believed that the insurrection in New Spain was proletarian in nature, targeting property and civilization.[130] Certainly in December 1810, Hidalgo issued decrees from Guadalajara abolishing serfdom and ordering the 'restoration of lands', in terms which militated against both Spanish encroachments under the recent Bourbon reforms and the lands lost in the conquest of Mexico. During Hidalgo's stay in Guadalajara between November 1810 and January 1811, the insurgents launched their first newspaper. *El Despertador Americano* ('American Alarm') ran into seven editions of around 1,500 copies each in circulation, an unprecedented number for this capital of New Galicia.[131] But Hidalgo's revolution was made on the run, and in practice the insurgency possessed neither the radicalism nor the violence that the propaganda of the royalists claimed. In fact the insurrection had broader support amongst elites who desired above all to recreate a social order that was collapsing.[132] It was driven at local levels by vertical power networks, of wealthy families mobilizing their economic dependents below and supporting insurgent leaders above them.[133] This situation was eased by the dispersed nature of the royalist armed forces.

In 1808 there was no formal presence of the Spanish Royal army at all in the Americas. Instead permanently mobilized units known as *fijos* guarded strategic points whilst the more numerous militia could be mobilized in times of emergency. Both forces were mostly criollo rather than Spanish in composition, and the overwhelming weight of militia rather than mobilized forces (10 to 1 in the case of Buenos Aires) tended to give local interests an advantage.[134] In the River Plate an independence junta was formed on 25 May 1810. The ruling members of the Junta had named an executive triumvirate by September of 1811, to maintain effective rule over the region. For a long time, historians viewed the comparatively seamless independence process in the River Plate as the product of threefold militarization: the ascension of insurgent officers into elite social circles, the use of army structures as a blueprint for state-building, and the expansion of recruitment into the army.[135] Power seemed to have been highly consolidated by this point, but Peru and Paraguay lay outside Buenos Aires's control. In order to get the Paraguayans to submit to the will of the Argentine Junta, Manuel Belgrano was instructed to head to the Paraguay with a force of a few 100 soldiers. Owing to the harsh terrain and the toughness of the Paraguayans, Belgrano's forces were decisively defeated at the battle of Tacuarí on the 9 March 1811. From May 1811 Paraguay became de facto independent, its regime using the universalist inspiration of the French Revolution in a strange context of isolation from the rest of Spanish America. This process was perfected

when the eccentric ruler, José Gaspar Rodríguez de Francia, became dictator for life in 1814.[136]

In December 1811, veteran elements of the Buenos Aires militia rioted in protest at attempts by local authorities to subject them to militarization.[137] In general, in 1810, higher-ranking officers tended to obey the Spanish Patriots, whereas more junior officers tended to be persuaded by promotions and local kinship to support the American juntas. Both loyalists and juntas claimed to be 'loyal' in defending the rights of Ferdinand VII, so there was none of the Manichaean choice facing their comrades in Spain in 1808. But the Spanish chaos of 1810 would tilt the balance towards the juntas, which gave the autonomy movement a social base even when the royalist counterinsurgency gained the upper hand in 1811. The royalist forces of Brigadier Calleja marched north from Mexico City in October 1810, timing their movements with the harvest for logistical reasons and managing to recapture rebel towns in the Bajío and also the priest Hidalgo himself.[138] Calleja became such an effective counterinsurgent (and Viceroy between 1813 and 1816) that his name was punned in varieties of lewd insults amongst the rebels.[139] Yet the juntas' resolve was strengthened by news of the apparent fall of Spain. José María Morelos (1765–1815), a rebel priest who assumed command of the New Spain revolt after Hidalgo's execution in 1811, summed up this attitude eloquently: 'Now there is no more Spain, because France has seized her, there is no Ferdinand VII because either he chose to follow his Bourbon ancestors to France or he was seized by force, in either case he does not exist for us. In his absence sovereignty has reverted to the American Nation'.[140] Elites, including army officers, found the American juntas to be more reliable repositories of sovereignty than the chaos in Spain, and they acted accordingly. In the River Plate the independents never lost the control they had seized in 1810, even when the royalist counteroffensive from 1814 dispersed most other independent forces elsewhere in the Americas.

The Strength of Royalism

Royalism remained strong in key areas. Heavily garrisoned and slave-ridden Cuba remained loyal to the Spanish crown as the 'ever faithful isle'. The wealth offered elites by sugar plantations, and fear that autonomy could unleash a slave insurrection akin to Haiti, kept the criollos loyal. Even though sugar exports from Cuba expanded three times between 1790 and 1815, political uncertainty kept criolllo society on edge. But the island remained well garrisoned and was also represented in the Patriot Cortes at Cádiz from 1810.[141] Independence insurrections in Cuba, like that launched by Joaquín Infante in 1810, or by the free-black Havana militia captain, José Antonio Alponte in 1812, were crushed with ease. But the slaveholding society remained on edge. The Spanish colonial authorities, still terrified of the example of Haiti, in 1812 established

a committee ('comisión blanca') aimed at increasing white immigration to Cuba in a bid to prevent the 'Africanization' of the island.[142]

In Venezuela and New Granada the situation was more mixed throughout 1810–1812. Caracas launched a junta which on 5 July 1811 formally broke all links with Spain by declaring a republic. But the Venezuelan Constitution which emerged the following year was confederal. The republic's autonomous militia fought a long battle against the better-organized loyalist armies, and also failed to gain popular support. The slave trade was abolished, but not slavery, and free blacks (pardos) were formally granted equal rights with whites in a manner that both alienated white landowners while failing to satisfy raised expectations amongst blacks at the same time. Even theoretical equality failed to change the pigmentocracy of Spanish-American life. On 11 November 1811, pardo militiamen in Cartagena rebelled in protest, demanding to be led by pardo officers instead of white ones.[143]

The royalists, by contrast, gathered support from alarmed whites fearing another Haiti, and also from several slaves who joined their armies in return for a promise of liberty. As during the American Revolutionary War, most slaves did not have a particular loyalty to either side of the war. Rather they were largely fighting their own battle for personal freedom and manumission.[144] In the end, Francisco Miranda, whom the Caracas junta had reluctantly allowed into their state in December 1810 and made Generalissimo, lost the first war for the first Venezuelan Republic. His overly defensive strategy allowed royalists to recover Venezuela over the course of 1812, assisted by a number of royalist slave rebellions and the chaos unleashed by a devastating earthquake in March. Several disgruntled officers, including Simón Bolívar, handed Miranda over to a Spanish prison in disgust at his leadership, while they fled west to continue the fight. By 25 July 1812 Venezuela's first republican regime was crushed, as former rebel areas recognized the Cortes of Cádiz and the loyalist command of Monteverde.

To the west in New Granada (Colombia), the autonomous movement faced even more difficulties. The Real Audiencia of New Granada, located in Santa Fe (de Bogotá), had jurisdiction over 19 provinces. In 1809 all the provinces swore loyalty to King Ferdinand, but their loyal junta was overruled by the Viceroy. About half the provincial juntas disobeyed the Viceroy, such as Santa Fe, and later Cartagena, while the other half remained loyal, including Santa María. Not even Bogotá could dominate its vast hinterland in the way that Caracas did for Venezuela, and so much sovereignty really rested on the ability of urban elites to dominate the surrounding rural population. Bogotá declared a constitutional monarchy in its Cundinamarca region, but the forces of loyalism were strong, especially as defenders of the Spanish Regency unleashed several slave revolts, pushing autonomous control further northwards. But the Spaniards lost the key port and naval base of Cartagena for good, which

meant they were deprived of its trade as well as its military potential. The civil war would persist until the first republic (1810–1816) collapsed under the campaign of royalist General Morillo's army.[145]

After his forces fled west into New Granada, Simón Bolívar took stock of the collapse. On 15 December 1812, he issued a lengthy letter from Cartagena explaining the causes of the collapse and his prescriptions for the future. The first republican forces had been too decentralized, with the serious defeat at the Battle of Los Colorados at San Carlos on 25 April 1812 having been caused by the inability of the republicans to rely on reinforcements from the anarchic command structure. This structure had also fostered rapacious behaviour towards non-combatants, alienating the very village communities from whom demands for men and money had to be made. The catastrophic earthquake of 26 March 1812 had bred fatalism amidst the physical devastation. It gave the royalist church hierarchy a pretext to preach that the natural disaster was divine punishment for resistance to legitimate power. At least 10,000 were killed in Caracas alone, and Patriot-held areas suffered more devastation in general. The scientist, Alexander von Humboldt, had left Venezuela long before the earthquake struck and yet he kept accurate reports of events in the aftermath of the catastrophe in Caracas:

> Mothers were seen bearing in their arms their children whom they hoped to recall to life. Desolate families were wandering through the city ... pressed along the streets, which could be traced only by long lines of ruins ... Wounded persons, buried beneath the ruins, were heard imploring by their cries the help of passers-by, and nearly two thousand were dug out ... Beds, linen to dress the wounds, instruments of surgery, medicines, every object of the most urgent necessity, was buried in the ruins. Everything, even food, was wanting; and for the space of several days water became scarce in the interior of the city. The commotion had rent the pipes of the fountains; and the falling in of the earth had choked up the springs that supplied them.[146]

International help was limited. The US Congress agreed to send five ships laden with flour to aid the refugees in Venezuela.[147] But the independence war and its international dimensions prioritized military considerations over humanitarian. British intervention was self-interested, as the Royal Navy was only too keen to ship loyal Spanish forces back to reinforce the motherland whilst leaving the Americas even more exposed to London's commercial interests. Thus Bolívar concluded that he needed a centralized structure to perform the liberation of Venezuela.[148] It was a fortuitous assessment, given Britain's alliance with Spain, and given Britain's war with the United States of America between 1812 and 1814 which absorbed Washington's attention.

War of 1812

The War of 1812 (sometimes called a Second War of Independence in the USA), was fought between the United States of America and the British empire, mostly in Canada. In his 1895 *History of Canada,* the Anglo-Canadian historian William Kingsford remarked that 'the events of the War of 1812 have not been forgotten in Britain, for they have never been known there'.[149] The domestic and European pressures caused by Britain's ongoing war with Napoleon certainly gave the Anglo-American conflict a peripheral importance to London, in stark contrast to the central importance it gave to Canada. Yet British writers then and since usually had only a hazy grasp of events in Canada.[150] American calculations, too, were dominated by events in Europe, with the US declaration of war being deliberately timed to coincide with a blockaded Britain's isolation in Europe. Napoleon's Continental system had tightened by summer 1810, and Britain's economic depression was worsened by the harvest failures of 1811 and 1812, and the loss of New World markets due to the War of 1812.[151]

The trigger for this war lay in the Royal Navy's impressment of American sailors from the 1790s. During the first period of the Napoleonic Wars, from 1793 to 1802, merchants from America, and European powers, sought to exploit their neutral status by transporting goods from France's colonies in the West Indies and elsewhere to the United States of America. As a result, in January 1794 the British government invoked the Rule of 1756, prohibiting neutrals from engaging in any commerce closed to them during time of peace.[152] No sooner had the rule been introduced, however, than American merchants discovered a loophole. The solution they came up with – known at the time as 'broken voyage' – rendered the goods effectively 'American,' thus allowing them to be transported to any port open to trade with the United States.[153] As the war went on, and as word of the enormous profits to be made spread, more and more American merchants became involved in the trade, using broken shipping to bypass a Royal Navy blockade of the French coast.

