THE OTHER SIDE OF EMPIRE

JUST WAR IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AND THE RISE OF EARLY MODERN SPAIN

ANDREW W. DEVEREUX

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To Christina, with "ligorous" love

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Note on Terminology

In what follows I attempt to remain faithful to the terms the fifteenth- and sixteenth-century Iberians I am writing about used when they wrote of "Aragon," "Castile," or "Spain." The Crown of Aragon encompassed the eastern third of the Iberian Peninsula, running from the Aragonese and Catalan Pyrenees in the north down to the kingdom of Valencia in the south, and including the Mediterranean islands of Majorca, Menorca, and Ibiza. The kingdom of Castile occupied the large central portion of Iberia, from the north coast along the Bay of Biscay south to the Atlantic and Mediterranean coastlines lying opposite Morocco.

That said, these figures themselves used such terminology inconsistently, and so for the sake of clarity and precision I sometimes opt to use vocabulary that will be most intelligible to the modern reader. For instance, I employ "Spain" and "Spanish" to describe what I see as joint or shared undertakings by the crowns of Castile and Aragon. An example of this is the fact that Ferdinand certainly pursued an Aragonese set of objectives in the central Mediterranean, but he did so through using mostly Castilian soldiers and resources. When presenting their objectives on the international stage, Ferdinand's ambassadors often simply referred to "Spain" or "Spanish" interests. Thus, the particularity of Aragon or Castile *within* the Iberian Peninsula was frequently masked beyond the peninsula by the representation of the "Catholic kings" as the monarchs of "Spain." Beyond this geographic variability, there is a temporal instability to this as well: notions of a united Spain gave way, following Isabella's death, to the resurrection of a more fragmentary understanding of the "Hispanic monarchy," one in which Castile and Aragon were, at least in theory, administered separately.

For the personal names of prominent figures about whom there is already a substantial scholarly literature in English, I use the standard English spelling in the text, except in cases where to do so would create confusion by having multiple people of the same name. Thus, I use Ferdinand and Isabella rather than Fernando and Isabel. I find it reasonable to standardize the monarchs' names, as their names are rendered differently depending on the language

(Castilian, Catalan, or Latin) of the source. In the notes, however, or when drawing directly from a primary source, I preserve the original. For the personal names of less prominent figures, such as Pedro Navarro or Cristóbal de Santesteban, I have opted to render them in a standardized modern Castilian spelling (thus avoiding the multiple spellings one encounters in the original, such as Santesteban/Santiesteban/Santisteban).

Unless otherwise noted, all translations to English are mine.

Introduction

In early January of 1516, the Aragonese king, Ferdinand "the Catholic," widower of Isabella of Castile (d. 1504), was traveling southward through the region of Extremadura, in southwestern Spain. He was gradually making his way from northern Spain down to the booming port city of Seville, which sat astride the broad Guadalquivir River.[1] Some in the king's entourage bruited that the monarch planned to spend the winter in Seville so that he might better oversee the construction and outfitting of an armada that he would lead that summer in a crusade against North Africa.

The sixty-four-year-old king, however, was ill, and many feared the illness would be his last. In anticipation of this possibility, Ferdinand had recently drawn up his last will and testament, and in Extremadura he was to meet with ambassadors of Charles of Ghent, the king's grandson and designated heir to the kingdoms of Aragon and Castile. By mid-January Ferdinand had made his way to the town of Madrigalejo. Here his illness forced him to pause. The chronicler and member of the royal council Lorenzo Galíndez de Carvajal relates that royal councilors informed the king that he stood at death's door and urged him to confess and to receive the sacraments.[2]

Ferdinand, however, turned away his confessor, Juan de Matienzo, suggesting that the friar was more interested in negotiating with the king for gifts and privileges than in helping him to unburden his conscience. Ferdinand insisted he was not dying. A few weeks earlier, while the king was in Plasencia,

a member of the king's council had come from the nearby town of El Barco de Ávila, bringing word from a local *beata* (a holy woman reputed to possess powers of prophecy). This particular *beata* had been an intermittent presence at Ferdinand's court for at least seven years, and Galíndez de Carvajal tells us that she had prophesied that King Ferdinand would not die until he had conquered Jerusalem.[3] Eventually members of the royal entourage concerned for the salvation of Ferdinand's soul prevailed on the king to accept last rites. On the afternoon of January 22, Ferdinand received extreme unction, and in the wee hours of January 23 he died wearing the habit of the Dominican order.[4]

The decades following 1492 naturally call to mind Spain's westward expansion across the Atlantic. We reflexively think of the new horizons opened up by Columbus's four oceanic crossings, of the establishment of colonies in the Caribbean, of the rise of an empire decidedly Atlantic in its orientation, not one still focused on the medieval crusading ideal of a Christian conquest of Jerusalem. In this light, the anecdote of Ferdinand's death appears at first glance a manifestation of a quixotic atavism. In fact, though, concurrent with the earliest phase of Atlantic expansion, Spain embarked on an ambitious course of Mediterranean conquest. Between 1497 and 1510, the crowns of Aragon and Castile won control of the southern half of the Italian Peninsula and established a string of outposts and presidios along a 2,500-mile stretch of the North African coastline, thereby making the Spanish kingdoms a dominant maritime power (although by no means the lone hegemon) in the western Mediterranean. King Ferdinand of Aragon intended to use his newly acquired territories as forward bases from which to extend his conquests into the eastern Mediterranean and beyond. The monarch and many of his advisers harbored plans to conquer Egypt, Greece, Anatolia, Palestine, and a vaguely defined swath of Asia. If we are to believe Galíndez de Carvajal, then even in his final days, twenty-four years after Columbus's first Atlantic crossing, Ferdinand remained focused on his Mediterranean interests in North Africa and the eastern Mediterranean.

This book examines Spanish expansion into the Mediterranean basin during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, as the monarchy sought to forge a multicontinental empire at the heart of the Old World. The book's title, *The Other Side of Empire*, alludes to the fact that the early modern Spanish Empire is often thought of as an Atlantic empire, one that arose as a result of the Castilian colonies of the Caribbean and, later, the American mainland. This book reminds readers that during the early decades of overseas expansion, Spain looked to the east as much as it did to the west.

There were geopolitical as well as dynastic reasons for the monarchy's enduring Mediterranean objectives. As king of Aragon, Ferdinand inherited a

Mediterranean political outlook that shaped his priorities along with the political alignment of Castile, through Ferdinand's marriage to Isabella (m. 1469–1504).[5] Pressing Mediterranean interests entangled the Spanish realms of Aragon and Castile in conflicts with Portugal, France, the Ottoman Empire, and sundry North African states. These Mediterranean wars required legal justification. What the eminent historian of Latin America Lewis Hanke termed "the Spanish struggle for justice in the conquest of America" is a well-known historical topic, one that embroiled the likes of Bartolomé de las Casas, Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda, and Francisco de Vitoria in debates over the capacity of non-Christian peoples to exercise *dominium*, or to enjoy sovereignty.[6] Less noted is the fact that Spanish wars and conquests in the Mediterranean, whether in Catholic Italy or Muslim North Africa, also demanded legal and moral justification.

This book seeks to address this discrepancy through an analysis of the variety of arguments that fifteenth- and sixteenth-century Spaniards developed to justify acts of war and conquest, along with aspirations to *imperium*, in the context of the Mediterranean. Throughout, I connect Spain's Mediterranean imperial project to its Atlantic corollary, elucidating the ways in which the Mediterranean experience sometimes informed and influenced Spanish arguments justifying war and conquest in the Americas, while in other respects the two ventures were understood in starkly different terms.

The Global Mediterranean

The Castilian conquest of the Canary Islands (concluded 1492–1496) and subsequently the islands and mainland of the Americas sparked the debate over the justice (or injustice) of those wars of conquest in lands that had never been Christian and, to wit, had never encountered any of the Abrahamic cultures. In particular, European contact with the indigenous Americans stimulated writings that fall under the rubric of early ethnography or anthropology, and the century that followed 1492 was an enormously significant moment in the history of political thought and of legal arguments over sovereignty, property rights, methods of religious conversion, and the like.[7]

And yet, Mediterranean phenomena were part and parcel of these debates. Indeed, it was in the context of the Crusades to the Holy Land that the question of non-Christians' capacity to exercise *dominium* first gained urgency. Pope Innocent IV (r. 1243–1254) famously argued that infidels living in accordance with natural law could possess licit *dominium* in lands that had never been under Christian rule. Innocent's student Hostiensis (ca. 1200–1271) disagreed with

his teacher on certain points, arguing that with the coming of Christ all worldly *dominium* had passed to Christ who, in turn, bequeathed it to Peter.[8] Thus, Hostiensis held that infidels could not possess *dominium* anywhere, even in lands that had never been under Christian rule.

This study enters into dialogue with the work of scholars of canon law, such as James Muldoon, who have engaged with the topic of Christian legal doctrines governing Christian rulers' interaction with the non-Christian world. This book examines the early modern progeny of those medieval canon law debates by analyzing sixteenth-century Spanish claims in a variety of lands ringing the Mediterranean. In this assessment, I integrate these questions with related topics that derive from arguments surrounding Spanish claims in lands that had never been exposed to Christianity, namely in the Canary Islands and in the Caribbean. It is my contention that to separate Spain's Old World assays at empire from their New World counterparts is to create an artificial division. In this regard, I view this book as contributing to burgeoning areas of scholarship in which new work integrates Mediterranean and Atlantic developments. For example, in her study *Frontiers of Possession*, Tamar Herzog makes the argument for her methodological decision to examine Old World and New World processes in conjunction with one another, to "consider them both as vibrant entities that coexisted, rather than were chronologically arranged."[9] One of the driving arguments underlying this book is precisely the importance of Spain's aspirations to Mediterranean *imperium* to understanding related questions that emerge on the far side of the Atlantic. For instance, in examining the variety of Spanish tactics of articulating claims to North Africa (the subject of chapter 4), I do so by contextualizing these claims against related arguments developed in defense of Spanish claims in the Canary Islands and the Caribbean. By situating Mediterranean disputes in a context that encompasses the opening Atlantic world, we are able to see ways in which medieval Mediterranean legal traditions shaped early modern practices of empire, while simultaneously noting the ways in which the conditions presented by the Atlantic islands were truly novel, thereby forcing jurists, chroniclers, and theologians to reconsider venerable doctrines. Such a method of viewing the Mediterranean in a global context is helpful in better understanding the processes I focus on here, and it also casts into relief what is particular about the Mediterranean, thereby suggesting certain boundaries for what might be termed "Mediterranean distinctiveness."[10]

One might quite reasonably ask why these legal debates mattered. What sort of weight did these arguments carry, and what were the checks that existed to ensure various parties' mutual recognition of, and respect for, the claims elaborated in the treatises I analyze here? In short, why was legal justification

necessary? The texts I analyze in this study, many of which were legal treatises, others diplomatic correspondence, were often intended to address an international audience composed of ambassadors and other dignitaries who were present at one royal court or another. In particular, the papal curia in Rome was a locus for the issuing of claims and the adjudication of international disputes. In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, monarchies could appeal to the papacy or to a church council to resolve political disputes. This occurred at the Council of Basle (1431–1449), in the case of competing Portuguese and Castilian claims to the Canary Islands, which was settled by a group of leading churchmen attending the council, an event I analyze in chapter 4. Along similar lines, the papal bulls "donating" the Atlantic lands lying to the west of the Azores and Cabo Verde (*Inter caetera* et al.) were part of an attempt on the part of the pope to act as supreme arbiter in international disputes over lands.

What is more, the papal curia operated as a clearinghouse of sorts for the transmission of ideas, information, and political claims. It was a stage on which representatives from the various polities of Latin Christendom articulated the religious and political positions their sovereigns had instructed them to defend. To illustrate the way this worked, let us consider the report contained in a letter from King Ferdinand to his ambassador in England, chronicling Ferdinand's return from Naples to Valencia in the summer of 1507. Ferdinand described his meeting en route with King Louis XII of France (r. 1498–1515) and their discussion of a possible crusading alliance: "Another subject of his conversation with the King of France has been a common war against the Infidels. Has been the more inclined to undertake it, as the King of England has written a letter to the Pope, which has been read in the College of Cardinals, and in which he has urged a crusade against the enemies of Christ."[11] This pithy anecdote provides a glimpse into the ways European monarchs, *through their ambassadors in Rome*, could broadcast political objectives and claims to the rest of Europe. What is more, Ferdinand's assertion that Louis XII now appeared more amenable to joining a crusading alliance points to the way an open letter to the College of Cardinals could serve to apply political pressure to another monarch.

European polities, and Spain in particular, were highly legalistic societies at this time. This is evident in the fact that when Spain claimed lands in the Americas and had a conquistador read out the *requerimiento* (a protocol of conquest), it was often done in Spanish to uncomprehending natives, and yet the act was always dutifully noted by a notary.[12] Along those lines, the interest in articulating a legal claim to Mediterranean lands (whether in the face of Muslim or fellow Christian opposition) seems to me to be symptomatic of those same legalistic tendencies. An example of this is evident in an anonymous chronicle of the Spanish conquest of Naples, written by a participant in

the events. The author describes an attempt in April 1502 to avert open warfare between the French and Spanish armies through recourse to legal adjudication: "And it was determined amongst them that they bring together the men learned in justice [lawyers] from both parties, as both sides had men extremely well educated who could well determine the justice of each claimant."[13] The texts I draw on in this monograph are part and parcel of serious attempts to have Spanish policies be viewed as legitimate by fellow European powers.

In spite of the papacy's attempts to exercise the role of international arbiter, the Church was not always successful in settling these disputes. Examples of disputants ignoring the terms spelled out in treaties are legion: in 1509, Castile disregarded earlier agreements dividing North Africa into Castilian and Portuguese spheres (a fact I discuss near the end of chapter 4), and a similar example is addressed in chapter 3, where I treat the French invasion of Italy (1494). The earliest Spanish diplomatic response to the French invasion was to argue that France had entered Italy without following the proper channels of juridical procedure to determine whether their Valois dynastic claim was valid there. Ultimately, after this and other lines of protest proved ineffective, the Spanish monarchs responded with a Spanish counterinvasion. A decade and a half later, Spain invaded Navarre on the very day (July 21, 1512) that Pope Julius II issued a bull depriving the Navarrese monarchs of their titles. Obviously, the Spanish could not yet have known about Julius's bull, even if their representatives in Rome had given them cause for optimism concerning Julius's inclination, so this serves as yet another example of a political actor choosing to ignore the agreed-upon conventions and norms that putatively governed relations between the various polities of Europe.

To note the breaches of these conventions, however, is not to suggest that the conventions themselves did not matter. On the contrary, they mattered enormously and frequently did serve to avert military conflicts. When the jurists, diplomats, and monarchs who appear in the pages that follow issued claims to territories on which their state held designs, they did so with an international audience in mind, that being comprised principally of various ambassadors and representatives at the papal curia (although the papal curia was not the only site for disputing these sorts of international claims). While there are numerous examples of states ignoring the terms of treaties, nevertheless numerous Christian polities continued to appeal to the papal curia as an international court of resolution of sorts into the sixteenth century. This book illustrates the intersection between legal arguments and the conduct of diplomacy between Spain and its neighbors (Portugal, France, etc.), as well as the role of the papacy in mediating these disputes.

Empire in the Old World

To return to Galíndez de Carvajal's account of Ferdinand's death with which I began, there is a second crucial point worth noting here: in the years after Isabella's death, the union of Aragon and Castile was by no means a *fait accompli*. There is a traditional teleological interpretation of Spanish history that has tended to present the union of the crowns of Aragon and Castile (through the marriage of Ferdinand and Isabella, in 1469) as the starting point of the inexorable rise of the early modern Spanish empire and part of the narrative of the emergence of a unified, proto-modern state.[14] Running counter to this, Galíndez de Carvajal's account points to the narrowly averted possibility of a dynastic separation, with distinct heirs for the crowns of Aragon and Castile. In recording Ferdinand's cause of death, Galíndez de Carvajal claimed that it was edema combined with heart disease. The chronicler recorded that some, however, had a different explanation for the king's demise. Noting the fact that Ferdinand's jaw drooped at the end of his life, certain observers believed he had died from ingesting a concoction of harmful herbs. Galíndez de Carvajal related the theory that Ferdinand had been given an herbal potion designed to arouse his desire for Queen Germana de Foix (Ferdinand's second wife), suggesting that she hoped to conceive a son who would inherit the Crown of Aragon (which included eastern Iberia as well as the Italian possessions of Sardinia and Sicily) and the kingdom of Naples.[15] In imputing to Germana the aspiration for a separate Aragonese inheritance, Galíndez de Carvajal suggested that this was an act of subterfuge conducted without Ferdinand's knowledge. Substantial evidence, however, demonstrates that Ferdinand himself sought desperately to produce a male heir who would inherit the patrimonial realms of the Crown of Aragon as well as Ferdinand's conquests in Naples and North Africa.[16] In 1509, Germana had borne Ferdinand a son who lived only a few hours, and since that moment Ferdinand had continued to attempt to produce another son. In 1513, the Italian humanist Peter Martyr, who was a court fixture during these years, recorded an anecdote about Ferdinand's consumption of aphrodisiacs, in this case, though, indicating that it was the king, rather than the queen, who sought the heir. In a letter to his friend Iñigo López de Mendoza, Martyr described how Ferdinand ate bulls' testicles mixed into his food in an attempt to arouse his sexual appetite so that he could produce an heir for his paternal realms (i.e., the Crown of Aragon).[17] Ferdinand's own correspondence from 1510 reveals that he sought papal concessions for the right to conquer lands in the eastern Mediterranean that he hoped to bequeath, along with the Crown of Aragon, to an *Aragonese* successor.[18]

Whether the desire for an Aragonese heir lay primarily with Germana or with Ferdinand (and, of course, the couple could certainly have shared this objective), what clearly emerges from Galíndez de Carvajal's account is the fact that the ultimate union of Aragon and Castile was in fact an accident that occurred only because the aging king, in spite of his consumption of aphrodisiacs, was unable to produce an heir with his second wife.[19] In short, there was nothing fore-ordained about the ultimate union of the crowns. Rather, what with hindsight appears inevitable was, in the early sixteenth century, a precarious union that somehow survived numerous threats, both during the years Ferdinand survived Isabella (1504–1516) and into the early years of Charles V's reign (1516–1556).

Galíndez de Carvajal's account of Ferdinand's last days thus serves as a salutary reminder that, from the perspective of those Iberians living in the early sixteenth century, the ultimate realignment that would eventually occur as a result of the combined inheritance of Aragon and Castile, along with the survival of the Castilian colonies planted on the far shores of the Atlantic, was by no means a foregone conclusion. By redirecting our attention to the long decade that Ferdinand outlived Isabella and by looking at Castile's and Aragon's Old World imperial interests, we come away with a very different view of the early modern Spanish monarchy. These years constitute an important chapter in the development of the early modern religious and political rivalries between Habsburgs and Valois, and between Habsburgs and Ottomans, that dominated the Mediterranean into the late seventeenth century.

In addition to shifting our geographic gaze back toward the Mediterranean, this book devotes a great deal of attention to a span of years that is often neglected by historians of the "Catholic Monarchs" Ferdinand and Isabella.[20] Much of the subject matter of chapters 3 through 6 occurred during the period of 1504–1516. These years were characterized by a series of disruptions, rebellions, and revolts. During this time, Ferdinand's legal authority in Castile was reduced to that of a mere administrator, and he attempted to exercise power through his daughter Juana, who ruled Castile as queen.[21] And yet, paradoxically, it was during these final twelve years of his life that Ferdinand embarked on his most ambitiously expansionist projects. He ordered the conquest of a series of presidios stretching eastward along the North African coast toward the Levant, and considered proposals to attack the Ottoman Empire at Constantinople, to conquer Mamluk Egypt, and to lead a Christian recovery of the Holy Land. As Ferdinand pushed the string of Spanish conquests further east across the Maghrib, sapping Castilian resources in the process, the venture arguably served to protect Aragonese interests more than Castilian. From Algiers eastward, the presidios acted as bulwarks protecting Ferdinand's

Italian possessions—Sardinia, Sicily, and Naples—from North African corsair activity and piracy. In diplomatic correspondence to his ambassador in Rome, Ferdinand referred to the fact that the right to the conquest of the kingdoms of Bougie and Tunis belonged by right to Aragon, but he added that even absent this formalized right, the Crown of Aragon would have grounds for conducting conquests there "due to those kingdoms' proximity to our kingdoms and islands," an oblique reference to Naples, Sardinia, and Sicily forming part of the Crown of Aragon.[22] In 1510 and 1511, several Castilian municipalities wrote open letters to Ferdinand criticizing the king for his *empresa de África* and pleading with him to desist.[23] These municipal protests have been read as a manifestation of Castilian opposition to the king's Aragonese politics.[24]

From Ferdinand's perspective, however, the most promising prospects for empire lay to the east, in the Mediterranean basin. Not only were these the lands to which he held a patrimonial title (unlike the lands constituting the Crown of Castile, including its new American possessions), but during the 1490s and early 1500s the outposts of Castilian colonists on Hispaniola and Cuba were beleaguered, their survival not assured. In his book *Empire: How Spain Became a World Power*, Henry Kamen describes the hardships that beset the Castilians attempting to survive in the Caribbean in the 1490s, noting that it proved so difficult to entice settlers to travel there from Spain that the Crown considered the idea of transforming Hispaniola into a penal colony. In 1498, Christopher Columbus assisted three hundred settlers who decided to return to Spain.[25] In 1503, Juan de Ayala wrote a letter to Ferdinand and Isabella describing the factions into which the Castilian colonists of Hispaniola had become divided.[26] For a variety of reasons, then, the future of the colonial enterprise in the Americas did not appear propitious during the early sixteenth century.

Life was also challenging in the Spanish presidios of North Africa, and obtaining enough settlers to populate those strongholds was a perpetual struggle. But under Ferdinand, at least, the Crown proved willing to expend more resources on the *empresa de África* than on the American colonies. To give one example, Columbus's second voyage, which sailed in September 1493, consisted of seventeen vessels carrying twelve hundred men.[27] By contrast, the Spanish conquest of Orán (May 1509) was said to have necessitated twenty thousand men, and other assaults on smaller North African targets likewise drew forces in the thousands: the attack on Bougie (January 1510) involved four thousand Spanish soldiers.[28] An anonymous account of Spanish military engagements in North Africa in 1510–1511, written by a participant, records that there were at least five thousand soldiers among the Spanish forces in the attack on Tripoli.[29] To be sure, this relative discrepancy would shift over the

years, but I believe it is arguable that for at least some time there were considerably more resources devoted to the conquest of Africa than of the Americas.

In short, up through at least the second decade of the sixteenth century, the human and material resources dedicated to Mediterranean conquests were greater than those dedicated for conquests in the Americas. Why is that? Was Spain's Atlantic destiny not evident? I argue that, at least from the perspective of the Crown of Aragon, the notion that the Atlantic presented more auspicious possibilities than did the Mediterranean was not at all clear. In fact, the driving geopolitical and religious concerns of the Mediterranean basin produced what I term a "Mediterranean moment" that spanned the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries. Ferdinand's aspiration to forge an Aragonese empire at the heart of the Old World was profoundly reflective of the concerns characterizing this "Mediterranean moment."

During the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, a constellation of forces converged on the religiopolitical landscape of the Mediterranean, including but not limited to the rise of the Ottoman Empire, the Papal Schism, the threat posed to Rome by Lutheranism, and the Italian Wars between France and Spain. Among Latin Christians, this period was characterized by a volatile combination of dread at Ottoman westward expansion and wild optimism at the prospect of Christian conquests in Africa and the eastern Mediterranean. Typical of this era was the febrile interest in establishing contact with Prester John and in effecting a Christian recovery of Jerusalem, along with the aspiration to topple the Ottoman Empire.[30] This millenarian worldview, and the importance it ascribed to sites within the Mediterranean world, was common in Castile and Aragon, Portugal, France, and Italy. A short list of figures from this era whose lives are emblematic of this "Mediterranean moment" would include Charles VIII of France (r. 1483–1498), Girolamo Savonarola, the "priest-prophet" of Florence (1452–1498), King Manuel I of Portugal (r. 1495–1521), and Christopher Columbus (1451–1506).[31] Columbus's inclusion in this list might surprise, known as he is for his Atlantic navigations, but numerous modern studies reveal the depth of his religious motives for exploration and his long-standing interest in a crusade to recover Jerusalem.[32]

These religious and ideological concerns were not the only factors spurring Aragonese interest in the Mediterranean. In plans hatched in 1506 for a conquest of Alexandria (plans never put into action) and in Ferdinand's 1510 instructions to Jerónimo de Vich, his ambassador in Rome, the king and his advisers all demonstrate a clear recognition that control over the southeastern Mediterranean (including the lower Nile) would grant access to the commercial networks of the Red Sea and Indian Ocean. Aragonese control of the east-

ern Mediterranean, then, would present significantly more direct access to eastern markets than did Portuguese navigators' circumnavigation of Africa.

The geopolitical importance of the Mediterranean in southern Europe was reflected in a mirror image at the far end of the inner sea, in the Ottoman Empire.[33] Here too a feverish ambit of millenarian expectations, encompassing both fear and optimism, prevailed.[34] When viewed from Constantinople during the reign of Bayezid II (r. 1481–1512) (whose reign witnessed repeated internecine dynastic struggles), Spain's rapid conquest of a series of North African presidios (1497–1510), the Aragonese acquisition of the kingdom of Naples (1503), and the Spanish-Venetian victory over the Ottomans at Cefalonia in 1500 must have appeared quite alarming. Under Bayezid's successor, Selim I (r. 1512–1520), similar concerns inspired the sultan's Mediterranean politics. "In the leading Ottoman political ideology, universal sovereignty was intimately related with the control of the Mediterranean and its trade and travel routes. In order to substantiate these claims, the Ottoman state, during the reign of Selim, took control of the major ports in the eastern Mediterranean and strengthened its military power to challenge the Venetians and the Habsburgs in the central and western Mediterranean."[35]

In other words, long after 1492, for Muslim as well as Christian polities, the Mediterranean remained extremely important—a focus of geopolitical, strategic, economic, and religious interests. My objective in highlighting this "Mediterranean moment," however, is not merely to note it but rather to contextualize it—to analyze these attempts at Mediterranean *imperium* and the legal arguments that underlay them in the broader context of Spain's contemporaneous interests in the Americas.

This book, as a study of the political and legal thought undergirding expansionism and conquest, is of necessity shaped by political categories such as the Crown of Aragon, the kingdom of Castile, Mamluk Egypt, or the Ottoman Empire. Nevertheless, as a study of processes of conquest and the articulation of imperial claims in the Mediterranean region, this study is deeply indebted to recent scholarly developments that approach the *mare nostrum* as one of several premodern maritime systems.[36] Fernand Braudel, via his expansive study *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II* (first published in French in 1949), helped to launch the modern move among scholars away from terrestrial (and national) categories and toward the new possibilities opened up by adopting in their place maritime systems as categories of analysis.[37]

In this study, I employ terms such as "kingdom of Castile" and "Crown of Aragon" in part because the primary sources on which I draw use those categories. That said, in my analysis I approach the questions raised in this study

through a Mediterranean framework, cognizant of the fact many of the ideas and arguments I analyze here moved freely around the Mediterranean world, irrespective of political, religious, or even linguistic boundaries. My intent in adopting this methodological position is to employ the Mediterranean not only as a geographic category that represented a zone of geopolitical interest for the Spanish monarchy, the Ottoman Empire, and France but also to situate the Mediterranean in a broader, more global context. In doing so, however, the focal point remains unequivocally the inner sea.

This study rewrites traditional narratives of the early modern Spanish monarchy, not only by turning the geographic focus toward the Crown's Old World interests but also by shifting the chronological center of gravity into the sixteenth century and interpreting 1492 as less of a hinge moment.[38] The momentous events of that year have often been invoked to argue for a sharp distinction between the medieval and early modern eras. To be sure, for certain topics (the development of early modern ethnography, expanding European geographical consciousness, the history of disease and epidemics) 1492 represents a valid temporal boundary. When looking at the Mediterranean world, it is tempting likewise to see 1492 as a moment of rupture. Indeed, for the Sephardim expelled from the Spanish realms or for the Nasrid rulers of Granada, 1492 marked a dramatic (and tragic) moment of realignment. In traditional scholarship, the fall of Granada and the establishment of the first Castilian colonies in the Caribbean are treated as related events, as if once Spain had solved the "problem" of the presence of an Islamic polity on Spanish soil, it could turn its energies westward.[39] Granada and the establishment of the Caribbean colonies are indeed connected chronologically. But in other ways the connection is rather accidental. This study places Granada into broader processes of Mediterranean conquests by probing what the restoration of Christian rule in southern Iberia meant for the legal arguments that writers developed to justify Spanish claims in North Africa and other Mediterranean zones. When approached from a Mediterranean perspective, the events of 1492 are less a moment of rupture than they are part of a continuum along which Christian jurists attempted to work out thorny questions surrounding just war, conquest, and who could possess *dominium*.

I am not suggesting here that the processes of Mediterranean and Atlantic expansion were unrelated. On the contrary, one of the arguments of this book is that we must examine the two trajectories together. And yet, the two expansionary ventures are not analogous either. The Mediterranean presented a wider range of legal contingencies than did the Atlantic, due to competing claims from a range of Christian polities (France and Portugal, to name just two), due to claims by the papacy to exercise universal dominion and the ways

in which these papal claims at times clashed with the secular dynastic claims that princes traced back to the remote past, and, perhaps most significantly, due to the fact that it was in the Mediterranean context that scholars had to work out the doctrines of just and holy war against a fellow Christian opponent. In short, many continuities are obscured if we reify 1492 in the context of the Mediterranean. For example, in chapter 4, I note Ferdinand of Aragon's policy of taking in new *mudejar* (Muslim) vassals in his North African acquisitions in the early sixteenth century, a policy that had been practiced for centuries by Christian monarchs in Iberia proper. Thus, while 1492 represented the end of an Islamic political presence in Iberia, in certain ways the *modus operandi* of the medieval Iberian frontier was merely transposed to the coastal strip of the Maghrib.

In geographical as well as chronological terms, then, this book contributes to the recently revitalized study of the medieval and early modern Mediterranean. The modern field of Mediterranean Studies might be said to have begun in 1949, when the eminent historian Fernand Braudel published his study of the Mediterranean in the age of Philip II.[40] In spite of Braudel's contributions, Spanish entanglement in the sixteenth-century Mediterranean remained for decades a relatively neglected topic, particularly in Anglophone scholarship.[41] Andrew Hess's 1978-study, *The Forgotten Frontier: A History of the Sixteenth-Century Ibero-African Frontier*, sparked renewed interest, and in recent years there has been a flurry of groundbreaking scholarship that is reconsidering the role of the Mediterranean in the early modern Spanish monarchy.[42] This book is part of this renewed interest in Spain's early modern Mediterranean interests.

Dramatis Personae

In this book, I explore the question of "the problem of empire" by looking at royal policy, as driven by King Ferdinand of Aragon and, to a lesser extent, by Queen Isabella of Castile, but I remain sensitive to the fact that the monarchs developed policy in a dynamic environment populated by a variety of figures constituting the court retinue. These characters included *letrados* (university-educated men who commonly had a background in law), court humanists (who might be commissioned to write royal chronicles, dynastic histories, or to tutor the monarchs' children), and members of religious orders who were sometimes involved in the formulation of royal policy (the prime example of such a figure is Cardinal Francisco Ximénez de Cisneros, who on two occasions served as regent of Castile). Thus, in this study I do draw on the personal and diplomatic correspondence of the monarchs, but I rely much more

on the writings of a number of jurists, diplomats, and theologians. With the intent of achieving a broader cross section of views, I also bring in hitherto little-studied sources composed by figures who were deeply enmeshed in executing military engagements and conquests, but who might have lacked the formal education of the *letrados*. Thus, the military commander Pedro Navarro plays a prominent role, and I also draw on two anonymous sources chronicling Spanish conquests in Naples and in North Africa, written by participants (most likely soldiers) in those events.

Some of the figures on whose writings I draw are well known and require no introduction. Others are more obscure, and three in particular are worth introducing here.

The figure on whose work I draw most throughout this study is Juan López de Palacios Rubios (aka Juan López de Vivero, ca. 1450–1524). This name is familiar to students of Latin American history, as he was the author of the *requerimiento*, an infamous text that constituted one of the Castilian protocols of conquest in the Americas.[43] While Palacios Rubios gained notoriety (even in his own lifetime) for his role in composing the apparently cynical *requerimiento*, he was a prolific redactor and author of numerous other legal texts. As a professor of canon law at the University of Salamanca and a member of the councils of the Mesta (which oversaw sheep transhumance in Castile) and of the Indies, Palacios Rubios moved in the highest court circles and was frequently called upon by King Ferdinand to redact law codes or draft legal treatises; among these number compositions that offered legal grounds for Spanish expansionary efforts in a variety of locales.

Apart from his authorship of the *requerimiento*, Palacios Rubios has been relatively little studied, particularly in recent years. Eloy Bullón y Fernández wrote a biography of the jurist in 1927.[44] Bullón y Fernández had an apologist's reading of Palacios Rubios, defending the jurist's role in composing the *requerimiento* by stressing that Spanish colonization in the Americas was a net good because of the benefits of civilization that it brought to the Indians. Significantly, however, a key text by Palacios Rubios, *De insulis*, had not yet been discovered in 1927, meaning that Bullón y Fernández had to conduct his analysis without the benefit of reading the jurist's fuller argument in defense of Spanish claims in the Americas.[45] The lone surviving manuscript of *De insulis* was subsequently discovered in Madrid's Biblioteca Nacional and published in a modern translation and edition in 1954.[46]

Palacios Rubios was among the numerous jurists and theologians who were summoned to Burgos in 1512, when King Ferdinand convened a *junta* there to address the justice of Castile's claims to the Americas and the attendant treatment of the American Indians. The *requerimiento* was composed (in

Castilian) in response to the questions raised at Burgos, to serve as a brief text conquistadors were to read to the indigenous inhabitants they encountered on the American mainland. The full legal argument underpinning the *requerimiento*, however, was elaborated in Latin in the significantly longer treatise *De insulis*, probably composed sometime between 1512 and 1515. In that more substantial text, Palacios Rubios includes lengthy passages addressing Spanish claims to a variety of Old World territories. The sections of *De insulis* pertaining to Spanish claims in North Africa are a major focus of my analysis in chapter 4. Ferdinand clearly appreciated Palacios Rubios's ability to craft legal arguments in defense of his political interests, and sometime between 1512 and 1515 the king commissioned the jurist to compose a text defending Spanish claims to the kingdom of Navarre.[47] Printed in Burgos sometime between 1515 and 1517, this text is an important source for my analysis in chapter 3 of the just-war arguments Spain developed in defense of its conflicts with France.

A figure more obscure than Palacios Rubios is Cristóbal de Santesteban (ca. 1440–ca. 1524). Little is known of Santesteban, beyond the fact that he and his wife, Doña Isabel de Ribadeneyra, were courtiers at the court of Isabella and Ferdinand and subsequently that of Charles V. Santesteban was appointed to the post of *regidor* (alderman) in the city of Valladolid, and he also held the commandership of Biedma in the military Order of Santiago.[48] This biographical information indicates that Santesteban moved in the highest circles and was likely close to Isabella and Ferdinand. For the purposes of this study, Santesteban is important thanks to his authorship in 1503 (at the height of the Franco-Spanish War for control of the kingdom of Naples) of a tract (*tratado*) offering a defense of Ferdinand and Isabella's claims to the kingdoms of Jerusalem, Naples, and Sicily.[49] Taking the form of a genealogy that presents the Spanish monarchs' dynastic claims to these lands, Santesteban's text simultaneously reveals a great deal about the strategic importance of these Mediterranean kingdoms to Spanish designs on Mediterranean empire and about the role of religious authority in crafting political legitimacy. This little-studied source is one that I return to throughout this book, particularly in chapters 1, 3, and 4. Santesteban's treatise seems to have met with royal approval, and it is possible that one or both of the positions he held on the municipal council of Valladolid and in the Order of Santiago were granted in recompense for the service he had rendered the Crown with the composition of his *Tratado*. While the size of the print run of Santesteban's *Tratado* is not recorded, we do know that Ferdinand Columbus (the navigator's bibliophile son) purchased an edition of Santesteban's *Tratado* in Toledo in 1511 for the price of 12 maravedises.[50] Ferdinand Columbus's interest in Santesteban's *Tratado* could have lain in the fact that it offers several of the earliest references

in print to the Americas (although indicating that they are part of Asia), or Ferdinand might have shared his father's millenarian interest in crusading proposals to recover the kingdom of Jerusalem, a theme that permeates Santesteban's text.

Finally, another figure on whose writings I draw extensively is Count Pedro Navarro (ca. 1460–1528). Navarro is well known as a military engineer and commander who played important roles in the Spanish conquest of Naples and in the conquest or annexation of numerous cities and presidios along the Maghrib coast. He was made Count of Oliveto in 1505 for his service in the war against France for control of the kingdom of Naples.[51] For this study, however, my interest in Navarro lies principally in an unpublished memorial he wrote to King Ferdinand in 1506, in which Navarro presents a concrete strategy for the conquest of Ottoman Greece and Turkey, to be followed by the conquest of Jerusalem.[52] Far from focusing only on the military necessities of soldiers and materiel, the contents of this memorial demonstrate a wide-ranging and eclectic education. Like his contemporary, Christopher Columbus, Navarro may have been an autodidact, and his memorial offers an extraordinary glimpse at a succinct and coherent vision of the political theology of kingship that he ascribes to Ferdinand.

Chapter Outline

This book is divided into two parts. Part 1 contains two chapters that serve as background for the case studies that comprise part 2. Chapter 1, "The Mediterranean in the Spanish Imaginary During the Age of Exploration," explores the ways late medieval Spaniards thought about the Mediterranean and the lands ringing its shores. Geographers believed that the three constituent parts of the earth (Asia, Africa, and Europe) met in the Mediterranean, leading to a belief that lordship of the world could only be attained through control of the inner sea (an argument articulated by Dante in *On Monarchy*). To this was wedded a sense, derived from the legacy of ancient Rome, of the Mediterranean as a locus of empire, a space that might plausibly again be united under a single rule. In addition to the precedent of political unity, writers pointed to the early expansion of primitive Christianity to suggest that the Mediterranean possessed a latent religious unity. Aware of the history of the early Church in North Africa and western Asia, jurists devised arguments to the effect that Christian conquests in those regions were in fact acts of recuperation or even defense, and therefore of "just war." Chapter 1 elucidates the nuances of fifteenth-century Spaniards' perspectives on Mediterranean space by demon-

strating that the proximate (western) Mediterranean was familiar and known, while the more distant (eastern) Mediterranean (Libya, Egypt) was more exotic and often depicted as the site of fabulous wonders. Chapter 2, "The Christian Commonwealth Besieged," traces three developments that informed the rhetorical strategies fifteenth-century Catholic rulers employed to represent their political projects. The Papal Schism (1378–1417) and the fifteenth-century conciliar movement stimulated a questioning of the spiritual authority of the papacy. Partly in response to this, many fifteenth-century European political theorists expressed the desirability of Christian union through the articulation of a conception of the *respublica christiana* that carried political as well as religious valences. Adding to the sense of spiritual crisis, many Western Europeans interpreted the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople (1453) as an existential threat. As I argue in later chapters, these developments created an environment in which the religiopolitical vocabulary of Christian universalism carried tremendous weight, particularly as advanced by secular rulers such as the kings of Spain or France. Thus, the political claims these monarchs made spoke to the spiritual and existential concerns of a broad swath of Latin Catholics and in consequence proved convincing.

Part 2 contains four chapters constituting the main study of this project. Chapter 3, "The Turk Within," is an examination of the rhetoric and methods of legitimation employed by both sides during the Franco-Spanish wars for control of Italy, from 1494 to 1516, and in the Franco-Spanish dispute over Navarre (1512–1516). In both conflicts, France and Spain transformed the struggles into holy wars fought for the defense and preservation of the *respublica christiana*. In the circumstances particular to these cases, in which both disputants were Catholic monarchies, arguments justifying war against a fellow Christian power were imbued with the legal force and legitimacy of a war for the expansion of the faith. Chapter 4, "The African Horizon," looks at the principle period of Spain's "African enterprise," from the conquest of the Canary Islands in the 1490s up through the conquest of Tripoli in 1510. This process presents a fruitful comparison with the arguments over the Spanish conquests in the Americas: in both instances, the inhabitants of the land were non-Christians, and this fact informed the methods of justification. Moreover, the right to effect both conquests had been enshrined in papal bulls. In the case of Africa, however, Spanish jurists eventually developed arguments to circumvent papal authority in this matter, citing historical claims that North Africa had once constituted part of the ancient Visigothic kingdom of Hispania and that, as a formerly Christian territory, Africa might be conquered by a Christian prince in a "just war." The status of Africa's Muslim rulers as usurpers ultimately differentiated them from the "Gentile" inhabitants Spanish friars encountered in the

Americas. Chapter 5, "The Eastern Chimera," addresses Ferdinand's planned series of Levantine conquests stretching from Egypt through the Holy Land to Greece, Turkey, and eastward into Asia. While these designs never attained fruition, they warrant analysis for the legal arguments upon which they were predicated. Through his conquest of the kingdom of Naples, King Ferdinand had obtained the title to the defunct crusader kingdom of Jerusalem. The seemingly symbolic title to Jerusalem served as the foundation for legal arguments that Ferdinand crafted regarding just war against non-Christian peoples both in the Mediterranean and beyond. The religious politics of the Mediterranean basin accordingly played a vital role in the formulation of the legal doctrines that were subsequently applied in other spheres of expansion, allowing Ferdinand to portray himself as an evangelical prince and imbuing Spanish conquests in other regions with legal and moral legitimacy. Chapter 6, "One Shepherd, One Flock," examines Spanish—and more broadly, Christian and Islamic—thought on "universal empire." The thinking on this form of political organization developed as a result of the protracted dialogue of competing claims by fellow Christian as well as Islamic polities examined in chapters 3 through 5. In this final chapter of this book, I address Portuguese, French, and Ottoman iterations of universalist claims (religious as well as political) as the expression of a utopian ideal of religiopolitical organization.

What becomes clear in this study of empire in the Old World is that Spanish political thought on just war, conquest, and the treatment of newly subject peoples, developed in a crucible in which Mediterranean dynastic rivalries were paramount (Trastámara vs. Valois, Trastámara vs. Avis, or Trastámara vs. Ottoman). It was in these circumstances, in geographies ranging from the wooded Pyrenees to the bustling port of Naples to the arid hinterlands of Tripoli, that the legal and moral arguments undergirding the rise of the early modern empires were forged. These, then, were transposed to the quite different circumstances of the Atlantic world in a process that shows the inevitable continuities linking Mediterranean *imperium* to its Atlantic successor, but that also demonstrates the incommensurability of Mediterranean dynamics with those of the Gentile-inhabited Atlantic.

This book sheds light on aspects of Spanish history that have been neglected for centuries. *The Other Side of Empire*, however, is not intended to signify merely a "recovery" of Spain's Mediterranean interests and aspirations during the early sixteenth century. Rather, this study aims to stimulate scholarship and dialogue on the legal and moral arguments surrounding just war, conquest, and empire in a variety of settings—some, it is hoped, quite distantly removed from the sixteenth-century Mediterranean.

Part I

CHAPTER 1

The Mediterranean in the Spanish Imaginary During the Age of Exploration

Crossroads of the World

In November 1503, at the height of the Franco-Spanish war for control of the southern Italian kingdom of Naples, the Castilian courtier Cristóbal de Santesteban published a juridical tract in support of King Ferdinand and Queen Isabella's claims not only to Naples but also to the kingdoms of Sicily and Jerusalem.[1] In his text, Santesteban included a panegyric to Sicily, extolling the virtues of the island kingdom. Its superiority to other lands, asserted Santesteban, derived in part from its status as the crossroads of the world. "Sicily is located between the three parts of the world, Asia, Africa, and Europe, and it has been the breadbasket and provisioner for all three." From this, Santesteban concluded that "no one might call himself lord of the world, nor even think of doing so, without first controlling Sicily."[2]

Coming eleven years after Columbus's first trans-Atlantic crossing, it might surprise that Santesteban should depict the island of Sicily as located at the center of the world, in both geographical and geopolitical terms. Santesteban's text, however, was not heterodox. On the contrary, it reflected widely held European notions about geography and political power in the early sixteenth century. The courtier's depiction of the central Mediterranean (in particular the kingdom of Sicily) as being a keystone of geographical and strategic interests is a pithy encapsulation of the geopolitical importance Ferdinand and

Isabella ascribed to the Mediterranean throughout their reigns. Indeed, Santesteban's juridical tract appears to have met with royal approval, and it was likely in remuneration for this composition that he was appointed to the post of alderman in the city of Valladolid and to a commandership in the military order of Santiago.

The pursuit of Mediterranean interests brought the crowns of Aragon and Castile into military conflict or political disputes with France, the Ottoman Empire, Portugal, Mamluk Egypt, as well as numerous polities of the Maghrib. An important element of these disputes, at least those in which Spain's opponent was a fellow Christian power, such as Portugal or France, was the legal basis on which representatives of the Spanish Crown asserted that it was their sovereign, rather than that of Portugal or France, who held the strongest claim. When Spanish jurists, theologians, chroniclers, or ambassadors argued in defense of Spanish claims to a variety of these Old World lands, they did so within an epistemological framework in which the Mediterranean zone carried a whole set of meanings, resonances, and significances. This chapter elucidates the Mediterranean as a conceptual space in what I term "the Spanish imaginary" during the Age of Exploration. What follows is an exposition of the Mediterranean region as a known geographical unit that constituted a cohesive geographical-religious-cultural-historical entity in the minds of fifteenth- and sixteenth-century Iberians. The elucidation of the ways these people thought about the Mediterranean region, in geographical, religious, historical, ethnographic, and political terms, serves as a framework against which to analyze Spanish political and legal thought on expansion and empire.

Significant scholarly contributions in recent years have noted the ways early modern Europeans approached the lands and peoples of the tropics with certain preconceptions.[3] In *The Tropics of Empire*, Nicolás Wey Gómez elucidates the political geography that underlay Christopher Columbus's (and sixteenth-century Europeans' in general) interest in the tropical zones of the earth and how this thinking underwent a shift, from viewing the lower latitudes as a region where nature produced zoological and human monstrosities toward an understanding of the tropics as a region of super-abundance, one ripe for an extractive economy.

During the same decades that Portugal and Castile were establishing the earliest European colonial outposts in the tropics, the crowns of Aragon and Castile were engaged in expansionary ventures in a variety of Mediterranean settings. Unlike the tropics, the Mediterranean lands were known, insofar as they constituted part of the historical frame of reference for early modern Europeans. This fact determined the line of argumentation that Spanish proponents of Mediterranean empire pursued. These Old World ventures entailed



Map 1. Map of the Mediterranean, ca. 1510

very little in the way of a "shock of discovery."[4] Rather, Spanish Mediterranean expansionary designs, whether in the Maghrib, Italy, Egypt, or Greece, all occurred in territories in which the Spanish realms of Aragon or Castile had long held interests, lands well known to fifteenth-century Spaniards, both through autopsy and through the writings preserved from the Middle Ages and classical antiquity. This differentiated European political thought about just war, conquest, and empire in the Mediterranean from that pertaining to the more recently encountered tropics. Of particular import was the fact that the entirety of the Mediterranean Sea basin lay within what was understood to constitute the temperate band of the earth's latitudinal zones. At a time when latitude was believed to play a significant role in shaping the sorts of people and civilizations that developed in different regions, the fact that Ferdinand's Mediterranean imperial project was directed against peoples inhabiting approximately the same latitudinal zones as the Iberian Peninsula meant that the questions this project engendered differed in significant ways from those that arose as a result of European conquests in the tropics. The inhabitants of the Mediterranean lands were familiar, and they fit into European understandings of the history and genealogies of the peoples of the world. To be sure, constructions of human difference were enormously important in sixteenth-century Spanish justifications for Mediterranean empire, but these differences, rather than being based on notions of human monstrosities or racial difference, were rooted more in differences stemming from confessional identity or the political offenses of usurpation and tyranny.

As later chapters in this book bear out, Spanish understanding of the geographical, religious, and historical dimensions of the Mediterranean basin informed the rhetorical strategies and legal arguments Spanish jurists and theologians developed to justify acts of war and conquest in a variety of Mediterranean locales. In spite of the discrepancy in the way Spaniards and other Europeans viewed the Mediterranean as compared to the tropical Atlantic, nevertheless the rationales for empire that developed in the context of the Mediterranean clearly played a part in the elaboration of related, yet distinct, rationales that apologists for empire developed to justify Spanish conquests in other regions of the globe. This chapter's examination of the Mediterranean as conceptual space serves to note the ways in which fifteenth- and sixteenth-century Spaniards' thinking about this zone differed from that on the tropical Atlantic. Simultaneously, it points to ways that doctrines that originated in the Mediterranean context (debates over the capacity of non-Christians to possess sovereignty, or the importance ascribed to prior Christian rule, to give two examples) were subsequently applied in sometimes incoherent ways to the quite different circumstances presented by the Americas.

Continental Drift

Late medieval European geographic conceptions of a tripartite earth owed a great deal to the Old and New Testaments and to the history of primitive Christianity. In the book of Genesis (chapters 6 through 9) in the wake of the flood, Noah divides the lands of the earth among his sons. Shem is given Asia, Ham is given Africa, and Japheth is given Europe. For medieval Europeans, the biblical account of the distribution of lands among brothers served to reinforce the notion of the earth as a coherent whole comprised of the three constituent and inseparable parts of Asia, Africa, and Europe. This endowed them with a natural (and biblically sanctioned) unity as constitutive elements of a whole. One can detect in this tripartite understanding of the lands of the earth a trinitarian cosmographical conception: while the regions of the earth are three, yet they constitute a single entity. Illustrative of the longevity and influence of this understanding of the parts of the earth is the fact that this tripartite geographical conception served as the organizing structure for most European universal histories of the later Middle Ages.[5]

As the locus at which the three regions intersected, the Mediterranean occupied a privileged position at the center of this cosmography. Within this schema, however, the boundaries of Asia, Africa, and Europe were malleable. As Martin Lewis and Kären Wigen have argued, before the development of plate tectonics as a field of study, continents were socially constructed entities.[6] Consequently, it should come as little surprise that the precise boundaries between the three continents were not stable and varied according to the writer and the date of composition.