American attention in this decade was absorbed with hostility with France, which developed into a quasi-war in 1798. Relations with Britain were mostly good, especially as Britain had made certain concessions on the Canadian frontier. British attention was likewise tied up with the European theatre. In 1803 the radical diarist, William Cobbett, observed in Britain's curtailment of neutrals' trade 'the vast importance that was attached to every little point in dispute with Denmark and Sweden' and 'the most imperfect indifference' that was accorded to 'all matters relative to America'.[154] But British conquests of French, Spanish, and Dutch possessions in the Caribbean ended US trading privileges there. Britain also suspected that the 50 million francs Napoleon obtained through the Louisiana Purchase of 1803 was funding a planned French invasion of

England.[155] In October 1805, James Stephen's pamphlet *War in Disguise: or, The Frauds of the Neutral Flags* convinced anguished politicians in Britain that America's growing share of neutral trade indirectly benefitted Napoleon's empire.[156] Meanwhile, American hostility was aroused by Britain's continued support of Native Americans on the US frontiers as well as its impressment policy at sea. Britain held that British or British empire-born sailors were still subject to Crown policy on the high seas, even if they claimed now to be Americans.[157] Britain's abolition of the slave trade in 1807 added to US anger, given the even more zealous Royal Navy searches of ships on the high seas that resulted. Even though the US government abolished the trade in the same year, it had neither the power nor will to enforce the ban, given the limited reach of the Federal government and the private nature of its investment in human bondage (as opposed to the state investments in Britain and France).[158] Britain's Orders in Council of 1807 tightened the campaign against neutral trade, infuriating opinion in the United States. By 1812 about 900 American ships had been taken in total, around 600 by the British.[159] From 1807, large segments of the American public, particularly in the South and West, and their representatives in Congress – Pan-Americanists such as Henry Clay and John C. Calhoun – began clamouring for war. Dreams of an American republic stretching north into Canada and west to the Pacific seized the imagination inland from the hard-nosed anti-war commercial interests of the eastern seaboard. Britain's declining, and by 1812 inconsequential, support for Indians hostile to United States expansion was presented as a *casus belli*.[160]

Yet few in Britain read the war clouds properly. British politicians and newspaper editors projected their class snobbery by seeing demagoguery in US war threats, believing that the belligerence of American politicians was merely a ploy to drum up enough support to secure re-election.[161] As late as the 28 July 1812, just two days before news that the United States had declared war reached London, the editor of the conservative *Star* insisted that 'the present administration of United States of America build their hopes of continuation in office, by keeping at peace with this country, however they may be necessitated to sound the warhoop for electioneering purposes'.[162] But there were substantial interests swaying Washington which led to the declaration of war on Britain on 18 June 1812, including midwestern plans to 'liberate' Canada and the distraction promised to Britain by an apparent recovery in French naval power. The US navy, however, offered little challenge to the British. In 1805 President Jefferson had introduced a gunboat policy, concentrating construction on smaller vessels designed to protect coasts and harbours in the belief that larger vessels would end up being captured by the British. Thus war in June 1812, found the US Navy with few large seaworthy vessels: ten frigates and twelve smaller vessels (minus gunboats), less than 10% of the combined Royal Navy fleet.[163] Nonetheless the outnumbered US navy

scored morale-boosting successes. Between August and December 1812, the Royal Navy's North American squadron lost three frigates – the HMS *Guerrière*, *Macedonian*, and *Java* – to American warships in single ship-actions. Strategically, these defeats were inconsequential; they neither raised shipping insurance rates nor restricted Britain's ability to reinforce its army in Canada. But US vulnerability at sea did not have to matter, given that the main US effort in 1812 was a land invasion of Canada. Fewer than 10,000 regular soldiers defended the vast frontier in 1812, and most Canadian population centres lay close to the US border. But early US successes were repelled, with a key role being played by the Canadian militia.

Three weeks after the declaration of war, an American army led by William Hull crossed the Detroit River and occupied the town of Sandwich, near modern-day Windsor, Ontario. Alarmed by discontent among his troops, in early August Hull retreated across the river to Detroit, where he was followed by a small British-Native American army under Isaac Brock. A brief siege ensued, which ended on 16 August when Hull agreed to surrender. The rhetorical clash accompanied the military. President Madison's fourth annual message to Congress in late-December 1812, demanded Britain renounce the practice of impressing American sailors as a pre-requisite for peace. Impressment had been cited as a casus belli in the declaration of the war in June 1812, and been the subject of American complaints since at least 1794.[164] The USA had more success crushing Britain's Creek Indian allies in present-day Alabama over the course of 1813. Native American offensive capacity was limited, their firearrows making little impression against American wooden forts supplied with water-buckets, and British operations in the Gulf of Mexico did not make an impression until 1814. Their greatest impact was in terror, as American troops feared being tortured if they were captured by Indians.[165]

But the abdication of Britain's main antagonist, Napoleon, in 1814 changed everything. When news of the abdication of Napoleon reached Britain on 8 April 1814, it was celebrated across the country. Firework displays, processions, and public feasts were given in most towns as Britons commemorated the end of the war in Europe. The news was greeted with jubilation by the press, celebrating a new era of total peace in the wake of total war. Almost immediately however, the focus of the press shifted to the war with the United States. Editorials and articles discussing the war in North America proliferated. The establishment newspaper, *The Times*, on 15 April summed up the national mood: 'now that the tyrant Bunoparte [sic] has been consigned to infamy, there is no public feeling in this country stronger than that of indignation against the Americans'.[166] Yet the influential radical William Cobbett, who had always opposed the war with the USA, wrote a series of editorials for the *Political Register* in which he demanded an immediate peace with America.[167] If Britain

remained at war with the United States, it would unite the Americans 'in a spirit of resistance', Cobbett warned. Cobbett rehearsed the logic of his earlier criticism of foreign mercenaries as a threat to British liberties. Any British conquest would corrupt liberty at home and ensure enmity from like-minded Americans.[168] Cobbett was particularly scornful of *The Times*, which in a long and fiery article published on 15 April, had pledged support for 'the doctrine of no peace with James Madison' and advocated a renewed offensive as a way of breaking up the American union and 'winning' the Eastern states to a 'union of interests with the country from whence they sprung'.[169]

Once the 1814 peace in Europe relieved Britain of its main commitment, the United States faced the nightmare of a full-blown British invasion. Its vast coastline proved vulnerable to amphibious landings, especially around the exposed Chesapeake Bay, and in 1814 the British even marched into Washington and burnt the White House, repaying a similar US action in Canada. By 1814 the economic cost to the United States of the British blockade had become severe. But little glory was forthcoming on the British side either, with defeats at Baltimore and New Orleans. On 24 December 1814 peace was agreed in the Treaty of Ghent. Prime Minister Lord Liverpool, appreciating the bigger picture of ascendant US power, did not press for harsh peace terms.[170]

The War of 1812 proved unsuccessful for the United States and unwanted for Britain, with neither side able to claim victory. However, its impact on Native Americans and Canadians was decisive. The former were virtually destroyed as independent tribes east of the Mississippi river, and all British support for them ended. The more abolitionist-minded British did very little for the slaves they encountered, although some 4,000 black slaves fled to the British at the end of the war. The Canadians, by contrast could claim victory in defeating US invasions, defending their separateness, and passing a milestone towards nationhood.[171] The defensive war in Canada helped forge unity amongst British, French, and Indian, comprising, in the words of one historian, a 'new, shared identity that transcended their parochial localisms'.[172] Hostile invasion thus reduced Canadian parochialism, in contrast to either the British militia recruitment on the other side of the Atlantic which experienced no actual invasion, or to the fragmented jurisdictions held by Patriots throughout Spanish America.[173] Canadians thus remember the war as a defensive victory against American nationalism. Strangely, even though the war for the USA was at best a stalemate and worst an outright failure, Americans, too, have tended to remember it as a success. This memory arose for two reasons. First, news of Andrew Jackson's sensational victory at the Battle of New Orleans spread across the United States of America at the same time as news that peace had been declared, creating a correlation between victory and peace.[174] Second, the public history continues to celebrate particular exploits, such as the successful

US defence of Baltimore (1814) and New Orleans (1815), and its unlikely success in numerous naval engagements. Even today the hype surrounding the museum ship *USS Constitution* moored at Boston underlines American nationalism. US frigates scored several victories against British merchantmen and warships, thanks to inaccurate British gunnery and overconfidence. But British naval superiority was never seriously challenged except on Canada's Great Lakes, and victory for the Americans thus proved impossible.[175]

The popular experience of the Anglo-American war seldom approached the horrors of Spanish America. Recent research has emphasized that the border between empire and republic in North America was blurred rather than defined, and not just geographically. Border inhabitants spoke the same languages, their loyalties were flexible, and even their politics overlapped. 'Late loyalists', or Americans who had moved to Canada since 1792, tended to remain loyal to the United States of America, whilst the Federalist party in the United States of America was anti-war and even pro-British. In other words, the war of 1812 was a civil war, rather than a war of nation and empire.[176] It differed from the civil war in Spanish America by being less brutal. In contrast to Spanish America, ethnic and economic divisions were less marked, culture was more shared, and its international resolution in 1814 allowed empire and republic to cohabit English America, unlike the ongoing agony of sovereignty and legitimacy south of the Río Grande.

1813: Patriot Victories

Over the course of 1813 the Spanish-American rebels counterattacked. Simón Bolívar emerged as the new Generalisimo, launching a ruthless 'war to the death' against Spanish royalists, which one recent study has called a genocide.[177] Bolívar made rapid advances using his corps of mounted infantry against the royalist foot soldiers. He won the Battle of Taguanes (31 July 1813) after he dispatched a vanguard of 200 of his strongest horses, each to carry an infantryman in addition to a rider to dash ahead and cut off the royalists' line of retreat.[178] Cavalry versus cavalry clashes were the most chaotic. Lassoes, close cavalry encounters known as 'entreveros', terror, and Bolivar's dictatorial leadership, all pushed the royalists back from all their gains of 1812. Bolívar's victory at Araure (Venezuela) on 5 December 1813 was the largest land battle of the Spanish-American war so far. Bolívar followed his success by militarizing the Second Republic, ordering the conscription of all men of military age. But Bolívar's draconian command barely obscured how ordinary Venezuelans remained as little persuaded by revolution as they had under Miranda. The spread of such French Revolutionary symbols as liberty trees and phrygian caps could not disguise the reality of conscription and death any more than in western France a generation earlier.[179]

Venezuela exceeded all other campaigns in the Americas in its scale of violence. Certainly, the Hidalgo insurrection in New Spain approximated the Bolivarian 'war to the death'. But the Mexican violence was much more the product of long-standing hatred towards Spaniards, caused by the concentration of mining wealth and governance in the hands of *peninsulares* (pejoratively dubbed *gachupines*) since the mid-eighteenth century.[180] The New Spain insurrection was also unique in its religious leadership, as both insurgents and royalists claimed divine justification. But in Venezuela the violence was the product of Bolivar's deliberate strategy and much more targeted towards more recent enemies within, namely the wealthy planter and coastal oligarchy that had seized power in April 1810.[181] Coercion forged loyalty to the revolution above all else.

Royalism held little appeal either, especially when pro-Spanish 'Generals' commanding platoon-sized irregulars raided and pillaged villages with reckless abandon.[182] But it held more appeal for blacks. Blacks serving the Caracas junta continued to be segregated by pay and unit. But blacks defending royalist Valencia (Venezuela) enjoyed civil equality and freedom from slavery. Even Miranda admitted that royalist black militiamen were amongst the city's fiercest defenders.[183] Alexander von Humboldt saw cynicism in the royalists' emancipation: 'the gradual or instantaneous abolition of slavery has been proclaimed in different regions of Spanish America, less from motives of justice and humanity, than to secure the aid of an intrepid race of men, habituated to privation, and fighting for their own cause'.[184] The royalists' emancipation in a civil war was analogous to the strategic calculations of French Revolutionary abolitionists like Georges Danton who said 'Emancipate the negroes, and the commercial ascendancy of England is forever destroyed'.[185] Even though the French government outlawed slavery in its colonies in 1794, Napoleon restored it in 1802, and even abolitionists insisted that former slaves continue the back-breaking labour of sugar cultivation after their legal freedom had been granted. Europeans continued to view blacks in racist terms, as men of superior physique and dimmed intellect.