Traditional medieval geography held that riverine systems formed the boundaries between Asia and the lands lying to the west. In the south, the Nile formed the border between Asia and Africa. To give but one example, the fifteenth-century French polymath Pierre d'Ailly described the place where the Nile debouches into the Mediterranean as marking the transition from Africa to Asia.[7] Peter Martyr of Anghiera, the Italian humanist long in the employ of the Spanish monarchs Ferdinand and Isabella, writing during his 1502 embassy to Egypt and following established geographical convention, used the Nile to demarcate Africa from Asia, placing Cairo in Asia and Alexandria in Africa, due to the respective banks of the Nile on which those two cities were situated.[8] Meanwhile, in the north most geographers agreed that the Don separated Asia from Europe. Europeans conceived of the boundary between Africa and Europe as roughly bisecting the Mediterranean Sea, following a line approximating the parallel of 36 degrees north, from the Strait of Gibraltar in the west through the island of Rhodes in the east.[9] According to most geographers, Jerusalem

lay at the intersection of Asia, Africa, and Europe, a fact reflected in the T-O maps that were relatively common in medieval Europe.[10] Even into the sixteenth century some writers continued to locate Jerusalem at the center of the earth's landmass.[11] Of course, the geographical conceptions conveyed by the schema locating Jerusalem at the juncture of the three continents were as much symbolic as they were representative. Ascribing such a position to Jerusalem emphasized the importance of the Holy Land as the locus where Christ had redeemed humans' sins as much as or more than it stood as a precise claim about Jerusalem's geographic centrality.

As noted earlier, however, these constructs were far from stable, and European geographical boundaries displayed a remarkable dynamism. As an illustration of this, let us examine the work of the fifteenth-century polymath and Castilian royal councilor Diego de Valera (1412–1488). In 1482, Valera published his *Crónica de España*, sometimes referred to as the *Crónica Abreviada*, a universal history dedicated to Queen Isabella. Valera opened with a history of the three portions of the known world, beginning with their settlement and population by Noah's sons in the wake of the flood. In the section on Asia, Valera lists twenty-five provinces that constitute Asia, among them Macedonia, Albania, Crete, Egypt, and Ethiopia (along with the terrestrial paradise).[12] Egypt and Ethiopia do not surprise here, if one takes the Nile as the boundary between Africa and Asia. But Albania, Macedonia, and Crete clearly lie well to the west of the Don, demonstrating that for Valera the boundary between Europe and Asia was constructed around some other criterion.

Valera's section on Africa includes the provinces of Cyprus, Corsica, and Sicily, the last of which he describes as "located in the African Sea."[13] For Valera, the boundary between Europe and Africa lay well to the north of the thirty-sixth parallel (the northern tip of Corsica reaches the forty-third parallel) and it followed a rather meandering line across the Mediterranean. Significantly, Valera included in Africa two islands to which King Ferdinand held claim: Ferdinand had been king of Sicily since 1468, and he held a dynastic claim to Corsica, even if that island was under the de facto rule of the Republic of Genoa at the time Valera composed his chronicle.[14] Valera's geographical itemization results in a nebulous space that cuts across the central portion of the Sea, a space in which Asia, Africa, and Europe very nearly mingle or, in some cases, could almost be viewed as overlapping. In Valera's geography, the "African" island of Corsica, for instance, lies to the north of the "European" islands of Majorca, Menorca, and Ibiza, as well as the "European" lands of southern Italy—Calabria and Apulia. In spite of this rather porous conception of continental borders, Valera nevertheless places Jerusalem at the center of the lands of the earth, demonstrating a conventional Christian geographical trope.[15]

It is clear that these fifteenth- and sixteenth-century writers did not view continental boundaries as aligning with political borders or dynastic claims. As we will see in chapter 4, countless Spanish writers saw no dissonance in arguing for the existence of an ancient kingdom of Visigothic Hispania that included lands on both sides of the Strait of Gibraltar, encompassing what modern thinkers would define as European as well as African lands. Along similar lines, Peter Martyr, cited earlier in this chapter, was by no means questioning the political unity of Mamluk Egypt when he located Cairo in Asia and Alexandria in Africa. When viewed in their totality, it likewise becomes clear that these continental demarcations do not follow religious divisions between Christendom and the Dar al-Islam, nor do they follow the linguistic divisions between Romance, Slavic, Semitic, and Berber languages.

If the fifteenth- and sixteenth-century construction of continents did not coincide with political, religious, or linguistic boundaries, did this geography carry any meaning? I argue that this was not an esoteric exercise. On the contrary, there *were* political stakes to geographical claims such as those Valera made in the *Crónica de España*. While at first glance Valera's decision to include Ferdinand's island possessions of Sicily and Corsica in Africa might appear to be merely a matter of convention, there were, at the same time, political claims at stake here. Twenty-one years after the publication of Valera's chronicle in Seville, Cristóbal de Santesteban's juridical tract, with which I opened this chapter, was printed in Zaragoza. Santesteban's text was of a very different sort than Valera's universal history. Intended primarily as a legal document to argue in favor of Ferdinand and Isabella's claim to Naples in the face of the French (Valois) counterclaim, Santesteban's tract defended the Spanish dynastic claim to Naples, while simultaneously arguing that Ferdinand and Isabella were best suited to rule in Italy due to the extent of their domains and their concomitant ability to defend Christendom against the ascendant Ottoman Empire. Toward that end, Santesteban claimed that Ferdinand and Isabella were the only monarchs who ruled lands in all three parts of the world. He then enumerated their holdings: within Europe they ruled Spain, Calabria, Apulia, and Majorca; in Africa they possessed Sicily, Sardinia, Corsica, and Melilla (only the last of which would today be considered to lie on the African continent); and in Asia they held "the Indies and Terra Firma."[16] This last itemization is in reference to the islands of the Caribbean and the north coast of South America (Terra Firma). Santesteban can be excused for writing as he did in 1503 that the islands and mainland of the Indies lay in Asia. At that time, there was still debate over precisely where the Caribbean islands lay. Christopher Columbus famously reversed his position on this numerous times. While on his fourth voyage (1502–1504), he wrote in his log that his position

(in the Caribbean) put him just ten days' sail from the mouth of the Ganges.[17] Whether or not Santesteban truly believed Columbus had claimed lands in Asia for the Crown of Castile, there were political stakes to the assertion he made. In his claim that Ferdinand and Isabella ruled lands in all three parts of the world, Santesteban tacitly demonstrates the influence of Dante Alighieri on his political thought. In *On Monarchy*, the Florentine had argued that truly universal empire consisted of control over all three parts of the earth, a theme he illustrated through the historical example of ancient Rome and its possessions in Asia, Africa, and Europe.[18] Santesteban's claim, then, operates as a way to portray his royal patrons as universal monarchs. This valence of the argument he crafts in his *Tratado* is reinforced by the importance he ascribes to Ferdinand and Isabella's island kingdom of Sicily: "No one might call himself lord of the world, nor even think of doing so, without first controlling Sicily."[19] Santesteban's assertion about Sicily is as much a statement about geopolitics as it is about geography. In placing Sicily in the position of centrality, Santesteban breaks from the convention of locating Jerusalem at the center of the earth (noted earlier in the writings of Diego de Valera and Giles of Viterbo), but Santesteban's objective here is arguably more political and less religious.

Santesteban's claims about the island of Sicily might even be read as part of a Mediterranean dialogue of competing imperial claims. Just as the Castilian courtier ascribed to Sicily the status of linchpin to the founding of a universal empire, the Ottoman court in sixteenth-century Constantinople witnessed similar efforts to employ geography in the service of political claims. Pınar Emiralioglu, in her study *Geographical Knowledge and Imperial Culture*, traces the evolution of Ottoman imperial claims as expressed through new geographical works at the sixteenth-century Ottoman court. Emiralioglu notes the shift away from the traditional Islamic practice of depicting Baghdad as the center of the world toward the novel practice of endowing Constantinople with this position of centrality and primacy. An example of this is evident in the *Public Instructions* (1525), a geographical work of Mustafa b. Ali al-Muvakkit, a timekeeper during the reign of Süleyman I (r. 1520–1566). Mustafa b. Ali herein described Constantinople as "at the center of all countries."[20] Other works dedicated to Sultan Süleyman soon followed, locating the Ottoman capital Constantinople "at the center of the universe."[21] The works of Santesteban and the geographers at the Ottoman court might be best interpreted as signaling a shift in Mediterranean dynamics of power, pointing to the newly ascendant states at each end of the Mediterranean and the ways in which the basis of their respective political power was viewed.

Over the course of the sixteenth century, Europeans increasingly reinforced the image of Sicily's geographic centrality and the importance of the island kingdom as the key to establishing rule over the Mediterranean and the three constituent parts of the earth. In the process, rule over Sicily was imbued with resonances of an imperial status related to universal monarchy. We see these themes exhibited not only in textual form, as with Santesteban's *Tratado*, but in the medium of visual culture as well, including cartographic depictions of the Mediterranean and stylized maps intended to convey political ideologies. In the fourteenth century, Europeans began to produce anthropomorphic maps depicting Europe as a queen. Known as the *Europa Regina* maps, these became common in the sixteenth century as a visual representation of Habsburg dominion over vast swaths of Europe. In 1537, the Tirolese cartographer Johannes Putsch designed a *Europa Regina* map that employed a powerful visual vocabulary to illustrate the Habsburg lands: the queen stood adorned with Spain as a crown, with Bohemia as her heart, and holding in her right hand the imperial orb of the island of Sicily, topped with a cross.[22] The German cartographer Sebastian Münster (1488–1552) followed suit in the 1544 edition of his *Cosmographia*, a work that went through numerous reprintings during the remainder of the sixteenth century. Since the days of the tenth-century Ottonian Empire, the orb topped with a cross had served as a symbol of imperial standing and of the evangelical mission of the empire to spread the gospel throughout the world. The meaning conveyed by this imagery remained current for centuries: in the fifteenth century, the Castilian chronicler and royal councilor Diego de Valera described the primacy of the imperial office, writing that by right there should be only one emperor in the world. As testament to the emperor's superiority over other princes, Valera wrote that the emperor is "normally depicted holding a golden orb in his hand, to indicate the compass of the world that is subject to him."[23] In the visual depictions of Sicily as the cross-adorned orb, we see an echo of Santesteban's assertion of the centrality of the island kingdom, not just in geographic terms but in geopolitical terms as well, as the key to establishing a universal Christian empire.

Mediterranean Unity

Santesteban's juridical tract, ascribing such geopolitical significance to Sicily, and the *Europa Regina* maps of the early sixteenth century that offered a visual corollary to the same portrayal, together point to the currency in sixteenth-century Europe of the continuing ways in which the Mediterranean was

FIGURE 1.1. *Europa Regina*, from Heinrich Bünting, *Itinerarium Sacrae Scripturae* (Wittenberg: Zacharias Krafft, 1587). Courtesy of the George Peabody Library, the Sheridan Libraries, the Johns Hopkins University.

conceived of as (potentially) an imperial space that might feasibly be united under a single polity. Expansionist agendas were frequently understood in imperial terms and often in reference to ancient Rome. For example, the Ottoman Sultan Mehmet II (r. 1451–1481) famously claimed the title of *Kayser-I Rum*, or Roman Caesar, following his conquest of Constantinople (1453), representing himself as the legitimate successor to the Byzantine emperors and to the Roman emperors of antiquity.[24] Pınar Emiralioglu asserts that the legacy of the Roman imperial precedent continued well into the reign of Süleyman I: "Although the sixteenth century was a time of world exploration, the prevailing model of the world empire was still the Roman one. As the conquerors of Byzantium—the New Rome—the Ottomans could not assert universal imperial power without controlling the Mediterranean."[25] As might be expected, the legacy of Rome was perhaps even more important for many Latin Christian writers. I have already argued for the influence of Dante's *On Monarchy* on Santesteban's *Tratado*, particularly in the Castilian writer's vision of the attainment of universal empire through control of the three parts of the earth. The Roman precedent is inescapable in countless other sources. For example, in a 1506 *memorial* to King Ferdinand of Aragon, the Spanish naval commander Pedro Navarro presented the king with a strategy for the subjugation of the Ottoman Empire by invoking the model of imperial Rome and comparing the Aragonese monarch's resources for conquest favorably with those of the ancient Empire: "Only Spain, Sicily, and Apulia are the breadbaskets of the world, plentiful in all manner of victuals. With only Sicily, the Romans undertook the conquest of the universe. How much more [you will achieve], as you also control Spain and Apulia."[26]

Beyond the political precedent of ancient Rome, the Mediterranean basin contained within it countless sites important in the history of the early Christian Church. Fifteenth- and sixteenth-century European Catholics frequently wrote about the primitive Church as though it had united the various shores of the inner sea. These fifteenth- and sixteenth-century writers propagated a utopian vision of the history of early Christianity as a time when all three parts of the known world had been united in a single faith as part of a divine plan. Here a letter from King Manoel I of Portugal (r. 1495–1521) to Samudri Raja of Calicut, written March 1, 1500, is particularly revealing. When Vasco da Gama returned to Portugal from India in 1499, his crew brought with them stories of an exotic form of Christianity that the Indians practiced. Confusing Hindu temples for churches, the Portuguese believed they had located a population of coreligionists in the East who would be amenable to overtures proposing a crusading alliance. King Manoel wrote to Samudri Raja suggesting that the Portuguese and Indian branches of Christendom be joined, "just as the whole of the

universe was joined in the Christian faith six hundred years after Christ." This state of perfect unity had lasted, wrote Manoel, up until the point that, "due to the sins of mankind, several heretical sects emerged . . . which had occupied, in the regions lying between your lands and ours, a large portion of the Earth."[27] This halcyon view of the primitive Church as universal, a condition that was shattered through divine castigation, as manifest in the rise of Islam (presumably the "several heretical sects" to which Manoel refers), animated European desires to recuperate the formerly Christian lands of Africa and Asia. Indeed, the earth was understood as a *corpus mysticum*, with two of the three parts (Asia and Africa) having fallen under the rule of infidels by the later Middle Ages. It was the responsibility of Christians to recuperate those parts, thus restoring unity to the earth and to God's divine plan.[28]

In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, as Portugal and Spain launched invasions of African and Asian territories, writers in both kingdoms drew on this distant Christian past to craft legal arguments in defense of their martial actions. In 1415, Portugal conquered the city of Ceuta, on the north coast of modern Morocco. João de Barros (1496–1570), one of the principle chroniclers of early Portuguese expansion, composed a chronicle in which he described the Portuguese King João's capture of Ceuta, followed by subsequent Portuguese incursions into Morocco, portraying these as a restoration of Christianity to North Africa:

> He [King João] later became lord of this city [Ceuta], and he took possession of that part of Africa and left the door open to his children and grandchildren to move even further forward. This they managed to do very well, because they . . . took cities, villages, and territory in the principal ports and forts of the kingdoms of Fez and Morocco, restoring, as obedient sons and captains of the faith, the Roman Church's jurisdiction in these parts of Africa that it had lost after the conquest of Hispania [a reference to the Muslim conquest of Iberia in the early eighth century]. . . .[29]

In chapters 4 and 5, I explore in detail the legal arguments that various European crowns deployed based on this precedent of Christian rule. Jurists and diplomats in the employ of Ferdinand of Aragon, for instance, crafted such arguments in support of Spanish territorial claims in the Maghrib, Greece, Anatolia, and the Holy Land, as they viewed the Mediterranean as the locus for the attainment of a Christian universal empire.

Changes of Latitude

Beyond the religious significance of the imagined early Christian unity that had united the disparate shores of the Mediterranean was an environmental understanding of the Mediterranean region that informed European perceptions of the inhabitants of the shores of the inner sea. Since antiquity, there had been consensus that the entirety of the Mediterranean basin lay within the "temperate zone" of the earth's latitudes.[30] Medieval European geographers understood Asia, Africa, and Europe "to configure a single landmass stranded on an upper quarter of a globe otherwise covered by water, and the inhabited world itself was supposed to form a narrow 'temperate,' and, thereby, 'civilized' corridor of this geographical system, besieged to the north and to the south by the extreme cold and heat of the 'wild' arctic and tropics."[31] From antiquity to the early modern period, geographers associated latitude, more than longitude, with the nature of a place.[32] A locale's latitude was believed to play a determining role in the characteristics not only of its flora and fauna but also of its human inhabitants. Ibn Khaldun, in *The Muqqadimah* (likely under the influence of Aristotle), describes the inhabitants of the temperate corridor of the earth (zones three, four, and five of the seven zones he enumerates) as the most cultivated of the earth's peoples. In his understanding, these include the inhabitants of the Maghrib, Syria, the two Iraqs, western India, China, and Spain: "also the European Christians near by, the Galicians, and all those who live together with these people or near them in the three temperate zones."[33]

This temperate nature rendered the Mediterranean distinct from the "torrid zone" that lay to the south, encompassing the tropical lands of sub-Saharan Africa, the southern reaches of the Indian subcontinent, not to mention the tropical belt of the Americas. It also differentiated the Mediterranean region from the inhospitable zones of the far north and the Arctic, where the cold was believed to render the people bellicose, an understanding of northern peoples that can be traced back to Pliny and other writers of antiquity. Indeed, Diego de Valera's 1482 *Crónica de España* includes precisely these portrayals of northern and southern peoples: in Book I of the chronicle, Valera describes Ethiopia and its inhabitants, suggesting that the intensity of the sun's rays there resulted in the "black" color of the Ethiopians' skin, and that the region was one inhabited by "innumerable people of monstrous appearance."[34] Valera makes no mention of the Ethiopians' Christian identity. For this fifteenth-century writer, the deficiencies or deformities caused by living in the southerly latitudes overrode any positive portrayal of the Ethiopians that might derive from their ancient Christian history. In Book III, on Europe, Valera describes Swedes as "robust and ferocious," a construction of northerners that was indebted to Pliny's

Historia naturalis.[35] In contrast to the northern and southern latitudes, the Mediterranean, lying between the extremes of the torrid zone and the Arctic, was viewed as the region most conducive to human civilization.[36]

The representations highlighted thus far point to various European attempts at imbuing the Mediterranean zone with some coherence or unity, whether real (in the form of the region's temperate latitude) or imagined (in the form of representations of the primitive Church as universal). In fact, however, the Mediterranean presented merchants, pilgrims, geographers, soldiers, and diplomats with an extraordinary diversity of many stripes: religious, environmental, and demographic. Awareness of this heterogeneity is reflected in the ways various Iberian writers described different regions of the Mediterranean in language that rendered them familiar or exotic. The Mediterranean region was home to a diverse human population, representing a variety of linguistic, ethnic, and religious communities. How, then, did Iberian writers in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries represent this diversity? When we examine closely the variety of viewpoints Iberian Christians held about the people and regions of the Mediterranean, what emerges is the fact that, beneath the imagined unity, there were actually multiple "Mediterraneans," a multiplicity of zones characterized by different climatic features, different inhabitants, different religious histories. Within this spectrum, parts of the Mediterranean were rendered more familiar, while others were rendered more foreign, more exotic. As one would expect, the degree of difference noted by these Iberian writers appears directly correlated to the geographic proximity to the Iberian Peninsula. Most important for this book is the fact that fifteenth- and early-sixteenth-century Spaniards held views and conceptions about the human populations of different lands surrounding the Mediterranean and that these views determined the political thought on Spanish interests in those lands, Spanish diplomatic relations with the rulers of those lands, and on the justifiability of acts of war or conquest against those lands.

Here it is worth examining Spanish views of North Africa and its inhabitants. According to premodern European geographical conceptions, this region was part of Africa, but then so were Corsica and Sicily. So this fact alone does not mark the Maghrib as particularly "other" or exotic. In fact, several factors coalesced to render the Maghrib as familiar, known territory. First of all, the coastline of North Africa was a relatively short sail from the southern shores of the Iberian Peninsula. To be sure, contrary winds, storms, and the depredations of pirates all made the traverse potentially dangerous. But under favorable sailing conditions, one could sail from Orán to Cartagena (in Murcia, on Iberia's Mediterranean coast) in a day.[37] Beatriz Alonso Acero notes that

some fifteenth-century Spaniards thought of the region of the Maghrib north of the Atlas Mountains as essentially an extension of Andalucía.[38] One could presume that there is an element of physical geography at work here: Spaniards who traveled to the Maghrib recognized its flora and fauna and did not need to describe its wonders in the way Columbus described those he encountered in the Caribbean.[39] It was not environmentally distinct from Iberia. In addition to environmental similarities, there existed a human familiarity that was a product of protracted commercial contact and human migration, as people from the Iberian Peninsula (Jews, Muslims, and Christians) had engaged in commerce, war, and captive-taking with the Maghrib for centuries. The human imprint on the physical geography of North Africa also rendered it familiar: it was a region of cities, of ports and harbors, a land that had housed Catalan commercial consuls since the thirteenth century.[40] It was a known world, a sort of *Baja Andalucía*.

Beyond the physical resemblance that rendered the Maghrib recognizable to Iberians, there was the fact, repeated in nearly all of the medieval Castilian chronicles, that the Visigothic kingdom of Hispania had spanned the Strait of Gibraltar, embracing within its dominions the African province of Mauretania Tingitana.[41] Representations of North Africa as familiar, or proximate, could even be found when it came to the region's inhabitants. For religious reasons, one would expect Diego de Valera's portrayal of North Africa's "Moorish" population to be negative. Valera, however, had words of praise for North Africa's Getulians, one of the Berber peoples. In antiquity, Gaetulia was the Latin name for the region lying south of the Atlas Mountains, between Roman Mauretania and the Sahara, but Valera places the fifteenth-century Getulians slightly to the east, in Libya. Citing Isidore of Seville's *Etymologies*, Valera writes that the Getulians are descended from Goths and that, due to a shared Gothic ancestry, the Greeks believe that the "Moors" of Libya are closely related to them.[42] Kenneth B. Wolf, in his article on the beginnings of the Portuguese slave trade in West Africa, has shown what a problematic and unstable term the word "Moor" could be in late fifteenth-century Iberia.[43] In light of that, it should be stressed that it is not certain that Valera intends it to carry a religious meaning, marking these Getulian "Moors" as Muslims. It is possible (although unlikely, I think) that Valera intends the term to serve as a geographic descriptor, denoting an inhabitant of the Maghrib. What is remarkable here is that the bulk of Valera's chronicle, which was dedicated to Queen Isabella, elucidates the Gothic origins of the royal dynasty of Spain. Thus, regardless of how Valera uses the term "Moor," his text ascribes blood ties, even if quite distant, between the Catholic monarchs and late fifteenth-century inhabitants of Libya.

Whatever confessional differences existed between Catholic Spaniards and Muslim Libyans, Valera's mention of these blood ties creates some sort of affinity, no matter how distant (or fictive).

Approximately a decade following the publication of Valera's chronicle, an anonymous chronicler, most likely a Sephardic exile who fled Spain in 1492 and found refuge at the court of the king of Naples, composed a universal history that presented a remarkable genealogy for the Getulians of North Africa as well as their distant cousins, Ferdinand and Isabella. While the anonymous author follows Valera closely in his elucidation of the Gothic origins of the Spanish royal house and the Getulians, our author presents a novel theory for the origins of the Goths themselves: "And the learned affirm that they took this name of Goths (*godos*) from their first father, who was Gad, son of the Patriarch Jacob, from which tribe they descend."[44] As the descendants of Jacob were dispersed through different parts of the world, relates the author, "some sailed out on the sea and conquered the region of Libya and settled Getulia, which is a province in Africa where they have lived up until today. And for this reason, the Goths said that the Moors of that region are their close relatives."[45] As is the case with Valera, it is by no means clear whether the author here uses the term "moro" to denote a religious identity, as Muslims, or whether he employs it, rather, to denote a geographic or perhaps an ethnic identity, something like a demonym for an inhabitant of North Africa. Significantly, however, in asserting that the *godos* descend from Gad, the anonymous author at once transforms the Getulians as well as the Catholic monarchs into Israelites! These two texts, Valera's chronicle and that by the anonymous source writing in 1490s Naples, reveal that late-fifteenth-century Iberians were prepared to ascribe non-Hamitic as well as non-Ishmaelite origins to a variety of North African peoples and even to suggest that blood ties existed between themselves and these African neighbors.

While long-standing human interaction and exchange between Iberia and the Maghrib rendered North Africa a relatively familiar zone, for many fifteenth- and sixteenth-century Iberians the familiar Mediterranean gave way to a more fabulous and exotic Mediterranean once one moved into the sea's southeastern quadrant.[46] East of Tunisia, from Djerba to Egypt and Palestine, the shore of the Mediterranean drops to a lower latitude, and in many places the desert reaches right to the shores of the sea.[47] In environmental terms, this means that the experience of disembarking from a ship takes one much more immediately into a semi-arid or arid climatic zone than is the case along the littoral of northwest Africa. The environmental distinction could have grave consequences for those not prepared to face climatic conditions that differed from those they were accustomed to in Iberia, Italy, or even the coastal region of

Morocco and Algeria. Spanish soldiers, led by the military commander Count Pedro Navarro, would experience this firsthand in August 1510 during their disastrous assault on Djerba. In a heat the men found suffocating, even in early morning, the soldiers were parched, unable to find potable water. An anonymous account, written by a participant, describes soldiers dying from the heat and from thirst, attempting to dig wells in the sandy soil as the Spanish forces were routed.[48] This episode was echoed with astonishing similitude nearly three centuries later, during Napoleon's disastrous first march inland from Alexandria as he moved his French forces toward Cairo in July of 1798.[49]

While the warmer conditions Navarro encountered in Djerba in August proved disastrous, under different circumstances the environmental change one sees upon reaching the shores of the southeastern Mediterranean could be cause for marvel. Peter Martyr, on his 1501–1502 embassy to Egypt, remarked on the climatic difference he noticed upon arriving in Alexandria. Martyr commented that the city lay in the third latitudinal zone, moving north of Meroe, placing it within the temperate zone but near its southern limits. He noticed that birds that flew south from Spain and his native Italy for the winter came to Alexandria for the colder months, and that gardens, trees, and flowers were in bloom there in December and January.[50]

Spanish writers also pointed to the demographic differences they perceived upon moving into the regions around Tripoli and eastward. Again, the anonymous source on Spanish military engagements at Bougie, Tripoli, and Djerba provides us with a vivid description of the cosmopolitan character of the emporium of Tripoli in the early sixteenth century: "Due to the port and the great volume of trade conducted there with the Moors of Syria, with Arabs and Turks, as well as merchants from Genoa, Sicily, Italy, Venice, and Malta, and since Tripoli is the last city of Barbary and the first of Turkey, there is good cause and reason that so many different peoples come to conduct business there."[51] Such a description of Tripoli as "the last city of Barbary and the first of Turkey," over a decade before the Ottoman conquest of Tripoli and establishment of the regency there, was clearly not a political statement, particularly when we consider that this account was almost certainly written while the city was under Spanish rule. Rather, the author described Tripoli as "the first city of Turkey" to indicate that east of there one entered a part of the Mediterranean in which the Turks were dominant, even in areas not at that time under Ottoman rule. Whatever opinions various Iberians might have held about the variety of people who lent Tripoli its cosmopolitan character, there was fundamental agreement on their humanity. Some of these people, in particular the Turks, might have been considered barbarians lacking the markers of civil society. Indeed, Margaret Meserve has elucidated humanists' fascination with

the Turks' origins and the transformation of the Turks' genealogy from Trojan to Scythian origins.[52] This humanist project, however, was fundamentally different than the questions that arose surrounding early European contact with the Canary Islanders or the American Indians. While Mediterranean Muslims (Arabs, Berbers, or Turks) could be demonized and represented as barbarians, these people were not members of "monstrous races" in the same way that Valera described Ethiopians or as Columbus expected to find in the southerly latitudes of his trans-Atlantic voyages.[53]

The regions of the southeastern quadrant of the Mediterranean, where the desert approached or reached the sea, where summers were suffocating and winters mild, constituted another, distinct Mediterranean—a zone that was foreign, unfamiliar, exotic, as much for its contemporary flora, fauna, and demographics as for its historical and religious sites. Libya and Egypt were a source of wonder and fascination to Europeans. For instance, in the 1490s, the Castilian Diego Guillén de Ávila, a Spanish "familiar" of Cardinal Battista Orsini in Rome, composed a laudatory epic poem to Isabella in which he predicted that under her rule Spain would conquer all of Africa and from there would go on to recover the Holy Land.[54] Guillén de Ávila, in his poem, enumerates the various provinces Ferdinand and Isabella were destined to conquer, including Byzantium, Cyrenaica, Tripoli, Libya, and Egypt, demonstrating a particular sense of wonder at the pyramids, something common among medieval Europeans: "Once you have conquered Egypt you will see the wonders / of her buildings the isles of the Nile."[55] Peter Martyr, too, clearly found Egypt exotic. Following the conclusion of his diplomatic business in Cairo, he made a special excursion to visit the pyramids, which he described as resembling mountains.[56] Martyr also devoted a full eight pages to describing the crocodiles that inhabited the Nile, and he contributed his own postulations on the Nile rising in the Mountains of the Moon, south of the equator.[57]

It must be noted, however, for all the fascination with Egypt and Libya that Europeans evinced, the region still lay (albeit barely) within the corridor of the temperate *klimata* of the earth. The majority of the region's inhabitants may have been Muslims, which, as we will see in later chapters, played a significant role in the doctrines justifying war and conquest that Europeans developed. That said, this resulted in a quite different approach to the Egyptians than that Europeans took towards the Gentile inhabitants of the Canary Islands, the Caribbean, or tropical West Africa.

Beyond their wonder at the pyramids and endless speculations about the source of the Nile, another factor in Western Europeans' interest in Egypt was the fact that this zone operated as a fulcrum between the commercial networks of the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean. The Nile, Sinai Penin-

sula, and the desert caravan routes linking the Nile to the Red Sea were portals to the Indian Ocean commercial zone and its lucrative trade in spices, gemstones, and other marvels. This fact alone had stimulated European interest in Egypt for centuries: a Catalan consulate was established in Alexandria in 1264.[58] After it lapsed, Ferdinand reestablished one there in 1485, an illustration of the Aragonese monarch's understanding of the value of the commerce that moved through that port. Throughout Mediterranean Europe it was common knowledge that the "Indias" were a source of luxury items, spices, gemstones, and other exotica. This information was conveyed by merchants who did business in Alexandria, and the depiction of parts of Asia and India as fabulously wealthy had spread far and wide in the wake of Marco Polo's *Livre des Merveilles du Monde*. A desire to find more direct lines of access to the spice trade was one of several stimuli to Portuguese exploration along the Atlantic coast of Africa.[59] Meanwhile, other Europeans sought to avoid the lengthy circumnavigation of Africa in favor of securing a Mediterranean point of access to the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean beyond. For obvious reasons, Alexandria was critical to these efforts. The anonymous Spanish author of the conquest of Bougie and Tripoli describes an enormous Turkish ship sailing into the port of Tripoli from Alexandria, laden with spices.[60] And Peter Martyr spends significant time describing the eastern Mediterranean as a source of gemstones, spices, Eastern medicines, and other rare and expensive goods.[61]

There was something more too. The desert oases of Egypt and Libya were known to be sites of prophecy and oracular predictions: the sixteenth-century jurist Juan López de Palacios Rubios, in one of his juridical tracts, offered an exegesis of an ancient prophecy from the Libyan Sibyl, Phemonoe (the prophetic priestess who presided over the Zeus-Ammon oracle at Siwa Oasis in the Libyan Desert), to foretell an auspicious future for King Ferdinand and the Spanish royal house.[62] Palacios Rubios wrote that the oracle had stated that a second David would appear in Spain, a ruler similar in faith and deeds to the Biblical king. The new David would conquer all of Africa and would go on to recover the Holy Land.[63]

Here we see, perhaps, an oblique echo of a common belief expressed by Pierre d'Ailly in his version of Haly's commentary on Ptolemy's *Tetrabiblos*. Regarding the inhabitants of the temperate zone, d'Ailly's translation of Haly's commentary noted that "The southernmost of them are in general more shrewd and inventive, and better versed in knowledge of things divine because their zenith is close to the zodiac and to the planets revolving about it."[64] This made inhabitants of the southern reaches of the temperate zone more gifted at prophecy.

Finally, of course, it must be noted that in addition to the southeastern Mediterranean functioning as a land of prophecy, it was simultaneously an area replete with religious significance for all three Abrahamic faiths. It was the birthplace of Moses, and Peter Martyr, on his embassy to Egypt, eagerly made time to visit Matarea, the site of refuge for the Holy Family during their exile in Egypt.[65] Egypt had been a target of crusaders' armies since the days of Louis IX of France (later canonized as St. Louis). Crusading strategists, such as the fourteenth-century Venetian Marino Sanudo, understood the importance of its commerce, arguing that to cut off Egypt's vital trade with the east would be to tighten the noose around the Mamluk sultanate.[66] Fifteenth- and sixteenth-century Latin Christians dreamed of "liberating" the Eastern Christians of the Levant from their Muslim rulers, and Egypt's history placed it squarely within that utopian vision of a primitive Christian world that had encircled the Mediterranean.

The southeastern quadrant of the Mediterranean, then, was perceived as somewhat foreign, exotic and enticing, for all the reasons adumbrated above: it was a world of different climatic characteristics than the northwestern Mediterranean, a world possessing exotic wonders, natural as well as artificial, a world in which Europeans perceived the Turks as the dominant force. Yet the fact remains that, even if inhabitants of the Latin Mediterranean perceived environmental, religious, and demographic variety from one corner of the Mediterranean to another, they recognized that the entire region lay within the temperate zone. This differentiated the Mediterranean from the tropical regions of Atlantic Africa, the Indian Ocean, or the Caribbean. It was significant, in the minds of Europeans, that the people of the Mediterranean inhabited the temperate zone of the globe, rather than the torrid zone or the Arctic, regions that were believed to be either uninhabitable or where the natural conditions resulted in zoological superabundance and human monstrosities.

By contrast, European thinking on the temperate Mediterranean was quite different. Spanish claims to Mediterranean lands, be they Christian territories such as the kingdom of Naples or Muslim regions such as the North African cities of Orán, Bougie, Algiers, or Tripoli, were framed of necessity within the parameters imposed by the commonly held European assumptions about the Mediterranean and its peoples.

Paradoxically, Spanish thinking on the lands encircling the Mediterranean and their inhabitants actually served to establish proximity and ties of affinity or propinquity that could be accessed in asserting territorial claims. This can be seen in a variety of ways: for instance, the Spanish understanding of Med-

iterranean Africa as a formerly Christian land—and one that had been subject to the Visigothic kings of Spain, no less—suggests that there are ancient religious and dynastic legacies that bind Africa to Spain. Along similar lines is the view of the Getulians as long-lost Gothic cousins and therefore distant relatives of the Spanish royal house. This rendered these people familiar, rather than "othering" them, a striking contrast to Spanish or more broadly European understandings of the inhabitants of the Canary Islands, sub-Saharan Africa, or the Americas.

This points to an inherent tension between European views of the Mediterranean as a familiar zone and European views of the Mediterranean as a zone of difference and conflict, where one might legitimately make war against the infidel. On the one hand, the northern and southern shores of the sea had at times been joined through bonds forged by polities, by religion, and even by ethnicity. On the other hand, Europeans could appeal to a commonality from the remote past in order to highlight contemporary differences (religious or other), thereby justifying acts of war and conquest in the neighboring lands of Mediterranean Africa and Asia.

In all these regards, Spanish expansionism in the Mediterranean differed from that in other spaces, such as the Caribbean. These conceptual understandings and historical precedents demanded a constant process of negotiation, and deliberate rhetorical choices and strategies in the presentation of (and justification for) political actions and objectives. Spanish expansionary efforts in the Mediterranean operated as a laboratory in which were developed legal and moral arguments concerning just war and empire. This experience informed the arguments Spaniards developed in defense of their conquests in more distant regions of the globe, but the two processes were fundamentally different and demanded different intellectual and legal responses. Ultimately, by comparison with North Africa and Mediterranean Asia, tropical America truly was a novelty that put to the test European knowledge on geography, history, and ethnography. Over the course of the sixteenth century, European engagement with the regions of the world that lay beyond their traditional and circumscribed ecumene resulted in the development of a new global order.[67]

Even accounting for the perception of difference, of multiplicity, of variety that existed across the Mediterranean, the Asian and African shores of the middle sea were fully integrated into Europe's political and religious ideologies. The accreted legacies of the Mediterranean, as meeting point of the three known lands of Asia, Africa, and Europe, as the cradle of the early Christian Church, and as the nucleus of the Roman Empire, influenced the policies expansionist states pursued in the inner sea and informed the legal and moral arguments they developed to justify those policies. While my focus in this book

is particularly on Spanish imperial ambitions in the Mediterranean, the kings of France and, to a slightly lesser extent, the Ottoman sultans negotiated these same legacies as they justified their expansionary efforts. Their understandings of this sedimented history determined the rhetoric various actors accessed and deployed in particular circumstances (e.g., invoking the primitive Church, invoking imperial Rome, etc.), and it influenced the line of legal argumentation people employed to justify conquest in particular regions, as we will see in chapters 3–5 of this book.

CHAPTER 2

The Christian Commonwealth Besieged

Shortly after the city of Constantinople, by then the last remnant of the Byzantine Empire, capitulated to its Ottoman besiegers in 1453, Aeneas Silvius Piccolomini (later Pope Pius II, r. 1458–1464) lamented the fractious state of Latin Christendom. He described it as "a body without a head, a republic without laws or magistrates . . . every state has a separate prince and every prince has a separate interest. . . . If you lead a small army against the Turks you will easily be overcome; if a large one, it will soon fall into confusion."[1]

Aeneas Silvius's conception of Latin Christendom as a body implies a certain degree of coherence or unity, even if that body was, in 1453, lacking a head. Moreover, Silvius's description of Latin Christendom as a republic warrants comment. The Roman Catholic Church was the only institution that could be said to encompass the whole of Latin Christendom. Silvius's modifier of Christendom as a republic "without laws or magistrates," however, makes it clear that he did not conceive of this republic as synonymous with the institutional Church. What is more, Sylvius's description of Latin Christendom as "a body without a head" illustrates the churchman's concerns over what he perceived to be a lack of leadership in the face of Ottoman advances. The "head" for which Aeneas saw a need might conceivably have appeared in the person of the pope, at that time Nicholas V (r. 1447–1455), although the writer's concern with maintaining military cohesion in the event of an assault

against the Ottomans suggests that Aeneas was likely thinking in more secular terms.

Silvius's lament regarding the unity of Latin Christendom, its lack of effective leadership, and the existential threat it faced in the ascendant Ottoman Empire are indicative of wider European concerns that obtained throughout the fifteenth century. As Norman Housley has noted, "Throughout the late Middle Ages, and especially after the Great Schism of 1378–1417, a strong sense prevailed of the inherent fragility of Catholic unity, of the danger of internal fissure being just as great as that of external assault."[2] Fifteenth-century Europeans felt besieged from within and from without. This sense bred a feeling that they were living through a moment of severe crisis, a crisis that threatened to destroy or to irrevocably alter Christendom as they knew it.

The fifteenth-century nostalgia for the days of the primitive Church as an imagined, universal institution that embraced the whole of the Mediterranean (as described in chapter 1) was in part an outgrowth of the state of fissure and crisis in which Latin Christendom found itself in the first decades of the fifteenth century. Anne Marie Wolf has noted the appeal the primitive, apostolic Church held for those late medieval thinkers who had lost confidence in the spiritual authority of the papacy.[3] The state of fracture and discord that many Catholics detected was the result of religious, political, and social divisions that, conjunctively, bred a deep spiritual angst that found expression in the religiopolitical vocabulary and messianic expectations of Christian universalism. These chiliastic hopes centered on a program that was predicated on the healing of Church schisms (the papal schism of the Roman Church, as well as the schism between the Roman and Greek churches), the forging of a general peace among Christian princes, the extirpation of Islam, and the undertaking of a general crusade to recover formerly Christian lands that had come under Islamic rule.

This chapter examines several key developments of the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries, in order to elucidate the background necessary for a contextual analysis of the rhetorical choices and legal arguments the Spanish Crown employed to articulate its expansionist agenda during the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries. The Papal Schism (1378–1417), the fifteenth-century conciliar movement, and the consolidation of Ottoman hegemony in the Balkan Peninsula and Anatolia contributed to the zeitgeist this chapter examines, and it was this climate that engendered the circumstances that determined the political vocabulary through which Spanish actors chose to articulate claims to Spanish *imperium* in the late fifteenth-century and early sixteenth-century Mediterranean. Following an exposition of the sense of crisis that pervaded Latin Christendom during the first half of the fifteenth century,

the second half of this chapter turns to an analysis of the rhetorical choices Ferdinand and those close to him made in the representation of his Mediterranean politics during his first full decade of rule as king of Aragon (1479–1489).

Corruption in the *Corpus Mysticum*

When Norman Housley referred to the "inherent fragility of Catholic unity," this sense was due in large part to the schism that had rent Western Europe between states obedient to the Roman pope and those obedient to the pope in Avignon over a couple of generations spanning the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries. Jean Froissart, in his *Chronicles*, records that ostensibly political crises, notably the madness of King Charles VI of France (r. 1380–1422), were interpreted through the prism of which pope the king supported. Contemporaries saw the king's madness as either just or tragic, depending on their allegiances in the schism, thus demonstrating the inseparability of the realms of the religious and the political.[4] Renate Blumenfeld-Kosinski notes the prevalence of the representation of the Church through corporeal imagery during the later Middle Ages. Through this understanding of the body-politic of the *ecclesia*, numerous writers conceived of the Papal Schism in terms of bodily illness or wounds inflicted on the *corpus* of the Church. Christine de Pizan, for instance, employed the imagery of pestilence to convey the sense that the schism posed something approximating a medical threat to the integrity of the *corpus mysticum* of Christendom.[5]

In response, reformers, churchmen, and theologians attempted to heal the schism and to restore unity to Western Christendom. After numerous failed attempts by the likes of Jean Gerson, Pierre d'Ailly, and other reformers, the Holy Roman Emperor Sigismund proved effective when he called a general council of the Church to meet at Constance beginning in 1414. For four years the churchmen assembled at the council worked to bring a resolution to the Papal Schism (by now there were three popes) and to address other threats to Catholic unity, such as Jan Hus's reform movement that had gained such a following in Bohemia.[6]

A central problem for those present at the general council was whether their decisions and proclamations carried any authority. In their statement expressing the council's claim to exercise legitimate authority in matters relating to the Church, those assembled at Constance issued the proclamation *Haec Sancta* (April 6, 1415), giving a single voice to the Council: "First, it declares that, lawfully assembled in the Holy Spirit, constituting a general council and representing the catholic Church militant, it holds power directly from

Christ; and that everyone of whatever estate or dignity he be, even papal, is obliged to obey it in those things which belong to the faith, and to the eradication of the said schism, and to the reform of the said Church of God in head and members."[7] The doctrines expressed here built on earlier formulations by Conrad of Gelnhausen and by Marsilius of Padua as elaborated in his *Defensor Pacis*, completed in 1324. This was rooted in what Brian Tierney has characterized as a "sharp distinction between the Universal Church (the whole *congregatio fidelium*) and the Roman church (understood as pope and cardinals), together with an uncompromising assertion that the former was superior to the latter."[8]

Dietrich of Niem specified that the universal Church included all those who believed in Christ, even if they adhered to the Greek, Syriac, or Ethiopian churches:

> . . . the universal Church is made up of various members of Greeks, Latins, and barbarians who believe in Christ, of men and women, of peasants and nobles, of poor and rich, constituting one body, which is called Catholic. The head of this body, the universal Church, is Christ alone. The others, such as the pope, the cardinals and prelates, the clerics, the kings and princes, and the common people, are the members, occupying their various positions. . . .
>
> The other is called the Apostolic particular and private Church. It is included in the Catholic Church, and is made up of the pope, the cardinals, the bishops, the prelates, and the churchmen. It is usually called the Roman Church.[9]

In his *Defensor Pacis*, Marsilius argued that the universal Church was made up of all believers, and that sovereignty resides in that collective or "corporation" of the faithful, as represented by the council.[10] Marsilius's formulation is an example of the "corporation theory" that the late medieval canonists had elaborated.[11] Brian Tierney notes that the canonists, in developing their corporation theory, had defined the whole Church as a "*universitas fidelium*."[12] Aeneas Silvius's use of the term "republic" to describe Christendom is thus characteristic of one of the most common and powerful modes of thought in fifteenth-century Europe. This corporate, and almost political, sense of the mystical body of Christendom frequently found expression in the phrase *respublica christiana*, or the Christian commonwealth.[13] The conciliarists active at the Council of Constance drew on this conception of the Christian commonwealth as one comprising all believers, clerical and lay alike, to develop the notion of a legal corporation that stood distinct from, and at times in opposition to, the office of the papacy, and they often employed the language of the *respublica christiana* to

express this notion of the body-politic of all believers, or the whole *congregatio fidelium*.[14] John N. Figgis detects here a bold argument that the ultimate sovereign authority of the *respublica christiana* resided not in the person or office of the pope but in the community of believers, both clerical and lay.[15] Figgis views the notion of the *respublica christiana* among conciliarists as a premise for sovereignty in Church matters, asserting that the legitimate basis for authority rested with the members of the Christian commonwealth, and theoretically in opposition to the absolutist claims made by the papacy. According to the argument crafted by the conciliarists, the pope "is a member of the body politic of the Church, of which Christ is the head. A diseased limb may be amputated."[16] Thus, it is clear that for many writers the *respublica christiana* was not coterminous with the institutional Church.

Equating the *respublica christiana* with the *Ecclesia*, popes drew on the same vocabulary, and on the doctrine of papal supremacy, to craft an argument for papal monarchy, meant here as an institution of governance over the entire community of believers.[17] With regard to this conception of *Ecclesia* as standing for the "corporate union of the whole Christian people into one body," Michael Wilks writes, "but it is not merely a spiritual unity: it is just as much a civil society, a universal body politic. . . . In short it is a Christianised version of the universal empire of the Romans: 'istud imperium catholicum' as Clement VI described it in 1346 as he bestowed his approval upon Charles IV's imperial election."[18] Francis Oakley, however, notes that by the first decades of the fifteenth century, the vocabulary of *respublica christiana* conveyed an idea of a corporation that was more a secular than a spiritual entity: "It is now known that by the lifetimes of d'Ailly and Gerson the doctrine of the Mystical Body had been almost completely secularized, losing its sacramental connotations and acquiring, instead, political and corporational associations."[19]

This brings us back to Aeneas Silvius's lamentation with which I opened this chapter. It seems that, in his longing for a head to lead the republic of Latin Christendom, the future pope is here thinking of this republic not as synonymous with the institutional Church but as the whole *congregatio fidelium*. Aeneas Silvius's use of the term "republic" here is most likely indicative of a broader intellectual shift that was underway: increasingly, during the course of the fifteenth century, Europeans developed an understanding of the Christian commonwealth as a geographical entity, roughly coterminous with the boundaries of Europe.[20] This, of course, is not to suggest that all other resonances of the term *respublica christiana* disappeared. When popes or other members of the Church employed the term, we can be certain that they did so with an understanding of the sacral overtones it conveyed. For instance when, in 1434, conciliarists at the Council of Basle were negotiating the terms of a possible

union between the Latin and Greek churches, they noted the benefit this would bring to the "*rei publice christiane*," presumably meaning here the community of believers rather than a political or geographical entity.[21] And, as we will see later in this chapter, as well as in chapters 3, 5, and 6, secular leaders often presented themselves as guardians of the *respublica christiana* in a sense that communicated a claim of a sort of extraterritorial sovereignty, suggesting that one secular prince or another was the defender and benefactor of the entire community of Christian believers, even those who lived beyond the boundaries of Europe and under the temporal rule of an Islamic polity.

During the fifteenth century, then, a multitude of understandings of the *respublica christiana* or Christian commonwealth were in circulation, and none ever predominated. The various meanings of the term were not sharply delimited, nor were they mutually exclusive of one another.[22] It was the term's imprecision that made it so useful to so many actors who in fact had very different priorities and objectives.