Dividing and ruling was a hackneyed imperial strategy, albeit one which proved effective in Spanish-America's ethnic hierarchy. Even areas still free of independence risings witnessed sharpened tensions between 'loyal' criollos and their legitimate government. On 24 January 1814 criollo elites in San Salvador (El Salvador) rebelled against the Intendant's repeated annulment of elections that their class kept winning under the rule of the Constitution of 1812. Intendant José María Peinado mobilized his posse of 'honoured volunteers of Ferdinand VII' against the local criollo militia. The militia forced the Intendant to release elected mayors he had imprisoned, but they failed to disarm the absolutist posse before news reached central America of King Ferdinand's revocation of the Constitution.[186]

News of Napoleon's defeat in Spain heartened the royalists, and in 1814 they launched their counteroffensive. Over the course of 1814, despite Bolivar making all men over the age of 12 liable for conscription, the royalists pushed the rebels back. The violence and war-related suffering may have killed as much as 20% of the Venezuelan population between 1810 and 1817. In 1815 Spain, now freed of its war against Napoleon, sent the largest Spanish force across the Atlantic hitherto witnessed. On 14 February 1815, General Morillo's force left Cádiz comprising 43 transports escorted by 18 warships and an expeditionary army of 10,642 troops.[187] Over the course of 1815 Morillo's force cleared Venezuela of independents, and then pressed west into New Granada. The royalists answered death with death, frequently unleashing blacks against white independents in a race war motivated by hatred of criollo elites rather than love of Spain. Morillo's royalists burnt, expropriated, and executed. Pablo Morillo, himself a veteran of the brutal Peninsular War in his native Spain, claimed that 'in America we had to fight a much more dangerous and cruel war than any up to that point'.[188] The collapse of the Venezuelan Second Republic was followed by the collapse of independence in Cundinamarca and even Cartagena, which fell to the royalists in December 1815 after a lengthy and bloody siege. The besieged Cartagena junta's pleas for British help had been in vain, and Bolivar fled into exile in Jamaica to await happier times.[189] The persistence of insurgency and counterinsurgency in Spanish America turned the hemisphere into one of the bloodiest battlefields of the wars of 1792–1815. It mirrored irregular wars which had erupted in Europe in the 1790s, but persisted well into the 1820s, as new Spanish-American states only painfully consolidated their authority.

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6 Living with Insurrection

Insurgencies in Europe and the Americas impacted on civilians in the wars even more than conscription into regular armies. Partisan warfare in such diverse locations as western France, Spain, the Americas, Finland, Tyrol, Italy, and the Balkans, in many ways looked timeless. Guerrilla warfare was indeed the oldest form of warfare. But the political upheaval of the era after 1792 turned irregular warfare into a force, which undermined the power of states and their armies. The era gave its greatest military theorist, Karl von Clausewitz, a blueprint for explaining the power of guerrilla warfare (his 'escalation dominance' model). It also drenched guerrilla forces in a romanticized myth, depicting their members as so many Robin Hoods and Jánošíks. In reality, of course, a huge grey area existed between guerrilla warfare and wrongdoing, and much of an insurgency's efficacy depended on the support of religion, local-power networks, traditional life, and outright criminality. But the pillage, violence, and coercion inflicted on civilians by guerrillas operating in their midst were airbrushed by folk memory and even by sympathetic historians. Marxian historians, who were as removed from the experience of guerrilla warfare as they were convinced in their materialist dialectic, saw in irregular warfare a form of liberation. Eric Hobsbawm called guerrillas 'social bandits', men on the margins of society who consciously robbed from exploitative land owners or capitalists.[1]

Nineteenth-century and twentieth-century explanations of irregular warfare often overlapped. The Russian example shows best how Romantic and Marxist interpretations exaggerated the agency of the 'people' and understated that of the regular army. The Russian officer and military historian, Alexander Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky (1789–1848), published Russia's first official history of Napoleon's invasion of Russia. He took his instructions from Tsar Nicholas I's notorious 'Third Department' of censors. As the revolt in 1825 by 'Decembrist' officers in the Russian army had soured court attitudes towards the army, Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky shifted the focus of his official history away from implicated individuals and towards the

partisan irregulars instead.[2] Leo Tolstoy's serialization in the 1860s of his epic novel *War and Peace* compounded the popular image further, as his work stressed the actions of thousands of individuals at war and of their collective consciousness.[3] The advent of Soviet historiography in the twentieth century thus found a ready-made canon of romanticized interpretation on which to overlay its dialectical materialism. Historian Yevgeny Tarle in 1936 declared the conflict a 'national war' placing emphasis on the leading role the people. Tarle's view remained orthodoxy throughout the Soviet era.[4] Soviet historians downplayed the role of feudal elites (nobles and clergy) and exaggerated that of the 'people'.[5] But as Dominic Lieven has argued, exaggerating the role of partisans understates the impressive performance of the Tsarist army, which pushed Napoleon's invasion back from the ashes of Moscow to the very gates of Paris.[6]

Naturally, all interpretations usually have some basis in reality. Foreign contemporaries were evidently impressed by popular resistance. General Wilson, who had first-hand experience of both Iberian and Russian wars, remarked that 'the Spanish guerrilla warfare never was more successful, and certainly was not so formidable to the enemy (as the Russian)'.[7] But such views are condescending and oversimplify the all-too-human choices made by insurgents, and not just in the hallmark examples of Russia or Spain. The uprising in Saint-Domingue, for example, led to the establishment of the first black republic (Haiti) in the western hemisphere in 1804. This major event was condemned by racist apologists for slavery on the one hand and celebrated as a precedent for anti-colonial struggles on the other. But neither interpretation, whether hateful or heartening, is of much use for understanding the experiences of the black insurgents in the context of their own time. Neither interpretation, for example, would reveal the reality that the free blacks sustained their insurrection by selling slaves to the neighbouring Spanish colony of Santo Domingo.[8] Yet myth remains more appealing than reality. Insurgents became heroes over the course of 1792–1815, all the way from Russia to the Caribbean, and they have never ceased to elicit sympathy ever since. They had a great run for their money, or, as one historian recently quipped, 'they had a great run with other people's money'.[9]

Yet not all irregular forces were guerrillas. The threat of French Revolutionary armies and ideals also provoked governments to nurture irregular units to police unrest and act as stay-behind forces. The old order also had recourse to 'people in arms'. Britain established militias, fencibles, and yeomanry that were used both as police forces and as an army. They suppressed unrest in Ireland throughout the period and the Luddite riots of the early 1810s in England.[10] In Ireland, the passing of the Catholic Relief Act in 1793 offered some political emancipation but no social emancipation. The passing at the same time of the Militia Act united Catholics and Protestants in unrest, the former motivated by

conscription and the latter for sectarian reasons.[11] The United Irishmen revolt of 1798 was on a grander scale. But even then, the rebels, lack of military experience and equipment increased their desertion and reluctance to meet the government forces in pitched battles. The outcome of the Irish 'Year of Liberty' of 1798, in pitching armed civilians against regular armies, could never be in doubt.[12] The outcome of a full-blown Napoleonic invasion could hardly have been in doubt either. During Britain's invasion scare of 1803–1805, the authorities placed great emphasis on volunteer militia that, as the Duke of York remarked in July 1803, would 'harass, alarm and fatigue an enemy'.[13] Men were tasked to attack small parties from flanking positions.[14] By the end of 1803, over 3% of the population had answered the call for volunteers, with over 400,000 men joining the 604 cavalry corps and 3976 infantry companies.[15] Vast numbers of volunteers on familiar home soil were poised to combat an army which would have landed in a foreign country after a perilous sea crossing. The invaders, apart from a few misfired amphibious attempts, never came. But British society became militarized all the same.

Clausewitz judged 'people's war' to be the defensive side to the offensive *levée en masse*. Small wars were more predisposed to atrocities than symmetrical warfare because the stronger party (the state) would seek to demoralize the weaker rebels by inflicting atrocities. The weaker rebels then escalated in kind and in number, keeping control over the level of escalation in a ploy to entice the superior enemy to fight on their terms.[16] Asymmetrical conflict was waged between parties that were fundamentally unequal, one side possessing authority, a recognized claim to a monopoly of power and a state apparatus in some form, often including armed forces.[17] Thus irregular resistance gained greater traction in remoter, poorer, and traditionally autonomous areas of the west, in western France, southern Europe, Finland, the Alps, and across wide areas of the Americas. The capture of ports and cities made less impression on irregular forces. Whereas modern nations facing hostile occupation of its industrial complexes and main cities tend to sue for peace, more backward opponents offering fewer strategic prizes are harder to subdue.[18] The peculiar psychological stresses attendant on counterinsurgency warfare turned security forces, especially the gendarmes of Napoleonic Europe, into a closely-knit band of brothers, as brave and daring, if not as beloved, as their insurgent enemies.

Thus the generation of warfare after 1792 shifted the perception, and to some extent the reality, of irregular fighters. Partisans initially emerged from the state, as scouts detached from a main force, or as militia or horsemen recruited locally in the service of a noble but in the name of the king. They did not systematically oppose the power or legitimacy of the state. But by the time of the Napoleonic wars, irregular forces would be seen as an intolerable challenge to the 'norm' of regular warfare.[19]

The norm reacted violently to insurgents because in many cases normal armies either felt the threat of revolution or had been actively changed by it. The French Revolutionary 'army of virtue' was fed a diet of propaganda, which depicted enemies of the Revolution as evil rather than just wrong. Probably more French troops were killed by insurrection within France in 1793 than at the hands of invading foreign armies, and the paranoid Parisian Terror regime exaggerated the degree of foreign support for internal counter-revolutionaries. Thus the response of the army to the peasant insurrection that erupted in the Vendée in spring 1793 could not be anything other than extreme. The French army branded the irregulars universally as 'brigands' in order to strip the guerrillas of their political legitimacy. Since 'brigands' did not have any political legitimacy but were fuelled by criminal motives, the customs of war did not apply to them.[20]

The Vendée insurgency initially overwhelmed and often massacred isolated government detachments in the early months of the revolt. But General Hoche deployed 'infernal columns' to quell the insurrection. The main campaign raged between March 1793 and the end of the year. Atavistic methods of killing were devised when anxieties ran high. Vendean rebels began by destroying the hated symbols of the Revolution, the so-called liberty trees that Revolutionaries had planted on desacralized grounds. They were cut down with glee and replaced with a restored cross.[21] But as reprisals escalated, the rebels found humans to be more fitting objects for destruction. Captive Republican troops were assembled in a kind of village fete and clubbed to death with iron bars to public applause. The counterinsurgency also plumbed new depths in torture and killing. After a breakout attack by Vendean rebels in 1793 failed, captured rebels were placed on barges in the Loire which were then sunk. Men and women were tied together to form 'republican marriages' and then drowned together.[22] During 1794, General Louis Marie Turreau sent 12 detachments of infernal columns with orders to make the countryside uninhabitable. The Vendée, in Turreau's own words, was 'the most horrible civil war that ever took place'.[23] The Vendée has been considered an archetype of atrocities of war, with some writers, such as Reynald Secher, exaggerating the death toll, calling the repression in the region a 'genocide'. Certainly, the perceptions and propaganda of the time multiplied the horror. General Hoche in 1796 reported '600,000 French deaths' in the Vendée, and the elimination of 80% of the male population.[24] In all likelihood, the rural Vendée suffered around 210,000 excess deaths during its insurgency, but not all of them were deliberately killed.[25] Irregular resistance continued until 1800 by mobile insurgents, known as *chouans*. Greater foreign support for the insurgents might have prolonged the conflict further. But a British amphibious operation in July 1795 to land a French émigré army at Quiberon Bay was a failure. The Austro-Russian advance towards France in 1798–1799 might have incited a counter-revolutionary fifth

column, given the disorders in Belgium and the brief capture of Le Mans by the *chouannerie*. But the Allied advance was halted short of the French frontier.[26]

The religiosity of the insurrection in the Vendée was undeniable. But it was distorted by a Revolutionary regime bent on ignoring genuine grievances and on vilifying the Catholic Church as a greedy instigator of criminality.[27] In fact the nature of Catholic support for the insurgency has been disputed. For a long time, historians stressed the spontaneous and poorly directed nature of the Vendean insurgency, with very little lead offered by churchmen, despite the attempts of Revolutionary propaganda to assert the contrary.[28] More recently, historians have stressed the strength and popularity of devotional life in areas covered by the insurgency. Parish priests here were on the whole economically better off than their counterparts further east, and were thus more likely to resist the Revolution's assault on clerical power. They also enjoyed more esteem in their communities.[29]

In fact, the socio-economic and cultural conditions making the Church popular in the Vendée would also apply in Navarra and the Tyrol, both centres of insurgency a generation later. Even so, religious motivations remained abstract. Insurgents doffed their caps outside churches, but considered Mass a matter for women and preferred to keep priests at arms' length. As Charles Esdaile, leading revisionist of the 'people's war' myth in Spain has revealed, the general population in Spain grew annoyed at the propaganda of clerics urging war against Napoleon. The archives are full of complaints registered at the swarms of clerics who thronged the streets of the Spanish rearguard, far away from any actual fighting, urging others to fight on behalf of the Church.[30] In fact, religious motivations were amorphous and tended to intersect with more powerful factors. Banditry was a way of life in marginal agricultural areas of Europe and the Americas.[31] In Andalucía, banditry had been so persistent that in 1767 the king's Peruvian-born minister, Pablo de Olavide, programmed the construction in depopulated areas of new self-defence villages which attracted some 6,000 Catholic settlers from the rest of Europe.[32] The poaching traditions of the Vendée, and the local militia traditions of Navarra and the Tyrol, made gun-ownership in these regions amongst the highest in Europe.[33] Vigilante traditions elsewhere in Napoleonic Europe could not make the same headway. The French-occupied Rhineland was hilly, forested, steeped in a tradition of banditry, and above all solidly Catholic. But it did not produce an insurrection. French authorities in the Rhineland occupied the territory firmly, and did not impose as provocative a conscription system as they had attempted in the Vendée. Time and again, the visceral threat of conscription provoked insurrection in different times and places. Appeals to religion paraded a spiritual veneer over material motives.

Fighting Insurgencies

The march of French armies across Europe unleashed insurrections in their wake, in Lombardy in 1797; in Switzerland and Belgium in 1798; and in Tuscany, Calabria, and many other parts of Italy in 1799, populations revolted either inspired by French occupation or opposed to it. In the Pyrenees, Piedmont, and the Tyrol French troops found themselves opposed at different times by a variety of peasant militias. Equally, in the Rhineland, Luxembourg, and south-central Germany there were sustained outbreaks of guerrilla warfare. In heavily policed and integrated territories, such as the Napoleonic Rhineland, large-scale popular resistance was impossible. The Rhineland had no recent military tradition, as seen in a police report from the Roer that explained the opposition to conscription into the National Guard. Before the French occupation, the Rhinelanders had always paid taxes in lieu of providing soldiers and therefore, as Napoleon's secret police chief discovered, 'the military spirit (was) absolutely zero'.[34] Rhinelanders falling foul of French justice were more likely to be apolitical rather than 'political' transgressors, despite the legend of the bandit-rebel, Schinderhannes.[35] The gentler conscription regime and overwhelming number of French troops in fact mitigated against any major insurgency from taking root.

In areas whose social and physical geography favoured irregular resistance, insurgents were seldom motivated primarily by abstract ideals. French plundering in Northern Italy during the 1790s produced a peasants' war in response. Smuggling activities represented small acts of resistance in the form of 'weapons of the weak', as Scott pointed out, implying a sort of affront to power.[36] The *barbetti*, or hard-living bandits and smugglers who inhabited the mountains between Nice and Genoa, pillaged French army columns just as in normal times they preyed on locals. French Revolutionary reprisals -- looting, rape, and random killings – turned the *barbetti* into agents of vengeance.[37] On 31 August 1796, Revolutionary General Garnier organized a flying column of 900 troops, including 80 gendarmes, and 2 artillery pieces to hunt down the '*barbets*'.[38] But the violence and anti-clericalism of French troops in Italy alienated the population and eased the task of the insurgents. Rural bands cried 'Viva Maria' and hunted down collaborators and French troops, infamously killing some 100 hospitalized French troops during an assault on Verona in Easter 1797.[39] Italian resistance did not ebb with the advent of Napoleon's empire. Religious leaders like Cardinal Fabrizio Ruffo inspired the Sanfedisti resistance of 1799. A new revolt spread in Calabria in 1806, led by the guerrilla leader, Michele Pezza, better known as Fra Diavolo (the 'Brother Devil'). Fra Diavolo was in fact no cleric at all. He was a fugitive who had fled a 13-year sentence of military service for murder.[40] But the nickname stuck, and insurrections in the Latin world in general preferred to claim religious legitimacy. In

Spanish America this was a foregone conclusion, as the Catholic Church had long enjoyed a monopoly on education and therefore ended up cultivating both royalist and independence leaders.

Insurgencies Against Occupation

Occupation by foreign armies led to all sorts of passive resistance, especially opposition to taxes and conscription. But active resistance usually required at least one of three preconditions: the support of regular forces, the weakness of enemy forces drawn away by campaigns elsewhere, and the existence of a social and physical geography which negated an occupying army's superiority. Thus local power networks supporting armed resistance in forested, hilly or swampy terrain blunted the efforts of cavalry and gendarmes to suppress insurrection and police the pacification. The year 1799 witnessed the invasion of the Italian mainland from Sicily by Cardinal Ruffo's 'Christian Army' of *Sanfedisti*. Taking advantage of the Austro-Russian advance into Lombardy, and counter-revolutionary risings throughout Italy, the 'ruffians' overthrew the short-lived Parthenopean Republic, restoring the Kingdom of Naples. Meanwhile, religiously motivated risings erupted across northern Italy, which evicted French administrators. But, just as during the insurrections in Spanish America in the 1810s, the uprising in Italy took on features akin more to a civil war than a war against a national enemy. Atrocities committed by insurgents against supposed collaborators in the cities, against Italy's Jewish minority, and the satiating of a host of other private grudges and grievances besides, all gave *Sanfedismo* a civil war quality that was seldom found in northern Europe or English America.[41] The association of wealth with liberal values made rich or even just comfortable town-dwellers easy targets for ruffians who uttered the cry 'whoever has bread and wine must be a Jacobin'.[42]

The same year as the Sanfedisti, the Anglo-Russian amphibious invasion of the French satellite state in the Netherlands (Batavian Republic) failed to unleash any popular rising to restore the counter-revolutionary house of Orange. The Greater Poland uprising of November 1806, by contrast, erupted against a clearly defined national enemy. Prussian rule had been unpopular in the partitioned west of Poland ever since 1795. Berlin's attempted imposition of conscription in the wake of its catastrophic defeats at Jena and Auerstädt caused uproar that Polish cavalrymen led into a national rising. Defeated Prussian troops retreating through western Poland were jeered and subjected to ambushes in forests by Polish nationalists seeking arms and supplies. A Prussian cavalry officer recalled a narrow escape from five 'brigands' in a Polish forest. His Jewish horse-trader fled to safety while he and his fellow officer fought off their assailants before galloping through the forest to safety.[43]

The Greater Polish rising was not just a national victory but also a French one, given the relationship with Napoleon's near-destruction of the Prussian army. But when the *Sanfedisti* rebelled in Calabria in 1806 against the imposition of the Napoleonic kingdom of Naples, they could count on less decisive support from Allies. British forces were ensconced with the exiled government in Sicily. This island served as a base for providing supplies and decisive force at some points (especially the Battle of Maida). But Allied help proved insufficient against the Neapolitan satellite army backed up by the formidable French. In any case, there was less prospect of Calabria forging a coherent political insurgency. It was an unstable region with a long tradition of brigandage.[44] But widespread disturbances ensued only after Joachim Murat imposed conscription, as both long-term bandits and civilians now had common ground to repel the French.[45]

The Calabria insurgency began on the 22 March 1806, when a dispute over the requisitioning of horses in Soveria Mannelli escalated into violence. The rising gathered steam, and a small British expedition aided the insurgents in driving the Napoleonic troops out of southern Italy. But by autumn 1806, Napoleonic forces rallied. The French set up flying columns of 250–400 men, including light artillery, a cavalry squadron, and local collaborators. They destroyed four Calabrian villages and set up a military tribunal that executed 200 suspects within a month. Calabria also saw instances of barbarism, such as at Lauria, when a French officer who had been sent to request food from the town was murdered immediately, cut up into pieces, and returned to the original French force in a basket. This act enraged the French troops, who then attacked the village, massacring all inhabitants in the process.[46]

But the guerrillas failed to endear themselves to the population. Guerrillas initially secured supplies from villages, but reprisals divided attitudes, turning the region into a civil war zone. Families became immersed in a climate of mistrust, suspicion, and confrontation. Urban Calabrians tended to support the Napoleonic side, holding republican and nationalist views. The Calabrian insurgency was essentially a war between collaborating towns and rebel countryside.[47] French general Reynier recruited some 600 local light infantry for use in counter-guerrilla operations. They performed better than the Neapolitan Civic Guard which had largely melted away, and were motivated in large part by vendettas.[48] Curiously, the violence remained driven by local interests and was deaf to the claims of the legitimate government ensconced across the Straits of Messina in Sicily. Efforts to raise the Calabresi in defence of Ferdinand IV got nowhere. Instead, Calabrian insurgents pillaged allied supply trains just as assuredly as those of the French.[49] In the end, the insurgency was pacified largely because of the repeal of conscription. After restricting conscription in 1809 to merely local service in the

Civic Guard, King Murat eventually abolished conscription in Calabria altogether.[50]

In northern Europe, by contrast, insurgencies tended to have a more clearly defined national rather than civil war character. Embarrassment caused by the failure of a state to avoid defeat and occupation was often soothed by the cultivation of a 'people's war' myth. During the Finnish War (1808–1809), the Swedes might have been expected to resist the Russian invasion more strongly, given the defensive potential of Finland's lakes, snow and mud, and the fact that the invading enemies only slightly outnumbered the defenders. But the real shock came with the Swedish garrison's surrender of 'Finland's Gibraltar', the fortress of Sveaborg, in May 1808. Swedish defeat and definitive loss of Finland was followed by Russian incursions into Sweden proper, and by the military launching a coup against the monarchy in March 1809 that installed the new Bernadotte dynasty in Stockholm. But in Finland the defeat of the Swedish overlords was assuaged by the romanticization of the inchoate popular resistance to the Russian takeover that was later immortalized in *The Tales of Ensign Stål*.[51] The Finnish parts of the Swedish army resisted the Russian occupation, organizing guerrilla bands. But the Tsar could count on the collaboration of powerful nobles, like Wilhelm de Geer, who sided with the Russians in order to protect his estates. In the end resistance was quelled once Tsar Alexander I conceded wide-ranging autonomy to his new Finnish possession and the old nobility managed to maintain its Swedish legal structure under an otherwise alien sovereign.[52] The moderation of Tsar Alexander's approach in Finland contrasted with Napoleon's ongoing tormenting of Prussia.

Wars of German Liberation?