Following Constance, the next of the great fifteenth-century general councils was Basle (1431–1449). The overarching agenda of the council is neatly summed up in the Portuguese Benedictine friar Andrés de Escobar's speech that captured the spirit of the age: the friar stressed the necessity of reforming the Church, members and head alike (to use his language), to subject the infidel Muslims and the pagans to the holy Catholic faith, to recover the Holy Land, Jerusalem, and other lands that once belonged to Christians, and to bring into line the Greek schismatics, all under the leadership of the Roman pontificate of the universal Church.[23] Escobar's speech is an expression of the same ideological bent that I have elsewhere described as characteristic of this fifteenth- and sixteenth-century "Mediterranean moment," wherein the religious and political dynamics of the middle sea make it a site of crucial geopolitical importance.[24]

In the course of the early years of Basle, the assembled representatives continuously disagreed with Pope Eugenius IV (r. 1431–1447) concerning the proper course for the reform of the Church. The pope ultimately withdrew his support for the council in 1437 and convened his own council at Ferrara in 1438 (later moved to Florence and subsequently Rome).[25] The Council of Ferrara developed an agenda based on similar aims to those expressed by Escobar at Basle, in particular the aim of bringing about an end to the schism dividing the Latin and Orthodox churches and creating a general Christian union.[26] The attendance by representatives of every known branch of Christian churches, including the Ethiopian, speaks to Eugenius IV's vision of attaining a union of the Christian *corpus mysticum*.[27] In a much more prosaic sense, the objectives at Ferrara/Florence were directed at ending the schism with the Church of

Constantinople in exchange for Latin military aid in the face of Ottoman encroachment. In a document issued in May 1439, Eugenius IV urged the Greeks to unite with the Latin Church: "Union, however, once achieved, both the western princes and all of us will be greatly rejoiced and will provide generous help for you. And our aid will be a source of great alleviation to the christians dwelling in the East, and to those in the power of the infidel."[28] Two months later, the assembled representatives issued an act of union, *Laetentur caeli* (July 6, 1439).[29]

There was dissent among the Greek representatives at Florence, however, and popular opposition in Byzantine lands culminated in violence in the streets of Constantinople, preventing the decree from having any impact once the Orthodox representatives returned home.[30] The efforts at union having proved unsuccessful, Constantinople fell to its Ottoman besiegers in May 1453. The political and religious significance of the fact that the "Second Rome" was now under Islamic rule was not lost on Western observers, and this recognition is evident in Aeneas Silvius's words that opened this chapter. The Ottoman conquest of Constantinople linked the two central preoccupations of Latin Christians: the fear of fissure generated from within by the forces of schism, and the fear of an external threat that now appeared imminent in the form of the new empire that ruled the city of Constantine. These fears and preoccupations are reflected in the efflorescence of prophecies that circulated throughout the Mediterranean, in Christian, Jewish, and Muslim circles, during the years following 1453. As Cornell Fleischer notes, "It was the 'reverberation through the world,' the Ottoman transformation in 1453 of the Second Rome into the westernmost capital of Islamdom, that most forcefully fixed the confrontation between Christendom and Islamdom as a primary concern of the prognosticative and prophetic literature that became so luxuriant in Christian and Jewish sectors in the late fifteenth century."[31]

Before he was elected Pope Pius II, Aeneas Silvius had looked to the Holy Roman Emperor as a source of leadership in attempts to unify Christian princes in the face of the Ottomans. In 1446, Aeneas Silvius expressed his desire to see a single font of authority in the temporal sphere in his treatise *On the Origin and Authority of the Roman Empire*, which he dedicated to Frederick III, at that time Duke of Austria and later Holy Roman Emperor (r. 1452–1493):

> If we were living under one head, if all of us followed one obedience, if we recognized only one supreme prince in temporal affairs, the best sort of peace would flourish everywhere on earth; and all of us would enjoy sweet concord. There is a manifest sign of this fact, that, from the beginning of the new-born world right up to this age, we read that there

> never has been universal peace except when the whole world turned [its] eyes to a single Caesar, Augustus, after the model of the heavenly kingdom. This may have happened then out of reverence for our Saviour Christ, who took our human form; it should suffice, however, that the creator of the world showed forth this divine way of having peace, when the world is ruled under one prince.[32]

The ideal among Latin Christians of a united Christendom is understandable, given the rapid advances of the Islamic Ottoman Empire in regions of the Balkans that lay so close to the lands of the Holy Roman Empire and the Italian Peninsula. James Burns views the external threats faced by Western Europe in the fifteenth century as instrumental in the growing appeal of Christian universalist ideals:

> Again, the dangers to which Christendom was exposed during the first half of the fifteenth century—the external threat from the Turks, the internal menace of the Hussite conflict and of the recurrent tendency to schism in the Church—perhaps generated a nostalgic longing for unity through universal authority . . . it is beyond question that the fifteenth century witnessed a notable revival of universalist ideology. The idea of monarchy in the sense of a single monarchical system embracing the whole of Christendom is one of the strongest elements in the political thought of the period.[33]

Already by around 1432, two years after the Ottoman conquest of Thessalonica, the Castilian theologian Juan de Segovia, in his capacity as representative of the University of Salamanca at the Council of Basle, portrayed the Turks as an existential threat to Christendom: "And similarly the Turks [moving] towards the most terrible desolation of all of Christendom."[34] To better understand these troubling times, fifteenth-century Europeans looked to the precedent of the fall of Rome and the subsequent rise of Islam. Viewing the remedy as lying in the reform of the Church and in a political union of Christian princes, some fifteenth-century writers suggested that the gains of the Ottomans, dire though they might appear, could be reversed.[35]

While fears of Ottoman advances were widespread throughout Western Europe, they seem to have been particularly acute in Italy. Kenneth M. Setton suggests that news of the Ottoman capture of Constantinople was especially fearfully received in Venice and Rome, and it was believed that, having conquered Constantinople, the Ottomans now had their eyes on Rome.[36] Two decades later, in 1473, Turkish troops made incursions into the Venetian Terra Ferma in Friuli and threatened Venice's commerce in the eastern Mediterra-

nean.[37] Surviving documentation from the 1470s illustrates the degree to which residents of the Italian Peninsula saw themselves as standing on the front lines of an imminent Ottoman invasion that would threaten not only Italy but all of Europe. In February 1474, Count Brotardi wrote from Trent, in northern Italy, that he had heard that Turkish armies were preparing to invade "Europe" and to destroy Christendom. The Count concluded his letter with a plea: "May God's hand protect us, for if God does not confound the power of these dogs the ruin of Europe, of Italy, and of Christendom appears imminent."[38] Two years later, Italians circulated a manuscript purported to be an oath sworn by Mehmed II in late summer 1476, vowing to pursue with blood and fire everything related to the Christian religion.[39] The fear that the Ottoman sultan aspired to conquer Italy is likewise captured in numerous fifteenth-century sources that describe Mehmed's desire to conquer Rome and to join East and West as Alexander had done.[40] The king of Aragon, Alfonso V (r. 1416–1458), who had only just brought the kingdom of Naples into his dominions in the early 1440s, wrote a letter to Mehmed, warning him of the wrath he would incur if he did not leave aside his string of conquests: "We are amazed at how, through your overbearing pride, you have launched your forces against the noble city of Constantine and, as we have heard, you intend to attack the island of Rhodes, and some even say that you have hatched a plan to march on the city of Rome."[41] Alfonso concludes his missive with an oath that all the forces of Christendom will join to attack the Ottoman Empire within three years.

The Italian documentation cited here tends to employ a construct of Christendom as a cohesive whole, in a way that belies the deep fissures that in fact existed. The use of this language of Christian universalism, while obviously not entirely stable and uniform, can nevertheless be discerned as appealing to some of the same connotations the conciliarists invoked when they deployed the term *respublica christiana*. Like the conciliarists, the more worldly actors, including Count Brotardi or Alfonso of Aragon, use the vocabulary of "Christian commonwealth" to represent themselves as members of a corporate body besieged by the Ottoman Empire. These secular princes' rhetorical choices portray themselves (and the Italian Peninsula) as standing on the front lines and facing an existential threat.

Italian fears of an imminent Ottoman attack persisted into the 1480s and beyond. King Ferdinand demonstrated a keen awareness of the climate of fear that gripped inhabitants of the various Italian states, and the Aragonese king's understanding of Italian preoccupations seems to have informed his policy decisions. Soon after acceding to the throne of Aragon (in 1479), Ferdinand addressed the consolidation of Ottoman control in the Balkans and rumors of an imminent Turkish advance into Italian lands. In response, he sought to



Map 2. Map of the Iberian Peninsula in 1482

safeguard his island possessions of Sicily and Sardinia (both of which formed part of his Aragonese patrimony). In February 1480, Ferdinand and Isabella convoked a meeting of the Castilian parliamentary gathering (the *Cortes*) in the city of Toledo. At this meeting, the master of the military order of Santiago proposed to the monarchs that the war with Nasrid Granada be taken up again. Ferdinand, however, emphasized that the higher priority lay with the defense of the coasts of Italy from possible Turkish incursions.[42] In the forum of a meeting of the Castilian *Cortes*, then, Ferdinand prioritized the Crown's interests in the defense of Italy, a region that had traditionally constituted the Aragonese sphere of interest.

Ferdinand's anxieties about Ottoman maritime advances proved well founded. In July 1480, an Ottoman fleet laid siege to Rhodes, off the coast of

Anatolia, and at that time the headquarters of the Knights of St. John of Jerusalem. The Grand Master of the military order wrote to Ferdinand, pleading for assistance in the face of this threat, for the sake of what he termed the well-being of Christendom.[43] Ferdinand responded by taking the military order under his custody, making them his vassals, for the benefit of the Christian republic, the *"rei publica christianorum."*[44] What does Ferdinand's choice of vocabulary here suggest? Is he (or his secretary) merely parroting the language of the Grand Master of the Knights of St. John of Jerusalem? Or is *"rei publica christianorum"* intended to convey something precise about Ferdinand and his actions? The interests of the military order were theoretically, at least, considered to align with those of Christendom writ large, and Rhodes was viewed as a bulwark against Ottoman westward expansion. Ferdinand succinctly expressed the understanding of Rhodes's strategic position three years later when he described the island as "the distinguished key to Christendom."[45] In light of this Western European view of Rhodes as bulwark, perhaps there was no better term to employ than the one Ferdinand settled on. Regardless, by representing himself as the guardian of the crusading military order (and, by extension, of the interests of the Christian republic), Ferdinand portrayed himself as taking a role of leadership over this vaguely defined corporate body. This proved to be an effective formula, one that the Aragonese monarch would employ throughout the remainder of his long reign.

On August 11, 1480, just ten days after Ferdinand wrote to the Knights of St. John of Jerusalem, Ottoman forces invaded and occupied Otranto, a city on the Adriatic coast of the kingdom of Naples. The Neapolitan kingdom at that time was ruled by Ferrante I (r. 1458–1494), Ferdinand of Aragon's cousin and a member of a cadet branch of the Spanish royal house of Trastámara. Western Europeans viewed the Ottoman occupation of Otranto as a grave threat to the stability of the Neapolitan kingdom and to the Italian Peninsula as a whole. In light of the extent and speed of Ottoman conquests in the Balkans during the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries, concern that Naples might succumb was not unfounded. Moreover, should Naples fall, the kingdom's immediate neighbor to the north, the Papal States, including the city of Rome, would lie exposed to the forces of "Mehmed the Conqueror."[46] The historian Franz Babinger suggested that Mehmed held the objective of conquering Rome and that this goal was well known throughout the Italian Peninsula. Babinger argued that, in light of this widely held belief about Ottoman pretensions to Italian hegemony, the occupation of Otranto led to acute fear in the Papal States, and that Pope Sixtus IV (r. 1471–1484) actually contemplated fleeing Rome. Chiliastic prophecies of a Turkish advance as far as Rome circulated in both Christian and Islamic lands during the second half of the fifteenth century.

Within Ottoman territories, Rome was represented as the "red apple," the conquest of which (in the wake of their conquest of Constantinople) would affirm the Ottomans' legitimacy as heirs to the Roman Empire.[47] In Western Europe, of course, prophecies of an Ottoman conquest of Rome were representative of the dread Europeans felt as they observed the Turkish juggernaut. Consequently, in 1480, when the Ottomans captured Otranto, these prophecies appeared on the verge of realization and the news quickly spread throughout Europe. Peter Schott, a canon of Strasbourg whose study of the classics influenced his understanding of the symbolic importance of Rome, was so concerned that the Ottoman advance would not be stemmed that he traveled to Rome to visit the Holy See, in case it should fall to the Turks and be lost to Christendom forever.[48]

As Ferdinand considered how to react to the Ottoman occupation of Otranto, a city in the Neapolitan realm to which Ferdinand himself held a dynastic claim, the Aragonese king must have weighed these fears and the atmosphere they engendered. This is the contextual background that renders intelligible the rhetorical choices Ferdinand made as he determined how best to represent the Mediterranean military interventions he was about to undertake. Just as he had done in his response to the siege of Rhodes, Ferdinand portrayed the Ottoman presence on Italian soil in terms that reflected a sense of an existential crisis threatening the entirety of Christendom. In instructions to Jerónimo González, secretary to Luis Juan Milá, an Aragonese cardinal in Rome, written February 19, 1481, Ferdinand emphasized that the Turkish occupation of Otranto posed a threat well beyond Naples, warning of "the hardship that all Christendom suffers as a result of the Turkish invasion of Italy," and positing that if Christians did not resist, the Ottomans "would easily establish dominion over Italy and Rome, to the great offense of our Lord God, and to the detriment of the Christian religion."[49] While this was a piece of private correspondence to Cardinal Milá's secretary, we must consider here that Ferdinand had a wider audience in mind. No doubt he hoped González would employ similar vocabulary in meetings with Milá and with the broader audience with whom he would interact in Rome, including representatives at the papal curia and the ambassadors of other European polities there assembled.

The same month that Ferdinand issued these instructions to Jerónimo González, the Castilian chronicler and chaplain Diego Rodríguez de Almela wrote a letter urging a swift military response to expel the Turks from Italy. Advocating a grand crusade, with Otranto merely the first step in the process, Rodríguez de Almela argued in favor of a large-scale military offensive to recover Greece, Constantinople, and all the other Christian lands the Ottomans had taken.[50] The evidence furnished by Rodríguez de Almela's crusade pro-

posal and by Peter Schott's visit to Rome demonstrates a widespread sentiment, not just in Italy but as far afield as the German lands as well as Castile, that the Ottoman occupation of Otranto posed a threat to all of Latin Christendom. It is doubtful that Ferdinand's self-stylization as a defender of Christendom would have had any impact in Strasbourg at this early date, but it is possible that Diego Rodríguez de Almela had been influenced by the Aragonese king's representation to his Iberian subjects of the importance of safeguarding the Crown's Italian possessions. Just as likely, however, is the possibility that through his rhetorical choices Ferdinand was responding to a widespread atmosphere of anxiety at the prospect of Ottoman conquests extending into Western Europe. Against the background of this climate, Ferdinand and his secretaries made rhetorical choices that addressed those deeply held concerns.

In response to the Ottoman presence in Otranto, Ferdinand and Isabella deployed armadas from ports in Aragon and Castile, and in April 1481, Pope Sixtus IV issued the bull *Redemptor noster*, granting plenary indulgences to those who participated in the armadas to liberate Otranto.[51] Thus, Italy itself became a theater of crusading warfare. When Neapolitan forces ultimately recovered Otranto (before the Aragonese and Castilian armadas arrived, incidentally), Ferdinand celebrated the news, in a letter to the Duke of Milan, as representing the liberation of Italy and "the restoration of a significant portion of the republic of Christendom."[52] Ferdinand here uses precisely the same vocabulary that he had employed fourteen months earlier when he took the order of the Knights of St. John of Jerusalem into his custody. The difference, of course, is that Naples was ruled by Ferdinand's cousin and had, at various times, formed part of the domains of the Crown of Aragon. The import of the liberation of Otranto thus becomes twofold: while it was no doubt a relief to Ferdinand given his dynastic interests in the southern Italian kingdom, in his letter to the Duke of Milan he portrays the Ottoman retreat as far more significant, a positive development for the whole Christian republic. Here, then, is an elision of Ferdinand's particular, or dynastic, interests with those of Christendom as a whole.

For over a decade following the Ottoman withdrawal from Otranto in 1481, Ferdinand continued to express concern over Turkish expansion into the Mediterranean, and he framed his policies throughout the central Mediterranean as driven by a desire to defend the *respublica christiana* against the depredations of infidels. In June 1482, as political divisions wracked the Italian Peninsula, Ferdinand and Isabella expressed deep concern over the dangers this posed, particularly in light of the Ottoman presence in Velona (modern Vlorë, Albania, just fifty miles across the Adriatic from the kingdom of Naples): "Being in Velona, so close to Italy, should the enemy of our faith see Italy divided and weakened

by war, he will launch an attack." Such an invasion, suggested the monarchs, would not only pose a threat to the Neapolitan kingdom and the other Italian states but would jeopardize the very survival of the Christian religion by inflicting "such great universal harm to Christendom" as might follow from an Ottoman assault, should the internecine turmoil in Italy persist.[53]

From 1484 to 1488, Ferdinand took further steps to secure his island kingdom of Sicily, as well as his smaller, but no less strategic, possessions of Malta and Gozo. For example, in August 1484, Ferdinand wrote to Gaspar d'Espes, the viceroy of Sicily, ordering him to repair the fortifications of the cities of Catania and Augusta as well as the castles of Termini and Cefalu, due to the danger posed by the Turks. In July 1485, Ferdinand wrote to the viceroy again, giving orders for fortification of Sicily due to the Turkish threat and urging the viceroy to focus especially on the city of Augusta, as well as the islands of Malta and Gozo.[54] In December 1484, when the king received intelligence reports that the Turks were preparing an armada in Vlorë to invade Italy, he upbraided his cousin, Ferrante of Naples, for what Ferdinand perceived as a lack of vigilance in these matters.[55] The summer of 1488 must have been rife with rumors of an imminent Ottoman assault on or near Sicily, for in August 1488, Ferdinand again issued instructions to fortify Sicily against a possible Turkish attack.[56] In March of 1485, Ferdinand wrote to Francisco de Rojas, his ambassador in Rome, concerning the cost of military defenses along the coast of Spain and in the waters surrounding Sicily, urging his ambassador to negotiate with the pope to allow Ferdinand to keep the full quantity of the *cruzada* tax collected in his realms. In this negotiation, Ferdinand expressed his hope that the pope would recognize that this war was "so just and necessary for the proper sustenance and defense of our kingdom of Sicily, which is under such grave threat." What is more, Ferdinand equated his concerns about Sicily's defense with the defense of the coastline of Granada, this at a moment when the war against Nasrid Granada was in full swing.[57] It is worth pointing out that Ferdinand held a pecuniary interest in convincing the papacy to relent in its demands that Spain furnish the *décimas*, or the tenth part of the *cruzada* tax that was levied to finance a general crusade against the Turks. That said, Ferdinand's instructions to his officials in Sicily throughout 1484–1485 and 1488 (see previous citations) suggest that in the context of a very different audience (the viceroy and various presidents of Sicily), and absent the financial considerations present in his negotiations with the papacy, Ferdinand earnestly perceived his Italian possessions as being at risk of a Turkish assault.

While Ferdinand might have made his argument in good faith when he instructed his ambassador to negotiate with Pope Innocent VIII concerning the fact that the Turkish threat to Sicily ought to absolve the king of the

pope's demand that he pay the *décimas*, Ferdinand simultaneously used this very fact to threaten the papacy. In the same letter, Ferdinand suggested that, should the pope not grant Ferdinand and Isabella the *cruzada* revenues in their entirety, the Aragonese king would not be able to adequately defend Sicily, something that would "dishonor God, the Christian faith, the conscience of the pope, and all those who hear this or learn of it."[58] Implicit here is an understanding that Sicily would serve as a bulwark against a Turkish attack, an island fortress that, if properly fortified and defended, would also protect Rome in the event of a Turkish attack. Here, then, is a continuation of the rhetorical strategy the Aragonese king had employed since the Ottoman occupation of Otranto. Ferdinand represented his Italian interests, not as particular or dynastic, but as universal, insofar as his actions in Italy and the central Mediterranean had as their end the preservation and defense of the *respublica christiana*. Even in the argument he instructed his ambassador to make to Innocent VIII, Ferdinand represented the security of Rome and of the Christian Commonwealth as something *only he* was capable of ensuring, provided he was granted the financial resources to do so.

In another example of the way in which Ferdinand understood the southern Italian realms as being a military frontier zone, in 1483 he wrote to Ferrante of Naples urging him to install chapters of the Castilian military orders of Santiago and Calatrava in the kingdom of Naples. Ferdinand cast the need for the crusading military orders as arising from the fact that Naples now stood on the front lines of a struggle against a Muslim enemy. The Aragonese monarch encouraged his cousin to give rents or lands constituting part of Ferrante's royal patrimony to establish the orders in Naples, reminding Ferrante, "You are in a state of continuous warfare against Muslims."[59] In the 1485 instructions to Francisco de Rojas cited earlier, Ferdinand alluded to the Christian polities that lay most exposed to attacks from infidels, suggesting that the Knights of St. John of Jerusalem (at Rhodes), and the kings of Naples, Hungary, and Castile were all engaged in similar enterprises.[60] This is a striking assertion, as in the 1480s most Europeans viewed war against the Muslims of Granada and the Maghrib as quite distinct from war against the Ottomans. The Ottomans were understood to pose a far graver threat to Latin Christendom. And yet, by equating warfare against Muslims as conducted by the Knights of St. John, and by the kings of Naples, Hungary, and Castile, Ferdinand implies that the Castilian campaign against Nasrid Granada was of equivalent religious and strategic importance.

Taken together, these examples demonstrate Ferdinand's discursive choices in framing his Italian and, more broadly, his Mediterranean interests during the 1480s. There was a variety of ways Ferdinand could have framed his interests in

Italy: he might have emphasized that Sicily was part of the Crown of Aragon, or that Naples was ruled by a cadet branch of the Aragonese royal house. In doing so, he would have represented the Turkish threat as something that directly endangered his patrimony or his familial, dynastic interests. Instead, though, he drew on a pattern established during the Ottoman attacks on Rhodes and Otranto, employing rhetorical choices to portray his interests as greater than mere dynastic interests. The king repeatedly and consistently, throughout the 1480s, depicted his actions in the central Mediterranean as undertaken for the defense of the *respublica christiana*. The malleability of this term left open to interpretation precisely what was meant by that. Did Ferdinand use *respublica christiana* in a purely geographical sense? If so, why apply the term when corresponding with the Knights of St. John of Jerusalem on Rhodes, located just off the coast of Anatolia? Did Ferdinand's profession to act on behalf of the *respublica christiana* suggest that he viewed himself as defender of the institutional (Roman) Church, of the body-politic of all believers (the *congregatio fidelium*), or both?

None of this is to insinuate that Ferdinand deployed the vocabulary of Christian universalism in purely instrumentalist ways. While I believe there is convincing evidence that he did make strategic rhetorical choices, and in certain cases there was a strong financial incentive for him to do so (as in his negotiations with Innocent VIII over the *décimas* from the *cruzada* tax), there is equally compelling evidence that Ferdinand and most people with whom he corresponded sincerely viewed the central Mediterranean as a frontier zone of Latin Christendom that was in danger of being conquered by an unstoppable Islamic foe. To try to distinguish cynical manipulations of this sort of rhetoric from sincere applications of it is not my point in this chapter or others constituting this book. Indeed, such a distinction misses a vital point: the consistent use of the vocabulary of Christian universalism is, I believe, indicative of the fears and preoccupations that animated many Catholics in the second half of the fifteenth century (fears about the internal threats to Christendom as much as those about the external threats). The decision by multiple actors (Ferdinand being merely one of many) to opt for this vocabulary as a vehicle for expressing their concerns, politics, and objectives about the central Mediterranean region suggests that these rhetorical and discursive decisions were made because the general ambit suggested that this representation of affairs was a valid one, one that held the potential to convince and persuade others.[61]

As will become clear in chapters 3 through 6, Ferdinand and his councilors represented Spanish expansionary ventures in the Mediterranean through a religiopolitical vocabulary that spoke directly to the concerns and preoccupations about the internal and external threats to Christendom examined here

and to the conceptual understandings of the Mediterranean basin elucidated in chapter 1. From the 1490s onward, as Ferdinand pursued expansionist objectives in Italy, Navarre, and North Africa, he and his retinue consciously represented those military endeavors according to a vocabulary that engaged the concerns of Latin Christians, in Iberia itself, in Italy, and beyond. The sense that the Italian Peninsula and islands now stood on the front lines against an implacable foe contributed to a set of circumstances that favored the employment of the articulations of political objectives through a vocabulary of Christian universalism. It was precisely this vocabulary to which Ferdinand appealed during the next phase of his reign as he sought to assert his own claim to Naples against a foe whose seat of power was much closer than Constantinople.

PART II

CHAPTER 3

The Turk Within

"... la mercaderia que mas en españa se trata
y la que menos cuesta levar
son las nuevas desta ytalia."

Anonymous, *La conquista del reyno de Nápoles*, Dedication (ca. 1504)

During the proceedings at the Council of Basle, a dispute arose over the precedence, within the general council, between the representatives of England and those of Castile. One of the Castilian delegates, Alonso de Cartagena (1385–1456), presented a discourse in which he enumerated, point by point, the reasons the Castilian king should have precedence over the king of England.[1] Cartagena based his argument for Castilian supremacy on a variety of factors, including the relative ages and geographical expanses of the two kingdoms, as well as many other criteria. One of these was the fact that, as Cartagena claimed, the kings of Castile, down through the ages, had continuously engaged in holy war against enemies of the faith. This brought Cartagena to a point in his discourse in which he differentiated between just war and holy war, or *guerra divinal* as he called it. In reference to the ongoing conflicts of the Hundred Years' War, the English king, he argued, might very well engage in just war. In making war on Christians, however, regardless of the justness of said war, this could not be considered a holy war. As war waged by English kings against France was not waged against infidels, nor for the elevation of the Catholic faith, nor for the extension of the boundaries of Christendom, this, argued Cartagena, could not be considered holy war. In clear contrast to this negative example, Cartagena presented his vision of Castilian history, arguing that the history of the Crown and the royal dynasty had been one of nearly unceasing *guerra divinal* against Iberia's Muslim states. In this,

stated Cartagena, the Castilian kings had done far more for the Church and for Christendom than had their English counterparts.[2] Throughout his *Discourse*, Cartagena suggested that Castilian kings acted not out of personal interest, nor even out of the interests of the realm, but were engaged in a holy mission that redounded to the benefit of all Christendom.[3]

The diplomatic correspondence analyzed in chapter 2 demonstrates that Ferdinand of Aragon represented his Italian interests, in Sicily as well as in Naples, as deriving not from personal interests, nor even from a dynastic obligation to assist his cousin, Ferrante I of Naples (r. 1458–1494), but from a commitment to defend the *respublica christiana* from the depredations of infidels. If Ferdinand's actions in the central Mediterranean were, in fact, for the elevation of the Catholic faith or for the extension of the boundaries of Christendom, then his military interventions there clearly met Alonso de Cartagena's criteria for a holy war. Pope Sixtus IV's granting of plenary indulgences in April 1481 to those who embarked in the armadas dispatched from Aragonese and Castilian ports to liberate Otranto from the Ottomans is of a piece with this understanding.[4]

Ferdinand's rhetorical choices made it clear that he was drawing on the understanding of a common corps of Christendom that was engaged in a struggle with an external, non-Christian foe. Such a conflict met the established criteria not merely for a just war but for a holy war. The next episode in Ferdinand's pursuit of his Italian interests, however, would lead him into direct conflict with a Catholic opponent, the king of France. This chapter traces the origins and evolution of this conflict, elucidating the ways both French and Spanish adherents sought to establish the struggle as a just and even a holy war. Continuing a strategy that he had employed in his response to the Ottoman assaults on Rhodes and Otranto, Ferdinand represented himself as the guardian and protector of the *respublica christiana*. Ferdinand's French counterparts, Charles VIII (r. 1483–1498) and Louis XII (r. 1498–1515), made similar claims. In the wake of Castile's 1492 conquest of Nasrid Granada, though, Ferdinand's rhetorical claims proved the more convincing. This chapter examines the processes whereby two related conflicts between the houses of Trastámara and Valois were transformed, through legal arguments, into holy wars waged in defense of the Church and of Christendom.

The Second Charlemagne

The kingdom of Naples was an object of desire for numerous rulers in the late fifteenth-century Mediterranean world. With a lengthy coastline along

Map 3. Map of Italy in 1494

both the Adriatic and Tyrrhenian littorals of the Italian Peninsula, and with a central location that placed it within easy sailing distance of Greece, Sicily, Tunisia, as well as Sardinia and the emporia of the western Mediterranean, the kingdom constituting the southern half of the Italian Peninsula occupied a position of enormous strategic and economic importance. These were

some of the factors behind the Ottoman occupation of Otranto (1480–1481, discussed in chapter 2), and they likewise spurred Western European designs on Neapolitan conquest.

During the second half of the fifteenth century, Naples was under the rule of King Ferrante I (r. 1458–1494). Ferrante was the illegitimate son of Alfonso V "the Magnanimous" of Aragon (r. 1416–1458) who through a variety of means, including adoption and conquest, had incorporated Naples into the Crown of Aragon during a protracted series of negotiations and wars in the early 1440s.[5] Upon Alfonso's death, the realms of the Crown of Aragon were broken up, with the lands that Alfonso had inherited passing to his surviving brother, Juan II of Aragon (r. 1458–1479) and the kingdom of Naples going to Alfonso's only son. The length of Ferrante's reign belies the instability by which it was characterized. As a member of a cadet branch of the Aragonese royal family, even if of illegitimate birth, Ferrante could claim Naples through his Aragonese lineage. This Aragonese claim, however, was disputed. As a result of the Sicilian Vespers (1282), the mainland and island portions of the kingdom of Sicily had been split.[6] For roughly the next 160 years the kingdom of the Two Sicilies existed in a fragmented form, with the mainland and the island ruled by the Angevin and Aragonese dynasties, respectively.[7] Even in the wake of Alfonso of Aragon's conquest of Naples by force in the early 1440s, the Angevin dynasty had never given up their claim, and throughout Ferrante's tumultuous reign restive baronial factions would appeal to the Angevin claimant to support their cause against a king they accused of tyranny and despotism.

The Angevin claim to Naples passed to the Valois dynasty of France in 1481, represented from 1483 by the young King Charles VIII. Many Neapolitan barons who had opposed Alfonso V's invasion of Naples and who had rebelled against Ferrante during the baronial revolts had fled to Angevin-ruled lands, such as Provence, where they were assured a warm welcome. One of these was Giovanni di Candida, who fought for Jean of Anjou at the Battle of Troia in August 1462.[8] Candida eventually made his way to the French royal court where, in the late 1480s, he wrote a compendium of the history of the kingdom of Naples that he presented to Charles VIII. Genealogical in its approach and argument, *Des Roys et Royaume de Cecille* traced the claim to the Neapolitan throne from Charlemagne, through the Normans and Angevins, down to Charles VIII.[9] Candida's text was part of an attempt by exiled Neapolitan nobles to encourage Charles VIII to invade the kingdom of Naples and to expel the Aragonese. The genealogical compendium provided a dynastic justification for such a military expedition.

A French contemporary of Candida, Leonard Baronnat, presented a slightly different dynastic argument in support of Charles VIII's claim to Na-

ples. In a tract composed in 1491 in support of Charles's purported dynastic rights to Naples, Sicily, and Aragon, Leonard Baronnat asserted that the papal donation of the Two Sicilies to the Angevins (in 1265) had been legal and that Alfonso V of Aragon had usurped by the sword and by tyranny not only the kingdom of Sicily but also that of Aragon, which belonged by all reason, divine and human, to the heirs of René of Anjou.[10] Both Candida's and Baronnat's tracts presented dynastic arguments for Charles's right to rule in Naples. Baronnat's depended on the legal right of the papacy to dispense kingdoms, while Candida's argument derived from Charlemagne's purported rule over the whole of the Italian Peninsula in the early ninth century. In spite of these distinctions, both texts were fundamentally genealogical in the form of the arguments they presented.

These, then, were the grounds on which Charles VIII hoped to stake his claim to Naples. But one obstacle remained: King Ferrante's cousins, Ferdinand of Aragon and Isabella of Castile, who throughout the 1470s and 1480s had been the Neapolitan king's strongest source of support. Meanwhile, Ferdinand desired to recover from France the Catalan counties of Roussillon and Cerdagne, captured by France in the 1460s during the civil wars that wracked Catalonia. With the Treaty of Barcelona, signed in January of 1493, these counties were returned to the Crown of Aragon. The transfer, however, came at the cost of Neapolitan independence. In no uncertain terms the agreement paved the way for a French invasion of the Italian Peninsula that would be unopposed by Spain. The treaty specified that the Catholic Monarchs were to give priority to their alliance with France over any other except one with the pope. One clause explicitly stipulated that Ferdinand and Isabella not assist their cousin Ferrante against Charles in the French king's recovery of whatever right may belong to him in the kingdom of Naples.[11]

In March 1494, French forces crossed the Alps into the duchy of Milan and then pressed southward toward the Papal States and Naples. In the process, Charles made a crucial determination concerning his justification for invading Christian territory. He did not represent his invasion as merely a recuperation of the Angevin claim to Naples. Rather, the French king portrayed his venture in religious terms. Drawing on centuries-old crusading associations between the southern Italian lands and the Holy Land, Charles indicated that his incursion into Naples would be merely the first step in a much grander design of Mediterranean conquests.[12] In the context of the 1490s, with the "Second Rome," Constantinople, now the seat of the Ottoman Empire, the crusading resonances Charles invoked took on a new sense of urgency.[13] Looking well beyond the southern reaches of the Italian Peninsula, Charles depicted his actions as part of a strategy to subjugate the Ottoman Empire and as a necessary

first step toward a Christian recovery of the Holy Land. At the time, prophecies circulated in France depicting him as a second Charlemagne, linking the late fifteenth-century French king to his crusading forbear and namesake.[14] While writers such as Candida and Baronnat had entreated Charles to claim his ancestral rights to the Neapolitan realm, it is clear that certain parties close to the king believed that his case would be stronger if he represented his invasion not as a recovery of patrimonial lands but as a glorious endeavor undertaken for the benefit of Christendom.

Charles broadcast his crusading intentions throughout Europe, and contemporary chroniclers repeated these professions. A text from 1495 composed by the Milanese Michael Fernus is immediately contemporary to the events it describes, and in Fernus's account of Charles VIII's invasion of Italy he records that the French king intended to attain the title to the Holy Land.[15] Fernus is representative of those Italians who sided with the French king, and throughout the French invasion of Italy, Charles VIII's partisans depicted the king as a liberator working against the forces of tyranny and as a just prince who would bring order to the politically fractious and volatile Italian Peninsula. Numerous Italians propagated this image: Francesco Guicciardini and Bernardino Corio both portrayed King Ferrante of Naples as a tyrant, and Charles's invasion as a remedy for Ferrante's abuses, with Corio going so far as to depict Charles as Christ-like.[16] In Florence, the charismatic preacher Savonarola painted Charles as a leader sent by God to punish the institutional Church for its sins and to purge it of impurities.[17] These crusading professions reached as far as Constantinople where, understandably, they aroused fear at the prospect of a Christian invasion.[18] Presumably in response to Charles VIII's stated intention to use Naples as a launching point for a crusade against the Ottomans, Pope Alexander VI (r. 1492–1503) offered crusade indulgences to French soldiers who participated in the invasion of Naples.[19]

The terms of the Treaty of Barcelona (1493), cited earlier, prevented the Spanish monarchs from opposing in any military sense the actions of the French king. Instead, as French forces marched south through Italy during the autumn of 1494, Ferdinand and Isabella immediately set in motion a diplomatic offensive to oppose any claims that the French king might attempt to assert. One front in this diplomatic offensive was to protest directly to the French court that Charles VIII had not followed proper legal procedure for pressing his dynastic claim prior to launching his invasion.[20] In a significantly more forceful statement, Ferdinand and Isabella sent instructions to Alonso de Silva, Spain's ambassador to the French court, at that time in Rome, and to Garcilaso de la Vega, their ambassador to the pope. The Spanish monarchs counseled their ambassadors on how to represent Ferdinand and Isabella's case before the papal curia

by stressing the destabilizing effect the French invasion would have on the already fragmented Italian Peninsula. In these instructions, the monarchs urged their ambassadors to emphasize the degree to which Ferdinand and Isabella had always worked for "the *peace and tranquility of the Christian republic* and the *union and concord of Christian princes*" (emphasis mine).[21]

In these two instances, we can detect a striking divergence in rhetorical strategy. In the diplomatic protest sent directly to Charles VIII, Ferdinand and Isabella opt for a vocabulary that presents the disagreement as one that has unfolded due to Charles's ignoring the proper juridical procedure a prince ought to follow when pressing a dynastic claim to a territory. By contrast, in the instructions sent to their ambassadors resident in Rome, Ferdinand and Isabella use an entirely different vocabulary to frame the dispute: before those gathered at the papal curia, Alonso de Silva and Garcilaso de la Vega are to represent the dissension not as an argument over the relative strength of two dynastic claims but as a crisis threatening the whole of the Italian Peninsula, with repercussions for the entirety of the Christian republic. The Spanish Crown's distinct approaches here are reflective of what the monarchs (or their advisers) believed would be the most effective means of achieving their political ends with each particular audience. Here it is helpful to invoke Brian Catlos's model of the ways in which expressions of religious, or communal, identity operate in multiconfessional Mediterranean settings. In *Muslims of Medieval Latin Christendom*, Catlos elaborates a tiered model consisting of macro-, meso-, and micro-registers.[22] Catlos's model is predicated on the idea that the greater the ritual content involved in a particular exchange, the more that exchange is imbued with the terms of religious/communal identity.[23] Catlos's micro- or "local" register corresponds to individuals and the sorts of interactions in which they might typically engage on a very informal level (making purchases at a market, for example). These exchanges, being nearly devoid of ritual content, tend not to result in strong expressions of religious identity. The meso- or "corporate" register corresponds to formal collectives or institutions, while the macro- or what Catlos terms the "ecumenian" register is that of "formal, dogmatic-informed religious identity."[24] It is at the ecumenian level, then, that we see the use of categories of religious identity that are impermeable, stable expressions of identity. Catlos's model applies to *inter*faith interaction and exchange, not *intra*faith communication. Consequently, it is worth being discerning in how this model might be applied to the present case, in which the Spanish, the French, and those at the papal curia all share a confessional identity. And yet, Catlos's model provides a useful way for us to think about the various rhetorical strategies that were at hand to these fifteenth-century figures and the deliberate choices they made in presenting their objectives in the way they believed

would be most persuasive to a particular audience. Thus, in the letter presented to Charles VIII by Ferdinand and Isabella's representative (see note 20) the disagreement is expressed in terms of dynastic right. Here we are operating on the register of the corporate or meso-level. However, in the instructions Ferdinand and Isabella issued to their ambassadors in Rome, the monarchs chose not to mention dynastic rights but rather to frame their case as deriving from the concern they felt for the security of the Christian republic.

In their appeal to the vocabulary of Christian universalism, the Spanish monarchs employed a rhetorical strategy nearly identical to their response to the Ottoman occupation of Otranto fourteen years earlier (on this, see chapter 2). In the face of the invading French forces, Ferdinand and Isabella instructed their ambassadors to represent them, before all those assembled at the papal curia, as guarantors of peace and stability. Painting the French as a threat equal to that posed by the Turks, Ferdinand and Isabella lamented that the eruption of war in Italy would cause as much harm to Christians as would war against the Turks. The Spanish monarchs went on to warn that if the French did not desist, there would result "universal harm and great danger to the *Christian republic*" (emphasis mine).[25] This represents one of the earliest instances (if not the first) of a Spanish equation between the threats posed by the French and the Turks. It would not, however, be the last.

Even before the French reached the Papal States, Ferdinand had been concerned about the possibility of a Turkish armada moving against his island possessions. In early August of 1494, Ferdinand wrote to his viceroy in Sicily, with instructions for the fortification of Malta and Gozzo.[26] Ferdinand provided detailed guidelines for what he thought necessary, and he even suggested that rural inhabitants be moved to the city, and new houses built for them there, should the viceroy deem that the best course of action.[27] Five days later, Ferdinand wrote to the viceroy of Sicily again, this time informing him that news he had of the Turkish armada was prompting him to issue an order forbidding the export of horses or weapons from Sicily, out of concern they might be imminently necessary for defense.[28]

Ferdinand's concerns about the security of his Mediterranean islands only deepened with the French invasion. In November 1494, as the French approached Rome, Ferdinand wrote letters to his officials on the island of Majorca, including the realm's governor, Juan Aymerich. Instability in Italy, Ferdinand argued, would serve as an invitation to the Ottomans to invade again: "You can well see the disturbances that are wracking Italy, how serious and dangerous they are, most of all because of the risk that they will invite an invasion by the Turks, enemies of our Holy Faith. This is a grave danger to Christendom, and especially to those kingdoms and islands that are near the

lands of the Moors and are located in the sea, as is our Kingdom of Majorca." To address the crisis precipitated by the French invasion of Italy, Ferdinand informed the governor of Majorca of his intention to convene parliamentary *Cortes* in his realms of Aragon and Castile, the latter of which arguably sat at some remove from the region of greatest concern.[29] Here Ferdinand echoes a theme that had been common since the Papal Schism during the late fourteenth century: the notion that the threat posed by the Turks was directly linked (attributable, even, some argued) to the internal divisions within Christendom.[30] Given the frequency with which the Ottoman threat was addressed at the various Church councils and in the crusading and prophetic literature of the fifteenth century, it is likely that the equation that Ferdinand draws here between Italian instability and the likelihood of a Turkish invasion had, by the 1490s, become something of a given.

These instructions to the governor of Majorca, like those Ferdinand and Isabella sent to their ambassadors Alonso de Silva and Garcilaso de la Vega (cited above), harp on the political instability in Italy, emphasizing that conflict within Italy will serve as an invitation to the Turks to invade and, by extension, that discord in Italy poses a general threat to all of Christendom. One key difference between these two sets of correspondence, however, lies in the intended audience. In the case of the instructions sent to Rome, these were intended to guide the ambassadors in their presentation of Ferdinand and Isabella's case at the papal curia in opposition to the French invasion of Italy. This was a forum in which we would expect claims to operate on Catlos's ecumenian register.[31] By contrast, the instructions sent to Majorca arguably had a significantly smaller and less international audience. Here we are operating on an intra-faith equivalent to Catlos's meso- or corporate register.[32] The fact that Ferdinand employed this sort of language in his correspondence to his governor in Majorca, along with the fact that he promised to convene a *Cortes* in the kingdom of Castile to address the crisis precipitated by the French invasion, suggests that Ferdinand sincerely perceived the French invasion of Italy as weakening Europe in the face of the expansionist Ottoman Empire. In other words, Ferdinand's use of Christian universalist discourse did not operate solely as a rhetorical device. The discrepancy that I have noted between the rhetoric used in direct correspondence with Charles VIII and that used at the papal curia is to be expected in the conduct of diplomacy with various actors holding diverse interests. That said, we should resist the urge to interpret appeals to the ideal of the common corps of Christendom as purely instrumental. On the contrary, the evidence furnished by Ferdinand's correspondence with his Sicilian viceroy and governor of Majorca suggests that Ferdinand earnestly believed the French invasion of Italy could serve to invite an Ottoman invasion. What

the documentary evidence presented here illustrates is the way in which those in the employ of the Spanish Crown made deliberate choices concerning how to represent the rapidly shifting situation in Italy, depending on the intended audience.

Charles VIII and his forces entered the city of Rome on December 31, 1494. While there, however, he failed to obtain the papal investiture of the kingdom of Naples, likely due to Alexander VI's fears of what the presence of a single hegemon in the Italian Peninsula would mean for his ability to exercise power there.[33] Without the papal investiture to the realm, Charles continued south. On February 22, 1495, Charles marched into Naples in a carefully choreographed triumphal entry. The spectacle was designed to convey the legitimacy of the French king's conquest. In telling displays, those who orchestrated the procession did not portray the conquest as a restoration of the realm to its rightful Angevin claimant. Rather, the triumphal entry broadcast Charles's conquest through a crusading discourse that drew extensively on millenarian prophecies that had circulated for over two centuries.[34] In the procession, Charles rode through Naples wearing the imperial cloak and adorned with a quadruple crown, representing France, Naples, Constantinople, and Jerusalem.[35] The symbolism of this display spoke to centuries-old aspirations of Latin Christians while also addressing anxieties that were specific to the late fifteenth century. By adorning himself with the quadruple crown that represented Charles as emperor of Constantinople, Charles portrayed himself as the one alluded to in prophecies, chosen to reunite the Eastern and Western empires and end the Great Schism that had separated Orthodox Christians from obedience to Rome.[36] The reference to Constantinople in 1495, however, carried a different meaning than it would have fifty years earlier. The Second Rome was now the seat of the Ottoman Empire, a polity whose expansion seemed unarrestable to many Europeans. As evidenced in the sources examined in chapter 2, including the Italian letters expressing fear of an imminent Ottoman invasion as well as the agendas of the fifteenth-century Church councils, Western European concern about the ascendance of the Ottoman Empire was acute and widespread. Against this backdrop, Charles's employment of the crown of Constantinople served to depict the French monarch in an imperial light, as the reuniter of the two halves of the Roman Empire, while simultaneously broadcasting his intention to lead a grand crusade to subjugate the Ottoman Empire and to recover Jerusalem. While on an embassy to England, Robert Gaguin assured the English court that Charles VIII's objective in conquering Naples was to reverse the Ottoman advances and to recover Greece for Christendom.[37] To emphasize his crusading intentions, soon after the French conquest of Naples Charles had money minted that read *Perdem Babilonie Nomen*.[38]

This is a phrase best rendered as "I will destroy the forces of Babylon," with Babylon here intended to represent Islam.

While Charles's crusading professions might have initially won him partisans in parts of Italy, in Spain the French king's crusading professions were greeted with scorn. The unofficial court chronicler Andrés Bernáldez related that Charles employed the language of crusade in a cynical manner that was designed to appease Pope Alexander VI, who had not been forthcoming with the investiture to the Neapolitan realm.[39] At the same time, Ferdinand of Aragon interpreted Charles's invasion of Italy as a direct assault on Aragonese patrimony. There were three bases on which the Aragonese monarch could level this accusation against the French king: there were blood ties that bound Ferdinand to his cousin, the king of Naples; Naples lay adjacent to Ferdinand's island kingdom of Sicily and might easily provide a point of invasion; and finally, there was the fact that Ferdinand believed that Naples rightfully constituted part of his patrimony and that his claim there was stronger than that of the cadet branch of his family that ruled the Italian kingdom, not to mention the Angevin claim. Given that it was well known that Charles also harbored ambitions to capture the island of Sicily (*Sicilia ultra farum*; for this, see the earlier reference to the juridical tract composed in 1491 by Leonard Baronnat), Charles's invasion of the Italian Peninsula could be construed to pose a very real threat to Ferdinand of Aragon's Mediterranean possessions and interests.

Leaving aside any Spanish skepticism surrounding Charles's crusading intentions, Ferdinand and Isabella evidently believed that the French occupation of Naples posed a threat not only to their hold on Sicily but to the stability and security of the Italian Peninsula more generally. Within months, the Spanish monarchs prepared a military response to expel the French. Enlisting the services of Gonzalo Fernández de Córdoba, who would go on to earn renown as the *Gran Capitán*, as well as numerous other Castilians who had gained military experience fighting in the War of Granada (1482–1492), on March 30, 1495, Ferdinand and Isabella dispatched an armada carrying three thousand light cavalry and two thousand infantry. The Spanish military response was ostensibly launched to aid Ferdinand and Isabella's relative, King Ferrante II of Naples (r. 1495–1496).[40] The action contained within it, however, the seeds of a Spanish conquest of the Neapolitan realm. In their decision to send an armada to Italy, the Spanish monarchs took a huge risk. After protesting that the French invasion destabilized Italy, thereby inviting another Ottoman assault, the Spanish Crown had to now justify a counterinvasion that could only further destabilize the Italian Peninsula. Moreover, as the investiture to the kingdom of Naples was granted by the papacy, the Spanish monarchs would need to win Pope Alexander VI over to their cause if they hoped to gain the

legitimate title to the realm. Finally, as Spain now readied to make war against a fellow Christian power, they would need to articulate a compelling reason for their actions if they hoped to gain the support of the papacy or any other allies. This coalescence of factors demanded that members of Ferdinand and Isabella's royal council develop a legal argument for invading mainland Italy, one that would convince other powers of the justness of the Spanish cause.

Ferdinand and Isabella made several conscious choices concerning the portrayal of their military response. The monarchs and their councilors could have argued that the armada was merely sent out of a dynastic obligation to assist their cousin, the Neapolitan king. Moreover, in light of intimations that the French king was contemplating an invasion of Sicily (Baronnat's tract, after all, spelled out a Valois claim to Sicily, and even to Aragon itself), Ferdinand could have cast a military response as a defensive move to protect his island kingdom. Either or both of these arguments would have cast the Spanish military response as a defensive action, thus meeting the criteria to be considered a just war. Ferdinand and Isabella and their councilors, however, chose not to employ a dynastic discourse to legitimate their counterinvasion; rather, they presented their military response as conducted principally for the well-being of the Christian commonwealth.

Several months after Charles's triumphal entry into Naples and shortly following the dispatch of the armada commanded by Fernández de Córdoba, agents in the employ of the Spanish Crown issued a broadside for circulation in a number of countries throughout Europe. It read, in part:

> Their majesties [Ferdinand and Isabella] wanted nothing more than to undertake the holy and just war against the Muslim kings of Africa, and toward this end they were already making preparations in Andalucía and in the ports along the coast, and it is to be assumed that their plans would have succeeded, due to the justice of their cause and their holy intentions. But as a result of the machinations of the devil, enemy of Christianity and of the Church, the King of France at that time took it upon himself to invade and conquer the Kingdom of Naples without first adjudicating his rights to the realm . . . and their Highnesses [Ferdinand and Isabella] feared that the war of Naples would disrupt the peace of the Church and that the Pope would be grievously harmed by this, and that from this would follow an infinite number of misfortunes throughout all Christendom, as indeed was later shown to be the case.[41]

In effect, the document portrayed the French invasion as an act of aggression that distracted from the universal goal of crusade against the infidel that Christian princes ought to share. The broadside indicated that the Spanish monarchs

had offered Charles the right to the conquest of the North African coast: "lands lying opposite Marseilles, which he [Charles VIII] holds, and kings almost never agree to grant part of their conquest to another king, but their Highnesses, with the zeal they had for a Christian peace and for a crusade against the infidels, were happy to make this offer in order that such an opportunity for joint action not be lost."[42] The lands Ferdinand and Isabella putatively offered had very recently been granted for conquest by Spain through the papal bull *Ineffabilis et summi* (February 13, 1495).[43] The broadside thus asserts that after being granted the right to the conquest of "all of Africa" through the papal bull, Ferdinand and Isabella had voluntarily surrendered a portion of this conquest to their rival, Charles VIII, simply out of a desire to avoid war between Christians and to induce the French king to join them in an African crusade. The broadside, then, is intended to portray Ferdinand and Isabella as working toward a shared crusading objective, a common cause that all Christian princes ought to share. According to the broadside, however, Charles had declined the offer. In stark contrast to Charles's triumphal entry into the city of Naples as a crusading king, the broadside depicted the French king, in his assertion of his claim to Naples, as an enemy of Christendom and of the Church, and, what was worse, a reluctant crusader against actual infidels. The Spaniards' rhetoric implied that Ferdinand and Isabella did not act as did Charles VIII: they were defenders of Christendom, not violators of the *Pax christiana*.

Drawing on a similar approach to that they had employed fifteen years earlier during the Ottoman occupation of Otranto, they opted to depict their military response to the French invasion as a defense of the Church and of Christendom writ large. At a meeting of the Catalan parliament (*Corts*), convened in Tortosa in December 1495, Ferdinand addressed the assembled representatives on the matter of the French conquest of Naples in a bid to convince the Catalans to furnish troops for the Spanish counterinvasion. Ferdinand represented Charles's actions as constituting an act of war against the Church and as engendering fissures throughout Christendom: "He has persisted in sowing division and fire, as we have seen, throughout Christendom, and he will persist in committing all the damage and war that he can to the Holy Mother Church and in the said Kingdom of Naples."[44] As an exemplary Christian prince, Ferdinand had avoided declaring war against France for as long as possible, but events had finally forced him to form a league with the pope, with the Holy Roman Emperor, with Venice, and with the Duke of Milan, "for the well-being and peace of Christendom." Ferdinand stressed to his Catalan subjects, who were traditionally enemies of France, that the alliance stood not to the detriment of France but rather in defense of the Church and of the other lands threatened by the French.[45] Ferdinand here makes a fine legal distinction,

suggesting that the Spanish response to the French invasion of Italy constitutes an act of defense, thereby meeting one of the criteria for a just war. The act of defense, however, is not represented as a defense of patrimonial lands, but a defense of the Church and of Christendom. Indeed, in the wake of the Castilian conquest of Nasrid Granada (completed January 2, 1492), the argument that Ferdinand and Isabella were exemplary crusading monarchs who worked for the benefit of Christendom against the "enemies of the faith" was one that proved quite effective.