The Prussian collapse of 1806–1807 was not the caesura in German experience that later German nationalists wedded to Prussian militarism liked to claim. Rather southern and western parts of Germany had already been mutilated and reshaped by war during most of the time of Prussia's neutrality (1795–1806).[53] But the shock and scale of Prussia's defeat caused strategists to plot reform, revenge, and nationalism to tap into fashionable notions of popular resistance. People's war captivated the Romantic imagination. Marie-Henri Beyle, better known by his pen-name 'Stendhal', conflated his Romantic literary style and liberal politics in his writings on popular resistance in Italy, the Tyrol, and Spain.[54] Stirrings for 'people's war' in Prussia tapped into a milieu of emerging literary and cultural nationalism. Romantic writings of early German nationalists in the late 1700s evoked the idea of 'wild youths' and freedom fighters. Such ideas were generated by an expanding public sphere. The political press expanded so rapidly that contemporaries complained of

Lesesucht – the addiction to reading news – that extended beyond the élite to the popular classes.[55]

Reformers such as Scharnhorst, Stein, and Gneisenau managed to tap into notions of the *Volk*, yet with the veneer of fighting for religion, king, and a country dominated by the aristocracy.[56] Reformers tried to perform a sort of 'top-down' mobilization, refracting the more organic insurgency in Spain in 1808. Stein wrote in 1807 that 'we must train the nation to manage its own affairs', and some weeks later Scharnhorst wrote, 'we must enable the nation to understand itself and take up its own affairs'.[57] The example of Patriot Spain inspired the literate youth of Prussia, not least because the propaganda had some basis in reality. Literate youth provided a romantic veneer to mobilization. Spain's venerable University of Salamanca enlisted students for combat and melted down its gold and silver for the war effort.[58] But just as in Spain, volunteers in Prussia would form only a minority of the forces put in the field once war with Napoleon restarted in 1813. Nonetheless, the *Landwehr* and *Landsturm* units occupy a disproportionate amount of space in the future Prussian narrative of the events.[59]

For all the Romantic hype in Prussia, the only popular rising in Germany actually took place much further south, in the Catholic uplands of the Tyrol. Habsburg defeat in 1805 had forced Vienna to yield the Alpine Tyrol region to Napoleon's satellite, the kingdom of Bavaria. In the wake of this defeat, the Habsburgs continued the military innovations of the Archdukes John and Charles and strained every sinew in the creaking monarchical structure to expand military preparedness. The Austrian *Landwehr* (militia), launched in 1808 with apparent enthusiasm, became a bellwether of political feeling. Service was compulsory for men between the age of 18 and 45 in the hereditary and Bohemian lands. In Graz, a retired 81-year-old Major Schütte was celebrated after his (unsuccessful) attempt to enlist in the homeguard force. French residents in Vienna noticed over the course of 1808 how the *Landwehr* was demonstrating warlike hostility towards France.[60] This force would reach numbers of 240,000 by 1813. The Archduke Charles in 1809 attempted to evoke sentiments of German nationalism in Germany during his 1809 campaign, but to no avail.[61] Pan-German nationalism was still shrill, especially in the multi-national Habsburg empire. The Landwehr was not formed in Hungary, out of fear that the independent-minded Hungarian nobles would use it against Vienna. And as many as three-quarters of the Landwehr deserted in the face of actually being called upon to fight during the War of the Fifth Coalition (1809).[62]

Even the adventure of Major Ferdinand von Schill failed to inspire a popular revolt, despite a surge in brigandage across the new-fangled Confederation of the Rhine. Schill's adventure was seen by German nationalists as the start of the German War of Liberation, ennobling 1809 as a highpoint in national honour.[63] Despite lacking state backing, Schill

launched a raid into the Confederation on his own initiative, attacking the Baltic port of Stralsund on 25 May 1809. Even though Schill received extensive press attention and popular support, King Frederick William III of Prussia refused to support Schill's resistance, and also vetoed attempts by his statesmen to mobilize the *Landsturm*. In the end, Schill was killed in action when a Franco-Dutch force reconquered Stralsund on 31 May 1809. Schill's expedition was designed to spark off a general popular uprising but ended up as a foray, which was cheered by many and supported by few.[64]

In the end, only one concentrated insurgency rocked the German world. The fame of the revolt in Tyrol in 1809 almost rivalled that of Spain during the Peninsular war, despite the far smaller size of the region. Unlike Spain, whose regional autonomy outside of the Basque country had been largely subdued by eighteenth-century absolutism, the Tyrol had continued to enjoy medieval privileges and autonomy under Habsburg rule.[65] Tyrol had been a part of the Austrian (Habsburg) kingdom since the fourteenth century, but Napoleon gifted it to the state of Bavaria in 1806 as a reward for its alliance with France the previous year. The Bavarians fell under French pressure to join the anti-British economic system, which in the Tyrol led to a sharp rise in taxation of close to 20% and a blockade of its trade routes. Bavaria was also pressured to impose conscription. Only 1,000 conscripts were earmarked for conscription from Tyrol, including 62 in Innsbruck, and the new policy was postponed until spring 1809 in order to avoid the appeal to draft-dodging offered by winter snows. But Bavarian circumspection was fruitless all the same.[66]

The subsequent revolt launched by Andreas Hofer, an illiterate poacher, targeted the hated Bavarians. Hofer's rebel force seized the initiative against the Bavarian occupiers, including taking complete control over the regional capital of Innsbruck. They enjoyed minor help from the Austrian army, including the first-ever personal defeat of Napoleon at the battle of Aspern-Essling on the 22 May 1809. But Napoleon's occupation of Vienna persuaded the Austrians to sue for peace and the Tyroleans were left to fight alone. Hofer's insurgents held their own for months, exploiting the advantages of topography and forests to mount ambushes against the Bavarians. But the rebels lacked cohesion. The poorer, Italian-speaking *Welschtiroler* proved less supportive of the insurgency than the *Deutschtiroler*. Even the German-speaking insurgents were prone to disperse after a local victory, especially as their pay was usually insufficient or late. Villages liberated by the rebels were usually regaled with tax holidays, which were poorly compensated by raising indirect taxes or public loans. The financial chaos was barely concealed by the Catholic revivalism imposed in the villages.[67] In fact the religiosity had its dark side. The purchase by local Jews of church property confiscated by the French set tempers raging amidst the rebels who stormed Innsbruck in April 1809. They trashed official records and sacked Jewish businesses.[68]

Napoleon's armistice with Austria in June freed up French troops to assist the Bavarians, which led to combined efforts against the Tyrol rebels. Hofer's springtime successes, including the capture on Innsbruck, could not now be continued. Sources of defensive strength for successful rebellions – remote, isolated, and often mountainous regions with a high level of social cohesion and a common religious identity – were ineffective for offensive warfare.[69] Attempts by Hofer's captain, Martin Teimer, to raise neighbouring parts of Swabia met with hostility once his 800 volunteers made rapacious demands of the villages they were supposedly liberating. The rebels lacked artillery to reduce fortresses, like that of the Bavarians at Kufstein, and on 1 November 1809 they lost the fourth battle of the Bergisel. Even though the possession of high ground allowed the rebels to ambush a French column at Waidbruch on 4 November (during which they rolled boulders down mountain-sides), their overall situation was dire. By the end of 1809, the revolt had been suppressed, the rebels having suffered over 1,000 losses via deaths in combat, captivity, or exile. Even though the Bavarian Crown Prince Ludwig was conciliatory to the rebels, French General Broussier Lienz executed 25 of them in cold blood. The leader of the insurgency, Andreas Hofer, was betrayed and executed on 20 February 1810.[70]

By then the largest insurgency in Europe's third most mountainous country was well underway. The origins of the guerrilla war in Spain lay in the coup at the palace of Aranjuez in March 1808, which proved to be the first in a long line of soft military coups (*pronunciamientos*) in Spain. The pronunciamiento was backed by disaffected aristocrats, the Royal Guard, and peasants. Carlos IV abdicated and the dictator Godoy went into hiding. During two days in April, the crowd was master of the streets of urban areas. Local authorities and anyone suspected of being connected to Godoy were robbed and attacked. But French troops loomed over Spain. They were still upholding the Franco-Spanish alliance against Britain and Portugal, even though their behaviour was more akin to that of an occupier than an ally. Key fortresses guarding communications between Madrid and the French frontier were occupied by Napoleon's troops, and altercations grew between soldiers and civilians. Two French officers invaded a Madrid printing works and demanded that the owner print the protest made by Carlos IV at his forced abdication.[71] Tensions escalated. When on the 2 May, Marshal Murat's troops opened fire on a crowd in Madrid attracted by his removal to France of remaining members of the royal family (Godoy had already been evacuated whereas Ferdinand had arrived in Bayonne in his ill-fated attempt to win imperial recognition for his crown), the result was the famous uprising of 2 May 1808.

The historical novelist, Benito Pérez Galdós, called the Peninsular War a 'school of disorder'.[72] Its social upheaval dominated young men who later became statesmen. For the liberal politician Count Toreno,

writing a generation later, both the Second of May in Madrid and the subsequent disorders in the provinces represented a spontaneous popular assertion of national independence against Napoleon's mendacious invasion.[73] The writer and later politician, Antonio Alcalá Galiano, saw both 'enlightened patriotism' and elements of 'blind fanaticism' in Spain's summer of 1808.[74] For subsequent politicians on the left, the Spanish uprising affirmed popular sovereignty, whereas for those on the right it affirmed a defence of tradition. Abroad, the insurrection produced a wave of Hispanophilia in Britain and the United States, especially in the wake of the surprise Spanish Patriot victory at Bailén in July 1808.[75] Even European conservatives hostile to the concept of the 'nation' were horrified by Napoleon's gangsterism. Metternich remarked: 'The upheaval in Spain is one of the most horrific events of history ... teaching us that one cannot disarm a pitiless enemy by capitulating to him'.[76] Contemporaries, and several historians since, saw Napoleon's gambit as the cause of Spain's irruption and the subsequent disintegration of its huge American empire. However, the scale of the collapse was in large degree dictated by the two decades of crisis in Spanish finances and absolutism since 1788, as well as the fact that Prince Ferdinand's coup in March 1808 left no time for his new regime to implement real policies instead of responding to events orchestrated by Napoleon.[77]

The Second of May proved the chaos of mass panics in dense urban environments. The wealthy classes who lived in the centre of Madrid avoided the popular suburbs where they faced ridicule and disaffection at the sight of open prostitution and shaving and other ablutions in the streets.[78] The altercations outside the Royal Palace rapidly expanded into an urban insurrection. The young Alcalá Galiano, whose anguished mother warned him 'it has begun', rushed out onto the streets of the capital looking to be a hero, only to be snubbed by the artisan and day-labouring insurgents who failed to see how they could use a nobleman in such times as these.[79] Blanco White remembered seeing the massacres unfold with an air of unreality before prudently rushing to the safety of his lodgings, only then realizing the enormity of the situation.[80] Spanish army units in Madrid were confined to barracks, the famous heroism displayed by the Patriot martyrs, Pedro Velarde and Luis Daoíz, both army officers, notwithstanding. A truce was eventually brokered that day between Madrid's civilian authorities and the French military governor, Joachim Murat. In return for the French disposing of the 100 or so captured Spanish insurgents as they saw fit, imperial troops would abstain from any further violence. In reality many innocent artisans were added to the grim list of mass executions when scouring French troops interpreted clasp-knives and tools in their possession to be offensive weapons. Between 15% and 17% of casualties were women, whilst almost half the male casualties were ordinary wage earners.[81] A complete breakdown of society thus seemed for the moment to have been narrowly

averted, thanks to this demonstration of solidarity between Spain's ruling elites. The streets of the capital fell deathly quiet after 3 May. Bodies were cleared, notices were posted on street corners warning against crowds assembling, and torches were waved by French night-patrols to signal safe conduct.[82]

The Madrid massacre revealed a scale of killing and hatred that has led some historians to identify a form of 'total war'.[83] But the events of spring and summer 1808 reveal a confused social disorder as Spanish elites chose either to collaborate with Napoleon's takeover, captain 'Patriot' violence, or to resist disorder and often get swept aside in the process. If King José had been installed with responsible powers immediately, then there would have been much more scope to stifle the insurgency. But the two-month 'interregnum' between the news which reached Spain of Ferdinand's abdication in April and the arrival of José in Madrid on 20 July 1808 created a vacuum in which social grievances exploded with often only the most superficial anti-French claims. The Spanish insurgency of 1808 was not a time when, as one otherwise authoritative historian argued, 'the nation thus abandoned had time to decide on its own future, and its decision was war'.[84] It was a time of social revolution that insurgent Patriot authorities would mould into a war effort, with one eye on resisting the French occupation, and another on containing social disorder.