The Particularity of Naples

Several important considerations factored into the decisions Ferdinand and those in his retinue made in determining how to portray the Spanish military response. First, the kingdom of Naples was a fief of the papacy, meaning that an invasion of Naples could be construed as an act of aggression against the pope. Moreover, the French armies marched through the Papal States in order to reach Naples from France. In the process, they occupied the port of Ostia, the main supply point for Rome, commandeering supplies and infuriating Pope Alexander VI.[46] Indeed, the pope immediately wrote to Ferdinand and Isabella, pleading for assistance in expelling the French from Ostia.[47] What is more, in multiple missives he sent to the Spanish monarchs, the pope noted that war in Italy only heightened the danger posed by the Turks.[48] In the broadside printed for circulation outside Spain, the Spanish stressed the harm the French did to the Church and asserted that Spain's military response came only from a desire to comply with the pope's pleas for military assistance:

> His Holiness then sent their Highnesses [Ferdinand and Isabella] a brief begging them and commanding them to assist him by supplying an armed force, to counter the spilling of divine blood, and out of the obligation that all Catholic princes hold to protect and defend the Roman Church, particularly at a time when it is placed in such need and distress.[49]

Indeed, in June of 1495, Alexander wrote to Ferdinand and Isabella from Civitavecchia, informing them that he had been forced to flee Rome due to the danger posed by the French.[50]

The Spanish argument, then, was that French actions throughout the Italian Peninsula did not accord with French royal propaganda representing Charles VIII as a liberator from the forces of tyranny. The Castilian chronicler Andrés Bernáldez, hardly an unbiased observer, to be sure, paints a lurid picture of the

French in Rome: among the crimes of which Bernáldez accuses the French forces under Charles VIII is sacking the *juderia* (the Jewish quarter) in Rome and violating Jewish women there.[51] Italians who had greeted the French as liberators in 1494 and 1495 soon changed their opinion and began to view Charles VIII as lacking many of the cardinal virtues. Italians also developed a representation of French soldiers as particularly brutal and prone to violence, forging something of a precursor to the *Leyenda Negra* that was subsequently applied to Spanish conquistadors.[52] The anonymous Castilian author of a chronicle of the Spanish conquest of Naples recorded that the French forces were disliked even by the Italian *condotieri* in their company.[53] Along these lines, Spaniards portrayed the French as violators of the Christian peace and as a threat to the security of the Christian commonwealth. By contrast, the Spanish justified their own counterinvasion as a *defense of Church lands* and as being done solely for the good of the Christian republic.

Italy's proximity to Ottoman-ruled lands in the Balkan Peninsula and the eastern Mediterranean served to increase the perception of an Italy (and a Christendom) under siege. Meanwhile, Castile's 1492 conquest of Granada, the last Islamic polity on the Iberian Peninsula, served to cement the image of Ferdinand as protector and guardian of Christendom against the forces of Islam. This victory appeared to offset, if only marginally, the Ottoman gains in southeastern Europe. The Spanish monarchs could thus represent themselves as working against the forces of usurpation and tyranny, be they Muslim (in Iberia) or Christian (in Italy).

In Ferdinand and Isabella's diplomatic response to Charles VIII's invasion of Italy, the monarchs employed precisely the same vocabulary they had used to characterize the Turkish threat to Rhodes, Otranto, Sicily, Sardinia, and Majorca. They presented their actions as being in defense of the *respublica christiana*. This was a deliberate choice. There were other ways they might have framed their response. For example, Ferdinand held a dynastic claim to the kingdom of Naples that was arguably just as strong as Charles VIII's. Documentation produced by many of his advisers and by Ferdinand himself shows that the Aragonese king viewed the 1458 accession of his cousin Ferrante (of illegitimate birth) to the throne of Naples as illegal and as constituting the "loss of Naples" for the Crown of Aragon.[54] Writing to his ambassador in Rome, Jerónimo de Vich, in 1510, Ferdinand noted that "it is well known that I am the true successor to King Don Alonso, my uncle."[55]

In other territorial disputes with France, Ferdinand *did* make his case in dynastic, rather than religious, terms. In 1479, for example, in negotiations over the restitution to the Crown of Aragon of the Catalan counties of Roussillon and Cerdagne, Ferdinand and his advisers did not once invoke the religiopolitical

vocabulary of the *respublica christiana*.[56] The articulation of the dispute over Roussillon and Cerdagne in terms entirely devoid of the vocabulary of Christian universalism demonstrates the range of rhetorical and legal strategies available to jurists and diplomats.

This is not to say that the dynastic line of argumentation was entirely absent in the Spanish monarchs' attempts to incorporate Naples into the Crown of Aragon. In November 1503, the Castilian courtier Cristóbal de Santesteban drew up a juridical study of Ferdinand and Isabella's rights to the kingdoms of Jerusalem, Naples, and Sicily. Santesteban's *Tratado dela succession delos reynos de Jerusalén y de Nápoles y de çecilia y delas provincias de Pulla y Calabria* is the strongest surviving argument made in support of Ferdinand and Isabella's dynastic rights to the kingdom of Naples.[57] Santesteban presented his text as a juridical study in the form of a genealogy. In his *Tratado*, Santesteban argues that Naples (along with the historically linked realms of Sicily and Jerusalem) was rightfully part of the Crown of Aragon. Here, he traces the Spanish monarchs' dynastic claim back to the Hohenstaufen rulers of the Two Sicilies, providing a genealogy for the transmission of Hohenstaufen rights to the house of Aragon through the marriage of Manfred of Sicily and Constance of Aragon.

The genealogical format of Santesteban's text, however, is deceptive, for his dynastic argument for the Spanish monarchs' rights in the realms of Jerusalem, Naples, and Sicily constitutes merely one component of the process of justification he employed in support of his royal patrons. Concomitant with his deployment of a dynastic argument in favor of his patrons' claim to Naples, Santesteban simultaneously presented a discourse of legitimation through the argument that Ferdinand and Isabella's actions contributed to the defense of Christendom, and that the Spanish monarchs adhered to the ideals and standards of crusading kingship. This, of course, is an argument the monarchs themselves had instructed their ambassadors to present on their behalf ever since the initial French invasion of Italy in 1494. Along those lines, Santesteban lauds Spanish conquests and evangelization in Granada, North Africa, the Canary Islands, and the Caribbean, arguing that these deeds had redounded to the benefit of all Christendom.[58]

Through these devices Santesteban crafted a justification for a sixteenth-century Spanish offensive to recover the French-controlled areas of the kingdom of Naples, a process that stood *in medias res* as he composed this treatise. Lest the Spanish monarchs' actions in Naples be mistaken for avarice, however, Santesteban emphasized that Ferdinand and Isabella had been reluctant to undertake a military engagement with France because of their desire to avoid making war on fellow Christians.[59] Now, though, this course of action

was justified because the French claimant had proved himself a threat to Christendom.

Throughout his juridical treatise, Santesteban dutifully painted his patrons as champions of the faith whose actions, in Italy and elsewhere, contributed to the defense of Christendom:

> Truly, it is a fact worthy of praise that Spain, being the Christian nation most removed and protected from the Turk; and that their highnesses have been so occupied in war, and having conquered the Kingdom of Granada and begun the conquest of that of Fez; that, in the service of God and for the benefit and succor of the Christian people who were in such danger, they sent so many knights as they have done with this armada. And what the armada has done there has proved a great honor to them [the monarchs] and to their kingdoms.[60]

Unlike those of the French, the military engagements that the Spanish undertook in Italy were conducted solely, as Santesteban noted, "in defense of the Holy Father."[61]

There were good reasons for the Spanish to craft their claim to Naples along multiple lines of argumentation. Santesteban's decision to present his treaty in the form of a genealogy indicates that the Spanish certainly believed their dynastic claim to be strong. Nevertheless, it is possible that Ferdinand and Isabella feared that a juridical dispute over the relative weight of dynastic claims to Naples and Sicily was too risky. Or, in the wake of their recent conquests of Nasrid Granada (1492) and of North African Melilla (1497), perhaps they felt that they, more than Charles VIII, could legitimately present themselves as monarchs who acted in defense of the common corps of Christendom.

It is clear that in many cases the Spanish Crown opted to represent its motives in the central Mediterranean as being selflessly focused solely on the well-being of the *respublica christiana*. To have made this conscious decision regarding the presentation of their case, Spanish jurists and diplomats must have opted for a depiction of their patrons, and a vocabulary through which to represent their objectives, that they believed others would find persuasive. As the diplomatic correspondence examined here and in chapter 2 demonstrates, Ferdinand and his councilors frequently elided the safety and security of the Italian Peninsula with that of Christendom writ large. The evidence presented here suggests that the equation between the security of Italy and the security of the body-politic of Christendom was an intentional strategy employed in order to depict Ferdinand's interests and actions in the Italian Peninsula as deriving from a devotion to the defense of Christendom rather than a desire to attain

dominion over any part (or parts) of Italy. Such a line of argumentation was calculated to assuage concerns a pope might have about the rise of a single hegemonic power within the Italian Peninsula. In this way Ferdinand could portray his military responses to events such as the Ottoman invasion of Otranto or the French invasion of Italy as originating in a desire to protect the boundaries of Christendom and the lands of the papacy, rather than in a conqueror's greed or avarice. This approach, then, was part of a concerted Spanish effort to define the Valois-Trastámara war for hegemony within the Italian Peninsula not merely as a just war but as a holy war undertaken for the defense of Christendom. Such a strategy represents a clear understanding of the legal distinction between *guerra justa* and *guerra divinal* that Alonso de Cartagena invoked in the discourse he presented at the Council of Basle.

The contest for control of the kingdom of Naples gradually assumed a religious dimension that distinguished it from a mere dynastic dispute to recoup an alienated patrimony. The factors elucidated above, particularly the political instability of Naples and its exposure to Ottoman attack, raised the stakes of the Franco-Spanish struggle, imbuing it with the aura of a crusade. The papacy's actions contributed to this perception. In 1494, Pope Alexander VI offered crusade indulgences to the French soldiers who participated in the initial invasion.[62] Just over a year later, enraged by Charles VIII's conduct in Italy, the pope censored Charles VIII and his allies, invoking the danger posed to the entire Christian republic by the Turks and the fact that internecine wars among Christians only served to invite a Turkish invasion.[63] In July 1496, in light of the disastrous French occupation, Alexander granted plenary indulgences to those who died in Naples fighting to defend the Church against the French invaders.[64]

The proffer of crusade indulgences seems to have been one factor in inducing soldiers of fortune from northern Europe to venture south in defense of the common cause of Christendom. An anonymous chronicle of the Spanish conquest of Naples, composed by a participant, records the arrival in April 1503 of two thousand German soldiers sent to assist the Spanish forces.[65] These soldiers from Germany and other northern European lands who traveled to Italy to fight apparently viewed their military service as merely one facet of a holy pilgrimage of sorts. In this regard, northern European martial engagement in Mediterranean Europe was an extension of a pattern that had been in place since the 1480s. Soldiers from northern Europe who traveled to the Iberian Peninsula to fight for Castile in the war against Nasrid Granada from 1482 to 1492 frequently combined their military service with religious pilgrimage to Santiago de Compostela in northwestern Spain. Surviving safe-conduct passes issued by Ferdinand and Isabella attest to German soldiers journeying to Santiago following their fulfillment of military obligations on the frontier with

Granada.[66] In light of the fact that Granada was under Islamic rule, it is not surprising that these Germans viewed their military service in southern Iberia and their pilgrimage to Santiago as two parts of a whole, a religiously purifying experience in the Iberian Peninsula, as the War of Granada was depicted throughout Europe as a crusade undertaken for the whole of Christendom. Indeed, Ferdinand's safe-conduct pass refers explicitly to the northerners' sacrifice in leaving their homeland in order to fight infidels.[67]

Thirteen years later we see precisely the same practice in the Italian Wars, a conflict in which the warring parties were both Christian kingdoms. Indeed, German soldiers fought for the Aragonese cause in Naples. In certain instances King Ferdinand granted safe-conduct passes so that these northern Europeans could perform a pilgrimage to Santiago following their military service in Italy.[68] For some of these soldiers, fighting in the Italian Peninsula seems to have been understood as one component in a larger religious undertaking in southern Europe that presented possibilities for salvation in a variety of ways. The Wars of Italy between France and Spain and the War of Granada, in which Castile conquered the last Islamic polity in Iberia, were thus rendered equivalent as holy endeavors that afforded opportunities for spiritual salvation through holy war and devotional pilgrimage.

German perceptions of the religious valence of warfare conducted in Italy might be partially attributable to political alliances. Since May 1493, with the enactment of the Treaty of Senlis, Spain had been allied with the Holy Roman Empire through a dual marriage alliance. The treaty was one component of Ferdinand of Aragon's tactic to encircle France by forming alliances with all of France's neighbors. For geopolitical reasons, Emperor Maximilian I (r. 1493–1519) had a vested interest in preventing France from obtaining a position of hegemony in Italy, and at points during his reign the emperor even harbored ambitions of becoming pope. In light of the natural enmity between Emperor Maximilian and the monarchs of France, it is likely that the war in Naples was also portrayed in German lands as a religious obligation.

The pilgrimage destination of Santiago, however, raises further questions. Santiago, or St. James the Apostle, held a particular significance within the kingdom of Castile. During the late Middle Ages he served as the de facto patron saint of the realm, and in the early seventeenth century this association erupted into a dispute over whether Santiago or Teresa of Ávila was the best choice as patron saint for the realm.[69] It is therefore worth asking whether Ferdinand's cause in Naples was understood as Castilian in any way. Ferdinand drew his forces from throughout the peninsular realms, apparently relying on those who, like the *Gran Capitán*, Gonzalo Fernández de Córdoba, had gained military experience fighting for Castile against Granada. Another figure who

distinguished himself in the Italian Wars was the Navarrese military engineer Pedro Navarro, who had a knack for planting mines that, when detonated, would topple fortress walls. An anonymous account of the conflict over Naples, written by a Castilian participant, records that as the Spanish troops broke through the walls of the Castel Nuovo in Naples, they cried out, "España! España!"[70] Does this bespeak an early iteration of "Spanish" identity? Is the association between military service in Naples and pilgrimage to Santiago further evidence of this? This proposition cannot be entirely discounted, but aside from the example of the battle cry just cited, there is very little to suggest that there was any protonational sentiment of Spanishness or that this conflict was in any way viewed as Castilian. On the contrary, the kingdom of Naples was incorporated into the Crown of Aragon, and although numerous Castilian veterans of the War of Granada fought in Naples, there is no evidence that this was understood as a Castilian venture. What seems to be at play here is the link between Santiago and acts of holy war, or crusade, against enemies of the faith. Medieval Castilians had developed an association between Santiago and wars against Muslims, an association that had led to the transformation of the apostle into a medieval crusader, Santiago Matamoros, or "Saint James the Moor-slayer." This resonance remained strong into the sixteenth century: when Spanish forces conquered Orán in May 1509, Cardinal Cisneros blessed the city's mosques, transforming them into churches. He dedicated Orán's Friday mosque to "Our Lady of the Incarnation," and another to "the glorious apostle St. James."[71] The latter was clearly meant to recognize the religious valence of this conquest.

The association between Santiago and war against infidels was not, however, a peculiarly Castilian phenomenon. In late medieval Portugal, too, soldiers invoked the aid of the apostle in military engagement with Muslims, a practice Lusitanian forces carried with them as they invaded Africa in the fifteenth century. Gomes Eanes de Zurara, in his chronicle of the Portuguese conquest of Guinea, describes the Portuguese attacking scattered encampments of Berbers in West Africa: "And when our men had come nigh to them, they attacked them very lustily, shouting at the top of their voices 'Portugal' and 'Santiago.'" On another occasion, the Portuguese shouted, "St. James," "St. George," and "Portugal" as they attacked.[72] In invoking the aid of St. George, patron saint of Portugal, and of Santiago, the Portuguese soldiers made their assault one with national as well as confessional resonances.

In the war for control for Naples, we see this exact practice replicated. An anonymous Castilian account of the Spanish conquest of Naples records a speech Gonzalo Fernández de Córdoba, the *Gran Capitán*, putatively delivered to bolster his troops' morale: "Have faith in God, for when fighting for a

just cause, as we most assuredly are, a very few are capable of defeating a great host. Think of the goodness of the king and queen whom we serve and of the great justice they have in this war in which we fight, and call on Santiago, and you may be certain that we will emerge victorious!"[73] If Santiago was associated with war against enemies of the faith, then in the case of the war in Naples, when both belligerent parties were Catholic, why did the captain apparently invoke his name, and by what rationale did soldiers combine their military service with pilgrimage to Santiago? It is possible that the German soldiers might have understood their service in Naples as a defense of Christendom against an Islamic threat, in the form of the Ottoman Empire. In other words, through the restoration of peace and stability to Italy and the expulsion of the French aggressors, those who fought for Spain were acting to shore up Italy against the possibility of a Turkish assault. From a logical standpoint, this is not precisely the same as claiming that acts of war against the French were acts of holy war, but that they served a greater purpose of defending the Christian republic against enemies of the faith, thereby qualifying as a holy war even if the martial actions themselves were undertaken against fellow Christians. The choice of pilgrimage destination likely reflects the perception that southern Italy formed a frontier zone on the front lines in a struggle against the forces of Islam, as embodied by the Ottoman Empire. The pilgrimage destination of Santiago suggests that fighting for the Spanish cause, as opposed to the French, was understood in certain other parts of Europe as action undertaken to protect Christendom against a potential Turkish invasion. The coalescence of these factors served to imbue the war for Naples with the aura of a holy war, a conflict that met Alonso de Cartagena's definition of a *guerra divinal*. In some sense, the Spanish Crown's choice of rhetoric through which to portray the Italian Wars represented a transposition of the locus of crusading warfare from southern Iberia to southern Italy. In both locales, the Spanish Crown claimed to act as a bulwark against the Islamic world, and this served to cement the legitimacy of Spanish actions in both settings.

"Semi-Turks," or the Transmogrification of the French[74]

Ferdinand ultimately proved successful in his bid to incorporate the kingdom of Naples into the Crown of Aragon. After ruling the southern Italian kingdom in its entirety from 1504, in 1510 he finally procured from Pope Julius II the formal papal investiture to Naples and Jerusalem. The terms of the investiture obligated Ferdinand to assist the Church if it was threatened by any

force whatsoever.[75] The role of *defensor ecclesia*, of course, was one that Ferdinand had been propagating on his own behalf for at least thirty years, going back to his response to the Ottoman attacks on Rhodes and Otranto in 1480. Soon after winning the formal investiture to Naples and Jerusalem, Ferdinand would be called on to uphold the stipulation that he defend the Church, and against an all-too-familiar foe.

Already by early 1511, rumors circulated that Louis XII of France (r. 1498–1515) was preparing an army to invade Italy, possibly to make war on Pope Julius II and perhaps with the end of marching further south and attempting to wrest Naples from Spanish control. This, at least, is how Peter Martyr expressed his concerns in a letter he wrote from Seville, in which he claimed to have gleaned his information from his close friend Jerónimo de Cabanillas, Spain's ambassador to the French court.[76]

Acting on this suspicion, Ferdinand gave instructions to Fabricio de Colonna, one of his military commanders in Italy, to lead a force north from Naples with three hundred lances. Well aware of what it meant to lead troops against a fellow Christian power, in March 1511 Ferdinand wrote to his ambassador in Rome, Jerónimo de Vich, giving him instructions to orchestrate a universal Christian peace, and also offering a defense of his decision to have Colonna march north. Ferdinand articulated his defense of his decision on three grounds. First, his activation of a fighting force was done primarily in defense of the pope and the Church, he wrote. Among Ferdinand's other reasons were the fact that he claimed to have knowledge that Louis XII of France had his sights on Naples (meaning that Ferdinand's preemptive action was actually an act of defense). Finally, Ferdinand suggested that sending Colonna north was in fact intended to keep the peace by creating conditions conducive to the establishment of a general Christian peace. In an extraordinary claim, Ferdinand argued that if the French were not dissuaded from pursuing their ambitions in Italy, this would pose a grave danger and the French would "work to destroy all of Christendom."[77] The accusation that the French would "work to destroy all of Christendom" echoes earlier rumors of an imminent Ottoman invasion that circulated in Italy during the 1470s (see chapter 2). When leveled against France's *Roi Très Chrétien* this charge appears incongruous, but it is of a piece with the rhetorical strategy the Spanish Crown had employed against France since the autumn of 1494.

Two months later, in May 1511, French troops captured Bologna from papal control. The same month, with the backing of Louis XII of France, a group of disaffected cardinals called a Church council, to be convened at Pisa on September 21, 1511.[78] The *Conciliabulum* of Pisa, as it was known, was ostensibly aimed at Church reform, and its adherents asserted that Julius II had failed to hold

regular councils as he was bound to do.[79] In an echo of the great councils of the fifteenth century, such as Constance and Basle, conciliarists defended the sovereignty of the council and the right of the council to act on behalf of the *corpus mysticum* of the Church.[80] There had long been suspicion that the French desired to remove Julius II and to install a pope who would be more favorable to them. In March 1510, Ferdinand wrote to Jerónimo de Vich, his ambassador in Rome, expressing his belief that Louis XII aimed to seize everything he could in the temporal and spiritual realms.[81] Two months later, again in a letter to Vich, Ferdinand referred to rumors that the French planned to depose Julius II and install a French pope.[82] Such a move, if successful, would have brought Louis XII an extraordinary degree of power in European affairs, making France a true hegemon, and in a letter to Ramón de Cardona, Ferdinand asserted that the French king aimed at universal monarchy.[83] Diplomatic efforts to reduce tensions were ineffective, and in March 1511 Ferdinand wrote to Vich in Rome describing Louis XII as a threat to the Church and to all Christian princes.[84] These suspicions surrounding the French king's objectives and ambitions must surely be the contextual background against which to read Ferdinand's letter to Vich, cited above, in which he asserted that Louis XII would work to destroy all of Christendom. In the months leading up to the *Conciliabulum* of Pisa, it was known throughout Europe that one of the principal aims of the council was to sanction Pope Julius II and, indeed, when proceedings finally got under way in October, those assembled suspended the pope.[85]

Official Spanish reactions to the calling of the *Conciliabulum* of Pisa were quick and uniform in their condemnation. Ferdinand wrote to his ambassador in France, Jerónimo de Cabanillas, seeking to dissuade Louis XII from offering his support for the council. Just as the conciliarists did, Ferdinand appealed to the notion of the *corpus mysticum* of Christendom, emphasizing to Louis the importance of maintaining the unity of "todo el cuerpo de la xpiandad." Ferdinand wrote that the risk of a schism arising from the council worried him and that another schism would be the worst form of "pestilence" that Christendom could face.[86] None of these diplomatic overtures was effective at dissuading the cardinals who convoked the *Conciliabulum* of Pisa or the French king. As Louis XII readied an army to invade Italy in late summer 1511, French support for the council about to convene was interpreted as a sign that Louis held designs of conquering the whole of the Italian Peninsula, Church lands included.

Pope Julius II responded by calling for a general church council, to be convened in April 1512. This eventually became the Fifth Lateran Council (1512–1517). On August 23, 1511, Peter Martyr wrote to a friend in his native Lombardy. Martyr's letter portrayed the situation in Italy in terms similar to those Ferdinand himself employed. Martyr discussed the French king's ambitions in Italy,

positing that he aimed to make himself lord of the whole peninsula. "In contrast," he wrote, Ferdinand would "defend with determination the cause of the Church."[87] Meanwhile, other partisans of the Spanish cause bemoaned the threat of schism, linking this, yet again, to the menace of the Ottoman Empire. In an official opinion written for Ferdinand, a jurist named Illescas warned of the threat the *Conciliabulum* of Pisa posed to church unity, while voicing his support for the pope's plans to hold a general council. In the opinion, dated August 28, 1511, Illescas wrote "it is well known that the Turkish people are frightened, indeed terrified, whenever they hear that the universal church is joined together in celebrating a general council."[88] In a letter to Ferdinand, Julius II portrayed the rift as an obstacle to the crusading objectives that ought to galvanize Christian rulers: "If Christian princes would join their forces under a single command in order to attack the Turks and the Safavids, who are fighting each other, or the sons of the Turkish tyrant Bayezid who are battling for their paternal inheritance, then they [the Christians] could easily expel them [the Turks] from Europe and reconquer and secure the Holy Land of Jerusalem."[89] These documents demonstrate the clear link their writers drew between the threat to Christian unity from within and the existential threat embodied in the Ottoman Empire.

What is more, Ferdinand and others harped on the fact that the Aragonese king had abandoned plans to lead a North African crusade in person to address the threat of church schism posed by Pisa. The jurist Illescas, in his *parecer* on the matter, stressed the cost and planning Ferdinand had already invested in the African crusade and how, at the last minute, he had suspended everything to travel "from the ends of Andalucía all the way to Burgos" in order to work to avert a schism.[90] In a sermon likely delivered in November 1511, the bishop of Oviedo made the same point, as did the bishop of Astorga in a legal *parecer* prepared in December 1511.[91] Ferdinand included an audacious reminder of this fact in the instructions he prepared for his ambassadors who were to attend the Fifth Lateran Council. In the item pertaining to the desirability of forging a universal Christian peace at the council, the king ordered his ambassadors to remind those present of all that he had abandoned when he suspended his plans for the conquest of "all of Africa" to go and assist the pope in the recovery of Bologna.[92] Most of these documents represent Louis XII's support for the *Conciliabulum* of Pisa as diverting Christian resources from a holy war against enemies of the faith, an undertaking that presumably would have been a more "noble" endeavor. In the sermon of Villaquirán by the bishop of Oviedo, however, we see a clear portrayal of war against the French as equally meritorious: "Set in motion those large armies you had prepared to lead against the infidels and turn them against the false faithful, who are even worse enemies of

Christendom as they are so deeply embedded at its core."[93] This represents the French, not as harming the Christian commonwealth because their actions distract from crusades against North Africa or the Ottoman Empire, but as themselves posing just as grave a threat as the Muslims.

In October 1511, Spain, the papacy, and Venice entered into a Holy League to recover Bologna for the papacy and to ensure mutual military assistance.[94] In April 1512, a joint Spanish-papal force met the French army at Ravenna. The French routed their opponents in a horrific battle whose name became synonymous with the atrocities of the Italian Wars. Following the battle, a papal nuncio wrote a letter to Pope Julius II detailing the carnage and describing the actions of the French victors as worse than those of the Turks when they conquered Constantinople:

> They have despoiled monasteries and churches, and have made off with chalices and crucifixes, throwing the Eucharist and relics on the ground and stealing the silver. Never did the Turks commit such acts of cruelty when they conquered Constantinople and Negroponte.[95]

In the portrayal of these episodes of intra-Christian warfare, we can see that the Turks are always present—even when they are not! By the late fifteenth century, Italian humanists curious about the origins of the Turks had written extensively about their "barbaric" origins as nomads in Central Asia.[96] By the time of the Battle of Ravenna, many Europeans used "Turk" as a synonym for "barbarian." Thus, the repeated comparisons of the French to the Turks cast the French as inherent threats to European civil society. This representation of the Battle of Ravenna, then, marked a continuation of the understanding of the Italian Wars as a holy war. The external threat from the Ottoman Empire persisted, and partisans of the papacy and of Spain argued that not only did French actions distract from a pan-Christian crusade against the Turks but the French themselves posed just as great a threat.

In June, in the wake of the Battle of Ravenna, Ferdinand wrote to Jerónimo de Vich in Rome, instructing him to encourage the pope to employ "spiritual arms" against the French.[97] Within weeks, Julius issued the bull *Etsi ii* (July 21, 1512), excommunicating the French and arguing that it is *like infidels* to work against the unity of the Church (emphasis mine).[98] In the bull *Pastor ille*, issued the same day, Julius accused Louis XII of "violating the unity and purity of the Catholic Church through his schismatic intentions." Julius went on to declare the schismatics, along with all those who assist them, excommunicate, stating that their goods and states would pass to whomsoever should take possession of them.[99] The clause pertaining to France's allies here applied to the king and queen of Navarre, Juan and Catalina Albret, as they had supported Louis XII

and the *Conciliabulum* of Pisa. The kingdom of Navarre, then, was for the taking of the ruler who should first occupy it. Several months later, Julius confirmed the forfeiture of goods in a subsequent bull, *Exigit Contumacium* (February 18, 1513), in which he called Juan and Catalina "children of perdition" for the support they had given to the Council of Pisa, and in which he explicitly wrote that whomsoever should seize Navarre would do so with all the rights of one seizing lands in the *most just and most holy of wars* (emphasis mine).[100] There was, of course, a precedent of crusades against Christians.[101] These, however, had generally been conducted against those, like the Cathars, accused of adhering to a particular heresy.[102] In the case of Julius II's bulls against the French and Navarrese royals, it was their alleged status as schismatics that rendered them objects of a crusade.

The series of bulls Julius issued beginning in July 1512 made Navarre ripe for the taking, to be licitly held by the first prince who should occupy the kingdom. As it happened, the Duke of Alba, at Ferdinand's instruction, launched an invasion of the Pyrenean kingdom on July 21, 1512, the very day Julius issued *Etsi ii*. Clearly news of the papal bull could not have reached Spain by then and, in fact, Ferdinand had long held an interest in acquiring Navarre. It seems that for a number of years prior even to the *Conciliabulum* of Pisa he had examined ways he might stake a claim to the kingdom.

Decades earlier, within two years of Ferdinand's inheriting the Crown of Aragon, the Castilian courtier Diego Rodríguez de Almela composed a letter in which he celebrated the young monarchs who now together ruled Castile and Aragon. Rodríguez de Almela expressed his wish to see Ferdinand and Isabella ruling over the whole of "Spain," which included by his definition not only Aragon and Castile, but also Portugal and North Africa. He argued, too, in favor of Ferdinand and Isabella's rights to Gascony, the duchy of Guienne, and Navarre.[103] In the early 1500s, Ferdinand explored a number of ways he might stake a claim to the Pyrenean kingdom. By early 1509, he had apparently dispatched Pere Miquel Carbonell to investigate the marriage capitulations of his father Juan II of Aragon (r. 1458–1479) and Blanche of Navarre.[104] Just four days after Carbonell wrote to Ferdinand conveying that his quest had turned up nothing, the king's secretary, Miguel Pérez de Almazán, received a letter from Ferdinand's natural son, Alonso de Aragon, the archbishop of Zaragoza. In the letter, Alonso asserted that Navarre belonged to Ferdinand by right, and the archbishop even defended his father's right to conquer the kingdom with arms.[105] Beyond these dynastic ties that Ferdinand sought to exploit, it is also worth noting that Ferdinand's second wife, Germana de Foix, was a collateral member of the house of Foix, meaning that under certain conditions there existed the possibility that she could advance her own claim to the throne of Navarre.[106]

All of this evidence, then, demonstrates that Ferdinand had long been ruminating over the possibility of conquering Navarre. The papal bulls that Julius II issued in response to the convocation of the Council of Pisa provided Ferdinand with precisely the opportunity he sought. Under the leadership of the Duke of Alba, the small Pyrenean kingdom was quickly conquered in 1512 in what, thanks to the sanction afforded by Julius II's bulls, met the criteria for a *just and holy* war.

There were significant differences between the Franco-Spanish conflict to control Naples and that to control Navarre. Navarre was not a fief of the papacy, and it clearly did not stand on the front lines against Muslim invasions from the eastern or the southern Mediterranean in the same way Naples did. To argue that the struggle for Navarre was a struggle against an external threat to Christendom would have stretched the limits of plausibility. That said, the conflict over Navarre between Valois France and Trastámara Spain nevertheless took on the tenor of a religious war conducted in defense of the Church, in this case against an *internal* threat to the unity of Christendom.

Julius's bulls excommunicating Louis XII of France and Juan and Catalina of Navarre, and depriving them of their goods, titles, and states, drew on the understanding inherent in the notion of the papal monarchy, of the pope as *dominus mundi*, possessing the right to dispense lands anywhere in the world, even, in rare circumstances, those under Christian rule. In this particular case, the justification was achieved by invoking the argument that those Christians' schismatic behavior made their lands equivalent to infidel lands, to be occupied by whoever should capture them in a just war.

This was the essence of the argument the eminent jurist Juan López de Palacios Rubios crafted defending Spanish claims to Navarre, in a text titled *De iusticia et iure obtentionis ac retentionis regni Nauarre*.[107] It is not clear when exactly Palacios Rubios was tasked with drawing up a legal treatise to defend Spain's claims to Navarre, but Ferdinand likely gave him instructions to do so sometime in 1512, perhaps around the same time the jurist was commissioned to draw up a defense of Spanish claims in the Americas (which resulted in the tract *De insulis*, examined in chapter 4). In *De insulis*, Palacios Rubios refers to his composition on Navarre, while in *De iustitia* he refers to his *tractatu insularum maris oceani*, suggesting that he was at work on both texts simultaneously during the years 1513–1514.[108]

In *De iustitia et iure*, Palacios Rubios develops an argument that Christian union is to be desired above all else. The jurist here appeals to the understanding of Christendom as a *corpus mysticum*, arguing that the community of all Christian believers, together with the pope, constitutes this mystical body.[109] Palacios Rubios, however, makes it clear that this is not an egalitarian body.

Within the *corpus mysticum*, the pope occupies a position of authority: drawing on John 10:16, he writes, "Fiat unum ovile et unus pastor, qui est Romanus pontifex."[110] As the jurist did in *De insulis*, he argued that the pope held the position of *dominus mundi* through his status as the legitimate heir of St. Peter. This gave the pope universal jurisdiction in the temporal as well as the spiritual realms.[111] From this position, the jurist argued that popes therefore held the right to depose kings and deprive them of their realms, a position he defended through historical examples, including that of Pope Zachary's deposition of the Frankish king Childeric III and installation of Pepin the Short (r. 751–768), father of Charlemagne.[112]

Having asserted those rights for the pope, Palacios Rubios went on to address the matter of cardinals of the Church who participate in general councils not called by the pope. Here the jurist reached a strongly anti-conciliar position, suggesting that cardinals who participate in such councils are schismatics and guilty of *lèse majesté* (*lese maiestatis rei*).[113] Diplomatic correspondence roughly contemporaneous to Palacios Rubios's *De iustitia et iure* shows that Ferdinand and his ambassadors were engaged in a concerted effort to portray the French, not as Church reformers, but as schismatics whose support of the *Conciliabulum* of Pisa rent the fabric of the Christian commonwealth. In September 1513, Ferdinand wrote to Jerónimo de Vich in Rome, describing the French as violators of peace and fomenters of schism.[114] In 1514, Ferdinand continued to justify his actions against France through the French king's support of the *Conciliabulum* of Pisa against the papacy.[115] Time and again, the Aragonese king interpreted French royal support for the *conciliabulum* as evidence that the French posed a threat to Christendom and sought to seize control of the Church.[116]

This diplomatic offensive took place at the same time that Palacios Rubios composed *De iustitia et iure*, and in that tract the jurist presented a powerful argument about non-papally sanctioned Church councils as schismatic. In Book 4 of the treatise, Palacios Rubios defined schism as a sacrilege by appealing to the Old Testament as an authority. From this premise, he then argued that the commission of sacrilege means that schismatics can be deprived of their goods and dignities.[117] The Church, through the person of the pope, has the right to instigate war against schismatics.[118] What is more, argued Palacios Rubios, "the pope can offer crusade indulgences to those who take up the cross and make war against the schismatics and rebels, just as Pope Julius did in the case that concerns us here."[119] Just as one would expect in a holy war against enemies of the Catholic faith or in defense of the Church, "those who die in this type of war are martyrs."[120]

Palacios Rubios must have known that he might encounter opposition to this line of reasoning whereby he crafted an argument defining certain wars between Christians as holy. Already in the case of the Franco-Spanish war for control of Naples we have seen such hostilities imbued with the status of a crusade. And yet, this position did not meet with universal acceptance among Catholics. Here we are reminded of Alonso de Cartagena's distinction that, although a war between two Christian parties might be just, it does not qualify as a holy war. An anonymous account of the messy Mediterranean geopolitics of 1510–1511 records (ca. May–June of 1511) that a force of Spaniards expecting to attack Tunis that summer had just learned that the French had invaded Italy. Our source informs us that this caused the Christian soldiers much grief, "as they desired to go to Barbary, and not to Bologna to fight Christians."[121] This suggests that some Christians, at least, were unpersuaded by the repeated Trastámara portrayals of warfare against Valois France as holy. The matter of taking up the cross against fellow Christians (even schismatic Christians) clearly concerned Palacios Rubios, and he addressed this pointedly in the text, claiming that it is licet to do so when there exists someone who acts against the unity of the *ecclesia*, as had the French king, in this case.[122]

Finally, upon reaching Book 5, Palacios Rubios examined the particulars of the case of Navarre. Based on the reasoning he had presented in Books 1–4, the jurist suggested that Juan and Catalina met the criteria for being schismatics and that therefore it was just to deprive the monarchs of Navarre of their rights to their realm.[123] Palacios Rubios argued that all monarchs are required to defend the Church.[124] Not only had Juan and Catalina not defended the Church; they had actively conspired against it and the pope by offering assistance to the king of France, the principle author of the schismatic *Conciliabulum* of Pisa.[125] Palacios Rubios noted that Juan and Catalina had failed to allow Spanish troops to pass through Navarre to join up with English forces north of the Pyrenees attempting to recoup the duchy of Guienne (to which King Henry VIII of England held a competing dynastic claim). Invoking a doctrine justifying violence against any infidels who impede the passage of crusading forces on their way to Jerusalem, Palacios Rubios declared Juan and Catalina guilty of the same crime.[126]

In Book 6, the last of his tract, Palacios Rubios presented a very different sort of argument from that that had constituted the bulk of Books 1–5. In Book 6, rather than concerning himself with the criteria for defining a war between Christians as holy, the jurist instead used historical exegesis to argue for Navarre being an integral component of the realm of Castile. Here the jurist elucidated the ancient history of Navarre, arguing that it had constituted part

of late antique Visigothic Hispania. The Goths, he wrote, had brought all of Hispania under their rule, of which Navarre was a not insignificant part.[127] Here we see the same legal argument Rodríguez de Almela had made some thirty years before (cited earlier). Indeed, this was a common and widely held understanding of the body-politic of Hispania, particularly among the *letrados* of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Many writers interpreted the marriage between Ferdinand of Aragon and Isabella of Castile according to this understanding of the state. Their union was thus cast as part of the process of reconstituting ancient Hispania. Antonio de Nebrija, for example, described the process whereby the pieces that made up the body of Spain had been brought together and made whole again under Ferdinand and Isabella. Peter Martyr conceived of the body of Spain as having been reconstituted in its entirety, with the exception of the two "tiny fingers" that were Portugal and Navarre.[128]

Palacios Rubios's motive in including this final book in his juridical tract is not clear. Presumably this served to justify Ferdinand's decision (at the *Cortes* of Burgos in 1515) to append Navarre to the Crown of Castile, rather than incorporate it into the Spanish monarchy as an independent kingdom (as he had done with Naples, for instance) or to link it to the Crown of Aragon, to which it had been linked through dynastic ties as recently as the 1460s. In addition to this consideration, the dynastic argument inherent in Palacios Rubios's invocation of the political rights that were the legacy of Visigothic Hispania was one way to get around the mercurial shifts in papal politics. This tactic, as we shall see in chapter 4, was one he employed in crafting Spanish claims to Africa as well. Pope Julius II died, and Leo X was elected his successor, likely while Palacios Rubios was at work on *De iustitia et iure*. Perhaps uncertain whether Leo would confirm the bulls Julius had issued against Juan and Catalina Albret, Palacios Rubios buttressed his legal argument by presenting two distinct lines of justification for Castile's rights in Navarre. We know that this possibility was a real concern, as in April 1513 Ferdinand wrote to his ambassador in Rome, instructing him to get Leo X to confirm all previously issued papal bulls, pertaining to *spiritual as well as temporal* matters.[129] As it turned out, Ferdinand's plea was successful.[130] Palacios Rubios, however, surely knew he could never be too careful in these affairs.

Ferdinand was able to present himself as a champion of the Church, a guardian of Christendom against all threats, be they the Ottoman Empire or even France's *Roi très chrétien*. Pope Julius II appealed to precisely this representation of the Aragonese king when, in 1510, he opted to invest Ferdinand rather than Louis XII of France with the title to the kingdoms of Naples and Jerusalem, praising Ferdinand for his service to the Church and for his conquests in

Muslim North Africa: the pope referred to Ferdinand's contributions and service to the Church, including bringing in the "wild peoples" of the Indies under the banner of the cross. Along related lines, Julius also cited Ferdinand's taking up the war of Africa, pointing to the recent Spanish conquests of Orán and of Bougie as evidence of this ongoing service to Christendom.[131] At the level of royal discourse, the Italian Wars came to transcend the matter of establishing hegemony within the Italian Peninsula. Drawing once again on Brian Catlos's model for interfaith exchanges, here in the context of intrafaith proclamations we see a similar resort to the ecumenian register when pressing claims before the papal curia. The dynastic dispute over Naples between the houses of Valois and Trastámara was transformed into a referendum on the survival of Christendom in the face of the ascendant Ottoman Empire, a fact reflected in the rhetoric that the French and Spanish sides deployed throughout the conflict. Thus, what was at root the continuation of a centuries-old dynastic struggle, an epilogue to the "Two-Hundred Years' War," took on the aspect of a holy war for the defense of Christendom.

Given that the investiture to the kingdom of Naples was granted by the pope, we must view the supreme pontiff as the principal (albeit by no means the only) audience for the claims and arguments examined in this chapter. When Julius II invested Ferdinand with the title to Naples and Jerusalem, this might be considered confirmation of the efficacy of Ferdinand's (and his advisers') discursive choices. The representation of the French king that developed during the first decade of the Italian Wars, as being just as great a threat to the *respublica christiana* as were the Turks, is one that proved so effective that it continued in contexts that were in fact quite distinct from the circumstances presented by the Neapolitan dispute. This was, as we have seen, precisely the argument to which Ferdinand appealed in the conflict over the *Conciliabulum* of Pisa and the rights to the kingdom of Navarre. In the case of Naples, the kingdom was technically a fief of the papacy, meaning that the pope could, at least in theory, deprive or invest the temporal ruler of his choice as king. Navarre, however, was different, and yet, nevertheless, Ferdinand was able to assert his claim due to the papacy's having declared excommunicate anyone who colluded with the French king. David Nirenberg has noted the ways in which medieval claims of sovereignty frequently hinged on the articulation of threats, internal as well as external, to Christian society.[132] In most cases, accusations of the threats presented were leveled against religious minorities or subalterns—Jews, Muslims, or Christian heretics. In the case of the Trastámara-Valois conflicts in Italy and in Navarre, we see Ferdinand and his advisers making such claims of sovereignty, but based on the perceived threat posed by an entire kingdom.

While the application of the language that Julius II, Ferdinand of Aragon, and Juan López de Palacios Rubios employed against Louis XII of France and to the monarchs of Navarre might strike us as a cynical cloak for ulterior motives, such language must also have been persuasive enough of the time that it remained effective. In other words, even if this language had the potential to be used cynically, it also had the potential to be understood sincerely; otherwise it would have ceased to operate effectively, and monarchs, diplomats, and jurists would have devised new strategies for asserting claims. The conditions that gave this political vocabulary of Christian universalism such weight were those elucidated in chapters 1 and 2, in particular Western European anxieties about the ascendant Ottoman Empire. The Latin Christian perception of the Turks as an existential threat on the doorstep of Italy resulted in the transformation of the war to control Naples into one that qualified as a holy war—a *guerra divinal*, to use Alonso de Cartagena's nomenclature. What is truly extraordinary here is the manner in which Navarre, which was not under the same Turkish threat as Naples, was nevertheless transformed into a similarly holy war between two Christian kingdoms.

Throughout this series of conflicts with the house of Valois, Ferdinand found it expedient to articulate expansionist claims (to Naples and to Navarre) by portraying himself as a selfless Christian prince who acted with the well-being of the Christian republic as his highest goal. Ferdinand found a faithful ally in Juan López de Palacios Rubios, who crafted for the king a legal treaty that gave a firm grounding to the claim that Spanish wars with France were not only just but holy. This approach to making political claims was effective enough that it swayed several popes to the side of the Aragonese king. In the context of the wider Mediterranean, however, Spanish forces in other locales were simultaneously engaged in wars with Muslim states. These conflicts, while fundamentally different than those with Catholic France, nevertheless raised similar questions about when military aggression could be justified, the criteria for a holy war, and the rights of the papacy to dispense lands. Chapter 4 addresses these matters in the context of the early sixteenth-century Maghrib.

CHAPTER 4

The African Horizon

In his treatise *De insulis oceanis* (*On the Islands of the Ocean-Sea*), completed ca. 1512–1515, the jurist and law professor Juan López de Palacios Rubios cited a prophecy he claimed originated with the Libyan Sibyl, Phemonoe, the prophetic priestess who presided over the Zeus-Ammon oracle at Siwa Oasis in the Libyan Desert. Palacios Rubios wrote that the oracle had stated that a "lion cub" would appear in Spain, a ruler similar in faith and deeds to the Biblical King David. The new David would emerge from Spain to conquer all of Africa.[1] Palacios Rubios included an extensive analysis of the details of the prophecy, arguing that all evidence indicated that the "lion cub," the new David, would come from the royal house of Spain and that this clearly pointed to King Ferdinand of Aragon (r. 1479–1516) or one of his descendants.[2]

Palacios Rubios's use of the future tense in this passage seems to anticipate a conquest of Africa. In analyzing the prophecy of the lion cub, he addressed Ferdinand directly: "This lion cub will conquer Africa, something that, in my opinion, Your Majesty would have already done had it not been for the lamentable schism that is currently dividing the Roman Church."[3] Palacios Rubios was here referring to the *Conciliabulum* of Pisa (1511–1512), a council called by a collection of prelates who opposed Pope Julius II (r. 1503–1513) and who were supported by King Louis XII of France (r. 1498–1515).[4] While the jurist lamented that Ferdinand had been impeded from conquering all of Africa,

his tract *De insulis* in fact appeared at a moment when the Spanish crowns of Aragon and Castile had been engaged in their African crusade, the so-called *empresa de África*, for at least fifteen years. In the 1490s, with the conclusion of the conquest of Tenerife (1496), Castile consolidated its control over the Canary Islands as well as the African mainland lying opposite, between Cape Chaunar and Cape Bojador.[5] The conquest of the Mediterranean shore of the Maghrib was split between Castile and Aragon, with Castile taking Melilla (1497), Mers el-Kébir (Mazalquivir) (1505), Cazaza (1506), El Peñón de Vélez de la Gomera (1508), and Orán (1509), and Aragon incorporating Bougie (1510), Algiers (1510), and Tripoli (1510). The two crowns thus controlled much of the 2,500 miles of coastline between Cape Bojador on the Atlantic and Tripoli (Libya) on the Mediterranean. At the moment Palacios Rubios composed *De insulis*, King Ferdinand hoped to extend his string of conquests eastward to Egypt and beyond. Palacios Rubios's exegesis of the "lion cub" prophecy is but a small portion of a lengthier passage in *De insulis* in which he developed a legal argument justifying future conquests in Africa while simultaneously offering an ex post facto defense of conquests that had been achieved up until that point.

Around the time Palacios Rubios wrote *De insulis*, others who were associated with the court of Ferdinand of Aragon wrote about the *empresa de África* in terms that likewise anticipated a series of Spanish victories in Africa as almost inevitable. Peter Martyr is one such example. The Italian humanist had been resident at the Spanish royal court since 1487 and had traveled to Egypt on a diplomatic mission on behalf of Ferdinand and Isabella in 1501–1502, a journey he chronicled in his *Legatio Babilonica*.[6] Martyr's nearly quarter-century presence at court gave him insight into royal policy in a variety of areas. In his personal correspondence, Martyr expressed unbridled enthusiasm for Ferdinand's African enterprise. On August 13, 1510, Martyr composed a letter to his friend Iñigo López de Mendoza, the second Count of Tendilla:

> Concerning Africa, listen to this piece of news, impossible to believe if accounting only for human agency. You will have heard that Tripoli is a city of Barbary, the richest emporium of Africa, defended by impregnable walls and towers, surrounded by sea and land, fortified by nature as well as the artifice of man, and under the rule of the King of Tunis. Leading an armada that departed from the Aeolian Isles, Count Pedro Navarro has arrived at the city and subjugated it.[7]

Five months later Martyr wrote to López de Mendoza again, suggesting that recent conquests, such as those of Orán, Bougie, and Tripoli, augured an imminent Spanish annexation of the entirety of North Africa: "Today we see that the way is being opened so that the Spanish might easily subjugate all of



Map 4. Map of Northwest Africa, ca. 1510

Africa." Martyr saw at work here the powerful forces of history, indicating that the events that had led to the Muslim invasion of Iberia in 711 C.E. were now being reversed, as Christians made incursions into Africa.[8] Martyr's sanguineness was not unusual. Ever since the conquest of Melilla in 1497, Spaniards had interpreted each successive incorporation of another African city or presidio as an integral step in the eventual conquest of all of Africa.[9] Cardinal Francisco Ximénez de Cisneros, who financed and participated in the conquest of Orán, interpreted the victory as the gateway to the conquest of all of Africa and of Jerusalem.[10]

Leaving aside these millenarian expectations, the early sixteenth-century *empresa de África* did represent a novel course of action for the crowns of Castile and Aragon. While Ferdinand's African conquests formed part of his broader Aragonese Mediterranean agenda, during the years following Isabella's death Ferdinand broke sharply with medieval Aragonese precedent. With the financial, material, military, and demographic resources of Castile at hand, Ferdinand was in a position to pursue a more aggressive Mediterranean policy than had his Aragonese predecessors. Under Ferdinand's auspices, Spain sought to establish its sovereignty across territories that encircled the Mediterranean, a development that, had it been entirely successful, would have rendered the sea a Spanish lake. To give one example of the ways in which Ferdinand's reign inaugurated a shift in policy, during the Middle Ages, the Crown of Aragon held consuls in North African trading ports. These worked for the interests of the Catalan and Aragonese merchant communities, but they operated within spaces controlled by sovereign Muslim rulers.[11] During the early 1500s, as Ferdinand directed conquests of strategic points along the North African coast, Aragonese and Castilian forces established areas of Spanish sovereignty on the African mainland, pushing the boundary with sovereign Muslim states into the interior hinterlands. In a sense, this represented a transposition of the terrestrial frontier with an Islamic polity from that with Nasrid Granada (conquered in 1492) across the Sea of Alborán to the Maghrib. This led to wildly optimistic hopes, among European Catholics, that Ferdinand stood on the verge of bringing all of North Africa under his rule.