For example, Galicia, a poverty-stricken, overpopulated region in north-western Spain, was free of French troops in the summer of 1808, and would remain so until General Moore's retreat would take him to La Coruña during the winter. Nevertheless, the initial Galician military rising of 30 May 1808 was soon sidelined by violent civilian unrest motivated not so much by hatred of the absent French, but by resentment of the burdens of feudalism, tithes, and developments since the 1790s in fishing and ironmongery that threatened traditional means of subsistence.[85] Even violence targeting French nationals revealed social tension more than an abstract commitment to 'total war'. The Patriot authorities in Valencia, for example, were noble landowners profiting from some of the most oppressive and hated feudal conditions in Spain. Looking to channel rural hatred, they sponsored the demagogue friar, Baltasar Calvo, to raise a lynch mob to target the unpopular French merchant community in the city of Valencia. On the night of 5–6 June, some 330 French nationals were massacred.[86] Once this Patriot revolution had been bloodily consummated, the authorities hastily diffused the power of the mob, by depriving local volunteers of their arms on the pretext of awaiting the arrival of ammunition from Cartagena.[87] In February 1809, the Patriot authorities revitalized ordinances dating from 1774 enabling local militia forces to be used against domestic unrest.[88]

In other instances, Patriot massacres tended to be the unwanted products of manipulation and misunderstanding. Three-dozen French

prisoners were killed by civilians in Lebrija (Andalucía) on 7 December 1808, out of motives which were at least as much socio-economic and patriotic. The victims were some of the 17,000 prisoners of war captured in the Patriot victory of Bailén (16–19 July 1808). Their sheer numbers had caused local authorities to release to help bring on the olive harvest. In Lebrija, local resentment at the crowding out of day labour coincided with the Patriot authorities calling up local men to the army, creating the prospect of the elderly, the women, and children being left at the mercy of lingering French prisoners of war. Added a rumour that some of the French captives had revolted, and the massacre resulted.[89]

Forging Guerrillas

Even more than Russia, Spain has carried a legend of popular resistance to Napoleonic imperialism, which was repeatedly politicized and imagined through art and literature. In his picaresque depiction of the woes and wilfulness of the Patriot guerrilla leader, Juan Martín 'el Empecinado', Spain's foremost nineteenth-century historical novelist, Benito Pérez Galdós, presented the warrior as an uncouth man of the people. He coloured his prose with amusing mispronunciations and syntax which marks the warrior's humble origins. The guerrilla leader waxed indignant when he recalls a meeting with the liberal politicians of the Cortes of Cádiz who laugh out loud when he uses the wrong definite article for the word 'map'.[90] But historians now accept that the nature of the insurgency was more complex than the Romantic image. The leading revisionist, Charles Esdaile, has argued that the guerrillas were mostly criminals or deserters from the regular armies, commanded mostly by traditional rather than new elites, and were little supported by the Spanish population.[91] Draftees and conscripts for the Spanish army were forbidden from joining the guerrillas, but the same restriction did not apply to deserters. The guerrillas were also entitled to a share of booty they captured whilst still receiving pay at army rates.[92] Even though guerrilla bands continued to benefit from civilian intelligence networks, and respectable leadership in many instances, it is not clear whether they were even the most effective fighters. The most effective 'partisans' were usually either army regulars or former regulars applying irregular tactics.[93] A British officer during the adverse conditions of 1811 described the entire Spanish army as 'unfit for anything more than mere guerrilla work'.[94] To a large degree this attitude reflected the genuine lack of veteran troops in the Spanish army, and how those that existed were jealously controlled by their commanders. Too many new units of 'volunteers' had been created during the Patriot revolution of 1808, diluting the cohesion and efficiency of the army.[95]

Nonetheless the scale and diversity of Spain's guerrilla phenomenon impressed contemporaries at home and abroad. There were as many as nine types of guerrilla: 'partidas' (disciplined volunteers), 'cuadrillas'

(outlaws, usually smugglers), 'somatenes' (Catalan volunteer militia), 'migueletes' (Catalan militarized volunteers), 'cruzadas' (holy warriors), 'cuerpos francos' (post-1812 free corps police force), 'corso terrestre' (mounted militia raiding French border and guarding coasts), 'cazadores rurales' (landowners' militia), and various 'honourable' companies comprising local elites.[96] Many more troops besides looked and behaved like guerrillas. A thin line separated the guerrillas from the regulars. Regulars were left scattered throughout the Peninsula due to Napoleon's repeated defeats of the Spanish army. These regulars adopted guerrilla tactics, especially in Catalonia and Andalucia.[97] Guerrilla troops often fought as organized units, and outnumbered or left behind troops sometimes fought like guerrillas. In Catalonia local forces with claims to militia status were staffed by officers, paid wages, issued with uniforms, and covered by army ordinances. As early as October 1808, many of their units were absorbed into the 'Army of the Right' commanded by Juan Miguel de Vives, and later Enrique O'Donnell (who in fact employed 'little war' tactics with regular troops to his great advantage). At the battle of Granollers and the siege of Gerona in 1810, O'Donnell's Army of the Right employed guerrilla-style tactics against the French successfully, even though his forces were regular. During the famous siege of El Bruc, in which armed citizens defended their city and captured a French imperial eagle, there were in reality up to 500 Spanish regular troops. They had deserted from their garrison in Barcelona, and fought against the French disguised as untrained locals.[98] In fact, 70% of Patriot guerrillas were militarized by the last two years of the Peninsular War. Thereafter 'guerrilla' forces still at large were in reality bandits, deserters, and draft-dodgers who were being pursued by Imperial and Patriot law enforcement alike. The Patriot guerrilla leader, Espoz y Mina, extended condign punishments even to couriers and traders who tried to break through his blockade of French-held towns.[99] In any case, class was by no means a barrier to thuggish behaviour. The supreme commander of the Navarre guerrillas was forced to execute one of his subordinates, a local landowner, after the man distressed the local peasants with his 'ferocious brutality'.[100]

For most of 1809, the guerrillas shared the field with regular Allied forces, both the Spanish army as well as two consecutive British expeditionary forces, the ill-fated army of John Moore, and the more tenacious army of Arthur Wellesley (later Lord Wellington). But despite a tactical Anglo-Spanish victory at Talavera (New Castile) in July 1809, Wellington's forces were obliged to retreat into the safety of Portugal. Renewed efforts towards the end of 1809 exhausted the Allies, sending the Spanish reeling after Ocaña and the British back towards Portugal. For two-and-a-half years, the Anglo-Portuguese army had to limit itself to fighting battles along the Portuguese-Spanish border, decisively defeating a French invasion of Portugal in 1810. Without an effective Patriot

army for the better part of that time, the Patriot guerrilla was the only armed force available to keep resistance alive. Without the guerrilla continuing to fight, the rearguard's resistance might well have crumbled into acceptance of the French occupation, making Wellington's later military victory more problematic. The guerrilla proved effective in its 'battle for food'. Their actions starved French soldiers' rations and increased their sickness rate to the highest amongst all Imperial armies in Europe, as well as adding to their general demoralization at their frequently futile pursuit of an 'invisible army'. In other words, tens of thousands of Imperial troops that might have been used elsewhere were bogged down in Napoleon's 'Spanish ulcer'. Even Wellington, an Anglo-Irish Tory suspicious of his allies' bombastic claims, especially the *liberales*' obsession with guerrillas, admitted the decisive role played by irregular warfare in the eventual Allied victory.[101] The Allied victory in Iberia was thus a joint effort in which, in the words of one historian, 'the Spaniards bled the French army white while the Anglo-Portuguese forces delivered the hammer blows'.[102] But the formidable military achievements of guerrilla warfare were often drowned out by violence.

Violence was particularly rampant within Andalucía, where a long history of brigandage persisted throughout the Napoleonic period, growing in size as a result of economic hardships. Bandits utilized the war by targeting Frenchmen who were now deemed military targets by the Patriot government, thus effectively legalizing their 'trade'.[103] For civilians caught between occupiers and guerrillas, the consequences were dire. When a Patriot band raised the town of Cuenca in May 1812, the garrison and its Spanish collaborators merely retreated to the castle. As the Patriots had no artillery, they contented themselves with pillaging civilians before quitting the town. Even then the raiders squabbled over their loot and end up exchanging fire amongst themselves.[104] So bad was the bandit problem in Andalucía that Joseph Bonaparte was successful in raising Spaniards for his urban militias, since even the local population had turned against rural lawlessness.[105]

In the Serranía de Ronda (Andalucía), *serrano* guerrillas were active even when Napoleonic troops were mostly absent. They looted towns and villages, burnt records of debts they owed, and destroyed documentation of legal cases against the insurgents. Men joining the guerrilla bands in the Ronda were aiming not to fight the war, but rather to avoid fighting it. In the Ronda more than anywhere else, irregular warfare amounted to outright banditry. It proved detrimental to the Spanish war effort, especially when considering the number of Spanish regular soldiers who deserted to join these groups because of prospects of plunder.[106] In September 1809, the aristocrat, Duque del Parque, complained how 'guerrillas were turning into bands of highwaymen whom it will be necessary to shoot if they are to be brought under control'.[107] So bad was the insurgents' behaviour that their own leader, José Serrano Valdenebro, wrote that he was

'reduced to tears' from their conduct.[108] At the other extreme of Spain, geographically as well as militarily, were the rural Basque provinces and upland Navarra. Here popular resistance was much more widespread, owing to a blend of popular religiosity, popular landownership inheritable by primogeniture, the pressures of overpopulation and wartime sales of common lands, and a local tradition of armed mobilization. Thus the military impact of guerrilla warfare was mixed. Local insurgents defended their home territories tenaciously but had little concept of a wider struggle. Galician guerrillas overwhelmed French attempts to occupy their region in 1809. But once Napoleon's forces withdrew, the Galicians did not pursue them.[109] Only the militarization of guerrillas could change this parochialism. By 1813, the most successful guerrilla forces, those commanded by Espoz y Mina in Navarra, had been turned into regular units. In fact, the guerrilla effort proved at its most successful once most of its irregular characteristics had been superseded.

Living with Counterinsurgency

Guerrilla bands led by Martin Díez and the priest Merino ensured that only communications with a very strong escort got between Burgos or Valladolid and Madrid during the first six months of 1809.[110] Getting a letter from one garrison to another required hundreds of men as an escort, and even the escort could expect to suffer losses from guerrilla attacks.[111] But even when spatial control was secured, counterinsurgency continued to require pacification efforts and collaboration by local people. In France's European empire, the gendarmerie was charged with maintaining order, but in several parts of the continent this task proved impossible. The Illyrian provinces, the Habsburg Croatian frontier which Napoleon had annexed in 1809 largely in order to deprive Vienna of a coastline, was so riven by long-standing banditry and vendettas that any attempt at imposing French order was fruitless.[112] Across Napoleonic Italy, the relentless policing of the new and unwelcome internal passport system replaced face-to-face verification of traditional society with a bureaucratic version. Draft-dodgers were not alone in resenting these controls on free movement. Carnival-goers resented how local authorities exploited festivities to perform spot-checks, increasing psychological stress, and seasonal labourers and migrant tradesmen saw their livelihoods destroyed by overzealous officials. The announcement of a general requisition of mules could sometimes be enough to spark an insurrection. Bandits were envied, because they travelled freely.[113]

Everyday life on the other side of the Atlantic experienced even worse disruption. Drovers and their families were suspected of aiding the insurgents because of their lowly and mobile profession. A drover's wife in 1815 was detained in a women's prison (*casa de recogidas*) because the authorities disbelieved her pleas that her husband's absence from the

family home was caused by his work rather than his flight to the insurgents. Spanish colonial authorities mirrored Napoleonic Italy in their controls on free movement. A letter of identity was required of any person in New Spain not at their home or work, curfews were routine, and any travel required details of a strict itinerary for official supervision.[114] Often even official permits could not induce control. Insurgents in New Spain extracted protection money from drovers entering their territory, or seized their animals and cargo, leading many drovers to fear the rebels more than the government and therefore to ply their trade on behalf of the stronger side.[115]

The generality of violence and atrocity obscures the considerable extent to which insurgencies also witnessed strenuous efforts to moderate the killing, even in Spain. On Good Friday 1809, a peasant invasion targeting the weapons stored at a French military hospital in the town of Manzanares (La Mancha) escalated into a massacre of some 400 French casualties that the French rearguard had left behind. Once French troops encroached upon Manzanares weeks later, an expected massacre of the town in reprisal was prevented when a local priest led out a delegation to plead forgiveness of General Sebastiani.[116] Even amidst the deep war of 1811–1812, when Napoleonic territorial control was at its peak, the brutality of reprisals could reach mutually recognized limits. Napoleonic atrocities in late-1811 in Navarra led Espoz y Mina to proclaim reprisals. On 14 December 1811, he issued an order that 'French officers and soldiers captured with arms or without them in the course of battle or not will be hanged and left along the main road'.[117] Espoz thus ordered the execution of all French captives from the battle of Sangüesa. But after a while of reprisal and counter-reprisal, the local French commander Abbé decided to treat captured guerrillas better, and Espoz responded in kind with Napoleonic prisoners.[118]