With hindsight, of course, we know that during the 1520s the Ottoman Empire established regencies at Tripoli, Tunis, and Algiers, thereby checking Spanish advances across the Maghrib. The letters I cite here, however, capture the zeitgeist of the early 1510s, and are emblematic of Spanish participation in what I term the "Mediterranean moment."[12] This period of time, spanning roughly the 1450s through the 1510s, was characterized by a volatile combination of dread at Ottoman westward expansion and unbridled optimism at the prospect of Christian conquests in Africa and the eastern Mediterranean. In-

deed, when viewed from Constantinople (in the midst of the Ottoman internecine dynastic struggles that wracked the reign of Bayezid II, 1481–1512), Spain's rapid conquest of a series of North African presidios (1497–1510), the Aragonese acquisition of the kingdom of Naples (1503), and the Spanish-Venetian victory over the Ottomans at Cefalonia in 1500 must have appeared quite alarming. Just as did the Spaniards, the Ottomans likely viewed their rivals' advances with fear, and this no doubt contributed to the power that apocalyptic prophetic writings held at the Ottoman court.[13] During these decades it was not yet clear, to Iberians or to inhabitants of other Mediterranean polities, that the Spanish monarchy's fortunes lay in the Atlantic. From the Aragonese perspective, the prospect of a Mediterranean empire appeared far more promising than did the beleaguered outposts of Castilians on Hispaniola and Cuba. Throughout the reigns of Ferdinand and Isabella (1474–1516), and particularly during the dozen years that Ferdinand survived Isabella (1504–1516), the Mediterranean was a sphere of utmost geopolitical importance, and the African coast was a key component of that strategic vision.

The acquisition of cities and presidios along the Maghribi coast buttressed Castile's recent conquest of Nasrid Granada (1492) as well as the Crown of Aragon's incorporation of the kingdom of Naples (completed in December 1503) and served as a defensive bulwark for Aragon's island possessions of Sicily, Sardinia, and Malta. Indeed, the Maghrib was at times a point of contention, and always a zone of strategic importance, in the Spanish Crown's vexed relations with Portugal, France, and the Ottoman Empire. Ferdinand of Aragon's energies were so focused on the *empresa de Africa* that, in 1510, Peter Martyr wrote, "For the King, the conquest of Africa constitutes an obsession."[14] Spain's sixteenth-century African crusade is often interpreted as a function of the extraordinary influence Cardinal Francisco Ximénez de Cisneros wielded, particularly during his two stints as regent of Castile. To be sure, Cisneros did prioritize Spanish conquests and evangelization efforts in the Maghrib.[15] But the churchman was in fact one in a constellation of figures in early sixteenth-century Spain for whom a Christian conquest of North Africa was a priority. Ferdinand himself was one of these, and his designs on African conquests are inextricable from his broader Mediterranean pretensions, particularly his interests in Sicily and Naples.[16]

This is understandable when one considers that, for the Aragonese king, the incorporation of Africa into his monarchy could be viewed as the legitimate recovery of lost patrimony, a fact of which Palacios Rubios reminded the king when he wrote, "Africa, in the time of Saint Augustine, bishop of Hippo, was under the dominion of the Christian Kings of Spain. . . . Later this land was occupied, as it currently is, by the infidels and it ought to be

FIGURE 4.1. Cardinal Cisneros disembarking at Mers el-Kébir, prior to the Spanish conquest of Orân. Fresco painted by Juan de Borgoña, 1514, in the Capilla Mozárabe of the Toledo Cathedral Copyright: Cabildo Primado, Toledo. Photograph by David Blázquez.

subjugated by one who comes from a royal line."[17] With this pithy statement, Palacios Rubios advanced Ferdinand's claim to Africa on two grounds: the assertion that Africa belonged to Ferdinand on patrimonial grounds, and a religious argument qualifying Ferdinand's *empresa de África* as a just war of recuperation against the usurping forces of Islam.

Palacios Rubios's reference to late antique Africa having been under the rule of the Christian kings of Spain appears in *De insulis*, in the same section in which the author cites the sibylline prophecy about the lion cub. Palacios Rubios's primary objective in *De insulis*—and the vast bulk of the treatise is

devoted to this—is to craft a legal argument in support of Spanish claims to the islands of the Caribbean. At numerous points, however, the jurist addresses Spanish claims in a variety of Old World locales, particularly Granada, Africa, and the Holy Land. Palacios Rubios introduces these cases as part of a broader discussion of the criteria necessary for a just war against non-Christian peoples. The inclusion of these Old World examples in a text examining the "islands of the ocean-sea" demonstrates the imbrication of Mediterranean and Atlantic expansionary ventures in the development of early modern Spanish political thought on conquest and empire. Indeed, as the two expansionary ventures occurred simultaneously, Spanish experiences in the two theaters mutually informed one another, and at times, as in Palacios Rubios's *De insulis*, the two enterprises were even addressed in the same text.

The two processes, however, were not precisely analogous. Although both enterprises could be (and often were) represented as religious endeavors that served to extend the boundaries of Christendom, Africa occupied a quite distinct place in Spanish political thought, due to the history of both Christian and Islamic periods of rule there. In the pages that follow, I analyze a variety of arguments Spaniards deployed in support of their claims to Africa, paying particular attention to those put forth by Palacios Rubios, whose juridical tracts played an integral part in Spain's imperial project under Ferdinand and Isabella.[18] In addition to considering the religious and secular valences of these arguments, I also analyze the ways treaties of capitulation were negotiated with North African rulers, revealing disjunctures between legal and rhetorical claims, and the practical demands of conquest in an environment that was (by comparison with the Caribbean) relatively familiar and simultaneously more challenging.

Palacios Rubios's reference to fifth-century Africa having been under the dominion of the Christian kings of Spain provides a good point of entry into this discussion. In deploying his patrimonial argument that Spanish rule over Africa in late antiquity justified Ferdinand's political projects in the sixteenth century, Palacios Rubios drew on assertions of dynastic continuity between the royal house of Castile and the late antique Visigoths who ruled from Toledo. This was a tradition with an ancient pedigree by the time Palacios Rubios composed *De insulis*. This approach to Castilian dynastic history, known as the Gothic thesis, originated in late ninth-century Asturias, where a series of three chronicles, known today as the Asturian cycle, asserted that the Asturian kings were the descendants and legitimate heirs of the Visigothic kings of Hispania.[19] These claims of dynastic continuity were inherited and further developed by royal chroniclers in León and subsequently Castile, as each of these polities absorbed and superseded its predecessor. The Gothic thesis, as

a mode of Iberian dynastic history, was almost entirely a Castilian phenomenon. On rare occasions an Aragonese or Portuguese chronicle represented the royal houses of those realms as descended from the Visigothic monarchy, but for all intents and purposes this was a peculiarly Castilian approach to medieval dynastic history.

Chroniclers employed the Gothic thesis as a means of asserting Castilian primacy among the Christian polities of Iberia and to advance territorial claims geared toward projected conquests of Muslim-ruled lands in areas that had once constituted Visigothic Hispania. The Visigoths of late antiquity had established their rule over roughly the bounds of the Roman province of Hispania, including the entirety of the Iberian Peninsula as well as Mauretania Tingitana, which lay across the Strait of Gibraltar in North Africa. Medieval Castilian chroniclers routinely claimed these *trans-fretum* lands, expressing the desirability of effecting the "restoration" of Hispania at its greatest extent.[20]

Castile's Iberian neighbors also aspired to African conquests, and in negotiating distinct zones of conquest, the precedent furnished by late antiquity again came into play. In 1291, Castile and Aragon signed the Treaty of Monteagudo/Soria, dividing the Maghrib into spheres of projected conquest. Monteagudo/Soria employed the boundaries of two ancient Roman provinces: Mauretania Tingitana, or the lands west of the Muluya River (roughly modern Morocco) going to Castile, and Mauretania Caesariense, or lands to east of the Muluya, as far as Bougie or Tunis (roughly modern Algeria and Tunisia), falling to Aragon.[21]

Castile's neighbor to the west, Portugal, also held designs on Africa and, in fact, it was Portugal that inaugurated European incursions into the Maghrib with the 1415 conquest of Ceuta. During the fifteenth century, as Portugal pushed southward along the African Atlantic coastline and westward into the Atlantic (the zone bounded by the Azores, Madeira, and the Canary Islands, dubbed by Fernand Braudel the "Mediterranean Atlantic"), disputes erupted between Portugal and Castile, particularly over the zones to which each Crown claimed rights of conquest in Africa and in the Canary Islands. It was in this context that Castilians adapted the Gothic thesis for juridical purposes as they began to deploy such claims in the adjudication of international disputes over extra-Iberian territories.

In the arbitration of the Luso-Castilian conflict over the Canary Islands at the Council of Basle (1431–1449), the Portuguese King Edward I (r. 1433–1438) wrote to Pope Eugenius IV (r. 1431–1447), asserting that Portuguese rights to the islands were rooted in the kingdom's missionary actions there and its "civilizing" venture.[22] Against this argument, the Castilian delegate to the Council of Basle, Alonso de Cartagena (1384–1456), presented a starkly different line

of reasoning in favor of Castile's claims to the islands. Rather than a religious argument, founded on missionary activity and conversion, Cartagena crafted a case that rested on the claim that the islands rightfully constituted part of the Castilian king's patrimony. Cartagena's argument revolved around the province of Mauretania Tingitana.[23] As we have already seen, Castilian chroniclers had stressed for centuries the fact that Visigothic dominions included this African territory. Cartagena asserted that the Canary Islands constituted part of the province of Tingitana, thus claiming that they were lawfully part of the lands that had been under the rule of Visigothic Hispania. This claim presented a serious obstacle: the indigenous Canary Islanders had apparently been isolated for many centuries and demonstrated virtually no evidence of having had contact with Christian or Islamic civilizations; they certainly betrayed no signs of having once been ruled by the Visigoths.[24] Their technology was Stone Age, and they were particularly susceptible to Old World diseases, an indication of their lack of exposure to the peoples of northwest Africa or southwest Europe.[25] Most significantly, they showed no knowledge of any of the Abrahamic faiths, making them "uncorrupted Gentiles," which was precisely one of the facts to which King Edward appealed in pressing his case in defense of Portuguese missionary activity in the islands.[26]

In light of the fact that there was no vestigial evidence of any remote Visigothic presence in the Canaries, Cartagena was compelled to devise an elaborate legal argument. Islands, Cartagena pleaded, were known to belong to the lands to which they were most proximate; just as the island of Sicily was considered a part of Italy, so the Canary Islands should be considered part of Tingitana.[27] Having thus made the case that the Canaries ought to be considered part of Tingitana, Cartagena argued that the islands (along with the rest of Mauretania Tingitana) rightfully belonged to Castile based on Castile's status as legitimate heir to the Visigothic kingdom of Hispania.[28] Cartagena's argument concerning Castile's rights as successor to the Visigothic kingdom hinged on the claim of uninterrupted lineage connecting the ruling Castilian king (John II, r. 1406–1454) to his Visigothic forbears, a line of dynastic continuity that Cartagena asserted was unbroken from the fifth-century reign of King Theodoric I (r. 418–451), putatively the first Goth to rule in Spain.[29]

The Visigothic kingdom, of course, had been toppled during the Arabo-Berber conquest of the majority of the Iberian Peninsula in 711 C.E. How, then, could claims deriving from an ancient and defunct polity carry any legal weight? Cartagena offered a juridical reasoning for the Castilian king's right to this patrimony, asserting that the rights of the vanquished Visigothic monarchs were transmitted intact to their putative heirs, the kings of Castile. Thus, the legal right to the realm remained, even if the material possession had

been lost.[30] Cartagena's student, the churchman and Spanish envoy to Rome Rodrigo Sánchez de Arévalo (1404–1470), drew on a similar understanding of the perduring rights that inhered in a monarchy when he asserted Castile's status as rightful heir to Hispania. In his *Compendiosa historia Hispanica* (completed and printed at Rome in 1470), Sánchez de Arévalo asserted that all the rights of the title to Hispania were now held by the kings of Castile.[31] None of the political disruptions since the early eighth century could alter (or "break," to use Sánchez de Arévalo's terminology) the rights to this body-politic: "The invading armies could not dissolve the royal rights to the monarchy and to the entirety of the realm and to full juridical authority."[32] In other words, both Cartagena and Sánchez de Arévalo drew on the doctrine underlying the notion of the "king's two bodies": the first Asturian king, Pelayo (r. 718–737 C.E.), should be considered the same legal prince as his predecessors who had ruled Hispania prior to the invasion of 711 C.E. Moreover, the fifteenth-century monarchs, too, held the status of the same legal person as the Visigothic kings.[33]

By comparison with King Edward of Portugal's, Cartagena's argument at Basle was decidedly secular. He did not present Castile's claims to the Canaries as deriving from the fulfillment of a religious mission. In fact, he did not even address the confessional identity of the islanders. Cartagena did describe the islands' inhabitants as living "almost like wild animals."[34] But he employed this descriptor merely to prove that the Canary Islands were the same lands as the Fortunate Isles described by Isidore of Seville. For Cartagena, the islanders' confessional status was apparently inconsequential; he did not accuse them of usurpation or of unjustly occupying the islands, as he asserted the Muslims had Hispania and (mainland) Tingitana. Rather, in Cartagena's patrimonial argument the islanders were, for all intents and purposes, transformed into latent (and presumably unwitting) subjects of the Castilian Crown.[35] The rather secular tenor of Cartagena's argument in favor of Castilian claims to the Canary Islands should be juxtaposed against his discourse for Castilian precedence over England, also delivered at Basle. In his case for Castilian precedence, Cartagena delineated the differences between just war and holy war (discussed at the opening of chapter 3). In doing so, Cartagena argued that the kings of Castile had continually engaged in holy war against enemies of the faith and for the expansion of the bounds of Christendom. Why, then, did Cartagena not employ such an argument here, suggesting that Castile's claims to the Canaries were strengthened by this crusading legacy? Perhaps the answer lies in the fact that the Portuguese representatives at Basle had already made that argument (see the letter from King Edward to Pope Eugenius, cited above). Or, more likely, Cartagena believed that he could make a stronger argument by using the

claim that the Canaries ought rightfully to be considered part of Mauretania Tingitana. After all, the confessional identity of the Canary islanders as Gentiles with apparently no prior exposure to Islam made it more difficult to argue that they were enemies of the faith and that acts of war committed against them might be considered just, let alone holy. Indeed, this very question proved contentious in the debates over Spanish claims to the Gentile-inhabited Americas just a few decades later.

In 1438, the churchmen who adjudicated the Luso-Castilian dispute at Basle issued their ruling, deciding in Castile's favor. Their written statement, presented by the archbishop of Milan, as well as the bishops of Lausanne, Barcelona, and York, concurred with Cartagena's assertion that the islands rightfully constituted part of Tingitana and therefore fell within territories to which John II of Castile could assert a patrimonial claim. To this, though, the churchmen melded the religious argument that the current inhabitants of Tingitana were infidels who had violently occupied the territory, thereby delegitimizing their rule. Since the Canary Islands constituted part of Tingitana, the inhabitants of those islands were painted with the same brush as the Muslim inhabitants of the mainland: "all the lands . . . comprising that part of Hispania formerly called Tingitana, now known as Benamarin, and those adjacent islands, belong to the most serene King of Castile and León, and to his successors, under whose rule they were before the infidels violently occupied them. . . ."[36] In enumerating the territories to which Castile could assert its claim, the churchmen referred to the lands constituting Hispania on both sides of the Strait of Gibraltar currently occupied by the "Saracens and other infidels." Nothing in the churchmen's wording specifically addressed the confessional status of the Canary Islanders (presumably they are understood to be those "other infidels" to whom the document refers), but the crux of the legal reasoning the churchmen deployed was not that war against non-Christians is justified when conducted for the expansion of the faith (a doctrine that could, potentially, have universal application), but that in this quite particular case the Castilian king's claim was valid due to the precedent of Visigothic (Christian) rule in lands once constituting Hispania. This was a ruling based on the Castilian dynasty's assertion that Mauretania Tingitana constituted part of its patrimony, and that fifteenth-century Islamic rule in lands that had once been Visigothic was illegitimate due to the fact that the end of Visogothic rule came about through a process of violent usurpation and occupation.

The Gothic thesis, as articulated by Castilian chroniclers and jurists, operated as a legal argument legitimating Castilian territorial claims to a variety of locales in Iberia, the Maghrib, and the Canary Islands. As such, it was

predicated on the premise that infidel rule (Muslim or pagan) in those lands was illegitimate. It is worth stressing, however, that this was an argument that was *patrimonial* in nature and not solely founded on religious difference. In this respect, it could not have a universal application. It was not *any* Christian prince who had the right to conquer Granada, North Africa, or the Canaries, but exclusively the Castilian king. Moreover, the Gothic thesis could only serve to bolster Castilian claims to lands that could be convincingly proved to have constituted Visigothic Hispania. Castilian monarchs had the right to recuperate lost patrimony and, presumably, the immutable nature of those political rights meant that the Castilian king was not dependent on the papacy for his title to those lands. Thus, in spite of Portugal's claim to be engaged in a civilizing and Christianizing venture, the weight accorded Cartagena's patrimonial argument won the day at Basle.

Rights of Dominion

While the conciliar ruling at Basle had a specific application to Castile's claims to lands formerly under Visigothic rule, the argument the churchmen presented held an oblique relation to a debate that had concentrated the attention of canon lawyers since the thirteenth century. Pope Innocent IV (r. 1243–1254) famously argued that infidels living in accordance with natural law could possess licit *dominium* in lands that had never been under Christian rule. Innocent's student Hostiensis (ca. 1200–1271) disagreed with his teacher on certain points, arguing that with the coming of Christ all worldly *dominium* had passed to Christ who, in turn, bequeathed it to Peter.[37] Thus, Hostiensis held that infidels could not possess *dominium* anywhere, even in lands that had never been under Christian rule.

Fifteenth-century popes generally hewed to a more Hostiensian view and invoked their powers as *dominus mundi* to "donate" lands held by non-Christians to Christian temporal rulers. The best-known example of this occurred in 1493, when Pope Alexander VI (r. 1492–1503) issued a series of five bulls granting the newly encountered islands of the Caribbean to Spain, and then partitioning American and African territories into Castilian and Portuguese zones.[38] In the first of these bulls, *Inter caetera* (May 3, 1493), Alexander stated:

> we . . . give, concede and assign the aforesaid lands and islands in general and in particular, unknown and up to this time discovered by your messengers and to be discovered in the future, which are not established under the actual temporal sovereignty of any Christian Sovereigns by

> the authority of the omnipotent God granted to us in Saint Peter and of the vicariate of Jesus Christ which we are exercising on earth.[39]

The next day Alexander VI issued another version of *Inter caetera* that included the following variant passage, offering slightly more geographical specificity regarding the zone that would go to Spain:

> we . . . give, concede and assign all islands and mainlands found and to be found, discovered and to be discovered towards west and south, [by] establishing and constituting one line from the Arctic pole, that is the north, to the Antarctic pole, that is the south, whether the mainlands and islands found and to be found are towards India or [towards] any other part whatever; which line shall be distant from any of the islands, which are commonly called the Azores and Cape Verde, one hundred leagues towards the west and south, in such way that all islands and mainlands found and to be found, discovered and to be discovered from the said line towards west and south have not been actually possessed by any other Christian King and prince until to the day of the Nativity of Our Lord Jesus Christ last passed.[40]

The divisional boundary between Portuguese and Castilian zones was moved to 370 leagues west of the Azores-Cape Verde axis with the 1494 ratification of the Treaty of Tordesillas.[41] In both *Inter caetera* and in Tordesillas, the papal donation applied to lands whose extent and geography were poorly understood by Europeans. About the lands' inhabitants, almost equally little was known. Wild theories abounded hypothesizing that the American Indians were a lost tribe of Israelites. Some wondered whether the Indians might be descended from a band of isolated Christians, such as perhaps the St. Thomas Christians of India. In *De insulis*, Palacios Rubios posed the question of whether, in some remote past, Christianity had ever been preached in the Americas. He concluded that either Christianity had never reached American shores or, if it had, so much time had elapsed that all vestiges of that evangelization had disappeared and it should be considered that the gospel had never been preached in the Americas: "Either because those born in these islands have never heard the name of Christ, or because the Gospel was never preached among them, nor were the Sacraments known; or because if at some time they were known, so much time has since elapsed that no vestige remains of this preaching, this is reason enough to consider this situation as if said preaching never occurred."[42] For Palacios Rubios, the lack of some early Christian presence that had eventually been subjugated by later invaders or conquerors had the effect of absolving the American Indians of the charge of usurpation (or of apostasy). Instead,

the Indians were seen, by some at least, as "uncorrupted Gentiles" who would therefore make likely converts to Christianity. This view, later to become a trope, was first articulated by Columbus himself in the logbook of his first voyage: "I believe that they easily would become Christians, for it seemed that they had no religion."[43] Within a few years this was one of the hallmarks of the optimistic view that the American Indians were, for all intents and purposes, latent Christians and would soon become full members of the *corpus mysticum* of the *ecclesia*. Cristóbal de Santesteban, writing in 1503, argued that as the Indians lived "without law" it would be easy to bring them into the Catholic fold.[44] Thus, while according to followers of Hostiensis they might not be able to possess *dominium*, these infidels were viewed as *potential* Christians, and therefore worthy of every effort at conversion. The aspiration to draw these Gentiles into the Christian fold is reflected in Alexander's bull *Inter caetera*, which made it clear that his donation of the western lands was contingent on Castilian efforts at evangelization: "We earnestly require, that, since you intend to prosecute such expedition at all and to undertake it with a mind wholeheartedly zealous for the orthodox faith, you should endeavour and feel obliged to induce the peoples living in such islands to accept the Christian profession, that no perils nor labours should deter you."[45]

Less than two years later, in February 1495, Alexander VI issued the bull *Ineffabilis et summi*, investing Ferdinand and Isabella as "monarchs of Africa" and granting them and all of their successors the right to conquer, subdue, and lead Africa to the Catholic faith.[46] In many respects the bull bears a remarkable resemblance to the bulls of donation pertaining to the Americas. In contrast to medieval Iberian agreements, such as Monteagudo/Soria, which used the boundaries of late antique Roman provinces to delimit spheres of interest, in *Ineffabilis* Alexander did not employ the names or limits of the ancient divisions of Mauretania Tingitana and Mauretania Caesariensis. The bull made no distinction between Aragonese and Castilian territories. The terms stated pithily: "Without detriment to any other Christian prince . . . and through the authority of our status as vicar of Our Lord Jesus Christ on Earth . . . we grant you the investiture of Africa herself and of all the kingdoms, lands, and dominions she contains."[47]

What territories, precisely, were encompassed by the phrase "all the kingdoms, lands, and dominions she contains"? The oblique reference "without detriment to any other Christian prince" provides a clue. As we have seen, a similar clause was present in *Inter caetera*, presumably referring to possible Eastern Christians with whom Latin Christians hoped to forge alliances against Muslims. In the case of *Ineffabilis*, however, this clause referred to Christian powers much closer to home. The Treaty of Alcáçovas (1479), which ended the war of

Castilian succession between Isabella of Castile and Alfonso V of Portugal, confirmed Castile's claim to the Canary Islands and guaranteed Portuguese rights to the conquest of the kingdom of Fez as well as to "Guinea," or the West African lands south of Cape Bojador on the Atlantic. In addition to confirming Castilian claims to the Canaries, Alcáçovas granted Castile the stretch of coastline on the African mainland lying opposite the islands, from Cape Chaunar to Cape Bojador, thus creating a narrow Castilian strip separating Portuguese claims to Fez (to the north of Cape Chaunar) and to Guinea (to the south of Bojador).[48] The Treaty of Tordesillas (1494) pertaining to Africa (distinct from the treaty of the same name dividing the Atlantic into Portuguese and Castilian zones) reaffirmed the conditions set out in Alcáçovas while also granting Castile dominion over the future conquests of Melilla and Cazaza, on the Mediterranean coast of Africa just opposite the recently conquered kingdom of Granada.[49] In its clause concerning other Christian princes, then, *Ineffabilis et summi* was intended to prevent Spain from impinging on Portuguese claims to the kingdom of Fez and to most of Atlantic Africa. *Ineffabilis et summi* therefore applied to Mediterranean Africa or, more precisely, that part of Africa extending from Melilla/Cazaza eastward to the Nile River, traditionally understood by European geographers as the boundary between Africa and Asia.[50] The "Atlantic" Treaty of Tordesillas granted Castile the rights to all lands lying to the west of a line running north-south 370 leagues to the west of the Azores. In 1494, however, the extent of these lands remained unknown. Thus, in its western reaches what Tordesillas confirmed was Castile's right to the several islands around which Columbus had sailed in late 1492 and early 1493 (i.e., Hispaniola, eastern Cuba, and a few of the Bahamian islands) and any lands to be discovered in the future. Alexander's 1495 bull *Ineffabilis et summi* was therefore remarkable in that it granted the Spanish Crown the right to the conquest of an enormous swath of African territory, one significantly larger than that reserved for Spain in the agreements of Alcáçovas or Tordesillas, or in the thirteenth-century Treaty of Monteagudo/Soria.

The wording of *Ineffabilis et summi* makes no mention of Africa having once been ruled by the Visigoths of Hispania, nor does it mention the late antique Christian presence in Africa. Nowhere does Alexander VI represent his donation as being the resolution of competing dynastic claims (as the churchmen who ruled in Castile's favor at Basle had done). Rather, appealing to the same powers he cited in *Inter caetera*, the pope claimed the right to make this donation "through the authority of our status as vicar of Our Lord Jesus Christ on Earth."[51] This is a clear statement of the papacy's claim of *plenitudo potestatis*. Nowhere in the bull does Alexander describe the inhabitants of Africa as usurpers. It is not their ancestors' act of usurpation that invalidates their

right to rule, but rather, simply their status as non-Christians. Going merely by the language of *Ineffabilis et summi*, the Africans occupy an equivalent legal status to that occupied by the American Indians in *Inter caetera*: their position as infidels means they cannot exercise *dominium*, and the pope is therefore entitled to donate their lands to a Christian ruler. In other words, *Ineffabilis et summi* adheres to a Hostiensian legal view of infidel *dominium*. As in *Inter caetera*, in *Ineffabilis et summi* Alexander VI exhorted Ferdinand and Isabella to undertake a mission of evangelization: "And I exhort you that if, with God's favor, you should acquire Africa or a portion thereof, you work with all diligence and effort, as befitting Catholic princes, that the name of our Savior be honored there and that the Catholic faith be augmented, so that in this way, in addition to the eternal reward, you should merit our blessing and that of the apostolic see as well as other benedictions."[52]

Alexander VI probably had reasons for not invoking the precedent of Visigothic rule in North Africa. First of all, since Portugal now held the right to the conquest of the kingdom of Fez, *Ineffabilis et summi* did not, strictly speaking, apply to Mauretania Tingitana. Indeed, in encompassing "all the kingdoms, lands, and dominions" of Africa, *Ineffabilis et summi* appertained to a territory significantly larger than any that might reasonably have been claimed to have once been under Visigothic rule. Second, as the donation of Africa was contingent on the fulfillment of certain terms, the bull could, in theory, be revoked. *Ineffabilis et summi* was therefore an expression of supreme papal sovereignty, even in temporal matters. Joseph O'Callaghan, in a study of Iberian claims to the Canary Islands, pointed out the extent to which papal *plenitudo potestatis* implicitly undercut temporal rulers' claims of sovereignty.[53] Although O'Callaghan was not addressing the terms of *Ineffabilis et summi*, the same point might be made in this respect concerning the fact that the naming of Ferdinand and Isabella as monarchs of Africa in some ways compromised their capacity to act as sovereigns in the Maghrib.

In the interest of cementing Castilian claims to the newly encountered American lands, the Spanish Crown was clearly willing to recognize the right of the papacy to dispense lands ruled by infidels. And there were certainly Spaniards who, in keeping with the terms of *Ineffabilis et summi*, enthusiastically embraced the call to spread the gospel in the Maghrib. Francisco Ximénez de Cisneros (1436–1517), from 1507 a cardinal, would prove the most vocal proponent of a Spanish missionary venture in Africa.[54] Pope Alexander VI's successor, Julius II (r. 1503–1513), on at least one occasion exhorted Ferdinand to work for the conversion of the Muslim inhabitants of North Africa. In a brief issued February 2, 1511, in which Julius offered plenary indulgences to any who

should die in the war against Africa, the pope wrote, "We have learned from your ambassador here [in Rome] that you wish to employ all the forces of your kingdoms in an invasion of Africa, to destroy those impious people devoted to the filthy mohamedan cult *or to draw them to the light of the Catholic faith*" (emphasis mine).[55]

Alexander VI's and Julius II's encouragement of evangelization efforts in Africa served as one way for the papacy to maintain some control over the venture. Ferdinand, however, proved adaptable, ever willing to work out an ad hoc system to preserve his conquered territories, even if that meant shirking the obligation to convert non-Christians, as required by a papal bull such as *Ineffabilis et summi*. In May of 1510, Ferdinand wrote to his naval commander, Pedro Navarro, providing instructions for concluding terms with Muley Abdallah, the emir of Bougie, who had conceded defeat in January 1510. What Ferdinand suggested was an arrangement of condominium: Ferdinand proposed that he would populate the African cities along the coast with Christians, but that the vanquished emir would be allowed to administer as much of the hinterland as he desired, maintaining authority over his subjects, as well as all "rents, goods, and jurisdiction" (*rentas, bienes, jurisdicción*). The littoral, by contrast, would belong to Ferdinand and his successors. Along the coastal strip, Ferdinand would enjoy full sovereignty over both the *Christian and Muslim* populations. Ferdinand would now be king of Bougie, requiring Muley Abdallah to assume a title connected to a different locale, somewhere in the interior of the realm. In recognition of his vassalage, the Muslim ruler would pay an annual tribute to Ferdinand.[56] This sort of arrangement had been common practice in medieval Iberia, from the age of the eleventh-century *ta'ifa* kings and the *parias* they paid to Christian monarchs, up through the treaties of vassalage that the rulers of Nasrid Granada signed with the monarchs of Castile as late as the fifteenth century.[57]

Seven months later, in December of the same year, Ferdinand wrote to Navarro again, this time instructing him to launch an attack against Tunis the following summer (1511). Ferdinand expressed hope that the planned venture would result in the annexation of a large swath of land stretching into the interior. Should that occur, wrote the king, he would receive the Muslims of the interior as *mudéjar* subjects.[58] The summer of 1511 brought no such Spanish conquest of Tunis, but if Ferdinand's plans had been realized, this would have marked a significant departure from the injunctions to evangelize that were clearly stated in *Ineffabilis et summi*. The arrangement the Aragonese king proposed allowed for the possibility of Ferdinand acquiring new *Muslim* subjects. While Spanish men of the cloth, such as Cisneros, may have held

evangelizing aspirations in Africa, such a mission does not appear to have been a priority for Ferdinand.

As Bougie was incorporated into the Crown of Aragon and Tunis lay within the region that would go to Aragon if conquered, it might be suggested that Ferdinand's policy vis-à-vis Muslim subjects in this part of Africa was really no different than his policy within the Crown of Aragon proper.[59] That region of eastern Iberia, in contrast to Castile, would maintain a Muslim population up until Charles V (r. 1516–1558) applied the edict mandating conversion or exile in 1526. Yet it was not only in the African territories subject to the Crown of Aragon that Ferdinand employed a policy of conquest not predicated on the conversion of the local Muslim population. In 1494, Ferdinand and Isabella entered into negotiations with the "Moors of Cazaza," an enclave on the coast of North Africa, about their becoming subjects of the Crown of Castile.[60] The negotiations led nowhere, but this is a demonstration of the policy of conquest that the Catholic monarchs were disposed to implement in the Maghrib. Along similar lines, following a more successful set of negotiations, in 1500 the Crown of Castile recognized Muslim vassals in its possessions in Atlantic Africa, along the coastal region opposite the Canary Islands.[61] Of course, both of these episodes predated the edict stipulating conversion or expulsion that was issued to Castilian *mudejares* in 1502. That new policy, however, was not applied in the Crown's African territories. In May 1511 (three months after Julius II's brief cited above, in which the pope advocated the destruction or conversion of the Muslim population of Africa), Ferdinand came to terms with the rulers of the city of Mostaganem and the town of Mazagran, both part of the kingdom of Tlemcen. These settlements fell within the zone reserved for Castilian conquest. According to the terms of capitulation, Ferdinand received the residents of the municipalities, *Muslims as well as Jews*, as his vassals. These new Castilian subjects would pay the same taxes to Ferdinand that they had formerly paid to the king of Tlemcen.[62] The treaty explicitly stated that the inhabitants of Mostaganem and Mazagran would not be compelled to convert to Christianity but would be permitted the continued practice of their "law," and they would maintain their houses and property as before and would be treated, in most respects, as loyal vassals and subjects of King Ferdinand and his daughter Juana, queen of Castile.[63] Mostaganem and Mazagran now fell under the jurisdiction of Spanish Orán, which was part of the Crown of Castile. Thus, Ferdinand implemented a policy of mudejarism in his Castilian African possessions as well as his Aragonese.[64] Jean-Frédéric Schaub has shown that Ferdinand also allowed for the practice of Judaism in Orán, marking a departure from the policy of conversion or expulsion he implemented in Aragon and Castile in 1492. Indeed, a small number of Jewish families in Orán were al-

lowed to remain right up until the edict expelling them in 1669.[65] The case of Spanish North Africa, then, demonstrates that Spanish protocols of conquest were by no means uniform but, rather, that they varied dramatically from one region to another depending on the local circumstances.

These treaties from 1511 most closely resemble medieval Iberian capitulation treaties between Christian victors and Muslim vanquished. For example, the capitulation reached in November 1491 between Nasrid Granada and Castile could easily have served as a model for the treaties executed two decades later in the Maghrib. Even by 1511, after fourteen years of engagement in North Africa, and following the conquest of a whole string of presidios and cities, neither in areas that fell to Castile nor in those that went to Aragon did Ferdinand pursue a policy of conquest predicated on religious conversion. In this regard, Ferdinand's approach in Africa stands in sharp contrast to the policies being simultaneously implemented in Granada, and it clearly circumvents the injunctions laid out in the bull *Ineffabilis et summi*.

It is not, however, only with post-1492 Granada that we should compare Spanish policies of conquest. The Castilian capitulation treaties with Mostaganem and Mazagran happened to coincide with a crucial moment in the history of Castilian colonialism in the Americas. In December 1511, on successive Sundays of Advent, the Dominican friar Antonio de Montesinos delivered a series of rousing sermons from the pulpit of the main church of Santo Domingo in which he took the Castilian colonists of the Caribbean island of Hispaniola to task for their treatment of the Indians. To his astonished parishioners, Montesinos railed, "Are these not men? Do they not possess rational souls? Are you not bound to love them as you love yourselves? Do you not understand this? Do you not grasp this? How have you fallen into such a profoundly lethargic state of slumber? You may be certain that in your current state you are no more worthy of salvation than are the Moors and Turks, who lack and deny the faith of Jesus Christ."[66] The protests of Montesinos and his fellow Dominicans prompted King Ferdinand to convene a *junta* in the Castilian city of Burgos in 1512 to examine the legality of the Spanish conquest of the Americas and the attendant treatment of the region's inhabitants. One result of the meeting at Burgos was that Juan López de Palacios Rubios was commissioned to codify the *requerimiento*, the document Castilian conquistadors were to read to indigenous peoples upon first contact. While the *requerimiento* is a brief text that was intended to serve as a legal ritual of conquest, it is in fact a vastly distilled version of the significantly lengthier legal argument that Palacios Rubios elaborated in his treatise *De insulis*.[67] Although the jurist's primary aim in *De insulis* was to develop a legal grounding for Castilian claims to the islands and mainland of the Americas, as we have already seen in this chapter, he included

numerous digressions in which he addressed Spanish claims in other parts of the world, even including a ten-page excursus in which he defended Spanish expansionary ventures in North Africa and the eastern Mediterranean.

In *De insulis*, Palacios Rubios supported Spanish claims in the Americas as founded on the validity of the papal bulls of donation and on the Spanish monarchy's evangelical mission to spread Christianity, representing the Spanish enterprise in the Americas as being in accordance with the terms of the bull *Inter caetera*.[68] In this portion of *De insulis*, then Palacios Rubios appeals to the same doctrine of the pope as *dominus mundi* as he did in his juridical tract on Navarre, *De iustitia et iure*.[69] In the cases of Granada, Africa, and Palestine, however, Palacios Rubios crafted a quite distinct rationale. In his excursus on Spain's rights to these Mediterranean lands that were once Christian but subsequently fell under Muslim rule, the jurist made no reference to *Ineffabilis et summi*, to the pope's role in granting lands to temporal rulers, or to a Spanish policy of evangelical conquest based on the conversion of conquered peoples to Christianity.

It bears emphasizing here the fact that, in the legal argument Palacios Rubios devised, the Spanish conquests in the Americas were *not* understood as a war of recovery or recuperation, the classic line of reasoning underpinning the ideology of *reconquista* in Iberia proper. Establishing the historical precedent of some prior Christian rule in the Americas, even in some remote past, would have served to legitimate any sort of military action the Spanish might take in the Western Hemisphere. And it is worth noting that at least one Spaniard attempted to make such an argument in defense of Spanish claims in the Americas: in 1535, Gonzálo Fernández de Oviedo, the first royal historiographer of the Indies, asserted that the West Indies had once been under the rule of the Visigothic monarchs of late antique Hispania.[70] According to this argument, Fernández de Oviedo stressed that Castilian conquests in the Americas were merely a war of recuperation of lost patrimony. Moreover, Fernández de Oviedo asserted that Christianity had been preached in the Americas by the sixth or seventh century. The subsequent disappearance of all Christian practices proved, to Fernández de Oviedo, that the Indians were incapable of becoming good Christians on their own and that they needed the firm hand of the Spanish to guide them out of their ways of error.[71] It is not at all clear how seriously European readers took Fernández de Oviedo's claims, but Bartolomé de Las Casas considered them dangerous enough that he felt compelled to refute them at length in his *Historia de las Indias*.[72]

Fernández de Oviedo's assertions here represent the powerful influence these Mediterranean legal precedents held, even as the sixteenth-century Spanish wrestled with the quite distinct case of the Americas. Twenty years earlier, Palacios Rubios knew better than to put forth what, to modern read-

ers, is such a patently absurd argument. Unlike Fernández de Oviedo, Palacios Rubios never crossed the Atlantic, and yet the jurist recognized that the Americas presented an entirely novel set of circumstances and that European engagement there could not reasonably qualify as a war of recovery. By contrast, in the portions of *De insulis* in which the jurist crafts legal arguments defending Spanish claims to a variety of Mediterranean locales, the rationale is uniformly that these are wars of recuperation. Palacios Rubios invokes the recent Spanish conquest of Nasrid Granada as a point of departure from which he draws conclusions about the perduring nature of Christian political rights in lands that had at any time been under Christian rule: "A prince may licitly defend his patrimony or recuperate it if he has lost it. . . . From which it may be inferred that the conquest of all territories held by infidels that were at one point subject to Spain belongs to the king of this nation, in his capacity as universal heir to the Kingdom of Spain."[73] Palacios Rubios thus concluded that Ferdinand and Isabella's decade-long campaign against Granada qualified as a "just and holy war."[74]

Palacios Rubios extrapolated from the case of Granada to propound a similar argument in support of Spanish dynastic rights in Africa, claiming that at the time of Augustine, Africa was under the rule of the Christian kings of Spain.[75] Through here Palacios Rubios follows Alonso de Cartagena's patrimonial argument in defense of Castilian claims to the Canary Islands (even citing it in one instance). But the legal principle Palacios Rubios invokes is rooted not only in the precedent of a Visigothic monarchy that spanned the Strait of Gibraltar but also in the early Christian presence in Africa. The emphasis on Africa's Christian past is implicit in Palacios Rubios's reminder that it had been the native land of St. Augustine, and he describes sixteenth-century Africa as "occupied" by the same infidels, prone to violence and tyranny, who had occupied Granada for eight centuries. Palacios Rubios thus argues that Spain's rights in Africa are essentially equivalent to those in Granada. This rendered Spanish conquests in the Maghrib, such as that of Tripoli, like Granada, a just and holy war, as it qualified as a war of recuperation against the usurping infidels.

To the modern reader, the passage of eight centuries of Islamic rule stretches the limits of what might reasonably qualify as a just war of recuperation. Palacios Rubios, however, insisted that the passage of time makes no difference: "nor can [the land's] current rulers defend themselves on the grounds that so much time has passed, for since they took possession of the land unjustly (in bad faith—*mala fe*), no statute of limitations applies to them."[76] As far as Palacios Rubios was concerned, the immutable nature of these rights was rooted not only in the dynastic history of Iberian monarchy but in the shifting religious power relations of the medieval Mediterranean, thus making this doctrine

applicable even to lands that had never been subject to Hispania: "From this it may be argued that if any region, province, or kingdom was ever possessed by Christians and later occupied or usurped by infidels, the former may recover the land by their own authority."[77] Thus Palacios Rubios deftly transformed the particularity inherent in the claims that could be made through recourse to the Gothic thesis into a doctrine of significantly more universal application.[78]

At the moment in which Palacios Rubios was writing, this principle concerning the justness of war against non-Christians inhabiting lands that had at one time been Christian could theoretically be used to justify attacks on an enormous territory, stretching from the Maghrib east through Egypt and up through Anatolia and the Balkans. As discussed in chapter 1, early sixteenth-century Europeans often held a halcyon view of the history of the primitive Church as universal, insofar as it encompassed large portions of the three known parts of the world (according, at least, to the European vision of the ecumene): Asia, Africa, and Europe. This conception of a lost state of unity that had united the component parts of the earth in the Christian faith animated European desires to recuperate the formerly Christian (and by then Muslim) lands of Africa and Asia.[79]

In this religious ambit, it is not surprising that the Spanish *empresa de África* was celebrated throughout Europe as miraculous and as an enterprise that stood on the verge of restoring one-third of the earth to the fold of Christendom. In March 1510, Pope Julius II issued to Ferdinand the bull *Sacrosancte Romane* granting plenary indulgences for those who participated in a Spanish assault on North Africa projected for the summer of 1510. Julius praised Ferdinand's stated intention to lead the assault himself (at the age of fifty-eight!), and described the king's objectives as:

> to bring an end, through blood and fire, to the perfidious sect [of Islam], to excise the ignominy marked on the Christian people for so many years, to recuperate such a large province, *fully one-third of the globe* [emphasis mine], formerly (oh sorrows!) faithful and Catholic, and now oppressed and enslaved for so long by cruel peoples, and to assure and avenge the honor of the entire Christian commonwealth, which has been sullied and scorned.[80]

Julius's portrayal of Africa as an essentially *Christian* land that had been usurped, oppressed, and enslaved is of a piece with sixteenth-century European legal arguments on the illicitness of Islamic *dominium* in the Maghrib. It is worth noting, though, how starkly Julius's characterization of Africa differed from that of Alexander VI. In *Ineffabilis et summi*, Alexander made no reference to a pe-

FIGURE 4.2. The Spanish assault on the city of Orân. Fresco painted by Juan de Borgoña, 1514, in the Capilla Mozárabe of the Toledo Cathedral. Copyright: Cabildo Primado, Toledo. Photograph by David Blázquez.

riod of earlier Christian rule in Africa. Rather, the inhabitants of the region could be dispossessed simply due to the fact that they were not Christian. Julius's bull, by contrast, implied that Ferdinand's African enterprise differed in important ways from Spanish colonial projects in the Americas, insofar as the justness of the Old World endeavor was grounded in the fact that this was a war of recuperation.

To elucidate the nuances of sixteenth-century European thought on different types of infidels, and their various capacities to possess *dominium*, it is helpful to turn to Bartolomé de Las Casas, a writer most commonly associated with his critiques of Spanish colonialism in the Americas. Las Casas did, on occasion, address interconfessional relations in the Old World, and his writings about Muslims in Africa penetrate to the heart of the legal distinction that I am pointing to here. Las Casas wrote that the Turks and Moors of Barbary and the eastern Mediterranean had an open and declared war against Christendom. He argued that, in contrast to Spanish actions in the Americas, in the case of war against the Muslims of the Mediterranean, there was no doubt that Spain was engaged in a just war, and even that these actions qualified as a "legitimate defense."[81] Las Casas also presented a legal opinion on the papal donation of lands, drawing a distinction between donations of Mediterranean territories such as Africa or Jerusalem and the donation of the Americas. He noted that different conditions obtained in the Mediterranean, due to the fact that the Moors and Turks, as "open and declared enemies, persecutors of us and of our Catholic faith," had usurped Christian lands and ruled them tyrannically.[82]

In drawing attention to the legal distinctions rendering Spanish actions in Mediterranean Africa different from those in the Americas, Las Casas asserts that some confusion on these points has ensued from a tendency to conflate different types of infidels, thus understanding the innocent Gentiles of the Americas as equivalent to the violent usurpers of Christian lands in the Mediterranean.[83] Las Casas suggests that the tendency to elide different types of infidels arose from a reading of Hostiensis, the canonist who in the thirteenth century, Las Casas posits, could not have been familiar with innocent Gentiles but knew only about the infidels who had "tyrannically usurped the Holy Land, Spain, and Africa."[84] The friar Matías de Paz, who, along with Palacios Rubios, was present at the *junta* of Burgos in 1512, wrote a treatise in 1512 on Spanish rights of dominion over the American Indians. In this text, Paz elucidates what he perceives to be the positive sin of denying Christianity (of which are guilty the Jews, Saracens, Turks, and Christian heretics) and the lesser sin (if it even qualifies as a sin) of which the American Gentiles are guilty.[85]

This distinction between positive sin and what might be termed the sin of ignorance was significant enough that it governed European law on who could be licitly enslaved. In the 1430s and 1440s, as Portuguese caravels pushed south of Cape Bojador on Africa's Atlantic coast, the Christians entered a borderlands zone between Muslim North Africa and the region of Guinea. The Portuguese chronicler Gomes Eanes de Zurara, one of the few extant sources on these events, describes the Portuguese seizing hundreds of captives whom they took back to Lisbon and sold into slavery. Zurara's description of the

captives, of their attire, their lack of knowledge of Arabic, and their purported demonym of Azanegue, suggests that some, at least, were Berbers. Others were likely black Africans from further south. It is debatable how many were actually Muslim. And yet, in his account, Zurara describes them uniformly as Moors. In an article on this subject, Kenneth Wolf argues convincingly that the term "Moor" was incredibly unstable and flexible in the fifteenth century, and he makes a compelling case that Zurara employed the term, in part, to depict these unfortunate captives as legitimate prisoners taken in a just war against enemies of the faith.[86] On those grounds, their subsequent sale in the markets of Lisbon was licit. Debra Blumenthal's study of slavery in fifteenth-century Valencia, *Enemies and Familiars*, points to the identical practice in that eastern Iberian city: there the bailiff general often recorded the sale of black Africans or of Canary Islanders using the term "Moor," and described them formulaically as captives seized in acts of just war.[87]

The West African Gentiles the Portuguese encountered could be "mooricized" (to use Kenneth Wolf's term) in part due to their geographic proximity to the Muslim lands of North and West Africa. But what proved to pose a complication to this line of reasoning was whether the lands they inhabited had ever been under Christian rule. To return to Matías de Paz's 1512 tract defending Spanish claims in the Americas, the friar is explicit on the point that the peoples inhabiting lands where there had never been a Christian presence cannot be considered guilty of any sin.[88]

Las Casas is in complete agreement with Paz on this point. In the portion of his *History of the Indies* in which he addresses European incursions into the Canary Islands, Cape Verde, and West Africa, Las Casas asserts that the Canarians were secure in their homes, doing harm to no one, when the first invaders arrived.[89] Here Las Casas is implicitly endowing the Canary Islanders with full sovereignty and simultaneously suggesting that there were no legal or moral grounds for the Christian invasion. The Dominican goes on to stress repeatedly the pacific nature of the Canary Islanders, stating that the actions of the Portuguese there, although purportedly geared toward evangelization, were counterproductive to conversion efforts.[90] Las Casas goes on to address the enslavement of Canary Islanders, arguing that this violated "every tenet of natural law, divine law, or human law."[91]

Given Las Casas's view of the Gentile inhabitants of the Americas, it does not surprise that he would hold a similarly sympathetic opinion of the Canary Islanders, arguing for their salvation rather than their enslavement. But let us turn now to the episode to which I alluded earlier, chronicled by Gomes Eanes de Zurara, in which Portuguese raiders of the African mainland described their captives uniformly as Moors, thereby legitimating their enslavement. Las Casas,

taking Zurara at his word and assuming these captives to have been Muslim, nevertheless excoriates the Portuguese for this practice. Las Casas writes that the Portuguese had no right to capture and enslave these Moors, because they were not the Moors of Barbary, and were therefore not the same as the Moors who did harm and damage to Christians. The key distinction here for Las Casas is the fact that the Moors of West Africa did not inhabit "our lands" (presumably meaning, for Las Casas, lands that had formerly been Christian). Las Casas says that, rather than raiding, the Portuguese should have acted pacifically toward these Moors in order to draw them to Christianity.[92]

Indeed, for Las Casas, who desired the conversion of these Muslims, the Portuguese actions in Africa had made the work of evangelization nearly impossible.[93] Las Casas writes that the Portuguese prince Henry the Navigator defamed the name of God, rather than glorifying it, and that for every soul saved in Africa (and many might have converted only out of fear, asserts Las Casas), thousands more were lost, due to the fact that the Portuguese planted a hatred of Christianity in the people there.[94] Las Casas plaintively asks his reader, "How could these people possibly have any love for the Christian faith or desire to convert thereto, deprived of their liberty, their women, their children, and their homeland, etc., all against natural law."[95] In conclusion, Las Casas writes that no one possessing the reason of a man, let alone that of a *letrado* (someone with a university degree), could doubt that these West Africans (whatever their religious identity) engaged in a fully just war against the Portuguese.[96]

This entire section of Las Casas's *History of the Indies* is noteworthy, not only because of his argument in support of the Canary Islanders' sovereignty but even more so because of his defense of Muslim sovereignty in lands that had never been Christian. Las Casas explains that while Christians might have a just war against the Turks and Moors of the Mediterranean,[97] they do *not* have a just war against all infidels.[98]

Indeed, while the doctrine of enslaving "enemies of the faith" taken captive in war was considered fully licit in Iberia and in the Maghrib, Las Casas asserts that the Portuguese enslavement of the Muslim inhabitants of West Africa is unjustified, as those lands had never been Christian, and their rulers therefore could not be guilty of charges of usurpation.

> . . . those people never injured or endangered the faith, nor did they ever even consider doing so, and they held those lands in good faith and never robbed us, nor did any of their ancestors, as they lived at such a great remove from the Moors who trouble us so in these parts, because they live near the borders with Ethiopia, and there is no written testimony or

> memory that the people who possess those lands ever usurped them from the Church. With what reason, then, could all this harm, all these deaths and enslavements, all these scandals and the loss of so many souls be justified? In spite of the fact that they be Muslims, under what right do the Portuguese commit these acts? This is clearly a case of willful ignorance and lack of reason.[99]

For Las Casas, at least, Muslims in lands that had never been under Christian rule had a perfectly legitimate right to exercise dominion. In this light, Palacios Rubios's determination (discussed earlier) that the Americas had never been Christian, even in some remote past, takes on new significance.

For Palacios Rubios, as for Las Casas, the Islamic conquest of lands that had been Christian was an act of usurpation and tyranny. The jurist employed this argument to invalidate sixteenth-century Muslim rule in North Africa and, commensurately, to characterize Ferdinand of Aragon's *empresa de África* as a just war of recuperation. To understand this is to reconcile the apparent dissonance between the jurist's defense of the papal donation of the Americas and his complete silence on the papal donation of Africa, all within the text of *De insulis*. The quite distinct set of religio-historical circumstances of the Mediterranean world allowed Palacios Rubios to craft a very different kind of argument in support of Spanish claims to Africa. As far as Palacios Rubios was concerned, the Muslim rulers of the states of North Africa were tyrants, and not once in *De insulis* does he evince any concern over efforts at conversion in the Maghrib. Indeed, the jurist's portrayal of Africans suggests that he viewed them as static, immutable. Drawing on the prophecy of the Libyan Sibyl, Palacios wrote, "There will always exist violent discord among the Africans, that is to say, the Africans will always be discordant and violent; they will hurl themselves into destruction and they will behave rashly in all their actions."[100] The inclusion of this passage suggests that Palacios Rubios was little focused on conversion as part of the process of Spanish annexation of North African territories. In Palacios Rubios's appeal to the dynastic argument that Ferdinand's claim to Africa derived from his status as legal heir to the Visigoths of Hispania, the jurist implied that the king was not dependent on the papacy for his title. If Ferdinand's rights in Africa were the same as those in Spain proper, then Ferdinand could act as a sovereign prince in Africa. In a passage of *De insulis* addressing Ferdinand's rights to make war in Granada and in the Canary Islands (both of which Palacios Rubios argued constituted part of ancient Hispania), the jurist wrote that Spain was justified in resorting to force to reclaim these lands, "because there exists no higher authority before whom to plead for justice [in this case]."[101] This statement suggests that Palacios Rubios

believed that in Old World locales the venerable dynastic claim deriving from the late antique Visigothic kingdom took precedence over more recent papal donations of lands such as *Ineffabilis et summi*.

This legal strategy might also have been intended to preserve a measure of Spanish sovereignty. To return to the point that Joseph O'Callaghan makes regarding the popes' *plenitudo potestatis*, Palacios Rubios clearly attempts to carve out a legal space in which Spanish sovereignty in territories that had once been Visigothic is preserved.[102] There could be many reasons for the jurist's choice of legal argument here, but one possible explanation is that this approach, in circumventing the terms of *Ineffabilis*, served to relieve Ferdinand of the obligation to support an evangelical mission in Africa. As we have seen in analyzing Ferdinand's pragmatic (and traditionally Iberian) capitulation treaties that allowed the ongoing practice of Islam in many of his newly conquered African territories, the Aragonese monarch was likely grateful for the latitude that such an argument would afford him.

Perhaps this fact is indicative of a certain cynicism on the part of the jurist (or his royal patron), but it might just as likely point to the fact that Palacios Rubios's passages in *De insulis* treating Spain's *empresa de África* address the very specific geopolitical context in which the jurist composed the treatise. In July 1508, Castilian forces led by Pedro Navarro conquered the Peñón de Vélez de la Gomera, a tiny but strategic presidio on the Mediterranean coast lying midway between Portuguese Ceuta and Castilian Melilla.[103] This ignited a dispute between Castile and Portugal over the demarcation of the eastern boundary of the kingdom of Fez.

The entire region west of the Muluya River, of course, fell within the purview of Mauretania Tingitana, which Castile could claim on patrimonial grounds, but the Treaties of Alcáçovas and Tordesillas (both ratified by papal confirmation) reserved the kingdom of Fez for Portuguese conquest. As we saw with Alexander VI's bull *Ineffabilis et summi*, the Spanish monarchs were granted the right to conquer all African lands "without detriment to any other Christian prince." Thus, if it could be proved that Vélez de la Gomera fell within the kingdom of Fez, then Castile would be in contravention of the terms of the papal bull of donation. Representatives of the Portuguese and Castilian crowns attempted to resolve this dispute over the course of a number of months in 1509. The Portuguese claimed Vélez de la Gomera on the grounds that it fell within the boundaries of the kingdom of Fez, and that it was therefore theirs to conquer. Gómez de Santillana, the Castilian representative, argued that the citadel had been a haven for piracy and captive-taking targeting Christians, and that for those reasons Navarro's capture of the site was an act of defense.[104] In the resolution to this dispute, known as the Convenio

de Cintra (ratified September 18, 1509), Castile and Portugal agreed that the kingdom of Fez was to remain designated for Portuguese conquest, while the North African coastline beginning six leagues to the west of Peñón de Vélez de la Gomera all the way to Egypt was reserved for Spain.[105]

Less than two months after the signing of the Convenio de Cintra (before November 5, 1509), Pedro Navarro led a Spanish flotilla that occupied the city of Asilah, located roughly twenty miles south of Tangiers on the Atlantic coast of North Africa, and incontrovertibly within the jurisdictional limits of the kingdom of Fez.[106] In the account he gave to King Ferdinand, Navarro stated that he and his men had captured Asilah from the "moros," but as this region was clearly part of the kingdom of Fez this was a conquest that had been reserved for Portugal, implicitly in Alexander VI's bull *Ineffabilis* and explicitly in the Convenio de Cintra, upon which the ink had not yet dried. In fact, the Portuguese had occupied Asilah but had been unable to hold it, even with assistance from Castile in late 1508. Navarro thus seems to have taken matters into his own hands, leading an assault on the city and claiming it for Castile.[107]

By late 1509, then, it was clear that the series of agreements partitioning North Africa into Portuguese and Spanish zones was not effective at preventing the repeated renewals of conflicts between the two crowns. In *De insulis*, composed sometime after mid-1512 and before 1516, Palacios Rubios addressed the situation in the Maghrib: "Should a donation be made, and the beneficiary *not* expend reasonable effort to take possession of it, then the donation becomes void."[108] Here was a general principle that could apply to any territory, but in the next section of *De insulis* Palacios Rubios made it clear that he was concerned with the kingdom of Fez. Noting that the papacy had ratified the terms of the Treaty of Alcáçovas in 1480, thereby confirming Portuguese rights to the kingdom of Fez, the jurist asserted that since that date the king of Portugal had done little to carry out the conquest, thus calling into question the validity of the donation.[109] Palacios Rubios elaborated on this by stipulating a statute of limitations within which a ruler must act in such cases: "If he who is ordered to take possession of something temporizes in doing so without just cause, then he shall lose his rights after a period of time sufficient to prove his negligence, that being two years if he be resident in the province and four years if he be absent from the province."[110] It is not clear whether Palacios Rubios considers King Manoel of Portugal to be near enough to the kingdom of Fez for the statute of limitations to be two years or four, but in either case, the fact that the jurist cites the year 1480 as the moment when the donation was made renders this question moot. Palacios Rubios is clearly arguing that Portugual's rights to Fez are forfeit and that Castile may therefore conduct conquests in the region.

When these circumstances are considered, it becomes clear why Palacios Rubios crafts the argument he does in *De insulis* in support of Ferdinand's rights in Africa. The jurist had at his disposal a variety of legal arguments from which to choose, and he might easily have founded Ferdinand's claims to Africa in Alexander VI's *Ineffabilis et summi*, just as he defended the validity of *Inter caetera* and the Spanish mission in the Americas. Instead, though, the jurist articulated Ferdinand's rights to Africa in dynastic terms, as patrimony that had been unjustly conquered and occupied. In tracing the Aragonese monarch's dynastic rights back to the fifth century, Palacios Rubios was able to circumvent more recent treaties (Alcáçovas, Tordesillas, and Cintra) and papal donations (*Ineffabilis et summi*) to assert, on behalf of Ferdinand, unfettered rights of conquest in the neighboring continent. These rights of conquest, it should be noted, were not dependent on the papacy or on the fulfillment of papal injunctions to spread the faith. Moreover, as immutable dynastic rights that were transmitted intact from one generation to the next, Ferdinand's rights to Africa could not be revoked. The particulars of Palacios Rubios's argument concerning Ferdinand's rights to Africa point to the way in which jurists working in the employ of an expansionist state might sometimes articulate universal principles governing just war or conquest and at other times, even in the same text, craft arguments addressing the contingencies of a very particular situation. This dynamism in the development of legal arguments and tactics is something Tamar Herzog notes as well, in her study *Frontiers of Possession*.[111]

It is worth recalling the argument Alonso de Cartagena composed that proved instrumental in securing Castilian rights to the conquest of the Canary Islands. In the adjudication at Basle, Cartagena's argument that the Canaries rightfully constituted part of Castilian patrimony was more effective than the Portuguese professions that they were bringing the islands' inhabitants into the fold of Christendom. We know that Palacios Rubios read Cartagena's *Allegationes* on the Canaries, and he doubtless had this argument in mind when he composed *De insulis*.[112]

Studies of Palacios Rubios's legal writings have long focused more on the short text known as the *requerimiento* than on the jurist's significantly longer treatises. Consequently, he is known primarily for the doctrines he espoused in support of Spanish conquests in the Gentile-inhabited Americas. A close reading of *De insulis*, however, reveals how deeply entwined the Atlantic and Mediterranean components of Spanish expansionism were. Indeed, this text demonstrates the fact that Spanish conquests in Muslim Africa demanded every bit as much the legal grounding as did the Crown's expansionist ventures in the Americas. And yet, in Palacios Rubios's discussions of Spanish rights to make war in various locales, in the case of Africa he opted for an

argumentative strategy that was distinct insofar as it paid no heed to the papal donation of lands or to Christianizing missions aimed at conversion. Instead, in its passages on Africa, *De insulis* addresses a specific set of circumstances that had arisen from the Luso-Castilian conflicts over zones of conquest in Africa. The patrimonial argument was particularly effective against competing claims issued by other European polities. To this line of reasoning, though, Palacios Rubios melded a set of tenets of canon law concerning the illegitimacy of Muslim rule in lands that had once been Christian. In doing so, Palacios Rubios transformed the *empresa de África* from a just war of dynastic recuperation into a holy war for the recovery of lost Christian territory, giving his argument the potential for a much more universal application than merely within Visigothic Hispania, no matter how expansive one understood that ancient polity to have been. As we shall see in chapter 5, these arguments concerning former Christian rule would prove significant in Spanish pretensions to recover the former Byzantine Empire (now under Ottoman rule) as well as the Holy Land.

European views on the illicitness of Muslim *dominium* in North Africa differed from those on infidel *dominium* in regions, such as the Americas, that had never been Christian. Consequently, European colonizers articulated claims to these territories differently. Centuries of engagement and interaction among individuals of the Abrahamic faiths in the Mediterranean had conditioned the legal doctrines governing just war and conquest, as well as the ways in which conquests were executed on the ground. There is no question that the Spanish experience in Granada and North Africa informed the ways in which conquistadors understood and recounted their experiences in the Americas.[113] While the influence of these recent (in some cases contemporaneous) episodes of warfare against non-Christian foes is undeniable, I believe it bears emphasizing that the Dar al-Islam occupied a different space in Spanish political thought than did the novel lands of the Americas. Indeed, the legal writings of Palacios Rubios and Matías de Paz, the writings of Las Casas, and the so-called Valladolid debates between Las Casas and Sepúlveda (1550–1551) all suggest that Spaniards were in fact acutely aware of the novelty of their experience in the Americas, and that they well understood that the medieval Iberian "Reconquista" did not actually serve as a clear precedent for acts of warfare and conquest in the New World. Already by 1512 or 1513, both Palacios Rubios and Matías de Paz held that the Americas had never been Christianized and that its inhabitants must therefore be treated as true innocents (preached to, or at least offered the chance at conversion, prior to being conquered). This is a clear illustration of the ways in which Mediterranean arguments mattered in the Americas. To wit, as we can see from the writings of figures such as Gonzalo Fernández de

Oviedo and Palacios Rubios, it *did* matter to Europeans whether or not there was some remote Christian past in the Americas. And yet, at the same time, when there was general consensus that the Americans had never been preached the gospel, those Mediterranean precedents began to lose their importance and jurists were forced to devise new arguments to buttress European colonial claims.

Spanish actions on the ground in the Maghrib did not conform to the injunction in *Ineffabilis et summi* that the Spanish monarchs evangelize in Africa. And yet, that did not matter, as what is clearly evident in juridical texts such as *De insulis* is the fact that Spanish monarchs did not feel reliant on the papacy to recognize their claims in Africa to the extent that they were obligated to recognize the pope as *dominus mundi* for their claims in the Americas. Spanish political thought on war against a Muslim foe, and on political claims to lands that could be proved to have at one time been under Christian rule, differed from thinking on the question of just war, conquest, and enslavement in lands that had never been exposed to Christianity. Spain's two expansionary ventures, Mediterranean and Atlantic, and the legal arguments they engendered, certainly informed one another. And in the human suffering they caused, these two theaters of imperial expansion bore a strong resemblance the one to the other. But at the level of legal and theological doctrine, the two processes were in fact quite distinct.

CHAPTER 5

The Eastern Chimera

During the 1980s, a scholarly turn helped to transform popular understanding of the enigmatic navigator Christopher Columbus. An earlier generation of scholars had interpreted the admiral as an expert sailor, one who pushed the bounds of European navigational technology and know-how.[1] Beginning roughly a decade before the five hundredth anniversary of Columbus's first Atlantic crossing, several new studies were published that shed light on a quite different side of the admiral's mental world.[2] This work, particularly Alain Milhou's exhaustive analysis of the prophecies that circulated in the fifteenth-century Mediterranean, demonstrated the deeply apocalyptic tenor of the Genoese navigator's thought, the ways in which he interpreted contemporaneous events as auguring the end of times, and the fact that he understood himself as a tool in God's hands, chosen to play an instrumental part in ushering in an epochal age. The figure who emerges from the pages of these studies is Columbus the crusader, a man who famously exhorted his royal patrons, Ferdinand and Isabella, to use the proceeds from their nascent Atlantic colonies to finance a Christian recuperation of the Holy Land. This current of Columbus's thought seems only to have intensified later in his life: in a 1501 letter he penned to Queen Isabella he discussed plans for a Spanish-led expedition to recover the Holy Land.[3] One year later, in 1502, Columbus wrote to Pope Alexander VI urging the launching of a crusade and even offering to lead the venture in person.[4] This facet of Columbus's thought

did not, however, render him heterodox or an outlier by the standards of his time. On the contrary, substantial evidence points to these beliefs and aspirations being shared by a whole host of Columbus's contemporaries, many of whom moved in the court circles closest to Ferdinand and Isabella. Indeed, Ferdinand himself held designs on the lands of the eastern Mediterranean, including the Holy Land, and he conceived of this zone as the locus in which he hoped to attain an Aragonese empire that he might leave to a longed-for heir.

On August 13, 1510, King Ferdinand was in the town of Monzón, presiding over a parliamentary gathering of the Aragonese *Cortes*, at which he was soliciting funds for the conquest of Africa and, it was hoped, the Holy Land itself.[5] In his royal address that had opened the *Cortes* at Monzón, Ferdinand had discussed the holy endeavor of the war of Africa, part of which, he reminded the assembled representatives of the Aragonese estates, belonged by right to the Crown of Aragon.[6] On that August morning, news reached Monzón that Pedro Navarro had captured the city of Tripoli, considered one of the wealthiest and best-defended emporia along the North African coast. King Ferdinand immediately composed a letter to Cardinal Francisco Ximénez de Cisneros (1436–1517), claiming that Navarro's victory (achieved July 25, the day of Saint James)[7] demonstrated God's clemency, and that the path (*camino*) was being opened for the completion of the "holy enterprise," a term that referred to the recovery of Jerusalem.[8] Ferdinand's use of the term *camino* gives a sense of the geographical crusading strategy the king envisioned: the establishment of Spanish control over the Maghrib, which could then serve as a locus through which to move Spanish forces and supplies into the eastern Mediterranean in order to support a Spanish assault on Mamluk-ruled Palestine. In a separate piece of correspondence concerning the African conquests, the king wrote, ". . . that these strongpoints be emptied of Muslims, so that, seeing as Africa is full of them [Muslims], we may not have them in our rearguard."[9] By securing these strategic presidios, the Spanish would free themselves of enemies in their "rearguard," a clear indication that Ferdinand envisioned continuing eastward, leaving the Maghrib at their back.

This strategic vision of the Maghrib as a stepping-stone to conquests in the eastern Mediterranean is likewise discernible in other diplomatic correspondence relating to the Spanish conquest of Tripoli. On September 8, 1510, Emery d'Amboise, the Master of the Knights of St. John of Jerusalem, based at Rhodes, wrote to Ferdinand congratulating him on recent Spanish victories in the African cities of Bougie and Tripoli. The Knights of St. John had ordered solemn processions to mark the conquest of Tripoli, he related, and he expressed confidence that the Spanish would soon reach Egypt, where Amboise's military order would join forces with them to "liberate" the Holy Land:

> May it please God that all Christians, following your Majesty's example, take up arms against the infidels who have afflicted the Christian nation for so long. And in their lands may we raise the banner of the cross and recover the Holy Land, a task that will not be as difficult as many ignorant people believe . . . may God Almighty carry out Your Majesty's wishes and allow you to proceed with and complete the conquest of Africa as far as Egypt, where . . . we hope to join forces with your Highness' army and serve God in this worthy endeavor.[10]

Amboise's letter, while ascribing great importance to the conquest of Tripoli, places this event into a broader strategy, with Spain's North African possessions serving as stepping-stones toward Egypt, a site Amboise intimates will be employed as a forward base for a Christian assault on the Holy Land. These letters situate Spanish conquests in the Maghrib in a broader context. While Ferdinand and those in his royal council may have valued the African presidios in and of themselves, it is also clear that they considered them components in a broader Mediterranean strategy. That strategy entailed protecting the sealanes of the Mediterranean, thus shoring up the security of the coastlines of Iberia, the Balearics, Sicily, and Naples. The strategy, however, was offensive as well as defensive, and was geared toward a series of conquests in the eastern Mediterranean, including Egypt, Greece and Anatolia, Palestine, and eastward into Asia. While these aspirations were never realized, a thorough examination of the texts and crusade proposals pertaining to Spanish designs on the eastern Mediterranean proves instructive because of what the surviving documentation reveals about legal and moral arguments on conquest and empire. Although the arguments examined here bear certain similarities to those analyzed in Chapter 4 (in defense of Spanish claims to Africa), there are important distinctions. What is more, some of the arguments developed in the context of imperial expansion in the eastern Mediterranean informed arguments that were then deployed in other arenas of expansion, demonstrating the foundational part that the chimeric aspirations to Mediterranean empire played. One example of this is the seemingly symbolic title to the defunct crusader kingdom of Jerusalem, which served as the basis for legal arguments that Ferdinand crafted regarding just war against non-Christian peoples both in the Mediterranean and beyond. The religious politics of the Mediterranean basin accordingly played a vital role in the formulation of the legal doctrines that were subsequently applied in a variety of other contexts.

As was the case with Ferdinand's African expansionary ventures, the king's designs on the eastern Mediterranean were all focused on lands that had at one time been Christian. Like the arguments buttressing Spanish claims to

North Africa, claims to the eastern Mediterranean could likewise be framed as a war of recuperation of formerly Christian lands, rather than an act of conquest. As in the case of North Africa, the question of procuring valid dynastic rights to a territory prior to launching a conquest thereof also came into play. Ferdinand had inherited the titles to the Duchies of Athens and Neopatria, and he eagerly sought the title to the Byzantine Empire from the last Paleologus claimant.[11] Moreover, Ferdinand and the French kings Charles VIII and Louis XII expended no small effort to procure the title to the defunct kingdom of Jerusalem, a title that was linked to that of the kingdom of Naples. The title to Jerusalem was understood as crucial to attain prior to organizing a crusade to the Holy Land, and it simultaneously served a legal role in terms of the arguments a ruler might make to justify acts of war against non-Christians.

In sharp contrast to North Africa, however, there remained a large Christian population in most of these eastern lands. Thus, much of the representation of Spanish designs on the eastern Mediterranean took the form of a war of liberation to free these oppressed Christians from the yoke of Muslim tyranny. This war of liberation had a multitude of valences and significances. On a practical level, there existed a belief that the Eastern Christians desired to be liberated, and that they constituted a fifth column that would provide military assistance to the Latin invaders. Secondly, the notion of liberating oppressed Christians living under Islamic rule spoke to the theocratic duties of the Christian prince, predicated on a form of extraterritorial sovereignty—that Ferdinand, as the *defensor ecclesia*, had a responsibility to all Christian believers everywhere, regardless of political affiliation. In other words, this construction of sovereignty over one's correligionists did not apply to a defined geographical space. Finally, this understanding of liberation also served, along with other arguments (e.g., prior Christian rule), as the legal justification for the proposed Spanish-led military assault on the lands of the eastern Mediterranean. Ferdinand and those in his royal circle therefore portrayed the king as a divinely appointed guardian of the *iglesia universal*, not just the *iglesia romana*, whose responsibility it was to defend all Christian believers everywhere, regardless of which temporal ruler they were subject to.

In the case of Ferdinand's designs on the eastern Mediterranean, these brought the Crown into conflict with the Ottoman Empire in a prelude to the imperial rivalry between the Habsburgs and Ottomans that was so prevalent a feature of the sixteenth-century Mediterranean. While military engagements between the two emerging hegemons of the Mediterranean were rare in the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, Spanish writers increasingly engaged in a campaign to delegitimate Ottoman rule over former Byzantine lands and to represent Ferdinand as the prince best suited to rule over



Map 5. Map of the Eastern Mediterranean, ca. 1510

the Mediterranean lands that had once constituted the eastern Roman Empire. Aside from the Ottoman sultans who ruled from Contantinople, Ferdinand's chief dynastic competitor for titles to eastern Mediterranean lands was France. Thus, the representations of Ferdinand as benefactor and guardian of the *respublica christiana* were calculated to suggest that Ferdinand did more for Christendom than did other Christian princes, especially the French kings, and perhaps even more than did the pope. All of these factors informed the arguments early sixteenth-century Spaniards developed to bolster Spanish claims in the eastern reaches of the inner sea.

An Eastern Patrimony

When Ferdinand inherited the Crown of Aragon in 1479, he became king of a polity that had long-standing interests, dynastic as well as commercial, in the central and eastern Mediterranean. Since the mid-thirteenth century, the house of Aragon had pursued marriage alliances and crusading ventures that enmeshed the Crown not only in the affairs of Italy but also further east, in Greece and in the Holy Land. Through the marriage of King Peter III of Aragon (r. 1276–1285) to Constance, daughter of the last Hohenstaufen claimant to the throne of Sicily, the Aragonese dynasty could lay claim to the title to Jerusalem, a title that had been linked to that of Sicily since the early thirteenth century.[12] Following the Sicilian Vespers (1282) and the subsequent Angevin-Aragonese war for control of southern Italy, the title to Jerusalem remained part of the papal investiture of the mainland portion of the Two Sicilies, the kingdom of Naples, a realm that remained under Angevin rule until 1442. Nevertheless, the house of Aragon continued to pursue marriage alliances that could potentially bring the title to the crusader kingdom into their domains. In 1315, James II of Aragon (r. 1291–1327) married Mary, the elder sister of Henry of Lusignan, king of Cyprus and claimant to a distinct line of inheritance to the title of Jerusalem. Mary of Lusignan was heir designate both to her younger brother's kingdom of Cyprus and to the kingdom of Jerusalem.[13]

The Crown of Aragon also invested resources in military ventures in the eastern Mediterranean. In the fourteenth century the Catalan Company, a confederation of mercenaries, embarked on raids in Greece, eventually winning control of the duchies of Athens and Neopatria in 1311. Although the Catalan Company acted initially with no royal involvement, within a year the company recognized King Frederick III of Sicily (r. 1295–1337), a cadet ruler from the Aragonese dynasty, as its lord.[14] From that point on, the title to the duchy was linked to the Crown of Aragon. In addition to dominions in the

central and eastern Mediterranean, the Crown of Aragon had established consuls to facilitate Catalan trade in numerous North African ports as far afield as Alexandria.[15] Thus, there existed a fourteenth-century precedent of Aragonese interests, both dynastic and commercial, across nearly the entire breadth of the Mediterranean.

In addition to dynastic unions, Aragonese interest in the kingdom of Jerusalem manifest itself in more concrete ways as well, including strategies for a crusade to be led by an Aragonese king. James II of Aragon was particularly supportive of such proposals. James welcomed the Majorcan polymath Ramón Llull at his court and proved receptive to Llull's crusading and evangelization plans.[16] The latter was a proponent of a crusade strategy that is often described as "the way of Egypt." This was a plan for the conquest of the Holy Land predicated on establishing control of the mouth of the Nile River (or the cities of Alexandria and Damietta) and then employing that strategic point as a base from which to attack Jerusalem, approaching Palestine by land from Sinai, by sea, or through a joint land and sea operation. The "way of Egypt" was the strategy employed by Salah ad-Din (Saladin) when he conquered Jerusalem from Christian rule in 1187, and European crusaders, including King Louis IX of France (r. 1226–1270), subsequently adopted the same approach, albeit without success.[17]

When James II of Aragon attended the Council of Vienne in 1311, he presented a plan for a Christian recovery of the Holy Land, in which he claimed to have been inspired by Llull.[18] This strategy was predicated on a conquest of the kingdom of Granada, followed by the Maghrib. Christian forces would then employ bases in the Maghrib as points from which to launch a final assault on Muslim rule in the eastern Mediterranean. Since the thirteenth century, Christian crusaders had come to view the approach to the Holy Land via the southern Mediterranean shore as more practicable than the earlier route across Anatolia.[19]

In the late fifteenth century, Llull's crusading strategy was still seen as viable, perhaps more than ever. In the wake of Ferdinand and Isabella's conquest of Granada (1492), hopes ran high that the Spanish monarchs would reverse the gains the Ottoman Empire had made in the eastern Mediterranean, and that they would conquer the Holy Land. On January 24, 1495, Hieronymous Münzer, traveling through Spain and Portugal, delivered an address at the Spanish court. The German traveler argued that earlier crusading ventures had failed because God had reserved the recuperation of the Holy Sepulcher for Ferdinand and Isabella. The German flatterer even alluded to a strategy, indicating that Ferdinand and Isabella should first conquer Africa before marching on the Holy Land:

> This triumph has been reserved for you. The coasts of Africa tremble before your arms and are prepared to submit to your rule. Thus, you will not have any enemies at your back. Spain is in a state of peace and tranquility and there is no cause to fear revolts from within. The wealthy islands of Sicily, Sardinia, and Majorca will furnish you with all necessary supplies. Rhodes will provide her skilled soldiers [the Knights of St. John of Jerusalem]. The Germans and Hungarians will engage the Turk along their frontiers so that he cannot provide assistance to the Egyptian sultan. Thus it will be easy for you to recover the Holy Sepulcher from the jaws of the enemies of God and to adorn it with the insignias of victory.[20]

We must allow that Münzer's words are those of a sycophant, a foreign guest eager to ingratiate himself at the court of the Spanish monarchs. And yet, one of the most remarkable aspects of this episode is the fidelity with which Ferdinand's *empresa de África* during the years 1497–1511 seemed to follow the strategy laid out in this exhortation. The string of Spanish conquests along the Mediterranean littoral of Africa, leading from west to east, did indeed mark out a path. Ferdinand seems to have conceived of his North African possessions as components of a thalassocracy, in which control of the sea was paramount. The Aragonese king's interest in controlling the sea is obvious: the fundamental basis for power in the Mediterranean at this time lay in controlling the sea lanes for commercial reasons, as well as for moving arms, men, and information from one region of the sea to another. Moreover, the rise of Ottoman sea power in the Mediterranean during the final decades of the fifteenth century rendered control of the waterways imperative for any ruler with aspirations to challenge the Turkish empire. In addition to these thalassocratic features, Ferdinand's North African policy bears the imprint of Llull's crusading proposal, a plan that aimed to employ strategic points along the North African coast as waypoints for supplies and reinforcements to reach crusading armies whose ultimate objective lay at the eastern end of the Mediterranean. These African acquisitions were understood not as ends in and of themselves but as steps toward something else. The *camino* along the rim of Africa led to the eastern Mediterranean, toward the port of Alexandria and to the Holy Land.

In chapter 4, I examined the process of Castilian and Aragonese conquests of key points along the littoral of the Maghrib. Even before the acquisition of some of the most important cities and presidios, such as Orán (1509), Ferdinand entertained proposals for conquests in the eastern Mediterranean, beginning with Alexandria. The earliest evidence for Spanish designs on Alexandria is apparent in an exchange of correspondence between Francisco Ximénez de Cisneros and King Manoel I of Portugal (r. 1495–1521) in March 1506.[21] In two

letters Manoel wrote to Cisneros (one to Cisneros himself, the other addressed to Cisneros and containing information to be delivered to King Ferdinand) discussing the possibility of a joint Portuguese-Spanish North African campaign for the coming summer, the Portuguese monarch revealed that he was aware of Spanish plans to conquer Alexandria, which he claimed to have heard about from a prior from Rhodes who had journeyed to Portugal.[22] The Portuguese king thanked Cisneros for information he had received concerning the disposition of the Christian population of Egypt, noting that his source had informed him that the Christian population living under the Mamluk sultan was supportive of the possibility of a Latin Christian invasion. Believing that God was making manifest his desire for a Christian crusade, Manoel expressed optimism that the support of the Egyptian Christian population would render this conquest easy: ". . . and we are very pleased to read what you wrote us concerning the disposition of the Christians who inhabit the Sultan's lands, and it appears certain that our Lord is giving us signals that at this time His volition is that we should undertake this and that we will be victorious in this venture."[23] Here, then, we see an early iteration of the theme that the Eastern Christians would assist Latin invaders.

The Portuguese king's letter makes it clear that Alexandria was not the only objective of these crusade proposals. Linking a hoped-for Egyptian conquest to one of the Holy Land, Manoel wrote to Cisneros that he expected that "very soon we will be able to receive the body of our Lord Jesus Christ from your hands [i.e., take communion from Cisneros] in the Holy House."[24] In fact, Manoel referred not only to a Christian conquest of Jerusalem but to the conquest of other sites of religious significance as well, defending the Portuguese presence in the Red Sea by arguing that Portuguese engagement in the spice trade of the Indian Ocean was not at odds with their crusading intentions. Manoel bragged that his ships were positioned such that Portuguese forces could easily arrive within two or three leagues of St. Catherine's of Mt. Sinai and that they could get within two days' march of Mecca. The Mamluks took the Portuguese threat seriously enough that in 1506 one of their military captains, Mir Husayn al-Kurdi, constructed fortifications at Jedda in order to cut off the point of access the Portuguese might use to approach Mecca.[25] During the early Portuguese presence in the Red Sea some close to King Manoel (including perhaps even the king himself) harbored aspirations to seize Mecca as a sort of hostage holy site, and then to exchange it for Jerusalem.[26] Manoel stated that the Portuguese presence in the Red Sea signaled the imminent downfall of the Mamluk dynasty.[27] It is true that for over three centuries Catholic crusading strategy had included the idea of an economic blockade of the Red Sea. The understanding here was that by cutting the Mamluks off from the lucrative spice trade,

crusading forces would more easily be able to conquer Egypt and then take the Holy Land. As Luís Filipe F. R. Thomaz writes, concerning the spice trade, "Since the Middle Ages, the desire to control this trade had been inextricably mixed up with crusading plans; here, the idea was not to bypass the Red Sea route, but to master it."[28]

While Manoel's claims about Portuguese proximity to St. Catherine's and to Mecca may have been somewhat exaggerated, his letter does speak to the fact that Europeans recognized Alexandria and the Lower Nile Valley as a strategic zone linking the Mediterranean to the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean beyond. To be sure, the city of Alexandria occupied a strategic location for a crusade to the Holy Land, a feature that rendered the port a target for Catholic Europeans who harbored hopes of a Christian recovery of Jerusalem. Control of the city would give the Spanish access to the wheat crop of the Nile Valley and provide a base for military incursions into Palestine, either by sea or overland through Sinai. In addition to its suitability for crusading strategy, however, Alexandria possessed an allure due to other attributes. At the mouth of the Nile, Alexandria could also serve as a gateway to the caravan routes that crossed the Egyptian desert, linking the Nile to the Red Sea and the emporia of the Indian Ocean basin.[29] Ferdinand's reestablishment of the Catalan consulate in Alexandria in 1485, with Juan Cascassona as consul, indicates that he perceived the commercial benefits of access to the spice markets of the East. Even after Vasco da Gama's rounding of Africa (1497–1499), many Latin Christians continued to view the eastern Mediterranean as a more efficient and safer point for accessing the spice routes of the East. Indeed, Luís Filipe F. R. Thomaz argues that the Portuguese initially viewed the Cape Route to India as temporary: according to the strategic thinking of those close to King Manoel of Portugal, a Portuguese blockade of the Red Sea would lead to the collapse of Mamluk Egypt. Then, once the Portuguese had seized control of Egypt and the Lower Nile, the Cape Route would not longer be necessary.[30] In a crusading proposal he presented to Pope Julius II in 1507, Giles of Viterbo reminded the pope of the fact that Egypt was the access point to the commerce of the East, demonstrating that religious and commercial motivations were fully enmeshed.[31] Venice, too, continued in its attempts to control the spice trade that flowed into the Mediterranean from the East, and Catalo-Aragonese perceptions of the commercial possibilities of the inner sea meant that in the Crown of Aragon too there was an understanding of the commercial possibilities presented by the eastern Mediterranean. Indeed, Latin Christians were not misguided in their understanding of Egypt's economic significance. Andrew Hess argues that the sixteenth-century acquisition of the Mamluk Empire provided the Ottomans with far more revenue than did the riches from the New World that

reached Charles V's coffers.[32] Control of Alexandria therefore represented a variety of potential benefits, both crusading and economic. For the reasons outlined here, the Lower Nile Valley was one of the most strategically important areas for the emerging early modern empires of Spain, Portugal, and the Ottoman Empire. The same combination of strategic, economic, and religious motives that spurred Ferdinand's interest in Egypt lay behind the Ottoman conquest of the region in 1516–1517.[33]

No joint Spanish-Portuguese attack on Alexandria occurred in the summer of 1506. Nevertheless, Iberian interest in Egypt and the rest of the eastern Mediterranean remained strong. The same year that Ferdinand, Cisneros, and King Manoel considered plans for a joint crusade against Egypt, one of Ferdinand's most esteemed military commanders, Count Pedro Navarro, wrote an official *memorial* to Ferdinand, in which he exhorted the Aragonese king to leave aside the conquest of Africa and to instead focus his resources on a conquest of Greece and Turkey, an endeavor that Navarro represented as the first step toward a Christian recovery of the Holy Land.[34] This *memorial* is best described as a formal, eight-page political-theological brief. It was composed in Italy, and at numerous points throughout the *memorial* Navarro explains that he will go into greater detail when he meets face to face with King Ferdinand.[35] Presumably, this anticipates Ferdinand's visit to his newly acquired Neapolitan realm in the fall of 1506.[36] As in King Manoel's letters to Cisneros, Navarro demonstrates an interest in effecting a Christian recovery of the Holy Land. Even more than does the Portuguese monarch's correspondence, Navarro's *memorial* emphasizes the Christian population of the eastern Mediterranean, representing them as eager accomplices in a Spanish-led assault on the Ottoman Empire and portraying such an attack as a war of liberation.

The military plan Navarro proposed charted a course through the Ottoman-ruled lands of Greece and Turkey to which Ferdinand held symbolic title. In 1479, along with the Crown of Aragon, Ferdinand had inherited the titles to the duchies of Athens and Neopatria, titles he always included in his official correspondence. Moreover, in 1502 Andrew Paleologus, the last Greek claimant to the Byzantine Empire, had made Ferdinand and Isabella his heirs, believing that they were the rulers most likely to defeat the Ottoman Empire.[37] Through his conquest of Naples in 1503, Ferdinand had acquired the title to the defunct crusader kingdom of Jerusalem, a crown that was linked to that of Naples.[38] Navarro might easily, therefore, have made an argument that Ferdinand, as possessor of the titles to these lands, was the prince with the strongest legal claim to lead a conquest of them. Such a strategy, however, was inherently risky. In 1506, Ferdinand had not yet won the formal papal investiture to the kingdom of Jerusalem and would not until 1510. Furthermore, there was a

Valois counterclaim to the title to Jerusalem. Perhaps recognizing the weaknesses in making a dynastic argument, Navarro in his *memorial* chose not to cast his proposal as a juridical claim to patrimony.

Rather, Navarro emphasized the Christian history of these lands, as well as the contemporaneous Christian population. These factors thus served as Navarro's principal rationale for the conquest he envisioned. Navarro played on the early Christian history of Greece, Anatolia, and the Holy Land, writing that the land had been "blessed by the precious blood of our Savior Christ Jesus and that of many martyrs. In Turkey there still exist churches, monasteries, and the holy relics of saints."[39] Navarro thus represents these lands as having constituted an integral part of Christendom since the time of Christ. Now under Muslim rule, they maintain their Christian imprint and merely await liberation. This, rather than Ferdinand's claims to Byzantium or to Athens and Neopatria, serves as the justificatory argument for the war Navarro urges Ferdinand to launch. In this regard, Navarro might be invoking the common understanding of prior Christian rule constituting a legal basis for conquest, along the same lines as the arguments Palacios Rubios developed a few years later to justify Spanish conquests in Africa (see chapter 4). Navarro, of course, was not a lawyer or jurist, but in the ambit of the early sixteenth-century Mediterranean world, one would not have needed a law degree to be familiar with the viewpoint that saw a Christian subjugation of the Ottoman Empire as justified on the grounds that it would constitute a recovery of occupied lands.

A key distinction between Spanish pretensions in Africa and those in Greece and Anatolia was the presence of the sizeable Christian population in Ottoman lands. Navarro asserted that the Orthodox Christian inhabitants would support Ferdinand because they were Christian and because, as Christians, they were oppressed by the Ottoman sultan.[40] Among the benefits that Navarro argued would accrue to Ferdinand following a conquest of Greece and Turkey, he listed "the gratitude of so many Christians, presently in a state of servitude and slavery and continually afflicted by the Mohammedan blasphemy."[41] There is nothing innovative, of course, about Navarro's representation of the Orthodox Christians as living in a state of oppression and servitude. After all, in 1439 Pope Eugenius IV had held out the prospect of a union between the Catholic and Orthodox churches, and the benefits this would bring for the "christians dwelling in the East, and to those in the power of the infidel."[42] What is significant in Navarro's text, though, is the role of liberator that he assigns to King Ferdinand. This is the crux of Navarro's argument, and it is a significant element of his portrayal of Ferdinand in a theocratic light.

Navarro's proposal, predicated on the assistance of an Orthodox fifth column, ran counter to ideas expressed by figures with whom Navarro was in

dialogue. The course of action he encouraged was in fact a refutation of crusading strategy developed over the previous three centuries. The *memorial* grew out of a policy dispute between Navarro and the powerful Castilian churchman Francisco Ximénez de Cisneros (1436–1517), cardinal of Spain from 1507. In subsequent years Cisneros would prove to be a tireless proponent of Spanish conquests in North Africa. In his *memorial*, Navarro argued strongly against proposals for a North African crusade and advocated instead the conquest of Ottoman Greece and Turkey, a victory that would be assured by the assistance the Latin invaders would receive from the Greek Orthodox inhabitants. Once the Turks had been subjugated, Ferdinand's forces could approach Jerusalem from the north, rather than via Egypt.

At the time that Navarro composed his *memorial*, Spanish royal policy in the Mediterranean appeared wedded to the idea of a North African crusade. Less than one year earlier, Spanish forces had won a victory at Mers el-Kébir (Mazalquivir, an important port near Orán, in modern Algeria). Gonzalo de Ayora, who had been named royal chronicler of Castile in 1501, served as *capitán de ordenanza* (in charge of ordnance) in the offensive against the strategic port, and he wrote an eyewitness account of the battle in a letter to King Ferdinand. Ayora depicted the conquest of Mers el-Kébir as an important step in the eventual conquest of all of North Africa. Pointedly, he indicated that Mers el-Kébir marked the completion of half of this process. If Mers el-Kébir were properly fortified, he argued, it could serve as the base from which all of Africa (meaning here the Mediterranean rim of that continent) might be easily conquered.[43] As we saw earlier in this chapter, in March 1506 the Portuguese and Spanish crowns were in touch concerning the possibility of attacking Alexandria. In this light, and in the context of Gonzalo de Ayora's conviction that with Mers el-Kebir the conquest of Africa now stood half completed, it appeared that the "way of Egypt" so forcefully pushed by Cisneros and others was winning out in the policy dispute that was unfolding at King Ferdinand's court. Navarro's *memorial* thus might be read as an argument presented against the prevailing winds in the royal circle.

Navarro, however, recognized that the balance of powers in the Mediterranean region was tilting in the direction of a bipolar distribution of forces. In this conviction, he remained fixated on the polity that had emerged as Spain's chief rival, the Ottoman Empire. Navarro's views of the hegemon of the eastern Mediterranean led him to argue that the conquest of Africa would be fruitless, due to the logistics of holding the land once conquered. In addition to what he termed the "sterility" of the land beyond the fertile coastal strip, Navarro believed the lack of a sizeable Christian population in the Maghrib would pose difficulties to effective Spanish rule. In his *memorial*, Navarro argued

vociferously against Cisneros's projected string of North African presidios, suggesting, with a rhetorical flourish, that in order to hold those points, Ferdinand would need so many Christian settlers as to depopulate the entirety of Spain.[44] Navarro's concerns were not unfounded. Five years later, the viceroy of Sicily, Hugo de Moncada, wrote to Ferdinand concerning the difficulties he faced in administering and holding Tripoli: "I eagerly await a reply from Your Highness, concerning the proposal to reduce Tripoli to a military fortress; because the idea of populating Tripoli with Christians is not feasible."[45]

The conquest of Greece and Turkey could be more easily effected and maintained, wrote Navarro, due to the substantial population of Orthodox Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire. Navarro described Turkey as "entirely inhabited by Christians."[46] This, of course, was hyperbole, but Navarro was correct that there was a large Orthodox population living within the Ottoman Empire: in the early sixteenth century the Ottomans still ruled over a Christian majority, and this was particularly true in the case of their possessions in Greece and the Balkan Peninsula.[47] Navarro argued that these Christians living under Ottoman rule would rebel against their overlords, should Ferdinand invade, thereby allowing the Aragonese king to take possession of the land with little bloodshed and without the need to import Latin Christians to secure and hold the land.[48] Navarro clearly believed that the Orthodox Christians would act not only as loyal subjects who would help hold the land for Ferdinand, but potentially in a military capacity as well. He claimed that in his conquest Ferdinand would gain many *valedores*, a term best translated as "defenders," in a military sense.[49] Navarro's argument about the proclivities of the Orthodox Christian population of Greece and Anatolia clearly contained a pragmatic bent, one that we should expect from the military commander. And yet it is equally clear that Navarro represents the liberation of Eastern Christians as Ferdinand's religious obligation, as one of the responsibilities of a theocratic Christian prince.

Navarro's argument, while multifaceted, was largely predicated on the understanding of the Christian subjects of the Ottoman sultan as oppressed and enslaved. His exhortation to Ferdinand was to launch a war of liberation, and it was this process of freeing the oppressed Christians from the forces of tyranny that served as Navarro's primary justification. It is in this light, I suggest, that we are to read Navarro's argument that Ferdinand would be a robber and kidnapper, should he persist with plans to conquer Africa, and that such conduct would not redound well to the royal honor.[50] Along similar lines of advocating military aggression as an act of liberation, in May 1511, Emery d'Amboise, the Grand Master of the Knights of St. John of Jerusalem, wrote

to Ferdinand that the Ottoman sultan Bayezid's illness made it an opportune moment to go into the Balkans to "liberate" the Greeks, Albanians, Slovenians, Bosnians, Serbs, and other nations.[51] The evidence furnished by Navarro's *memorial*, by d'Amboise's letter, and by Eugenius IV's 1439 missive demonstrates that the understanding of martial actions against an Islamic polity that was home to Christian subjects as a war of liberation was widely held throughout the Latin Mediterranean. This, of course, was one of the rationales Pope Urban II had given in his sermon at the Council of Clermont in 1095 when he preached what was to become the First Crusade. And the doctrine gained legal sanction at the pens of jurists during the later Middle Ages. In his *De insulis* (composed ca. 1512–1515), Juan López de Palacios Rubios, when discussing the topic of Christians living under infidel rule, drafted a legal argument to justify the use of force against those infidels, should they in any way attempt to draw their Christian subjects away from their ancestral faith:

> Should the infidels mistreat the Christians who live among them, particularly in matters concerning faith, attempting to draw them into infidelity, to heresy, or toward their damned rites and ceremonies, then the said Christians, free as well as slave, may flee from the infidels, and the Pope or Christian Princes may take up arms against the infidels in order to liberate the believers from such grave danger. This is the opinion of Innocent [IV].[52]

Concerning the Christians who lived under Mamluk rule in Palestine, Palacios Rubios asked rhetorically, "Is there nothing more glorious than to liberate those Christians who live subjugated to the miserable yoke of the barbarians and, in the process, to extend the name and faith of Christ?"[53]

The notion of a crusade against the Ottoman Empire being justified on the grounds of there being a sizeable Christian population living there is clearly not particular to Navarro's reasoning in his *memorial*. On the contrary, the military commander likely articulated his proposal along lines that he had heard in a variety of contexts and settings. While there is no surviving documentary response from Ferdinand, it seems Navarro's *memorial* met with royal approval, as he continued to occupy important positions in Ferdinand's service for six years following his composition of the text, leading Spanish military engagements in North Africa and Italy until his capture by the French at the Battle of Ravenna in 1512.

Pedro Navarro's *memorial*, while remarkable for its detail, is no outlier. His Iberian contemporaries shared his sanguine conviction that the Ottomans might be easily defeated. King Manoel I of Portugal, in the previously cited

letter to Francisco Ximénez de Cisneros of March 2, 1506, voiced his belief that Turkey and Greece might be conquered with ease due to the great number of Christians who inhabited those lands:

> We have learned that within the Turk's lands, in Greece as well as in Turkey, there exists the best set of circumstances that will allow for its conquest, as many Christians live there. For this reason, the Turks have a great fear of their Christian subjects, as was evident in the siege of Mytilene [Lesbos] and when King Charles [VIII, of France] invaded Naples.[54]

The optimism that the Ottoman state might be easily subjugated is evident, too, in the personal correspondence of the Italian humanist Peter Martyr, since 1487 in residence at the Spanish court. In a letter to his friend Iñigo López de Mendoza in January 1510, Martyr expressed his optimism about the imminent fall of the Ottoman Empire, due to the internecine struggles among Selim "the Grim" and his brothers: "This discord will be the cause for the easy defeat of the Turkish empire, if the Christian princes would join common cause."[55] Pope Julius II (r. 1503–1513) shared in the belief that a united Christian front would easily defeat the Ottomans. Writing just two months after Peter Martyr expressed his optimism in his letter to Iñigo López de Mendoza, the pope granted Ferdinand a crusading bull for his African enterprise (the bull *Sacrosanctae Romane*), expressing optimism that Ferdinand's success in his African conquests would lead to a general Christian alliance that would destroy Islam once and for all.[56]

This widespread optimism, one of the features of what I label the "Mediterranean moment," underlay the plethora of proposals and discussions concerning an early sixteenth-century assault to topple the Ottoman Empire, an assault that was understood as a holy undertaking not only because it would be launched against an Islamic foe but because it would serve to liberate fellow Christians. Ferdinand's own correspondence reveals that he held the same view of the Christian inhabitants of the eastern Mediterranean. The Aragonese king expressed confidence in the success of a planned crusade, due to the assistance he expected to receive from Eastern Christians and from captives (presumably a reference to Catholics who had been taken captive and were held in polities under Muslim rule).[57]

The view of the Greek Orthodox potentially acting as a fifth column in the event of a Latin crusade against the Ottomans held currency in other parts of Europe as well, and other writers who advocated Levantine conquests likewise represented the Greek Orthdox subjects of the Ottoman Empire as simultaneously a population to be liberated and as a fifth column that would

assist the Catholics in the event of an invasion. In 1513, two Italian monks, Paolo Giustinian and Pietro Querini, presented a *memorial* to Pope Leo X (r. 1513–1521). The content of this document bears a striking resemblance to that of Navarro's *memorial*, composed seven years earlier. The two Italian monks exhorted the pope to launch a crusade against the Turks and advocated attempts to convert the Mamluk rulers of Egypt and Syria to Christianity.[58] In Giustinian and Querini's text, however, it is the authors' confidence in the assistance of the Greeks that guarantees the success of their proposal, as the authors posit, with a hyperbolic flourish, that upon a Latin invasion one hundred million Orthodox Christians would join the invading force to assist in defeating the Turks.[59] Nor were Catholic crusading plans predicated solely on the discovery of some distant Christian ally; there was also some hope of joining forces with an Islamic power, such as the Mamluk rulers of Egypt and Syria or the Safavid rulers of Persia, in order to defeat the Ottoman Empire.[60] Europeans reacted to the rise of the Safavid Empire in the first years of the sixteenth century with optimism that the new Shi'a force would be willing to ally with Catholics to fight the Ottomans. Some even hypothesized that, in light of the fact that the Ottomans considered them heterodox or even infidels, the Safavids represented a sort of quasi-Christian power on the eastern frontier of the Ottoman Empire. Margaret Meserve argues that Europeans interpreted the rise of the Safavids as a sign that God had created a force in the East to lend the Christians assistance against the Ottomans.[61] This is precisely the interpretation that Giles of Viterbo set forth in a *Discourse* he presented to Pope Julius II in 1507. In assuring Julius of the likelihood of Christian victory over the Ottomans, Viterbo referred to the wars between the Turks and the Safavids as creating the right conditions for a Catholic crusade, and he likewise emphasized the role the Greek Orthodox would play in assisting the Latins.[62]

Through networks of spies, European diplomats, travelers, and churchmen gleaned valuable intelligence about the Ottoman Empire and about prospects for launching an invasion against the dominant power of the eastern Mediterranean. In April 1514, Bernardino de Carvajal, the cardinal of Santa Cruz, wrote a letter to King Ferdinand from Rome. The cardinal informed Ferdinand that he had recently received intelligence from Ragusa on Ottoman affairs.[63] He explained to the Aragonese king that, thanks to a convergence of factors, the summer of 1514 represented a particularly opportune moment to attack the Ottoman Empire: "The Turk is preoccupied in Anatolia this year and will be leaving Greece almost completely undefended . . . meaning that he will not be able to make advances into Europe this year. . . . With a small force, your majesty would be able to win all of Greece easily, due to the internecine struggles among the Turks, as well as the desire of the Greek people to be

ruled by Christians."[64] Carvajal's comment about the Turk being "preoccupied in Anatolia" demonstrates a keen awareness of Ottoman-Safavid relations. Indeed, four months following Carvajal's letter, the Ottomans were victorious against the Safavids at the Battle of Çaldiran in eastern Anatolia (August 23, 1514). Carvajal's letter demonstrates the belief that the Greeks would rather be ruled by Latins than by the Ottomans, and the cardinal also shows the sanguine conviction that the Safavids would serve as a helpful diversion. This is of a piece with contemporaneous Latin Christian views of the Safavids as quasi-Christian or at the very least as potential allies against the Ottomans.[65]

The period spanning the late fifteenth through the early sixteenth century was rife with apocalyptic expectations that transcended confessional boundaries across the breadth of the Mediterranean. In the Iberian kingdoms, these millenarian hopes led to writings such as Navarro's *memorial*, and the conviction (held by some) that certain figures, perhaps King Ferdinand, would soon fulfill their anointed role as Last World Emperor.[66] The messianic strain was likewise evident in Ottoman imperial ideology, particularly during the first half of Süleyman the Magnificent's reign.[67]

As much as Navarro might have appealed to Ferdinand on the grounds that the monarch, as future liberator of Eastern Christians, was destined to fulfill the role of Last World Emperor, the king himself understood the pragmatic necessity of obtaining just title to a land prior to undertaking its conquest. For the first three decades of his reign, he employed his honorific titles of Duke of Athens and Neopatria in his official correspondence. Finally, in a meeting with his council of state in 1509, Ferdinand laid out a plan to make good his claim to these titles. In his address, he referred to the fourteenth-century Catalan Company's conquest of parts of Greece, and argued that if they could accomplish this with the limited resources of the Crown of Aragon, then surely, with all Spain united, and with the resources of Naples, Sicily, and Sardinia, there was hope that they could take back those lands that made up the duchy of Athens and now lay under Ottoman rule.[68]

Ferdinand's hoarding of symbolic titles was not limited to the duchies of Athens and Neopatria. The Aragonese king, along with other Christian rulers such as Charles VIII of France, expended no small effort in seeking the title to the defunct crusader kingdom of Jerusalem, a title he procured with his conquest of the kingdom of Naples. As noted earlier, since the thirteenth century the title to Jerusalem had been linked to that of the kingdom of Naples, and the crowns of the two kingdoms were conferred together through papal investiture. The fact that the king of Naples was also king of Jerusalem, even if this was by now largely symbolic, was reflected in the protocol used in addressing the Neapolitan monarch. The Castilian royal councilor and chronicler Diego

de Valera noted this in a text elucidating the preeminences of various offices throughout fifteenth-century Europe. In this text, Valera described the proper greeting to be employed with different royal dignities in different states: "With the kings of Spain," he wrote, "one only kisses the hand; with the kings of Naples, one kisses both the hand and the foot, just as is the practice with the pope. This is because the kings of Naples are also kings of the holy city of Jerusalem."[69] The title to Jerusalem thus elevated the Neapolitan king to a particularly exalted, perhaps even somewhat holy, status among Christian princes.