Rural insurgencies spawned diverse motivations and actions which were mostly far removed from the stated political aims of the leadership. The language of Spanish-American insurgents stressed the legitimate sovereign, religion and moral order, and claimed that the hated *gachupines* desired to oppress New Spain, or to surrender it to Napoleon. Acts of violence and confiscation were thus cloaked in the conservative terms of defending that moral order.[119] Support for the insurgency in Mexico was largely dictated by local grievances and grudges that had festered before 1810. Its local leaders were often frustrated at being second sons ineligible to inherit the family estate, or at being passed over for entry or promotion in public and militia offices.[120] On other occasions, the violence of the counterinsurgency sent men to seek revenge. Royalist violence in Spanish America was severe, especially in Venezuela and Mexico. But reprisals extended to the family members of real and suspected insurgents. The wives and daughters of insurgents were detained in the hope of humiliating the insurgents and persuading them to hand

themselves in, and of disrupting enemy supply and intelligence networks in the which the women were suspected of being involved directly or indirectly.[121] Manuel Toral, the Mexican priest who had incited hatred against 'heretical' Spaniards in 1794, later turned his handiwork against the independence insurrection. In 1813, he abused the confidentiality of the confessional in Querétaro in order to ascertain the identity of insurgents related to his parishioners, whilst launching another campaign in sermon and pasquinade against 'heresy'.[122]

Typically, socio-economic grievances and vendettas created the conditions for irregular warfare which in turn spawned banditry from insurgents and brutality from counterinsurgents.[123] María Tapía, a 30-year-old single mother of four, was one of a group of women arrested in Tamazula de Gordiano (Mexico) in March 1812 because her two absent sons were suspected of being insurgents. Whereas the colonial authorities gradually released other women, María remained a prisoner until her death in 1815. Her real crime was not having given birth to rebels, but, as local testimonies and rumours revealed, her supposed adultery, and even 'public prostitution', charges which the colonial authorities weighed as heavily as having wayward sons.[124] Counterinsurgency was every bit as brutal as insurgency, and long-standing local disaffection at a person's conduct could explode into reprisal once the pretext of rebellion offered itself. A parish priest working for the insurgents in a mining town in the Sierra Gorda (New Spain) was captured by loyalists in 1812. In addition to being charged with treason, Manuel Franco was accused by two independent witnesses of being overly fond of the boys amongst his parishioners, and of having sexual relations with them.[125] Sane people exasperated by the demands and the blackmail of each side tended to support whichever side was strongest. Even in Spain, where the insurgency gained more obviously national characteristics than in the civil war in the Americas, wide sections of the population glumly accepted Napoleonic rule. One British veteran and later historian, who admittedly admired Napoleon, believed that the French occupiers would have won the support of the Spanish population if they had destroyed the guerrillas.[126]

Collaboration

The war for food often pitted countrymen against countrymen, as stores became limited in the face of overwhelming and unremitting demand. Raiding food and livestock could be not just a feature of irregular warfare but also its cause. Royalist incursions into the Lerma valley (northern Argentina) were the main factor motivating local smallholders and livestock farmers into supporting Martín Miguel de Güemes's campaign to pin the enemy back into the Andes. The countryside in effect rose in defence of independence by forming temporary gaucho militias to protect and recapture foodstuffs.[127] In Spain, too, the countryside

found more security with the Patriot insurgents. The guerrillas cut off the Bonapartist government from securing revenue, leaving it unable to pay even a quarter of government expenditure. French-held cities were starved of livestock and burdened by taxes which were displaced from the countryside onto burghers.[128] Marshal Suchet, French commander in Aragón, lamented at the end of 1810 wrote how 'revenues have fallen far short, as the inhabitants do not pay unless forced, and our army, which has been involved in three consecutive sieges, has had to deploy away from Aragón'.[129]

Urban populations hosting garrisons were incentivized to maintain at least an understanding with the occupiers, if not outright collaboration. In the case of Spain, collaboration began at the top, as most statesmen of the pre-1808 regime opted to work with the 'intruder' king. The learned cleric, Juan Antonio Llorente, led Josephine religious policy, suppressing monasteries, regulating parish priests, and suppressing the Inquisition, an institution about which he would later write a learned history. José Mazarredo, an Admiral cashiered for siding with the French invasion, distributed catechisms in Galician villages in 1809 that attempted to justify obedience to the Josephine regime.[130] But such seemingly laudable aims made no impression on the bulk of Spanish opinion, nor did they represent the daily reality of collaboration. Elites on both Patriot and *afrancesado* sides tried to shore up their own powerbases, often indifferent to the wider war effort.[131] *Josefino* collaborators ranged from pre-war statesmen to pragmatic shopkeepers to public officeholders desiring to keep their jobs.[132] The French authorities tried to justify their regime by claiming to impose sound administration and justice. *Josefino* propaganda tried to win over adherents by stressing three themes: a new monarchy with a progressive constitution (of Bayonne), the war being 'over' and therefore needing to give way to reconciliation between victors and vanquished, and the lunacy and impossibility of resistance to the forces of Emperor Napoleon. The perversity of the Patriots' alliance with the Protestant British, who were the persecutors of the Catholic Irish, was preached by collaborationist clerics in a bid to pull at Spanish heart-strings.[133] During the era of almost-total French domination of Spain, between 1810 and 1812, such propaganda impacted correctly on local notables. As one *josefino* official in Alcoy explained to his friend in Zaragoza, it was a pity that 'good Spaniards' must fight the indomitable French, as they must surely lose or else become 'English slaves' in the process. Warming to his theme, he attacked the integrity of the Patriot resistance in Spain:[134]

> Are we really to accept that those Spaniards under arms constitute a faction resolved to resist everything coming from France and to establish a separate government instead? Even if this really is the case, dare we say that Spain is waging war? Are those Spaniards

> who do the majority of the nation? Are they the saner part? ... The French, at least, will forgive them everything ...

Rural terror by the Patriots also drove collaborators together. Officials collaborating with the Imperial occupation exposed themselves to Patriot reprisals. The elderly mayor of El Frasno was captured in a Patriot defeat of an Imperial relief column and burnt alive.[135] Fear drove collaborators to model their *josefino* army on the French model. Troops were drawn up based on the French system of a certain number of men being required to come from each town, with coercion to be used if men were not forthcoming. These regiments both produced and attracted large numbers of deserters. Joseph wanted to be seen positively by the populace; captives from the battle of Uclés in 1809 were given the choice of joining the army or swearing an oath of loyalty and going home; but those who did join were habitual deserters. The army was not large to begin with – a few regiments and a squadron of gendarmes – and these were dissipated by ongoing desertion. The 3rd regiment of infantry grew to 400 men on 3 occasions, but sometimes fell as low as 30. Josephine conscription efforts were limited to the small areas that the French reliably controlled. They were ineffective at retaining the limited number of troops they were able to recruit. The Napoleonic kingdom demanded that Spaniards join an army that would work towards their subjugation by a foreign power. Joseph attempted to portray himself as a Spanish king, with the Spanish regiments being given pride of place in the procession into conquered Seville, a ploy to convince elite collaborators that Joseph was a man of the Spanish people.[136] But most of the work of the collaborating army was less ceremonial. Josephine counter-guerrilla units were recruited, often from pardoned Patriot prisoners who agreed to turn their skills against their former guerrilla comrades under the title of scouts (guias) or gendarmes.[137]

The strains and terror of counterinsurgency mirrored the stress and risk of insurgency. Men became irregular fighters across Europe and the Americas for material and cultural reasons that usually had only a passing flirtation with patriotism, and still less with new-fangled nationalism. Equally, counterinsurgents were seldom cynical and legendary cruel agents of occupation and counter-revolution. Both made decisions informed by their environment and the upheaval caused by armies, like so many conscripts and civilians during the wars of 1792–1815.

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7 Conclusion

Ending the Wars of 1792–1815

The war of Europe and the Americas immersed soldiers, slaves, and civilians with burdens and opportunities which transcended the distance of time and space. Common political ground emerged despite the pendulum swings of radicalism and counter-revolution. In Europe, the wars tended to promote reformist and progressive changes in old regime states while, at the same time, rolling back revolutionary gains in France itself. Austria, Prussia, and Russia modernized their absolutist structures by establishing administrative apparatus and domestic reforms that enabled those powers to survive and ultimately to defeat the threat from France. In the Americas, especially Haiti and Spanish America, the upheaval was more traumatic. But once veterans acquired public offices, and in some cases land, the old hierarchies re-established themselves. Absolutism was vanquished in the Americas. It was undermined in Europe both by the legacy of the wars and their political emancipation and by the implications of the efforts by conservative statesmen aiming to 'restore' a peaceful Europe after 1814. But constitutional changes appeared cosmetic to the illiterate masses trying to rebuild their lives in the wake of violence, disease, and hunger. In Spanish America, the wars of independence dragged on into the 1820s. The last Spanish attempt to reconquer Mexico came as late as 1829. But in English America and Europe, the year 1815 marked an ending. The Battle of New Orleans in January 1815 ended the war between Britain and the United States of America, 18 days after peace had been concluded at negotiations, several weeks' sail away, in Ghent. The Battle of Waterloo in June 1815 ended the war in Europe. This battle ended the 'Hundred Days' of Napoleon's attempt to reverse the peace settlement of 1814 and to re-impose his empire in France. British, Dutch, and assorted German forces under the command of the Duke of Wellington defeated Napoleon's troops, aided towards the end of the battle by the arrival of Prussian troops commanded by General Blücher.

No-one in June 1815 could have imagined that the non-descript village of Waterloo (now in Belgium) would lend itself to such fame. Until then

Wellington's greatest victory was seen as the Battle of Vitoria. The night before the Battle of Waterloo, the Duke of Wellington was guest of honour at a ball held in Brussels celebrating the second anniversary of the great victory at Vitoria.[1] The battle of Waterloo proved to be the culmination of a week-long campaign comprising four battles, three of which were won by the French. But the Waterloo encounter on 18 June was by far the most important. It saw intense fighting between Napoleon's veteran army and the Duke of Wellington's somewhat less-experienced allied army of British, Dutch, and German troops. The Allies held off Napoleon's attack until the arrival of the Prussian army in the late afternoon. Wellington famously described the battle as a 'near run thing'. Waterloo retains a powerful significance in the British memory of the Napoleonic wars, akin to the greater (and more important) Battle of Leipzig in German memory. Yet the battle was, to quote one historian, a 'glorious irrelevance'.[2] Such was the resolve of the Allied powers in the Seventh Coalition arraigned against Napoleon that even an Allied defeat at Waterloo would not have ended the renewed war. Rather the 'Hundred Days' would have become the 'Two Hundred Days'. History would instead have remembered Napoleon's final defeat at Hasselt, Düren, or Gummersbach.

Europe was psychologically traumatized, and even the United States was bankrupt, insolvent, and its capitol burnt. Latin America's turmoil was ongoing. David Bell's controversial opinion has cast the 1792–1815 period as a 'cataclysmic intensification' of warfare, at least in a cultural and literary sense, throughout the period.[3] But the continued economic backwardness of Europe and the Americas proved one of its saving graces. Even though casualties during the First World War were proportionately similar to those of 1792–1815, they were concentrated in a timeframe less than one-fifth that of the French and Napoleonic Wars. Probably about 2.5% of the 1792 population of Europe perished because of the wars.[4] But in Spanish America, Bell's thesis is closer to reality. From the 1810s right up to the 1860s, independence here was accompanied by human suffering, lost economic growth, catastrophic political instability, and recurrent warfare.[5]

At first sight Europe's power in 1815 appeared truly 'restored', owing to the work of the Congress of Vienna. The old order was back in power throughout the continent, and appeared to be rolling back revolution in the Americas. Yet all these impressions proved short-lived. For one thing, as Beatrice de Graaf has recently argued, the peace of 1815 was recognizably modern. The Allied Occupation Council in July 1815 agreed the four objectives of subjecting France to reparations, demilitarization, de-Bonapartization, and de-Revolutionization. Beneath these overarching aims lay an equally modern regulation of private ownership rights of restored and recast thrones.[6] The territorial

shake-up led to monarchs ruling over new and unfamiliar territories, and over new subjects who had no tradition of deference or understanding for their new overlords. These subjects would revolt, as soon as their masters made excessive demands of them, as the revolutions of 1848 would show.[7] The peace of 1815 was based on private ownership, and a transnational capitalist one for that matter. Fiscal, humanitarian, and foreign political considerations created a fluid and sometimes contradictory environment. British Foreign Secretary Castlereagh, responding to mass agitation in Britain in 1814, pressed for the Vienna powers to abolish the slave trade. The empire whose modernity had done the most to enable the trade in human bondage had turned against it. But whilst the peace conference condemned the trade, European powers were left to abolish it at their own pace. Capitalist interests dominated the peace, and human bondage still dominated notions of private property in vast areas of Europe and the Americas where industrialization had still made little headway.

The capitalistic hegemony of the 1815 peace settlement also echoed cross post-war politics. In June 1817, the Duke del Parque, noble landowner of devastated estates in Spain, used the language of capitalism to win a ten-year moratorium on debts payable to creditors.[8] Britain, at the forefront of industrialization, witnessed a growth radicalism whose agitators disproportionately had backgrounds of military service in the wars of 1792–1815.[9] Veterans across Europe and the Americas tended to enjoy advantages over their civilian peers who were denied the basic opportunities in education, administration, and policing that army service afforded. The Habsburg army stood at 450,000 at the end of the war, several times its eighteenth-century size, and the increased promotion of non-nobles through officer ranks would change the culture of the army indefinitely.[10] Veterans from socially mobile armies, like the French, tended to enjoy advantages in the marriage market.[11] Napoleon's conscription system proved the greatest bureaucratic and military achievement, establishing a participatory role for male citizens which would be emulated around the world for decades.[12] After 1815, and right up to the end of the twentieth century, two antagonistic tendencies raged in French politics with regard to the French army. On the one hand, the conservative, reactionary, and royalist tendency wanted a professional army, or at least a conscript system with many exemptions, as this tendency feared the mobilization of the population. On the other hand, the republican, egalitarian tendency demanded universal conscription, and was suspicious of the professional army (as was borne out in the revolutions of 1830 and 1848). Conservatives wanted their soldiers apart from society whereas the left wanted military service to be integrated fully into citizenship.[13] This division was deepened by the experimentation in mass politics which came to France right at the end of the wars of 1792–1815. Napoleon's last act before Waterloo had been to give the vote to

13 million Frenchmen (the entire adult male population), a bitter legacy for his successor, King Louis XVIII.

The Iberian world remained in flux for a generation. About 40% of Spain's urban environment was destroyed or damaged by the war.[14] In Spain, the Inquisition was restored and in July 1815, published its list of banned texts, of which almost three-quarters were political in nature.[15] In Spanish America, the royalist revival did not endure. Independence fighters were on the back foot everywhere beyond the River Plate after King Ferdinand was restored to the throne in 1814. In 1815, Spanish royalists gained the upper hand in the American continent, albeit in brutal circumstances. Bolívar's 'war to the death' proved less deadly than disease. Most of the 40,000 troops Spain dispatched to the Americas under General Morillo in 1815 had died of disease by the following year.[16] The Venezuelan tropical grasslands (llanos) had boasted between four and five million head of cattle in 1810. But 10 years later, this number had declined to fewer than 300,000, having been ravaged by royalists and republicans alike.[17] But the wars dragged on. Women suffered privation but also acquired a veteran sensibility bestowed by their marriage to royalist officers. When María Josefa Matos, widow of a Venezuelan royalist officer, wrote to King Ferdinand requesting permission to wear a bust of Ferdinand bearing the words 'Faithful Venezuelan', the king saw his chance. He decreed that royalist widows across the Americas be rewarded with medallions inscribed with 'Award for the fidelity of American women' (Premio de la fidelidad de las Americanas). Fallen men were thus honoured via their widows, and a new level of social distinction opened up to beleaguered royalist families.[18]

European powers sought rapid demobilization after 1815. But wartime arms found their way into private hands after armies shrank in size. A surplus of arms and veterans in post-war Europe gave Spanish-American Patriots a second wind from 1817, as foreign mercenaries and weapons flowed to their side in thousands. In particular, some 7,000 European 'adventurers' sailed out to serve under Simon Bolívar during the struggles for Gran Colombian independence between 1816 and 1825. They were motivated less by abstract politics or 'informal empire' and much more by hunger for land and adventure.[19] The royalist tide was turned decisively after a revolt in the Spanish army assembled for disembarkation at Cádiz at the end of 1819 deprived King Ferdinand of his coup de grace. Renewed political upheaval of a liberal variety in Spain persuaded even former loyalists to opt for independence. The last major battle over this question was fought high in the Andes at Ayacucho (Peru) in December 1824. The 1820s witnessed the Mexican government expelling Spanish residents, as so many of them were deemed guilty of supporting the return of Spanish rule.

Once Madrid in 1836 formally recognized the independence of most Latin American states, it did so using the language of 'the motherland

recognizing that her children had grown up'. The wars sealed Latin America's first of three stages of modernization, the Bourbon and Pombaline reforms and ensuing independence process, and made way for the troubled successors of nineteenth-century liberalism and twentieth-century industrialization.[20] In growing up, the independent Spanish-American states would prove even worse than the Bourbons in their treatment of their Indian populations, if not as ruthless as the expanding United States of America. Throughout the nineteenth century, any Indian initiative was written off as a 'race war', and irreconcilable with white and mestizo nation-building.[21] The fact that Indians comprised a large proportion of the independence forces that permitted Mexican nation-building was overlooked by nineteenth-century elite preferences for the white, and twentieth-century preferences for the mestizo.[22]

The upheaval of war left millions of men rootless. The French Army's eagerness for the return of Napoleon in 1814 can in large part be explained by its dissatisfaction with the Bourbon regime's handling of the demobilization process. Similar dissatisfaction was felt across Europe. Edward Costello, British army veteran, recalled how the peace of 1814 was at first welcome, but that many old veterans became listless in civilian life and yearned for military action once more.[23] The pendulum swings of wartime politics and revolution marked a generation of politicians. The wartime generation of Spanish Liberals saw Spain's Peninsular War as a watershed. The twice future liberal Prime Minister, Evaristo San Miguel, wrote that the daily experience of 1808 and the subsequent war changed men forever whilst ushering in a revolution in public opinion.[24] Antonio Alcalá Galiano remembered how pre-1808 court and social conventions entailed much 'more respect and submission to all forms of authority'.[25] The counter-revolutionary terror sweeping southern France in 1815 targeted former Bonapartists, radicals, and Protestants. It also targeted migrants linked to the recent wars, such as the Egyptian refugees in Marseilles, who were Napoleonic Mameluke mercenaries and their dependents.[26] Tension grew between Catholics and Protestants, resulting in widespread violence in the White Terror in 1815. Grievances of Protestants and Catholics stemmed directly from Napoleonic policy in France. Firstly, Catholics and Protestants in small hamlets were designated satellite chapels without a permanent priest, and in villages with a large number of the opposite faith, it was necessary to travel to another village to attend mass.[27]

Amidst this counter-revolution, France was occupied by victorious foreign armies. The Allied occupation created tensions with villagers as soldiers and civilians competed for resources. But there was negligible violent resistance from French villagers, even if various forms of passive resistance targeted the French government as much as their foreign armies.[28] The initial peace of 1814 saw France subjected to pillage and terror by its most vindictive enemies. The Prussian army did not wait

for winter quarters, and invaded France over the winter of 1813–1814. When Nancy was occupied in January 1814, the Prussian commander ordered the town mayor to give a speech in German, for Nancy was 'an old German town', while his troops debauched themselves on wine cellars.[29] But when peace ended this War of the Sixth Coalition in April 1814, France was set to be free of Allied occupation. Outrages committed by the invaders proved fleeting once the Prussians evacuated eastern France ahead of the Vienna peace conference, and once General Morillo's Spanish contingent to Wellington's Pyrenean invasion was withdrawn for service in South America.[30] But Napoleon's escape from Elba and rallying of France behind renewed war during the 'Hundred Days' of 1815 harshened Allied attitudes considerably. Napoleon's defeat at Waterloo was followed by a vengeful Allied occupation, which would last until 1818. This occupation ushered in a new era in conflict resolution, as the collection of reparations and persistence of military occupation were geared towards making France comply with the international order. Whilst Allied soldiers occupying eastern France in general committed outrages against the civilian population, there were national tendencies which revealed the differing deficiencies and mind-sets. Alcohol-prone British soldiers occupying the north-east tended to commit drunken excesses, starved Russian troops tended to account for most of the thefts, and Prussian and Würtemberger troops, in the former case seized by vengeance against recent humiliation and in the latter case by a familiarity of dialect in Alsace, tended to commit sexual assaults.[31]

Individual veterans pieced their lives together as best as they could. Corporal Krüger, the Confederation conscript turned British riflemen, had been captured by his erstwhile French allies during Wellington's invasion of France in 1814. News of peace in 1814 set him free, but his French minders directed him towards British-held Bordeaux. Krüger was nonplussed: his French minders assumed he was British, but after some remonstration Krüger secured an easterly route towards Germany, amidst the war-weariness and privations of French towns and villages en route. Marching into Germany, Krüger passed the battlefield at Leipzig, where he was immersed in 'countless corpse-hills, barely covering the already-rotting limbs of the fallen'.[32] Perpetrators and victims appeared to have merged into one funereal mass, as Prussian soldier, Thomas Gottschall, observed in 1814.[33] Yet local authorities tried to commemorate the deliverance of peace, often by merging religious festivities with celebrations of victories. The first anniversary of the Allied victory at Leipzig was commemorated in Berlin with what the press promised would be 'as splendid as possible' events.[34] Over time, Leipzig, the greatest battle of the entire wars of 1792–1815, became what one historian has called a 'sacred centre', an iconic site of German nation-building.[35] It became to proponents of German nationalism what the Royal Navy had long been to British nationalism. Naval heroics throughout the war had been published

in the official *London Gazette* and syndicated for dissemination among the patriotic working classes.[36] Songs, symbols, and rituals prevalent among working class communities continued to perpetuate the wartime slogans of 'Church and King' well into the nineteenth century.[37] Post-war generations linked experiences to nation-building. Even defeated veterans of Napoleon's Grande Armée lost their attachment to forlorn military glory and gained attachment to belonging to the French nation.[38] Subsequent French governments used ageing veterans for political ends. The Left stressed the soldiers' enthusiasm and republicanism and the Right stressed their ongoing military hierarchy and duty towards the state.[39]

The wars of 1792–1815 originated in France and yet expanded to involve the whole western hemisphere. In some ways, this globalization was unremarkable. The Seven Years' War (1756–1763) had a greater impact globally than they had in Europe. By the end of the century, the fact that four European states controlled two-thirds of the Western Hemisphere guaranteed that the events of 1792 would end up being fought in the Americas as much as along the Rhine and the Po. But only an eccentric in 1792 would have suspected that events in Europe would lead to the formation of an independent black republic in the Caribbean, unleash the independence of Spanish America, and persuade the United States to invade Canada. The wars of 1792–1815 were thus correctly remembered as a 'great war', overshadowing conflicts before them, and staying ingrained in veterans' and collective memory until the 'Great War' of 1914 broke out. But for all their geostrategic impact, their greater impact lay in the human experience of war, revolution, and occupation. Individuals developed an *Eigensinn*. They reacted to a political and physical environment often not of their choosing by subverting authority, defying slavery and conscription, or merely surviving the pressures of battle, campaign, and occupation. The strains of a generation of war filtered out from the wartime generation to its descendants, crafting a collective memory which informed the nationalism and militarism of the nineteenth century. The wars of 1792–1815 were, above all else, wars of experience.

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