Following his conquest of Naples, Ferdinand employed his status as king of Jerusalem to bolster his political legitimacy at home and abroad, parlaying his position into universalist claims that placed him at the head of the commonwealth of Christian believers, the leader of a new Christian *imperium*. Such portrayals of the Aragonese king can be seen in sixteenth-century Italy, for example, in both the kingdom of Naples and in Rome. At the Vatican Palace, sometime between 1514 and 1517, sculptors employed in Raphael's workshop completed a heroic allegory depicting the Aragonese king and bearing the inscription: "Ferdinandus Rex Catholicus, Christiani Imperii Propagator."[70]

Ferdinand's procurement of the title to Jerusalem clearly increased his *fama*, allowing for his representation as a Christian prince favored by Fortune. But the title to the Holy Land also served a function more practical than that. While the territory of the kingdom of Jerusalem was under the control of the Mamluks of Egypt in the early sixteenth century, Ferdinand's diplomatic correspondence reveals the way in which the possession of this seemingly symbolic title in fact played a critical role in his aspirations to empire. Indeed, on two occasions during the early months of 1510, Ferdinand used his position as king of Jerusalem to justify conquests in Africa as well as projected conquests he intended to undertake in Asia.

In an address to the *Cortes* of Aragon convened at Monzón in April 1510, Ferdinand solicited funds to be used that summer in a series of African conquests. In his appeal to the representatives from the Aragonese estates, Ferdinand referred to medieval agreements between Aragon and Castile that had partitioned the future conquest of Africa, emphasizing that part of the conquest of Africa belonged by right to Aragon. Beyond this gesture to his Aragonese subjects, implying that his *empresa de África* would benefit them, Ferdinand went on to state that Africa would serve as a base from which he would be able to conquer Jerusalem. Ferdinand emphasized his right to the conquest of the Holy Land, due precisely to his possession of the Crown of Jerusalem through his recent acquisition of the kingdom of Naples.[71]

Beyond the fact that he believed his possession of the title to Jerusalem entitled him to conduct conquests in Africa, or to conduct conquests that

were geared toward an eventual recovery of Jerusalem itself, Ferdinand articulated a legal argument concerning his rights to make war on non-Christians, deriving from his status as king of Jerusalem. On February 28, 1510, the king wrote to Jerónimo de Vich, his ambassador in Rome, instructing him to solicit from Pope Julius II a bull that would grant Ferdinand the right to the conquest of the lands of "the Levant," a vaguely defined region stretching from North Africa eastward into Asia. The Aragonese king wrote:

> And in the said bull that you are to procure, I desire that it grant in general terms the lands from the eastern border of the Kingdom of Tremecen, or beginning from the Kingdoms of Bougie and Algiers inclusive, all the lands from there toward the Levant. Perhaps some might raise concerns, saying that in such generality this grant could be understood to include all of Greece and Asia, and to this I would respond that, should God favor us with a conquest of these territories, it would not be unsuitable that the apostolic See should grant us these lands, although it is not necessary to express it in these terms, but rather state your case according to the generalities that I have outlined here.[72]

At first glance, Ferdinand's demands appear striking for their audacity. The paucity of geographic particulars means that we can only speculate what the king had in mind when he wrote "all the lands from [Bougie] toward the Levant." Even if by "Asia" Ferdinand meant only Asia Minor and the region of Syria/Palestine, this would still be an extraordinarily broad swath of lands, encompassing Muslim-ruled territories of the southern as well as northeastern shores of the Mediterranean.

And yet, when viewed in the context of the several papal bulls of donation issued to the Spanish monarchs during the previous two decades, Ferdinand's solicitation does not appear so brazen. These bulls, of course, are the "donations" that Pope Alexander VI (r. 1492–1503) issued in 1493, granting the newly encountered islands of the Caribbean to Castile, and then partitioning American and African territories into Castilian and Portuguese zones (these bulls are cited and discussed at greater length in chapter 4).[73] Following the five bulls pertaining to the Atlantic lands, Alexander issued the bull *Ineffabilis et summi* in February 1495, investing Ferdinand and Isabella as "monarchs of Africa" and granting them and all of their successors the right to conquer, subdue, and lead Africa to the Catholic faith.[74] Seen against these earlier bulls, Ferdinand's pretension to obtain a bull of donation for the eastern Mediterranean, even if that eastern Mediterranean bled imprecisely into Asia, does not seem so audacious.

In Ferdinand's attempts to procure a papal imprimatur for his Mediterranean ambitions, the king invoked legal arguments concerning the significance

of former Christian rule over a territory, no matter how long ago, as well as the importance of holding just title to a territory intended for conquest. In his instructions to Jerónimo de Vich, Ferdinand emphasized that, although he desired the recognition from the papacy of his right to conduct conquests in the eastern Mediterranean, it was a mere formality. Citing the Italian jurist Bartolus of Saxoferrato (1313–1357), Ferdinand claimed that his status as king of Jerusalem entitled him to conduct conquests not only in the Holy Land proper but more generally throughout Greece and Anatolia and in any other lands ruled by the Turks:

> As you know, the right to the conquest of Jerusalem belongs to us and we rightfully possess the title to that kingdom. As Bartolus writes, he who holds the rights to the conquest of Jerusalem may licitly take the lands ruled by the Turks, even if they [the Turks] do not possess Jerusalem, because, as he says, Jerusalem cannot be conquered or held without first conquering the lands ruled by the Turks. When one is granted a particular right, one is also granted the rights to everything necessary in order to fulfill that right.[75]

Bartolus here must have envisioned an Anatolian approach to the Holy Land, with crusading armies traversing Seljuq and Ottoman lands, rather than the "way of Egypt" by which crusading forces (such as those of Louis IX of France in the Seventh Crusade) would attack Damietta and the Lower Nile in order to strike directly at the heart of Mamluk power. Of course, the breadth of the lands ruled by the Turks in 1510 was far greater than it had been when Bartolus was writing. By the early sixteenth century, the "lands ruled by the Turks" encompassed much of the Balkan Peninsula, Greece, and all of Anatolia. In making this appeal, Ferdinand argued that, as titular king of Jerusalem, he was entitled to conquer the whole of the Ottoman Empire.[76] Indeed, Ferdinand expanded his argument further, stating that as king of Jerusalem, he was aggrieved not only by the infidels occupying the Holy Land but by all other infidels.[77] This, he claimed, rendered any military action he took against non-Christians a just war:

> Moreover, as you know, the Church has a standing and declared war against the infidels who occupy Jerusalem and, as follows, against all other infidels, as they are enemies of our Holy Catholic faith and do not recognize His Holiness. This being the case, it follows that whatever one might seize from the infidels will belong to him who seizes it, as with things taken in the course of just and licit war. For the general rule is that that taken in just war is the rightful property of him who

> takes it, and in the case of war instigated by the Church, territory taken shall belong to him who first occupies it.[78]

Ferdinand, in this letter, is not at all specific about what he means by "all other infidels." Perhaps this was intended to clarify Ferdinand's conviction that he had just cause to make war not only against the Mamluk rulers of Jerusalem but also against the Ottomans. In light of the geographic scope of his request, he obviously means Muslims. To what extent, though, could this argument be applied in claims to lands ruled by non-Muslims? The capacious vagueness of the term "infidel" leaves the interpretation open. Is Ferdinand including here the right to make war on the non-Abrahamic inhabitants of the Canary Islands and the Caribbean? Does the king intend for his argument to apply to non-Abrahamic peoples of Asia, such as the Hindus of India? Based solely on Ferdinand's words in this letter, the answer is by no means clear.

At the hands of the jurist Palacios Rubios, however, the rights inherent in a prince's status as king of Jerusalem do seem to extend to the right to make war on infidels in any location throughout the world. In *De insulis*, Palacios Rubios addresses Ferdinand's possession of the title to Jerusalem in a section dedicated to the criteria necessary for a just war against non-Christians, irrespective of geography.[79] What is more, in the dedication to *De insulis*, in which the jurist directly addresses Ferdinand, Palacios Rubios writes that it is the responsibility of a *Rey Católico* to spread the Catholic faith throughout the world. He praises Ferdinand's triumphs as part and parcel of this process.[80] Here is a clear representation of the Spanish monarch fulfilling an apostolic role. Later, in reference to the apostolic responsibilities of the pope, the Holy Roman Emperor, and other Christian princes, Palacios Rubios writes that these figures should be reproached for their failings in this regard, as they have been so negligent in the conservation of the Christian patrimony.[81] The implication is that Ferdinand's political projects operate to fulfill both the temporal and spiritual responsibilities of the papacy better than the pope himself does. In Palacios Rubios's *De insulis*, then, there is a clear connection between the rights to make war on non-Christians that derive from possession of the title to Jerusalem and the universal mission that the author ascribes to King Ferdinand.

Another question that arises from Ferdinand's instructions to Vich is how a bull such as what Ferdinand hoped for would relate to the 1495 bull naming Ferdinand and Isabella monarchs of Africa. *Ineffabilis et summi* had been issued to Ferdinand and Isabella jointly, and the bull did not divide projected conquests in Africa into Castilian and Aragonese spheres. By the time Ferdinand wrote to Vich, in early 1510, Isabella had been dead for nearly six years and the ultimate union of the two crowns appeared tenuous at best. By then,

Ferdinand was married to Germana de Foix, with whom he was frantically attempting to produce a male heir to succeed him as king of Aragon. A boy had been born to the couple on May 3, 1509, but he died after a few hours. As Ferdinand grew older and increasingly desperate for an heir (in 1510 he was fifty-eight years old), he turned to consuming all sorts of aphrodisiacs, including herbal concoctions and bulls' testicles, in attempts to increase his libido. Members of Ferdinand's court recorded this, sometimes in quite unflattering terms. In December 1513, Peter Martyr, in a letter to Iñigo López de Mendoza, suggested that two appetites were killing Ferdinand: his love of the hunt, and his sexual appetite for the queen. Martyr complained that Ferdinand took Germana with him everywhere he went, presumably because he did not want to miss an opportunity to produce an heir.[82]

As Ferdinand made clear in his instructions to Vich, the lands he hoped to conquer from the infidels should be granted to him and to his successors in the Crown of Aragon in perpetuity.[83] Indeed, the notion of bequeathing newly conquered Mediterranean lands to an Aragonese heir was not novel. In 1507, Ferdinand had written to Vich regarding obtaining the papal investiture for the Kingdom of Naples. In those instructions, Ferdinand stipulated that Vich was to solicit from the pope an investiture that would then be heritable in perpetuity by any heir he and Germana de Foix might produce.[84] Ferdinand's 1510 instructions to his ambassador, then, should be read as an attempt to procure a bull recognizing a sphere specifically reserved for Aragonese expansion. In the letter, Ferdinand was explicit in juxtaposing his demand against the earlier agreements that had reserved the rights to the kingdom of Tremecén for Castile and those to Fez for Portugal.[85] In all likelihood, Ferdinand also had in mind Castile's claims in the Americas and Portugal's claims to the conquest of lands ringing the Indian Ocean. From August 25, 1499, on, following the return of Vasco da Gama, King Manoel I of Portugal claimed the right to the conquest of a vast swath of southern lands as yet relatively unknown to Europeans. To this end, the Portuguese king styled himself *Senhor da conquista e da navegação e comércio de Etiópia, Arábia, Pérsia e da Índia*.[86] Ferdinand's solicitation of a papal bull granting him the right to the conquest of any lands ruled by infidels is thus another volley in the contest between the Iberian kingdoms that had persisted since Portugal and Castile had clashed over rights to the Canary Islands in the early fifteenth century. Given Ferdinand's specific mention of "all of Greece and Asia" in his letter to Vich, it is possible that the king envisioned a string of eastern conquests that would extend across the temperate zone, abutting on their southern frontier the tropical conquests to which King Manoel claimed the right.

Ferdinand did not solicit only papal bulls by way of giving his expansionist aims a legal grounding; he also commissioned legal tracts to buttress his

objectives. In Juan López de Palacios Rubios's treatise of *De insulis*, the jurist presented a legal argument defending Ferdinand's right to conquer the defunct crusader kingdom of Jerusalem. Palacios Rubios wrote that for political and religious reasons, Ferdinand (more than any other Christian prince) possessed the right to execute the crusading enterprise. Palacios Rubios pointed to Ferdinand's just possession of the title to the Holy Land through his dynastic claim to the kingdom of the Two Sicilies.[87] Beyond these legal grounds, Palacios Rubios expressed the messianic belief that the conquest of Jerusalem had been divinely reserved for Ferdinand.[88] In addition to Ferdinand's rights to the Holy Land deriving from his possession of the title to Jerusalem, Palacios Rubios embedded other arguments legitimating a Christian assault on Palestine. He impugned the Mamluks' rights to rule over the Holy Land on the grounds of their religious identity. Following the centuries of early Christian history of the eastern Mediterranean, wrote the jurist, "the infidels violently occupied [the Holy Land] and now rule it as tyrants."[89] This tyrannical rule, and the fact that, as Palacios Rubios saw it, the Muslims had usurped those lands from Christians, formed part of the jurist's argument concerning the force carried by the precedent of Christian rule in a land: ". . . it may be argued that if any region, province, or kingdom was ever possessed by Christians and later occupied or usurped by infidels, the former may recover the land by their own authority."[90] In other words, the jurist defends Ferdinand's claim to the Holy Land on the ground that he possesses the title to Jerusalem, and also because the precedent of Christian rule there entitles Ferdinand to recuperate those lands from their tyrannical usurpers in an act of just war.

Through this section of Palacios Rubios's argument, the jurist follows a similar logic to that he employed in defense of Ferdinand's claims to North Africa (analyzed in chapter 4). There was nothing heterodox or innovative about any of this, as Innocent IV, over two centuries earlier, had articulated the same reasoning concerning the illegitimacy of Muslim rule in the Holy Land. Even those sixteenth-century writers who believed that non-Christians could possess *dominium* often agreed with Innocent IV and Palacios Rubios on the illegitmacy of Muslim rule in formerly the Christian territories of the Mediterranean. A clear example of such a position is to be found in the writings of Bartolomé de Las Casas.[91]

Why did Palacios Rubios include this excursus about Ferdinand's claims to the Holy Land in his tract *De insulis*? After all, the bulk of the text is devoted to Castilian claims in the Americas. Those portions of the text that pertain to the Old World generally address areas in which Spain was already engaged militarily or in which the Crown had consolidated its conquests: Granada, North Africa, and to a lesser extent the Canary Islands. Did Palacios Rubios include his

digression on Ferdinand's right to the Holy Land because he was aware of Spanish plans to launch a crusade into the eastern Mediterranean? He seems to imply as much in *De insulis*. The jurist writes that since 1265 all the kings of Naples and Sicily have claimed Jerusalem with words but not with arms; he hopes that Ferdinand will employ arms to make good his claim, just as he had done in Granada.[92] From here, he goes on to suggest that Ferdinand has discussed, in Palacios Rubios's presence, his plans to conquer the Holy Land: "I know how Your Highness' spirit is inclined with all determination toward this enterprise and how you intend to expend the remainder of your days on this holy expedition, as I have heard this profession many times from your own lips."[93]

In a different passage of the same text, Palacios Rubios includes an argument about the length of time a prince has in which to make good on a title to a land he does not currently occupy. The jurist develops this clause in the context of Portuguese rights to Fez, which Palacios Rubios argues should be considered forfeit.[94] But he presents his reasoning as having universal application: "If he who is ordered to take possession of something temporizes in doing so without just cause, then he shall lose his rights after a period of time sufficient to prove his negligence, that being two years if he be resident in the province and four years if he be absent from the province."[95] So what are the ramifications of this passage for Palacios Rubios's argument about Ferdinand's claims to Jerusalem? While Palacios Rubios is not specific on the criteria of being resident in a province, the distance between Iberia and the eastern Mediterranean makes it fairly certain that the statute of limitations in this case would be four years. Interpreting *De insulis* as having been composed in 1512, this would mean that Ferdinand would have until 1516 to take action to conquer Jerusalem. If the text was not written until, say, 1514, then Ferdinand's window to act ran slightly later. Palacios Rubios's *De insulis*, along with the fact that the jurist occupied a privileged position in royal circles, suggest that Ferdinand was quite seriously considering launching an attack into the eastern Mediterranean during the last years of his life. In October 1511, Pope Julius II wrote a letter to Ferdinand in which he exhorted the king to lead a crusade to recover Jerusalem, reminding Ferdinand of the title he held to the Holy City and of the monarch's resources and aptitude for conducting such a conquest.[96] Ferdinand clearly embraced his status as king of Jerusalem, but the corollary to that was that pressure could then be applied from quarters such as the papacy.

In Palacios Rubios's argument in defense of Castilian claims in the Americas, he appealed to the pope's position as heir to St. Peter, and his concomitant right to dispense lands anywhere in the world, so long as they are not under Christian rule.[97] According to this doctrine, Pope Julius II certainly could have given Ferdinand the right to conquer the lands of the eastern Mediterranean,

as Ferdinand requested in his letter to Vich. Indeed, Ferdinand's solicitation of a bull granting him the right to the conquest of eastern lands implicitly appeals to the pope's claimed status as *dominus mundi*, the same legal principle that underlay the papal donations of the Americas and of Africa. Ferdinand, in his letter to Vich, argued that the donation of eastern lands was merely a formality, as his status as titular king of Jerusalem entitled him to conduct these conquests. Left unmentioned in Ferdinand's letter was the fact that even for his title to Jerusalem, Ferdinand was dependent on the pope's investiture. In other words, for the attainment of his political objectives in the eastern Mediterranean (not to mention Naples, Navarre, and the Americas), Ferdinand was forced to acknowledge the pope as *dominus mundi*. Only in Africa, where patrimonial claims deriving from the ancient Visigothic legacy could apply, did Ferdinand and his jurists find themselves unbound.

By 1510, Ferdinand aimed at a conquest of "Asia," a region that encompassed Anatolia, Egypt east of the Nile, Syria, Palestine, and possibly lands even further east. While these conquests were never realized, Ferdinand's ambitions were grand. In an age when Castile was founding settlements in the Caribbean and Portugal was launching incursions into the Indian Ocean, Ferdinand aspired to forge an empire firmly planted on the shores of the Mediterranean. The king and his advisers understood this to be a distinctly Aragonese empire that would be inherited by any male heir Ferdinand could produce. In spite of prevailing historiography that frequently portrays the marriage of Ferdinand and Isabella (1469) as signifying the union of the crowns of Aragon and Castile, throughout most of the period from 1504 to 1516, the union of these two Iberian realms was not assured.[98] When Ferdinand solicited a papal grant in 1510 for the right to carry out his projected conquest of the Levant, including "Greece and Asia," he articulated this as an Aragonese empire, one that he would leave to a hoped-for Aragonese successor. This would not be united with the emerging Castilian empire in the Atlantic world but would serve as a counterbalance to it. Ferdinand and his councilors might also have conceived of an Aragonese empire in "Asia" as a temperate counterbalance to Portugal's tropical overseas claims in the Indian Ocean region. In any event, by considering the conquests that were successfully executed (Naples, Navarre, the Canary Islands, and North Africa) along with those that were not (Egypt, Greece, Anatolia, and Palestine), we can better understand the Mediterranean empire Ferdinand and his circle envisioned, an understanding that enriches our views of the contemporary processes of Spanish expansionism in the Atlantic world, as well as the trajectories of two other early modern expansionist states, the kingdom of Portugal and the Ottoman Empire.

Did Jerónimo de Vich follow Ferdinand's instructions and solicit from Julius II a bull granting Ferdinand the unfettered right to conduct wars of conquest throughout the eastern Mediterranean? If so, how did the pope respond? The answers to these questions are difficult to ascertain. What is clear is that, on March 26, 1510, less than one month after Ferdinand wrote his letter to Vich, the pope issued the bull *Sacrosanctae Romane* to Ferdinand. The bull offers crusading indulgences for Ferdinand's expeditions against Africa planned for that summer, and in the text Julius expresses the hope that Ferdinand's *empresa de África* will lay the foundation for the destruction of the "impious superstition" of Islam.[99] In the bull, Julius praises Ferdinand for all of his endeavors against the Moors, as well as against all other infidels. Julius offers papal support for Ferdinand's campaigns up until then conducted as well as those he might conduct in the future.[100] Once again, we are left to ponder what, precisely, Julius had in mind when he wrote "cualesquiera otros infieles." Was the pope here drawing a distinction between Moors and Turks? Or is this an oblique reference to the Gentile inhabitants of the Canary Islands or the Caribbean? The wording of *Sacrosanctae Romane* leaves this question open. Expressing optimism about a future alliance of Christian princes that might one day destroy Islam, and offering encouragement to Ferdinand in his future military ventures, are quite different than granting a bull of donation along the lines of what Ferdinand solicited. I suspect that Ferdinand must have been somewhat disappointed with *Sacrosanctae Romane*. Later in 1510, Julius did formally invest Ferdinand as king of Naples and Jerusalem. And Ferdinand clearly understood the power that the title to Jerusalem represented for the legal arguments he strove to make. But Pope Julius was not ready to grant the Aragonese king a bull of donation along the lines of what Ferdinand hoped for.

The Spanish legal texts examined here are very much a product of the particular geopolitical landscape of the early sixteenth-century Mediterranean. In addition to the Ottoman Empire, two other polities were emerging as competitors for Mediterranean hegemony: Spain and France. Ferdinand's concern for the legal protocol of procuring a papal bull of donation, or in commissioning an elaborate legal treatise such as Palacios Rubios's *De insulis*, spoke to his need to fend off Catholic European competitors who held designs on the same territories Ferdinand did. In the case of Ferdinand's Aragonese claims in Italy, Greece, Navarre, and the Holy Land, his main competitor was the Valois dynasty of France. This, then, is the context for Ferdinand's ongoing concern with developing a strong legal claim to Greece, Turkey, and the Holy Land, or with obtaining a papal sanction for any military actions he might undertake in the eastern Mediterranean. The target of the ambitious claims Ferdinand issued through these texts lay just across the Pyrenees.

In 1510, Pope Julius was embattled, beset by France's Louis XII (r. 1498–1515). Only one year later, the French king would be the driving force behind the *Conciliabulum* of Pisa that attempted to depose Julius.[101] Given the geopolitics of the Mediterranean and Europe in 1510, Julius likely demurred from acceding to Ferdinand's request, with the aim of not alienating France. Thus, Ferdinand's Levantine imperial ambitions were thwarted not by the Ottomans but by France (not to mention a perpetual shortage of resources), a polity that Spanish writers since the outbreak of the Italian Wars in 1494 had represented as a threat to the Christian commonwealth every bit as dangerous as the Turks themselves.

Throughout the final decade of his reign, as Ferdinand pursued his Mediterranean imperial ambitions, he and his councilors made concerted efforts to depict the Aragonese monarch as the guardian of the *respublica christiana*. This might be understood in geographic terms as roughly synonymous with the lands of Latin Christendom (or with Mediterranean Europe), but as the writings analyzed in this chapter demonstrate, those close to the king also asserted that Ferdinand played a role of protector, or guardian, over other Christian communities, even those inhabiting the Islamic polities of Mamluk Egypt and the Ottoman Empire. While the aspirational conquests of those lands never occurred, the doctrine upon which crusading plans were based, that Ferdinand would act as a liberator of oppressed and enslaved Christians, proved powerfully seductive and convincing to the Catholic audiences for these texts. At the same time that Ferdinand presented himself as having a duty to liberate Christians living under Islamic rule, the Aragonese monarch and his jurists employed the king's status as titular king of Jerusalem to articulate doctrines of just war against non-Christians in an increasingly broad range of territories.

CHAPTER 6

One Shepherd, One Flock

In 1486, the Marquis of Cádiz, Rodrigo Ponce de León, wrote a letter to the grandees of Castile in which he asserted that King Ferdinand of Aragon was the *encubierto*, "the hidden one," a divinely elected prince in the mold of the Biblical King David, who had been appointed the task of effecting a Christian conquest of Granada, North Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, and the Holy Land, where, ultimately, with his own hands, he would place the standard of the Crown of Aragon atop Calvary. In the process, this prince would conquer all the lands of the Muslims as well as those of the "bad Christians" (perhaps a reference to the Ethiopians, or perhaps to Orthodox lands not under Ottoman rule). This chosen prince would become emperor of Rome, of the Turks, and of the Spains. Citing Isidore of Seville as the source of this prophecy, Ponce de León wrote that through these deeds, King Ferdinand would attain the lordship of the world.[1]

It is difficult to know what to make of such a text. Why does a Castilian noble writing to the grandees of Castile extol Ferdinand's placement of the standard of the Crown of Aragon atop Calvary? What does it mean that Ferdinand is prophesied to become emperor of Rome *and of the Turks*? Clearly that indicates that Ferdinand is expected to conquer Constantinople, but why not refer simply to the name of the city? What did Ponce de León hope to achieve by including this prophecy in his letter? How did Ponce de León expect his readers to respond? One might quite reasonably view Ponce de León's words as those of a

flattering noble who hoped that royal assistance in the war against Nasrid Granada would bring the marquis certain tangible benefits in the form of increased estates and revenues that might accrue in the event of a successful Christian conquest of the Nasrid kingdom. Indeed, eleven years prior to this, during the War of Castilian Succession, Ponce de León had initially indicated that he would support Alfonso V of Portugal, the Portuguese claimant to the Castilian throne, against the claim of Isabella of Castile. One might justifiably assume that his exaltation of Ferdinand was done with a view to his own personal gain.

Twenty-six years later, however, the jurist and law professor Juan López de Palacios Rubios included a similar prognostication in his treatise *De insulis*. Citing a prophecy he claimed originated with the Libyan Sibyl, Palacios Rubios wrote that the oracle had stated that a second David would appear in Spain, a ruler similar in faith and deeds to the Biblical king. The new David would conquer all of Africa and would go on to recover the Holy Land.[2] Palacios Rubios included an extensive analysis of the details of the prophecy, arguing that all evidence indicated that the new David was clearly King Ferdinand or one of his descendants.

Palacios Rubios and Ponce de León were quite different figures. Palacios Rubios was a jurist who enjoyed royal favor and was regularly called on to draft legal treatises defending the crown's expansionist agenda. Ponce de León, on the other hand, was a frontier aristocrat whose loyalties must have been suspect and whose lands, in the 1480s, lay near the border with the Nasrid emirate of Granada. The prophecies in their respective writings were likely included with quite distinct objectives in mind. And yet, the presence of these prophecies in such different texts points to the ubiquity of this mode of thought during the reigns of Ferdinand and Isabella. Indeed, the themes expressed in the two very different texts cited here constitute a common trope in other genres of literature produced during the reign of Ferdinand and Isabella, in particular the various genres of poetry that were popular in royal circles. For example, in the 1490s, the Castilian Diego Guillén de Ávila, a Spanish "familiar" of Cardinal Battista Orsini in Rome, composed a laudatory epic poem to Isabella in which he predicted that under her rule Spain would conquer all of Africa and from there would go on to recover the Holy Land.[3] In the poem, titled "The Brief Destruction of Africa," Guillén de Ávila praises the Spanish monarchs, foretelling their imminent recovery of the formerly Christian lands of Africa and Asia, a process he predicts will culminate in the Spanish monarchs' restoration of the Holy Sepulchre:

I see your ships gathered on your shores
and on the opposite bank not one appears

there where the pillars stand close together
against the swells of the high seas
should you cross to the other side you will gain in their entirety
the three Mauritanias as well as Numidia
and Carthage and Getulia, you will destroy the perfidy
of the Ethiopians and peoples even more savage.[4]

The poet then lists the various provinces Ferdinand and Isabella were destined to conquer, including Byzantium, Cyrenaica, Tripoli, Libya, and Egypt, thereby bringing all of "Africa" and the eastern Mediterranean under their rule.[5]

At the courts of Aragon and Castile there were long-standing chiliastic traditions predicting that monarchs from Spain would conquer Granada, carry their crusade east to Jerusalem, and ultimately attain the lordship of the world. The fourteenth-century Valencian churchman Francesc Eiximenis (1330–1409) wrote a tract titled *Regiment de Princeps*, in which he predicted that the kings of Aragon would attain the "monarchy of the world."[6] Ponce de León's reference to Ferdinand raising the standard of the Crown of Aragon atop Calvary suggests that the marquis was familiar with the prophetic traditions that emanated from the lands of the Crown of Aragon. The fact that Francesc Eiximenis's *Regiment de Pinceps* went through numerous printings in Barcelona during Ferdinand and Isabella's reign suggests that the ideas it contained were ideas the Catholic Monarchs desired to disseminate.[7]

Similar prophecies regarding the imminent arrival of Spanish dominion over the world circulated in the court poetry composed under Ferdinand and Isabella's patronage. According to the chroniclers and poets responsible for the profusion of these prophecies, the bounds on what Ferdinand and Isabella would achieve were limitless. A poem recited to Ferdinand on the occasion of his entry into Barcelona in 1473 at the conclusion of the civil wars that had plagued Catalonia for the previous decade serves as a demonstration of a common line of thought. In this poem, composed over a year before his wife Isabella had inherited Castile, Ferdinand is presented as already reigning in Castile and as being the monarch for which not only the kingdoms of Spain but of the entire world have been waiting:

[For you are] That monarch the world awaits,
Superior King of all Castile.
For you are the bat
Which the kingdoms of Spain await.[8]

Three years later, the Castilian Bachiller Palma expressed similarly universalist aspirations in his text *Divina Retribución*. This panegyric was intended to

mark Isabella's consolidation of her hold on the Crown of Castile following a victory over the Portuguese at the Battle of Toro in 1476. Palma placed this victory at the beginning of what he prophesied would be many more, leading to a Spanish universal monarchy.[9]

These prophecies have an obvious political component. The consolidation of royal control following Isabella and Ferdinand's victory over Alfonso V, the Portuguese claimant to the Castilian throne in the War of Castilian Succession that inaugurated the reign of the Catholic monarchs, was followed by the Castilian recommencement of hostilities against Nasrid Granada in 1482. For the next ten years, as Castile gradually chipped away at the last Muslim polity on the Iberian Peninsula, much of the poetry composed within the court circles centered around the themes of crusade, of Christian unity, and of Ferdinand and Isabella's divinely appointed role in bringing about a new world order. The Aragonese court poet Pedro Marcuello is emblematic of these trends. He wrote hundreds of poems during the two decades spanning 1482 to 1502. Religiopolitical themes dominate his stanzas, and he refers time and again to the desirability of attaining a universal Christian peace ("paz cristiana entera").[10] In Marcuello's poetry, this utopian vision is wedded to crusading rhetoric that alludes repeatedly to the hoped-for conquests of Granada, the Holy Land, and Constantinople, culminating in Ferdinand and Isabella's triumph as universal Christian monarchs. The following stanza is representative of Marcuello's work:

> If [Ferdinand and Isabella] should persist
> In this Holy War,
> In Bethlehem they will achieve victory
> And make once more a church of Hagia Sophia.[11]

Frequently, writers expressed these universalist objectives through language that depicted Ferdinand as occupying a position of primacy over the *respublica christiana*. For instance, in the dedication of his work on astrology, the Valencian Jerónimo Torrella addressed the Aragonese king directly, styling him the "defender of the Christian republic, King of Spain and of the islands of our sea."[12]

The texts cited thus far represent a range of genres. Ponce de León's is a letter directed to the grandees of Castile, and was most likely intended for public consumption, while the *Cancionero* poetry was often read in the presence of the monarchs, at events such as a royal entry into a city. Palacios Rubios's juridical tract appears at first glance to be quite a different sort of text. The jurist's is a pragmatic, hard-nosed legal treatise that draws extensively on Gratian's *Decretum* and the *Siete Partidas* in making the case for early modern Spain's imperial

aspirations. In other words, *De insulis* appears designed less to entertain and more with the objective of constructing an airtight legal argument. And yet, this text, too, bears the imprint of an understanding of universal Christian *imperium* that informed Spanish political thought at the turn of the sixteenth century. For all their differences in genre and objective, the writings of Rodrigo Ponce de León, Juan López de Palacios Rubios, Pedro Marcuello, and Diego Guillén de Ávila are all equally indebted to this understanding of empire and to a notion of the theocratic duties of the prince. Among the responsibilities incumbent on the exemplary Christian prince were the attainment of a universal peace among the rulers of Christendom, followed by a restoration of dominion over sites that held particular significance in Christian history. Far from being some obscure and esoteric form, this prophetic strain and the messianic themes into which it tapped, functioned as a diplomatic language through which actors from all echelons of Mediterranean society communicated political ideas and objectives.[13]

The ideological component of this conception of empire was an outgrowth of the religious history of the Mediterranean sea basin and of medieval political thought on Christian universalism. The doctrine of universal Christian empire, a form of political organization deeply indebted to medieval political theory as elaborated by writers such as Dante, in his tract *On Monarchy*, was in its own way strongly utopian, quixotic, and impractical. As Dante argued, the political system he envisioned had as its end peace among humankind: "Universal peace is the best of those things which are ordained for our human happiness."[14] In order to safeguard that peace, Dante believed there needed to be a single ruler over the whole of humankind: "Now it is agreed that the whole of mankind is ordered to one goal, as has already been stated: there must therefore be one person who directs and rules mankind and he is properly called 'Monarch' or 'Emperor'. And thus it is apparent that the well-being of the world requires that there be a monarchy or empire."[15] This utopian vision of universal empire as a vehicle for attaining a state of peace became (paradoxically) wedded to religious thought on crusade and the restoration of Christian rule to all formerly Christian territory.[16] This combination is what underlay the political ideology of the wide variety of literature analyzed in this chapter, literature that situated the Mediterranean at the center of a drama where a universal Christian order would be instated.

The specifics of this imperial agenda differed according to the author, but the dominant themes of the utopian vision of empire included a general reform of the Church, a union of Christendom, the conversion of Muslims, Jews, and pagans, and the establishment of a universal Christian order that would usher in the Last Days.[17] These aspirations were often expressed through the

prophecies contained in poetry or in other literary forms, and their subject matter indicates that they addressed themes that were of great concern to many Europeans living in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.[18] These prophecies thus operated as a tool that expressed utopian aspirations, and that simultaneously attempted to explain or make sense of events that were viewed with apprehension by Latin Christians (the rise of the Ottoman Empire, internal discord among Christian princes, papal corruption, etc.).

These utopian visions of a universal religiopolitical order were at once radical and deeply conservative. They spoke of a process of restoration that would return the Church to the purity of an earlier era, but in fact these aspirations were for a world order that had never existed. The imagined state of unity and perfection that had existed during the early centuries of Christianity had, of course, been superseded by the religiously heterogeneous Mediterranean, marked first by the irruption of Islam into the region in the late seventh century and, four centuries later, by the schism between Rome and Constantinople. Here it is worth returning to a letter cited in chapter 1, written to Samudri Raja by King Manoel I of Portugal in 1500. Mistaking the Hindus of India for Christians, Manoel hoped to unite with them in a joint campaign against Islam. Describing the early Church as universal, encompassing Europe, Asia, and Africa, Manoel suggested to the raja that the Portuguese and Indian branches of Christendom be joined, "just as the whole of the universe was joined in the Christian faith six hundred years after Christ." This state of perfect unity had lasted, wrote Manoel, up until the point that, "due to the sins of mankind, several heretical sects emerged . . . which had occupied, in the regions lying between your lands and ours, a large portion of the Earth."[19] It was the recovery, or recuperation, of this imagined lost state of perfection that underlay much of the universalist and utopian currents in the texts I treat in this chapter.[20]

The argument justifying such a system of global governance was that this unified order would bring an end to strife among the world's various polities, creating a climate of peace that would allow humankind to attain the highest form of happiness possible in the temporal world. In late fifteenth- and early sixteenth-century Spanish iterations of a universal imperial ideology, many of the texts portrayed Ferdinand and Isabella as instruments elected by God to forge a general peace among the princes of Christendom, to end the Great Schism between the Roman and Greek Churches, and to recover all the lands that had constituted early Christendom. Embedded within that aspiration, obviously, was a Christian conquest of the Holy Land. Ferdinand and many at his court depicted his political and religious objectives as integral to the attainment of such a universal Christian empire. The Aragonese king was but one of numerous rulers who expressed his aspirations in such terms. His con-

temporaries on the throne of France, Charles VIII (r. 1483–1498) and Louis XII (r. 1498–1515), represented their invasions of Italy as a prelude to a grand crusade to subjugate the Turks and forge a universal empire, and Portuguese monarchs too, in particular King Manoel I (r. 1495–1521) held to a messianic understanding of Portuguese overseas expansion into northwest Africa as well as into the Red Sea and Indian Ocean. What is more, Ottoman sultans, in particular Mehmed II (r. 1444–1446; 1451–1481), Selim I (r. 1512–1520), and Süleyman the Magnificent (r. 1520–1566) articulated their expansionist policies in similar terms, albeit through an appeal to Islamic universalist ideology. Indeed, the Mediterranean in the wake of the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople was a region dominated by appeals to universalist ideologies, both Christian and Islamic.[21] By way of illustrating this mode of thought, let us examine a letter Aeneas Silvius Piccolomini (as Pope Pius II) wrote to Mehmed the Conqueror in the wake of the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople (although it is not clear that the letter was ever actually dispatched). In this missive, Pius II exhorted the Ottoman sultan to convert to Catholicism, addressing Mehmed in language that ascribed to him a messianic role: "O how great would be your glory for being the one who restored peace to the world! O how much happiness would redound to you who led back all the flocks to the fold of the eternal shepherd!"[22] Pius even invoked the understanding of the primitive Church as universal, suggesting to Mehmed that his conversion to Christianity would help restore that lost order: "But if you join us, in a short time all the East will return to Christ."[23] There is no record of whether Mehmed II ever read Pius's letter. Its composition, however, demonstrates that Pius was aware of the fact that Mehmed desired to be seen in a messianic light and that the pope believed his appeal, which employed the vocabulary of religiopolitical universalism, would be intelligible to the Ottoman sultan.

Within this ambit, there were countless figures who appealed to political leaders through apocalyptic prophecy, ascribing to one ruler or another the status of a Last World Emperor, an Angelic Pope, or a second Charlemagne. Among the panoply of purveyors of such vaticinations, perhaps the most famous is Christopher Columbus. The Genoese navigator came of age in this fervent Mediterranean climate of fear and expectation, and his thinking was deeply informed by these religiopolitical currents. Columbus is most commonly associated with his Atlantic crossings and the beginnings of European colonialism in the Americas, but his political and spiritual thought were at root fundamentally driven by the concerns he shared with many Latin Christians inhabiting the late fifteenth-century Mediterranean. Indeed, his crusading agenda and interest in effecting a Christian recovery of the Holy Land is an aspect of the explorer's thought and objectives that has garnered increasing

scholarly attention in recent years.[24] As his own writings attest, Columbus was animated by the idea of a Christian conquest of Jerusalem well before his first Atlantic crossing, and the navigator indicated that he viewed a western trajectory to Asia as a viable alternate route to the Holy Land. In 1489, he met with Antonio Millán, a prior of the monastery of the Holy Sepulchre, at the Spanish town of Baza. There the men discussed plans for the conquest of Jerusalem.[25] Indeed, Columbus's intent to forge a crusading alliance with leaders he might contact in Asia was one of the rationales he used to appeal to Ferdinand and Isabella for financial support prior to his first trans-Atlantic journey. The navigator's interest in Christian history and Jerusalem only increased following his successful Atlantic crossing in 1492. In late 1500, Christopher Columbus presented to Ferdinand and Isabella a memorandum advocating for the conquest of Jerusalem. Rather than offering a strategy, the document presented interpretations of scripture as evidence that the Spanish Crown had been elected by God to recover the Holy Land for Christendom.[26] In further examples of Columbus's professed crusading ambitions, in 1501, in a letter to Queen Isabella, Columbus discussed the possibility of a Spanish-led crusade to the Holy Land.[27] The following year, 1502, Columbus wrote to Pope Alexander VI urging the launching of a crusade and offering to lead the venture in person.[28] In short, Columbus saw the Atlantic as a route to India and argued in turn that the riches of India and Asia could finance a Spanish-led recovery of Jerusalem. In the broad contours of Columbus's schema, the admiral repeatedly appealed to Ferdinand and Isabella as the rulers divinely elected to carry out the pivotal series of conquests and to usher in the new world order.

Columbus's writings stand out to us now as bizarre—amusing in their geographical error and perplexing in their religious fervency. He is better understood, however, when viewed in the context of his contemporaries. A much less well-known figure, Pedro Navarro, also wrote a proposal for a Spanish-led conquest of Jerusalem. To some degree, Navarro and Columbus were cut of the same cloth: both were autodidacts, lacking formal education, and they had similar religiopolitical interests. Columbus's obsession with prophecy and the particular place reserved for the monarchs of Spain in the divine schema are much better known to us today because of the quantity of scholarship devoted to the admiral, but Navarro's *memorial*, which is unpublished and survives only in a single manuscript at the Biblioteca Nacional in Madrid, is nevertheless an important source due to the political theology of universal monarchy that it elaborates. Just a few years following Columbus's series of crusading proposals (1500–1502), Navarro composed a *memorial* to Ferdinand exhorting the king to subjugate the Ottoman Empire and to conquer Jerusalem.[29] The contrast with Columbus's crusading texts is striking: Navarro's *memorial* is detailed,

practical, and concrete. Not only does it offer a precise strategy for an attack on Ottoman Greece and Turkey, it elaborates a coherent vision of a Spanish Mediterranean empire while presenting a "political theology" of Spanish kingship and its proper relationship to other Mediterranean powers. It is a vivid example of the strain of political thought that represented empire in utopian terms, and which depicted the Mediterranean as the proper locus for attaining that empire.

Navarro opens his *memorial* with a two-page prologue in which he enjoins Ferdinand to undertake a grand eastern crusade. Here Navarro praises the Aragonese monarch as the Christian prince best suited to conquer Greece, Turkey, and the Holy Land, and to restore the Eastern Church to obedience to Rome.[30] Following the broad contours of his argument, as outlined in his prologue, Navarro embarks on a more detailed section comprising the next five pages of his text, in which he offers a granular analysis of the social and military structure of the Ottoman Empire, including the functioning of the *devshirme* practice, and what Ferdinand will have to do in order to effectively subjugate the empire. Finally, he concludes with an argument against a proposed crusade in North Africa, offering material and spiritual reasons for why the Anatolian crusade would be of greater worth than one to Barbary. Throughout, Navarro's text espouses a political and religious vision of Ferdinand's role as a universal monarch whose task it is to heal the Great Schism, thereby attaining a union between the Roman and Greek Churches, and to end discord through the forging of a universal peace.

Navarro's writing is deeply inflected by the currents of Church reform and Christian universalist thought that had grown so powerful during the fifteenth century, in part as an effect of the conciliar movement, but particularly in the wake of the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople in 1453. Navarro had no formal training as a theologian, but his text bears the imprint of one of the themes that most exercised the Latin Church of his day: the aspiration to achieve a union of the Eastern and Western Churches or, in Navarro's words, "the restitution of the holy Eastern Church to the holy Catholic faith."[31] In his advocacy of Catholic universalism, Navarro resorts to the traditional conception of the Church in corporeal terms, an understanding that, as we saw in chapter 2, was a predominant lens through which Catholics interpreted the Papal Schism (1378–1417). Navarro writes that Greek kings and emperors had become alienated from the Holy Mother Church of Rome, and for this reason they are now "members that have become separated from the mystical body of Christ our Redeemer."[32] This separation was the source of what Navarro portrayed as the corruption of the mystical body of Christendom. This language of bodily corruption (or pestilence) was similar to that used by

an earlier generation of writers, including Jean Froissart and Christine de Pizan, who had described the Papal Schism in medical terms as a form of pestilence.

For Navarro, this corruption was a crisis that needed to be resolved. The only solution he saw was the establishment of Roman primacy over the Greek Church. Throughout his *memorial*, Navarro presents historical and political events in a manner that demonstrates the religious lens through which he understands the unfolding of events. For instance, Navarro states that the oriental kings (meaning here the Christian rulers in Byzantium and the Balkans) have been subjugated by the Mahometans by "divine and eternal justice" due to their disobediences to the Holy Mother Church.[33] According to this formula, then, Navarro interprets the rise of the Ottoman Empire as an instrument of God's punishment, a castigation meted out upon the Orthodox for their disobedience to Rome. Navarro's approach transforms the perceived effect of the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople: in this light, the events of 1453 are no longer an unmitigated disaster, a threat to the survival of Latin Christendom, but an affirmation of the righteousness of Catholicism, reflected in the warranted punishment of the schismatic Orthodox.[34] Navarro asserted that the invasion he exhorted Ferdinand to lead would end the schism, serving as a vehicle for the attainment of a unified Christian order. It is not entirely clear what Navarro means by this. He states simply that, in recovering Greece, Turkey, and Jerusalem, all will be unified, and in union there will be no corruption.[35]

Navarro stresses the theme of union throughout his *memorial*, and he includes a section on the recent history of Iberia in which he argues that the history of Ferdinand's reign thus far foretold grander things to come. Referring to the inchoate union of Castile and Aragon that had been brought about through Ferdinand and Isabella's marriage, and in reference to the conquest of Muslim Granada that had been completed in 1492, Navarro suggests that these processes of union point to further processes of unification that will occur in the future. He claims that all the states and kingdoms of Ferdinand's ancestors, so long divided and alienated, have now been, by divine grace, conquered and united. Navarro interprets this to be a "divine premonition of things to come," and therefore he interprets Ferdinand's reign as auguring future processes of unification, perhaps in Christendom writ large.[36]

In referring to Ferdinand's ancestral realms, it is likely that Navarro was thinking of Aragon and Castile, but he may also have had in mind Ferdinand's Italian projects, including the reincorporation of the kingdom of Naples into the Crown of Aragon, a venture in which Navarro played an important military role. The perennially contested status of the southern Italian kingdoms

was such that the reunification of the Two Sicilies under a single authority had come to symbolize the beginning of much grander processes of unification across the Mediterranean world, including the union of the Eastern and Western Churches, and the restoration of Jerusalem to Christian rule. Since the late twelfth century, under the influence of Joachim of Fiore, writers supporting Hohenstaufen, Angevin, or Aragonese claims to the southern Italian lands had developed the image of those realms as a microcosm of the religious history of the Mediterranean. Due to the history of Byzantine and Latin rule in southern Italy, and to the fact that Sicily had been under Islamic rule until its conquest by Normans in the eleventh century, the unification of the crowns of Naples and Sicily was portrayed as a crucial step in the successful execution of a crusade, a prefiguration of a Latin recovery of the crowns of Constantinople and Jerusalem.[37] In light of Navarro's years of military service in Italy, it seems impossible that he could have avoided developing some awareness of these prophetic traditions.

Navarro suggested to Ferdinand that the crusading venture he proposed would be easily accomplished. Comparing Ferdinand's resources favorably with those of the Roman Empire of antiquity, Navarro stated that the Christian recovery of the Holy Land was a feat that lay within Ferdinand's grasp: "Only Spain, Sicily, and Apulia are the breadbaskets of the world, plentiful in all manner of victuals. Possessing only Sicily, the Romans undertook the conquest of the universe. How much more you will achieve, as you also control Spain and Apulia. [For your task is] not to conquer the universe, but simply to restore the blood of Christ."[38]

Navarro emphasized the boons that would ensue from the military plan he proposed. These benefits were carefully portrayed as redounding to the whole of Christendom. Beyond the service this would render to God, Navarro suggested that there would be political rewards as well. He claimed that, once the crusade was begun, all Christian princes would want to participate in Ferdinand's military expedition.[39] This unified expedition would be instrumental in achieving a cessation of what Navarro describes as the "civil wars" that persist among Christians, along with and the attainment of "a general peace among Christians throughout Europe."[40] The aspiration to a universal Christian peace clearly draws, directly or indirectly, on Dante's *Monarchy* and the Florentine's argument that the establishment of a universal monarchy would bring about such a utopian condition.[41] Navarro here casts Ferdinand as the only figure capable of instating this utopian vision. Navarro's employment of the term "civil wars" to describe conflicts among Christians suggests that he was thinking of the Christian commonwealth as a coherent body-politic of sorts, and that he saw Ferdinand as the logical leader of this commonwealth.

Navarro's stress on the attainment of a universal Christian peace employs precisely the same language King Ferdinand himself used to set out his political objectives. Examples are legion: in April 1507, in a letter to Jerónimo de Vich, his ambassador in Rome, Ferdinand expressed the desirability of attaining a peace throughout Christendom.[42] The following year, again in a letter to Vich in Rome, Ferdinand mentioned his aspiration to attain a universal Christian peace.[43] In November 1509, in a letter to Vich, Ferdinand referred to the "universal well-being of Christendom."[44] In a glimpse into Ferdinand's rationale for seeking a universal peace, a letter from Ferdinand to Vich written in February 1509 mentions the king's work to attain peace and union among Christian princes so that he might capitalize on this by launching an assault against the Turks.[45] The ideal of Christian peace and union was thus inextricably joined to the goal of defeating the enemies of the faith in a holy war. It was not only in correspondence with his Roman ambassador that the Aragonese monarch employed this vocabulary. In 1510, in a letter to Jerónimo de Cabanillas, his ambassador to France, Ferdinand expressed his desire to see the "peace and universal union of the Christians."[46] This letter to Cabanillas is likely best understood as an attempt by Ferdinand to reach a truce with the French king Louis XII over the Italian lands both kings coveted, in order that they might join forces in a crusading venture.

How did interlocutors interpret such vocabulary? We have no way of knowing whether Vich relayed Ferdinand's objectives to those assembled at the papal curia, whether he employed the same vocabulary, or whether Pope Julius found this convincing. In February 1508, though, Vich wrote a letter to an acquaintance in which he stated that that the pope had more faith in Ferdinand than in any other ruler in working toward the "bien universal."[47]

Whether or not the pope was persuaded by Ferdinand's Christian universalist rhetoric, this religiopolitical vocabulary was clearly widely used to express political objectives and aspirations. To return to Navarro's *memorial*, the commander argued that if Ferdinand followed Navarro's proposal, the king would prove instrumental in bringing about a unified religiopolitical world order. Navarro asserted that the kings and emperors of Greece were no more, and in recovering their lands all would be unified. Navarro reserved an exalted position for King Ferdinand within this schema, writing that there would be "one God and one Prince, and that Your Royal Highness [Ferdinand] will achieve a perpetual union in the service of almighty God and to the glory of Your Royal Majesty."[48] In another display of his Christian universalist thinking and crusading ambitions, Navarro urges the "restitution of the blood of our Savior Christ Jesus to its proper chalice" and stresses the ideal of uniting the world under a single prince or, as he puts it, the gath-

ering together of the flock under a single shepherd.[49] This aspiration, noted earlier in the *Cancionero* poetry, runs through much of the literary production of the Spain of the Catholic Monarchs, and numerous authors predicted that Ferdinand would achieve the monarchy of the world. The Aragonese royal chronicler, Gauberte Fabricio de Vagad, urged that there be "One God in Heaven, and one king on Earth," a position he believed King Ferdinand would attain.[50]

It is tempting to read Navarro's proposal as quixotic. Indeed, it appears logically dissonant when one considers that Navarro was renowned as a military commander who specialized, in the Italian Wars, in tunneling under battlements in order to plant explosive mines. It is not known whether he had read Dante's *De Monarchia* and, in any case, the religiopolitical order he envisions is far more spiritual than what Dante described. The Florentine saw the Holy Roman Emperor as the secular ruler best suited to be the universal monarch and to exercise authority in the temporal sphere. In *De Monarchia*, Dante argued that the pope's authority should be limited to the spiritual realm. In his *memorial*, Navarro seems to envision a far greater spiritual role for his universal monarch, as uniter of the two halves of the Church and, implicitly, of the Eastern and Western halves of the Roman Empire. This facet of Navarro's text might reflect widely held sentiments of the time. In the wake of the Papal Schism, some writers felt that it was easier to present a monarch, rather than the pope, as a staunch defender of the Church. Marjorie Reeves views the circumstances of the Papal Schism as giving rise to "a type of Ghibelline Joachimism which, despairing of sufficient will power in the papacy to reform itself, looks for the saviour in Dantesque terms, in the Imperial office."[51] Decades later, spurred perhaps by the advances of the Ottomans, many Europeans questioned the efficacy and authority of the papacy. Alain Milhou argues that by the 1470s there was growing anti-papal sentiment in Aragon and Castile, and that it boiled over into a contest to see who was the true champion of Christendom—the pope or the monarchs of Spain.[52] As noted in chapter 5, the jurist Palacios Rubios praised Ferdinand while upbraiding the pope, the Holy Roman Emperor, and other Christian princes for their negligence in the "propagation [of the faith] and the conservation of Christian patrimony."[53] Navarro's argument in his *memorial* seems to be part of that trend, for he crafts for the Aragonese king a strongly messianic role. The religiopolitical ideology implicit in the portrayal of a divinely elected monarch who would end the Great Schism of a Last World Emperor who would rule over all goes well beyond the Gelasian "second sword" that argued that the emperor was to act in the temporal sphere and the pope in the spiritual. Navarro's memorial casts Ferdinand in a decidedly militant *and spiritual* light.

Navarro does not provide any concrete suggestions as to how, precisely, Ferdinand ought to end the schism. Presumably the new order he describes would somehow result in the Greeks recognizing the authority of the Roman pontiff. After all, Catholics had come quite close to attaining this at the Council of Ferrara in 1439. Navarro believes Ferdinand would somehow be able to bring about what earlier generations had not been able to do. Perhaps Navarro believed that a half-century under Ottoman rule would have convinced the Greeks to recognize the authority of the pope in Rome? Implicit in his *memorial*, however, might be the understanding of the doctrine of Caesaropapism, which traditionally granted authority of the Byzantine emperor over the Greek Church. As Ferdinand had obtained the rights to the Eastern Empire from the last Byzantine claimant, Andrew Paleologus, in 1502, this, in theory at least, gave him authority over the Greek Church. As titular head of the Orthodox Church, Ferdinand would have been in at least a legal position, if not a practical one, to force the Orthodox patriarchs to recognize Roman primacy. It is not certain, however, that Navarro was familiar with the doctrine of Caesaropapism. While on military assignments in 1500 he had spent time in the Aegean Sea and some of the Greek islands, but he never mentions Ferdinand having procured the title to Byzantium. Maybe, in light of the fact that his *memorial* was directed specifically to Ferdinand and not to a wider audience, it was not necessary for Navarro to be explicit on this point. Perhaps the doctrine of Caesaropapism was simply implied in his entreaty to bring about the end of the schism between the Eastern and Western Churches.

Like the conciliarists at the Church councils of Basel and Florence, Navarro hoped to attain a Christian union. Rather than seeing the potential for ending the schism and reforming the Church in the conciliar movement, Navarro appealed to a powerful imperial figure to unify the Eastern and Western Churches, to subjugate the Ottoman Empire, and to recover Jerusalem.[54] Navarro, however, did not look to the Holy Roman Emperor, Maximilian I (r. 1493–1519), but to Ferdinand of Aragon.

In his memorial, the success of the plan Navarro proposes is predicated on the military assistance Ferdinand would receive from the Greek Christians living under Ottoman rule.[55] Navarro's belief that the Orthodox Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire would welcome a Spanish-led invasion of liberation is of a piece with a well-established Catholic tradition of detecting the presence of potential crusading allies in distant lands of the East. For example, upon first arriving in India the Portuguese understood the Hindu inhabitants to be schismatic Christians who needed only to be brought back into line with Rome, so that they might join forces in a war against Islam.[56] By 1506, the

elusive Christian ruler Prester John had a venerable, if unverified, lineage. King Manoel of Portugal, in a letter to Francisco Ximénez de Cisneros in anticipation of a crusade planned for the summer of 1506, expressed optimism that the Latins would soon join forces with Prester John and march together on Jerusalem.[57] Seven years later, in 1513, the Portuguese governor Albuquerque led an expedition into the Red Sea, with the objective of destroying Mecca and Medina, joining forces with Prester John in Ethiopia, and consolidating a Portuguese universal empire that would extend to the Indian Ocean.[58]

These examples drawn from Portuguese correspondence demonstrate that the religiopolitical ideology in Navarro's *memorial* was but a particular variation on a common aspiration that was applied to sundry figures aside from King Ferdinand. The Portuguese, the French, numerous popes, not to mention Ottoman sultans all espoused their own visions of some form of a universal religiopolitical order.[59] One year after Navarro composed his *memorial*, Giles of Viterbo presented a discourse addressed to Pope Julius II that was far more erudite and polished than Navarro's text but that aimed at similar ends. Viterbo pointed to numerous contemporary events, including the Spanish conquest of Granada and the Portuguese expansion down the Atlantic coast of Africa and into the Indian Ocean, as auguring the imminent arrival of the Golden Age, but in Viterbo's schema Julius, rather than King Ferdinand, was the shepherd.[60] Viterbo predicted that Constantinople and Jerusalem would fall to the armies of Julius, who has become known as "the warrior pope."[61] What is more, Viterbo foretold that Julius was the one anointed to heal the "duplex" created by the schism and to create once more a single Christian Church.[62] Viterbo's discourse, then, expresses many of the same ideals and aspirations that Navarro's *memorial* does, while reserving these triumphs for the pope rather than a secular prince. There are numerous similar examples of this Christian universalist thinking underlying the political projects of French and Portuguese kings, with the French portrayal of Charles VIII's objectives in invading Italy in 1494 (analyzed in chapter 3) being merely one case in point.[63]

As indicated through the citations of *Cancionero* poetry at the opening of this chapter, Navarro was far from the only one to ascribe to Ferdinand of Aragon a role of preeminent authority over the *respublica christiana*. This portrayal of Ferdinand as protector and guardian of the Church and of Christendom spread far and wide. Drawing extensively on the Castilian conquest of Granada and the acquisition of numerous presidios and cities along the coast of the Maghrib, Ferdinand and Isabella deployed a variety of propaganda that successfully disseminated the image of the monarchs operating in this capacity. Emery d'Amboise, the Master of the Knights of St. John of Jerusalem, wrote to

Ferdinand from Rhodes in September 1510, styling Ferdinand as a de facto leader against the enemies of the Christian faith, and addressing the Aragonese king as "protector and defender of the Christian commonwealth," or "firmísimo amparo de la república Christiana."[64] Popes addressed Ferdinand as a prince who had done more for Christendom than any other. In granting Ferdinand and Isabella the title of Catholic Monarchs (1496), Alexander VI stated that it was because "you serve as examples to other Christian princes because you have used your forces and your arms, not in the ruin and slaughter of other Christians out of ambition for new lands, but rather for the benefit of Christians and in the defense of the Church."[65] In the bull *Sacrosanctae Romane* (March 26, 1510), Julius II wrote that Ferdinand's actions in Africa and elsewhere had "assured and avenged the honor of the whole *república cristiana*."[66]

The understanding of Ferdinand as the political and spiritual leader who would exercise some form of leadership or authority over all Christians, regardless of whether they were his Catholic Iberian subjects or Orthodox subjects of the Ottoman sultan, expresses a notion of extraterritorial sovereignty that other scholars have noted in settings in the Islamic world. By way of comparison, as Mohamad Ballan has shown, the *qasida* the Granadino *moriscos* wrote to the Ottoman sultan Bayezid II in 1502, pleading for assistance in the face of forced conversions in Spain, appealed to him as a caliph, a ruler whose sovereignty is extraterritorial and extends to all Muslims everywhere, regardless of political boundaries.[67] Scholars of the Ottoman Empire, including Cemal Kafadar, Palmira Brummet, and Giancarlo Casale have noted that, during a period of rapid expansion and at times contested political legitimacy, Sultan Selim I (r. 1512–1520) cast himself as a guardian of religious orthodoxy as a means of cementing his authority within the Islamic world, particularly vis-à-vis the ascendant Shi'a Safavid Empire in Persia. Following the Ottoman conquest of Jerusalem, Medina, and Mecca in 1516 and 1517, Selim participated in a triumphal entry into Cairo, the former Mamluk capital, in which he proclaimed himself "Servant of the Two Cities" and assumed the title of caliph, claiming sovereignty over all Muslims, in an expression of what Giancarlo Casale has termed "extraterritorial" sovereignty.[68] In the contemporaneous Latin Mediterranean, Pedro Navarro appealed to Ferdinand as occupying a similar position within the *respublica christiana*, as a ruler who held a form of leadership and responsibility over the Greek Orthodox living under Ottoman rule.

The conviction Navarro expresses that the Orthodox Christians would be amenable to assisting a Spanish invasion of the Ottoman Empire, and his concomitant representation of Ferdinand as the healer of schism and defender of the universal Church, is related to this understanding of extraterri-

toriality that imagined sovereignty as falling along confessional rather than geographical or territorial lines. In Navarro's portrayal of Ferdinand as embodying some form of extraterritorial sovereignty over the Orthodox Christian inhabitants of the Ottoman Empire, he drew a parallel (whether wittingly or unwittingly is not clear) with a tenet of Islamic political thought. Navarro described the Turks as the head of the Islamic *ummah*, the entire community of Muslim believers, and the preeminent force in the Islamic world: "For, as all of Islamdom places the Turk at the head, once the head falls, the arms and legs shall too."[69] Here Navarro was arguing to Ferdinand that it made more sense to attack the Ottomans directly rather than to waste energy and resources on the smaller Islamic polities of North Africa. In doing so, Navarro here develops a stylization of imperial sovereignty that Ottoman sultans themselves eagerly embraced. Mehmed II (r. 1451–1481) famously claimed the title of *Kayser-I Rum*, or Roman Caesar, following his conquest of Constantinople, representing himself as the legitimate successor of the Roman emperors of antiquity.[70] Cornell Fleischer notes that Ottoman control of the second Rome (Constantinople) and their aspiration to conquer Rome itself, to reunite the ancient empire, served as a foundation of Ottoman sultanic claims of legitimacy in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.[71] By representing the Ottoman sultan as the preeminent force in the Islamic world, Navarro was portraying him as a caliph of sorts, over a decade before any Ottoman sultan ever claimed that title (although, as noted above, four years after the Granadino *moriscos* addressed him by that title). In Islamic political thought, one of the claims of the caliph is to exercise sovereignty over the *ummah* regardless of individual political affiliation. Navarro's objective vis-à-vis Ferdinand, meanwhile, can be read as the mirror image of this, as Navarro suggests to Ferdinand that he bears a responsibility for the lives and souls of Greek Orthodox subjects of the Ottoman sultan. He exhorts Ferdinand to end the Catholic-Orthodox schism, thereby restoring bonds of religious and political unity across the territory of the former Roman Empire. The success of this proposal was contingent on the Orthodox Christians viewing Ferdinand favorably and supporting any invasion he might launch. Here, Navarro ascribes to Ferdinand precisely the same sort of extraterritorial sovereignty that Ottoman caliphs would soon claim.

A decade after Navarro composed his *memorial*, during the Ottoman-Mamluk struggle for control over Egypt and the holy cities of the Levant and Hijaz, Selim I employed a discourse of legitimation that would have been completely intelligible to the councilors at Ferdinand of Aragon's court. There was, of course, no Christian legal office equivalent to that of caliph,

but in Navarro's *memorial* we can detect an inchoate variation on this idea, deployed in the form of a Catholic crusading proposal.

Whatever doctrines we might detect in Pedro Navarro's political thought, Ferdinand's own thinking on these matters is more difficult to discern. In certain correspondence, the king does distinguish between the Roman Church and the universal Church, implying that they are not necessarily the same. Concerning the recent election of Julius II as pope in 1503, Ferdinand wrote to his ambassador in Rome, Francisco de Rojas, "Seeing as Alexander, his predecessor, left the Roman Church completely out of order, as well as much of the universal church too, it is good that someone of Julius' prudence and experience be elected."[72] Likewise, in June 1511 Ferdinand wrote to his ambassador in France, Jerónimo de Cabanillas, attempting to dissuade Louis XII from supporting the *Conciliabulum* of Pisa that was about to be convoked in opposition to Pope Julius II. In this letter, Ferdinand appealed to the French king on the grounds that Louis XII should demonstrate care for the "yglesia vniuersal."[73] In other words, while Ferdinand grants that Louis's concerns about the reform of the Roman Church under Julius might be valid, he nevertheless argues that the French monarch ought to place a higher priority on the well-being of the *universal* Church. These examples make it clear that Ferdinand conceived of a certain coherence of Christendom that extended beyond Latin Christendom or beyond Western Europe. Here it is worth referring back to the conciliarists' distinction, highlighted in chapter 2, between the universal Church (the *congregatio fidelium*) and the Roman Church (the pope and cardinals).[74] Although Ferdinand himself never arrogated to himself any sort of authority over the universal Church or over the *respublica christiana*, he was clearly aware of the distinction between the particular (Roman) Church and the universal corpus of Christian believers, and courtiers who depicted him as a guardian of the latter, such as Navarro, were rewarded.

The jurist and law professor Juan López de Palacios Rubios did not claim that Ferdinand had any sovereignty per se over Christians living outside his realms and under infidel rule, but let us revisit a passage of *De insulis*, examined in chapter 5, regarding Christians living under non-Christian rule. In this section of his treatise, the jurist suggests that the Aragonese king bore a certain responsibility to those Christians who could be deemed to be living in a state of oppression or enslavement:

> Should the infidels mistreat the Christians who live among them, particularly in matters concerning faith, attempting to draw them into infidelity, to heresy, or toward their damned rites and ceremonies, then the said Christians, free as well as slave, may flee from the infidels, *and the Pope or*

Christian Princes may take up arms against the infidels in order to liberate the believers from such grave danger.[75] [emphasis mine]

Palacios Rubios here provides Ferdinand with an argument, drawing on the writings of Innocent IV, that would give legal grounding to any invasion of non-Christian lands where there are Christian subjects who are allegedly mistreated. One only has to think of the multiconfessional societies of the eastern Mediterranean, from Mamluk Egypt and Syria up through Anatolia and the Ottoman Balkans, to discern where such an argument could be applicable. There is a clear intersection here between Palacios Rubios's legal treatise and the doctrines Navarro espoused in his *memorial*.

In drawing a comparison between the Islamic office of the caliph and the extraterritorial nature of the role Navarro and Palacios Rubios ascribed to Ferdinand, I am not suggesting here that these figures, or other Spanish writers, were influenced by currents in Islamic political thought. There is no clear-cut evidence for making such a claim and, after all, the positions these writers stake out are not radically different from those of other European writers who supported the imperial claims of German emperors or the sweeping authority of papal monarchs. There are, however, numerous examples of ways in which ideas about power, authority, sovereignty, and empire circulated in ways that crossed confessional boundaries. Consequently, I believe it was possible for thinkers to be influenced by ideas that developed in the setting of a distinct religious culture without consciously reformulating a doctrine to fit their own religious culture. Take, for instance, an example drawn from an anonymous chronicle of the Spanish conquest of Naples, written by a participant in the events and published sometime after August 10, 1504.[76] In the concluding section of the chronicle, the author relates an anecdote about the Turkish ambassador traveling to Naples to negotiate for peace or a truce with Ferdinand of Aragon who, through the events described in the chronicle, had just brought Naples under his rule. Our source provides many details and specifics, including the movement of Turkish diplomats back and forth between Italy and Velona (Vlorë, Albania). Concerning the reason the Turks might have had for treating for peace with Ferdinand's ambassadors, the author writes "they are in great fear for, they find in their law [meaning here their prophetic traditions, presumably] that the king our lord is destined to destroy them. May it please God that, in this regard at least, their law be true. Amen."[77] Here, in the account of a humble participant in the military campaigns of southern Italy, we get a brief window into the ways in which the liminal spaces of the central Mediterranean (in this case, the Adriatic coastlines of Albania and southern Italy) operated as porous zones where all sorts of ideas (in this case, prophecies)

were transmitted across confessional and political boundaries. Rather than suggesting that Navarro or Palacios Rubios were directly influenced by ideas about Ottoman or Islamic sovereignty, I am arguing that countless figures, including our anonymous chronicler cited above and Navarro himself (who fought against Ottoman forces in the Aegean in the early 1500s) spent years in the porous borderlands regions of the Mediterranean. In those zones, these figures interacted with subjects of enemy powers, and it was through these relationships that prophecies as well as ideas about kingship transgressed confessional boundaries. In the representations of Ferdinand as the hoped-for universal monarch, these stylizations were part of a dialogue of competing claims with other Catholic powers (Portugal, France, the papacy) *as well as* with the competing claims to universal sovereignty that issued forth from Ottoman Constantinople. Gábor Ágoston has suggested precisely such a dialogue of claims, albeit at a slightly later date.[78] Similarly, Gülru Necipoglu has demonstrated the ways in which competing claims of authority were hashed out through representations of imperial magnificence in Habsburg and Ottoman art in the sixteenth century.[79] Finally, Cornell Fleischer's work on prophecy and politics demonstrates the shared political vocabulary of the whole of the Abrahamic Mediterranean.[80]

One can only understand the sorts of imperial claims the Spanish Crown made vis-à-vis the Mediterranean when these claims are viewed in conjunction with similar and related claims made by the kings of France, the papacy, the Holy Roman Emperor, and the Ottoman sultan. In this regard, the universalist ideologies proclaimed by each of these powers operated in similar fashion. In spite of their professed confessional differences (and imputations of their rivals' heterodoxy or status as religious infidels), these polities were in fact profoundly integrated, politically, culturally, and intellectually. As such, aspirations to some form of universal empire, as espoused by Ottoman sultans and Spanish monarchs, were decidedly exclusive in their demarcation of religious difference, yet they should not be read as indicative of a "clash of civilizations." On the contrary, the imperial ideologies espoused by Ottoman sultans and Catholic princes were perfectly intelligible to one another, and they operated in a dialogue of competing claims concerning political legitimacy and supremacy in the Mediterranean.

While Ferdinand of Aragon never asserted claims of sovereignty over the *respublica christiana* quite as far-reaching as Selim I's proclamation upon his entry into Cairo, the similarities between the means of claiming political legitimacy through defense of the faithful by rulers of the two ascendant empires at opposite ends of the Mediterranean points to commonalities in the way both empires represented their mission according to a complexly negotiated engage-

ment with the accreted legacies of the Mediterranean world, including the imperial legacy of ancient Rome as well as the universalist doctrines of both Christianity and Islam.

In conclusion, what can the evidence furnished by the sources examined here reveal about the underlying vision animating Ferdinand of Aragon's expansionist policies? What did the king hope to achieve? What did he hope to bequeath to an heir? These questions do not yield easy answers, but it is clear from the works of Navarro, Palacios Rubios, and others who were close to Ferdinand that the tenets of universal Christian monarchy were familiar to the king. Indeed, they constituted a religiopolitical vocabulary that was widely used at court, and that conveyed a coherent set of aspirations that was easily accessed and deployed by jurists and diplomats on a moment's notice, when called on to advance Ferdinand's agenda on the international stage. What is more, when these portrayals of Ferdinand as guardian of the *respublica christiana* were deployed in settings such as the papal curia in Rome, they immediately reached a multinational audience of ambassadors and emissaries who understood these sorts of claims, many of whom sought to portray their own patrons according to similar vocabularies.

The tenets of these universalist doctrines were utopian insofar as they were geared toward a general peace within Christendom. Moreover, as the particulars of these ideals focused on healing the Great Schism, defeating Muslim polities such as the Ottoman Empire, and restoring to Christian rule any lands that could be construed to have at one time been Christian, the Mediterranean was the only region where these Christian universalist aspirations could be achieved. In the decades that followed, similarly utopian dreams would inspire Spanish missionaries in the Americas.[81] During Ferdinand of Aragon's lifetime, however, the Mediterranean remained the locus where pretensions to universal Christian empire were focused.

Amid all the prognostications that Ferdinand was the one elected to bring together the three parts of the world, to heal the schism between East and West, and to effect a conquest of Jerusalem, we should now revisit the anecdote that began this book. When Galíndez de Carvajal recorded that Ferdinand, on his deathbed in Madrigalejo, initially turned away his confessors because he did not believe he was dying since he had not yet conquered Jerusalem, did the author include this detail in his account to present the king in a pious light? Or was this perhaps reflective of the influence that this religiopolitical ideology had on Ferdinand's vision of himself and his political project? Whatever Galíndez de Carvajal's account might indicate about Ferdinand's own beliefs, it provides a clear illustration of the general ambit of universalist ideology that

pervaded the Mediterranean world in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries. Far from reflecting some esoteric interests either of Galíndez de Carvajal or of Ferdinand, that anecdote indicates the extent to which, for countless figures inhabiting this Mediterranean moment, including Pedro Navarro, Christopher Columbus, Juan López de Palacios Rubios, and innumerable others, the language of Christian universalism served as the vocabulary through which so many people of this era, Muslim as well as Christian, conveyed their religiopolitical objectives.

Conclusion

Even after Ferdinand's death in January 1516, described in the first pages of this book, many Spaniards continued to view the Mediterranean as the region of utmost geopolitical, not to mention religious, importance. In September 1516, Cardinal Cisneros (acting in his capacity of regent of Castile) appointed Diego de Vera to lead an attempt to recapture Algiers.[1] Throughout the sixteenth century, decades later, North Africa remained a zone of importance for the Spanish monarchs Charles V (r. 1516–1556) and Philip II (r. 1556–1598). Orán remained under Spanish control for all but a few years until 1791; Melilla remains part of Spain today, as does Ceuta, captured by Portugal in 1415 but joined to the Spanish monarchy when Portugal was annexed in 1580. During the early sixteenth century, Charles V sometimes styled himself "emperor of Africa," and in 1535 he led an expedition that conquered Tunis.[2] This event was commemorated in tapestries depicting the emperor's victory at Tunis according to Roman models, with Charles cast as a second Scipio Africanus, the victorious Roman military commander who defeated Hannibal in the Punic Wars.[3]

Jerusalem was conquered in 1516, but contrary to the prognostications of the Beata del Barco de Ávila (and numerous others), the conqueror was not Ferdinand of Aragon. Nor was it a French king or a warrior-pope in the mold of Julius II. Rather, it was the Ottoman sultan Selim I (r. 1512–1520), and he did not stop at Jerusalem. Over the next several years, the Ottoman ruler

pushed south, conquering the Arabian Hijaz, including the holy cities of Medina and Mecca. Selim's soldiers finally toppled the Mamluk regime and in a triumphal display designed to assert his political legitimacy throughout the Islamic world, the Ottoman sultan processed through the streets of Cairo, proclaiming himself "Protector of the Holy Cities" and caliph, symbolizing a claim of sovereignty over all Muslims.[4]

The Ottoman Empire now controlled the Holy Land, the Hijaz, the Lower Nile Valley, and the shores of the Red Sea, giving them control of the commercial routes linking the Indian Ocean (and its lucrative spice trade) to the Mediterranean basin. While the Portuguese would contest Ottoman sea power in the Indian Ocean for decades to come, in 1520 it appeared that it was the ascendant Turkish state that held the strongest claim to world empire. Indeed, for decades following Columbus's first Atlantic crossing in 1492, the major powers of the Eurasian landmass continued to view the Indian Ocean and Asia as the most valuable prize.[5]

By the 1520s, Ottoman rule encompassed the entirety of the eastern Mediterranean, including both the Bosporus and the Lower Nile, bringing a political unity to this region that it had lacked since the Byzantines lost Egypt in the seventh century. The Ottoman Empire appeared poised to launch a grand series of Western conquests, perhaps fulfilling the centuries-old prophecy that they would attain the "red apple" (Rome) and successfully reconstitute the Roman Empire in an Islamic guise.[6] Indeed, during the 1520s the Ottomans pushed westward across North Africa, establishing the Barbary regencies at Tripoli, Tunis, and Algiers. The window of opportunity for arresting the advance of the Turks that Europeans had perceived for seven decades or more appeared to be closing, and the messianic expectations of a Christian universal monarch who would subjugate the Ottomans and lead a recovery of Constantinople and the Holy Land were gradually tempered by the realities of the sixteenth-century Mediterranean.

Nearly contemporaneously, between 1519 and 1521, the Castilian Hernán Cortés led an audacious conquest of Mexico, ultimately giving Spain a lucrative colony on the American mainland.[7] The transformation, of course, was not immediate. But the middle decades of the sixteenth century witnessed the opening of silver mines in Mexico and at Potosí, in the viceroyalty of Peru.[8] What is more, the Battle of Lepanto (1571), for all its celebration in Latin Christendom as a glorious victory over the Ottomans, did not significantly alter circumstances in the Mediterranean. Rather, the following years saw the development of a situation of stalemate between Habsburg and Ottoman forces.[9] With Spain's annexation of Portugal in 1580, the "Atlantic turn" was complete and the early modern Spanish monarchy definitively prioritized its Atlantic

possessions.[10] These political and geographical shifts away from the inner sea set in motion a series of processes that would transform the way Europeans thought about conquest, just war, and empire. The justice of the Spanish conquest of the Americas, already a concern at the *junta* of Burgos convened in 1512, became a more pressing issue. The questions of just war and conquest that arose from Spain's American colonies spurred the writings of Gonzalo Fernández de Oviedo, Francisco de Vitoria, Bartolomé de Las Casas, and the latter's famous Valladolid "debate" with Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda.[11] It is in this context that scholars have tended to consider the debates concerning the political rights of non-Christians and the legal and moral arguments underlying the origins of European colonialism. In part as a result of changes that occurred subsequent to the events examined in this book (particularly the new era ushered in by the conquests of the Aztec and Incan empires), most scholars of the early modern Spanish empire have paid scant attention to the period of Mediterranean expansion that took place during the reign of Ferdinand the Catholic. And yet, when we look to the writings of figures such as Juan López de Palacios Rubios, or even Bartolomé de Las Casas, it is clear that to ignore the genealogical origins of these debates is to create an artificial division, in geographical as well as chronological terms.

The study of the Mediterranean side of Spain's early modern empire illuminates a great deal about Iberian political thought on just war and holy war against foes of various confessional stripes, about the criteria for just conquest, and about the capacity for various peoples to exercise *dominium*. As such, it serves as a counterpoint to studies that have approached these questions from the perspective of the sixteenth-century Americas. As Ferdinand of Aragon and Isabella of Castile embarked on an expansionist course that led to Spanish conquests to the east, south, and west of the Italian Peninsula, they drew on traditional Aragonese and Castilian arguments for sovereignty, and deployed them in innovative manners that redefined Spain's relationship with the non-Christian world. Ferdinand, for instance, portrayed his expansionist Mediterranean agenda as deriving solely from a desire to protect Christians and to make war on infidels. This argument was easily made in the context of the Ottoman occupation of Otranto (1480–1481), when Italian as well Spanish diplomatic correspondence cast this event as an existential threat for all of Christendom. This proved to be so effective (and so seductively powerful), that fifteen years later Spaniards used exactly the same discourse to portray the French invasion of Italy, rendering the French just as grave a threat to the well-being of the *respublica christiana* as were the Ottomans. The fact that Spanish monarchs and ambassadors chose to portray the Italian Wars in this manner demonstrates the way in which fifteenth- and sixteenth-century Europeans

viewed the Italian Peninsula as the frontier between Christendom and the *Dar al-Islam*. Standing on the front lines of Christendom and also home to the Holy See of St. Peter's, Italy, it could be argued, needed a ruler who could act as *defensor ecclesia*.

Beyond that, however, there is something else worth noting in the presentation of claims of sovereignty along these lines. The use of this religiopolitical vocabulary by Spaniards against a fellow Catholic power productively complicates our sense of how religious discourses were accessed and deployed in the early modern Mediterranean. While the grounds upon which this rhetoric was deployed were ostensibly the external threat posed by the expansionist Ottoman Empire, the religious discourse that permeates the documents I have drawn on for this book was often directed primarily toward an internal threat as embodied in the kingdom of France. (In something of a mirror image, at the far end of the Mediterranean the Ottomans employed a similar tactic against their Safavid enemies.)[12] The theocratic ideals of messianic kingship underlie the articulation of imperial claims based on a prince's professed service to Christendom, or the depiction of a particular ruler as a guardian of the Christian commonwealth, divinely elected to forge a universal Christian peace and recover the Holy Land. In contexts ranging from the Franco-Spanish struggle for Italian hegemony to the *Conciliabulum* of Pisa and the attendant Spanish conquest of Navarre, to aspirations to recover the native land of Augustine of Hippo, these episodes together illustrate the ways in which claims of political legitimacy in fifteenth- and sixteenth-century Europe were frequently articulated through the religiopolitical vocabulary of Christian universalism.

During the same decades in which these events took place at the heart of the Mediterranean world, Spanish writers began to deploy related but distinct arguments in defense of the legality of the conquests in the Americas. The Castilians who journeyed to Hispaniola, Cuba, Mexico, and Peru did not view the American population in the same way they viewed Muslims in Granada, North Africa, or Anatolia, and the Spanish enterprise in the Americas was understood as rather distinct from contemporaneous events in the Mediterranean. The Americans, after all, were Gentiles, with no prior exposure to any of the Abrahamic faiths. This fact alone, along with pressing questions about the influence of the tropical environment on the development of human societies, the degree to which various American societies lived in accordance with natural law, among other questions, determined the quite different course that the American arguments took.[13]

And yet, the processes of Spanish expansionism in the Mediterranean and the attendant developments in political thought did have some influence on thinking about Spain's mission in the New World. Examples of this abound,

including early attempts to explain the origins of the American Indians as a lost tribe of Israelites, or the Americas as having formerly been under the sovereignty of Visigothic Hispania.[14] As these explanations for the origins of the Americans failed to convince, Europeans were forced to adapt the tripartite cosmography of the world to the reality of the Western Hemisphere. The notion, however, that Spain had been divinely elected to unify the diverse parts of the world and to spread Christianity to the ends of the earth nevertheless served as one means of justification for Spanish conquests in the Americas. Indeed, the complete novelty of the Americas and their inhabitants led some religious thinkers to view the lands in utopian terms, as an opportunity to begin anew and to create a pure, uncorrupted Christian society.[15] The funeral procession held in Brussels on the occasion of Ferdinand of Aragon's death included Indians brought from the Caribbean and a stylized golden globe bearing the phrase *Ulterius nisi morte*, a motto John Headley interprets as indicative of aspirations to universal expansion, but in this particular context with a view toward the Americas.[16] Ferdinand himself, in his deathbed instructions to his grandson and heir, Charles V (r. 1516–1556), directed the young prince "to conquer Islam and evangelize to the antipodes."[17] Thus, the universalizing impulse behind Spanish political thought in the Mediterranean could be translated to the novel context of the Americas, even if the thinking on the religious and legal standing of the inhabitants differed in significant ways.

If the Mediterranean origins of a Spanish imperial ideology have received little scholarly attention, the connections between the Mediterranean and Atlantic components of Spanish political thought on empire remain even less explored. Assertions of sovereignty through the claim to act as defender of the Church developed in the context of Mediterranean conflicts, but were also deployed in other arenas of early modern imperial expansion, particularly in Spanish claims to the Americas. The legal doctrines justifying war against non-Christian peoples were being worked out in the Mediterranean basin in the crucible in which the Ottoman Empire loomed large in the European consciousness. These doctrines were then adapted and applied in a somewhat awkward, even incoherent, fashion to the entirely novel set of circumstances the Spanish encountered in the Americas. The American angle of this story has been told. In this book, I have shed light on the Mediterranean counterpoint in order to demonstrate that these two processes were intimately linked and informed one another in the development of early modern Spanish political thought on conquest, just war, and empire.

Notes

The following abbreviations are used in the notes:

AGS	Archivo General de Simancas
BNE	Biblioteca Nacional de España, Madrid
BNF	Bibliothèque National de France, Paris
CODOIN	Colección de Documentos Inéditos para la Historia de España
CSIC	Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas
RAH	Real Academia de la Historia, Madrid
fol. (folio)	page (plural: fols.)
leg. (legajo)	bundle
no. (número)	number

Introduction

1. Throughout this anecdote, I draw on Lorenzo Galíndez de Carvajal's *Memorial o Registro Breve de los Reyes Católicos* (Edición Facsímil), ed. Juan Carretero Zamora (Segovia: Patronato del Alcázar, 1992).

2. Galíndez de Carvajal, *Memorial*, Año de 1516, chap. 2.

3. Galíndez de Carvajal, *Memorial*, Año de 1516, chap. 2.

4. Galíndez de Carvajal, *Memorial*, Año de 1516, chap. 2.

5. The Crown of Aragon's deep embroilment in pan-Mediterranean affairs can be traced back to the early thirteenth century. The conquest of Majorca (1229) facilitated Catalan trade with North Africa. In subsequent decades, the Crown established consulates in Tunis, Bougie, and Alexandria. See J. N. Hillgarth, *The Problem of a Catalan Mediterranean Empire 1229–1327*, *The English Historical Review*, supplement 8 (London: Longman, 1975), pp. 19–21. The Crown's Mediterranean interests were political as well as commercial. King Peter III (r. 1276–1285) conquered the island of Sicily from its Angevin rulers in the aftermath of the Sicilian Vespers (1282), and several decades later a protracted series of conflicts during the 1320s brought the island of Sardinia into the Crown's dominions. In the fourteenth century, the Catalan Company, a confederation of mercenaries, embarked on raids in Greece, eventually winning control of the duchies of Athens and Neopatria in 1311. Although the Catalan Company acted initially with no royal involvement, within a year the company recognized King Frederick III of Sicily (r. 1295–1337), a cadet ruler from the Aragonese dynasty, as its lord. On this, see

David Abulafia, "The Aragonese Kingdom of Albania: An Angevin Project of 1311–1316," in *Mediterranean Encounters, Economic, Religious, Political, 1100–1550* (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Variorum, 2000).

6. Lewis Hanke, *The Spanish Struggle for Justice in the Conquest of America* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1949); Anthony Pagden, "Dispossessing the Barbarian: The Language of Spanish Thomism and the Debate over the Property Rights of the American Indians," in *The Languages of Political Theory in Early-Modern Europe*, ed. Anthony Pagden (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 79–99.

7. For these topics, see the following influential works: Margaret T. Hodgen, *Early Anthropology in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1964); Lewis Hanke, *Aristotle and the American Indians: A Study in Race Prejudice in the Modern World* (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1959); Anthony Pagden, *The Fall of Natural Man: The American Indian and the Origins of Ethnography* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).

8. James Muldoon provides a succinct outline of Hostiensis's arguments on this matter. See Muldoon, *Popes, Lawyers, and Infidels: The Church and the Non-Christian World, 1250–1550* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1979), pp. 15–18.

9. Tamar Herzog, *Frontiers of Possession: Spain and Portugal in Europe and the Americas* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2015), p. 12.

10. "If our model—if any model—of Mediterranean distinctiveness is to be helpful, the Mediterranean must have some definition in the spatial sense—an edge, or at least a zone of transition, between the places for which comparisons and deductions of the sort we propose may be justified and neighbouring zones in which they would be more difficult." Nicholas Purcell, "The Boundless Sea of Unlikeness? On Defining the Mediterranean," *Mediterranean Historical Review* 18, no. 2 (December 2003): 9–29, at 11.

11. King Ferdinand to De Puebla, ambassador to England, July 20, 1507, in *Calendar of Letters, Despatches, and State Papers, Relating to Negotiations Between England and Spain, Preserved in the Archives at Simancas and Elsewhere, Vol. 1 (Henry VII, 1485–1509)*, ed. G. A. Bergenroth (London: Longman, Green, Longman, & Roberts, 1863), letter 528, p. 421.

12. Lewis Hanke, "The 'Requerimiento' and Its Interpreters," *Revista de historia de América* 1 (March 1938): 25–34. See also the articles in the collection *Empire & Exceptionalism: The* Requerimiento *and Claims of Sovereignty in the Early Modern Mediterranean and Atlantic*, ed. Andrew Devereux, a special forum for *Republics of Letters* (Stanford University, Division of Literatures, Cultures, and Languages) 5, no. 3 (2018).

13. Anonymous, *La conquista del reyno de Nápoles, con todas las cosas que Gonçalo Fernandes ha fecho despues que partio de españa con toda su armada*, fol. Aiv. Post-incunable, probably printed in Zaragoza by Jorge Coci, after August 10, 1504.

14. Luis Suárez Fernández, *Los Reyes Católicos*, 5 vols. (Madrid: Ediciones Rialp, 1989–1990); Luis Suárez Fernández, *Isabel I, Reina* (Barcelona: Editorial Ariel, 2012); see also Miguel Ángel Ladero Quesada, *Los Reyes Católicos: la Corona y la Unidad de España* (Valencia: Asociación Francisco López de Gomara, 1989).

15. Galíndez de Carvajal, *Memorial*, Año de 1516, chap. 2.

16. See Ferdinand's instructions to Jerónimo de Vich, his ambassador in Rome, on procuring an investiture for the Kingdom of Naples that would be inherited in perpetuity by any descendants Ferdinand and Germana might produce. Instructions for the Investiture, from Ferdinand to Vich, April 14, 1507, in Terrateig, vol. 2, no. 5, pp. 26–27.

17. Peter Martyr, *Epistolario de Pedro Mártir de Anglería*, trans. J. López de Toro, in *Documentos inéditos para la historia de España*, vol. 11 (Madrid: Imprenta Góngora, 1953–57), letter 531, pp. 137–38. See also Martyr, *Epistolario*, vol. 11, letter 542, Peter Martyr to Iñigo López de Mendoza (December 18, 1513).

18. ". . . querríamos que desde luego procurassedes de ganar de nuestro muy Santo Padre vna bulla en que generalmente declarasse la dicha guerra contra los infieles y *diesse a nos para nos y para nuestros sucessores reyes de Aragón* todo lo que con ayuda de Dios nuestro señor conquistássemos de las tierras de los infieles" [emphasis mine], Archivo Histórico Nacional, Estado, leg. 8605, letter from King Ferdinand to Jerónimo de Vich, February 28, 1510, in Baron de Terrateig, *Política en Italia del Rey Católico (1507–1516), Correspondencia inedita con el embajador*, vol. 2 (Madrid: CSIC, 1963), pp. 94–96.

19. For a succinct and clear presentation of the "accident" of the union of Aragon and Castile that took place with Ferdinand's death in 1516, see Bethany Aram, *Juana the Mad: Sovereignty and Dynasty in Renaissance Europe* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005), pp. 109–10.

20. David Abulafia makes precisely this point in in his essay, "Ferdinand the Catholic: King and Consort," in *Man Behind the Queen: Male Consorts in History*, ed. Charles Beem and Miles Taylor (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), pp. 33–53.

21. Aram, *Juana the Mad*.

22. "Demás desto sabeys que es común opinion y fama pública muchos tiempos ha que la conquista del reyno de Bugía y del reyno de Túnez pertenece a la corona de Aragón, y aunque no huuiera estos fundamentos por estar como están los dichos reynos de Túnez y Bugía más propinquos y más en confín de nuestros reynos e yslas." Letter from Ferdinand to Jerónimo de Vich, his ambassador in Rome, February 28, 1510, in Terrateig, *Política en Italia*, vol. 2, pp. 94–96.

23. Biblioteca Nacional, Madrid, R/34182-6: *Carta que enbiaron la Yglesia e cibdad de Córdova al Rey don Fernando nro señor: suplicando a su real magestad cesasse la passada en affrica en persona.por el gran bien y utilidad q dello resultaria a estos reynos*; Biblioteca Nacional, Madrid, R/34182-7: *Carta y requerimiento hecho de los de la muy noble e muy leal cibdad de Sevilla al Rey nuestro señor.*

24. For this interpretation, see Alain Milhou, "Propaganda mesiánica y opinión pública: Las reacciones de las ciudades del reino de Castilla frente al proyecto fernandino de cruzada (1510–1511)," in *Homenaje a José Antonio Maravall*, vol. 3, ed. María del Carmen Iglesias et al. (Madrid: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, 1985), pp. 51–62.

25. Henry Kamen, *Empire: How Spain Became a World Power, 1492–1763* (New York: Harper Collins, 2003), p. 44.

26. Juan de Ayala, *Letter to Ferdinand and Isabella*, 1503, translated with commentary by Charles Nowell (University of Minnesota, 1965), p. 45.

27. Kamen, *Empire*, p. 42.

28. Kamen, *Empire*, pp. 31–32. Along these lines, see the instructions contained in Ferdinand's correspondence, from the Real Academia de la Historia (Colección Salazar): K-4 (661 letters written by Ferdinand during 1508–1509), published by Antonio Rodríguez Villa in *Boletín de la Real Academia de la Historia*, Madrid, 1909, vol. 54, pp. 373–412, 518–25; vol. 55, pp. 137–272, 325–52, 369–406. Document 463, Ferdinand to the Viceroy of Sicily, March 9, 1509, from Valladolid: "Spetable Visorrey: Porque para algunas cosas cumplideras á servicio de Dios nuestro Señor é nuestro, nos enviamos dos

mill ynfantes españoles al nuestro Reyno de Nápoles, y vá por coronel dellos Christobal de Çamudio, levador desta." Ferdinand's instructions tell the viceroy to provide him with whatever might be necessary should Çamudio happen to land on Sicily. The 2,000 infantrymen were to be deployed from Naples to North Africa in support of the Spanish conquest of Orán, planned for May of 1509. There were identical letters sent to the viceroys of Mallorca and Cerdeña (vol. 55, p. 247). Documents 461, 462, 464–69, 476, 488–90 have to do with same subject.

29. Anonymous, "Relación de los sucesos de las armas marítimas de España en los años de 1510 y 1511," in *Colección de Documentos Inéditos para la Historia de España* [hereafter *CODOIN*], vol. 25 (Madrid: Imprenta de la Viuda de Calero, 1854; facsimile edition: Nendeln, Liechtenstein, 1966), p. 540.

30. An example of the fantastical optimism that saw the early sixteenth century as the cusp of a new Golden Age is to be found in Giles of Viterbo's discourse presented to Pope Julius II in 1507. See John W. O'Malley, S.J., "Fulfillment of the Christian Golden Age Under Pope Julius II: Text of a Discourse of Giles of Viterbo, 1507," *Traditio* 25 (1969): 265–338.

31. The list of works addressing these subjects is long, but a short sampling would include: Luis F. Thomaz, "L'idée impériale manuéline," in *La Découverte, le Portugal et l'Europe*, Actes du Colloque, Paris (26–28 mai 1988) (Paris: Fondation Calouste Gulbenkian, 1990), pp. 35–103; Lorenzo Polizzotto, *The Elect Nation: The Savonarolan Movement in Florence, 1494–1545* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994); on Columbus, see the brilliant study, Alain Milhou, *Colón y su mentalidad mesiánica en el ambiente franciscanista español* (Valladolid: Casa-Museo de Colón, 1983).

32. In addition to the study by Alain Milhou, see also Abbas Hamdani, "Columbus and the Recovery of Jerusalem," *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 99, no. 1 (1979): 39–48; Pauline Moffit Watts, "Prophecy and Discovery: On the Spiritual Origins of Christopher Columbus' 'Enterprise of the Indies,'" *American Historical Review* 90 (1985): 73–102; and, most recently, Carol Delaney, *Columbus and the Quest for Jerusalem* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2011).

33. Pinar Emiralioglu, *Geographical Knowledge and Imperial Culture in the Early Modern Ottoman Empire* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2014), especially chap. 1, pp. 20–22.

34. Cornell Fleischer, "Shadow of Shadows: Prophecy in Politics in 1530s Istanbul," *International Journal of Turkish Studies* 13 (2007): 52–53.

35. Emiralioglu, *Geographical Knowledge and Imperial Culture*, p. 22.

36. On this welcome development in the field of Hispanic studies, see "Introduction," in *The Early Modern Hispanic World: Transnational and Interdisciplinary Approaches*, ed. Kimberly Lynn and Erin Kathleen Rowe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), p. 2.

37. Along these lines, see also the essays in the collection *Can We Talk Mediterranean? Considerations on an Emerging Field in Medieval and Early Modern Studies*, ed. Brian Catlos and Sharon Kinoshita (New York: Palgrave, 2017), all of which address the possibilities presented by adopting the category of the "Mediterranean" as a heuristic tool.

38. I have been inspired here by the following article: Barbara Fuchs, "1492 and the Cleaving of Hispanism," *Medieval/Renaissance: After Periodization, Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies* 37, no. 3 (Fall 2007): 493–510.

39. "The conquest of Granada and the discovery of America represented at once an end and a beginning. While the fall of Granada brought to an end the *Reconquista*

of Spanish territory, it also opened a new phase in Castile's long crusade against the Moor—a phase in which the Christian banners were borne across the straits and planted on the inhospitable shores of Africa. The discovery of the New World also marked the opening of a new phase—the great epoch of overseas colonization—but at the same time it was a natural culmination of a dynamic and expansionist period in Castilian history which had begun long before. Both reconquest and discovery, which seemed miraculous events to contemporary Spaniards, were in reality a logical outcome of the traditions and aspirations of an earlier age, on which the seal of success was now firmly placed." John H. Elliott, *Imperial Spain, 1469–1716* (London: Penguin, 2002; first edition 1963), p. 45.

40. Braudel's most famous work, and the most influential study in spawning the modern field of Mediterranean Studies and the related fields of study of other maritime systems, is the classic *La Méditerranée et le monde Méditerranéen à l'époque de Philippe II* (Paris: Colin, 1949). Among his lesser-known works is the lengthy article "Les Espagnols et l'Afrique du Nord," *Revue Africaine* LXIX (1928): 184–233, 351–428; reprinted in Braudel, *Autour de la Méditerranée* (Paris: Éditions de Fallois, 1996), pp. 31–89.

41. For a survey of the recent literature on Spain and North Africa, see Abigail Krasner Balbale, Andrew Devereux, Camilo Gómez-Rivas, and Yuen-Gen Liang, "Unity and Disunity across the Strait of Gibraltar," *Medieval Encounters* 19, nos. 1–2 (2013): 1–40.

42. Andrew C. Hess, *The Forgotten Frontier: A History of the Sixteenth-Century Ibero-African Frontier* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978). See also the following important works: Yuen-Gen Liang, *Family and Empire: The Fernández de Córdoba and the Spanish Realm* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011); Barbara Fuchs and Yuen-Gen Liang, eds., *A Forgotten Empire: The Spanish-North African Borderlands*, special issue of *Journal of Spanish Cultural Studies* 12, no. 3 (September 2011). For recent works, see Daniel Hershenzon, *The Captive Sea: Slavery, Communication, and Commerce in Early Modern Spain and the Mediterranean* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2018); and Mayte Green-Mercado, *Visions of Deliverance: Moriscos and the Politics of Prophecy in the Early Modern Mediterranean* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2019).

43. Lewis Hanke, "The Requerimiento and its Interpreters," *Revista de historia de América* 1 (March 1938); Patricia Seed, "The Requirement: A Protocol for Conquest," in *Ceremonies of Possession in Europe's Conquest of the New World, 1492–1640* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), chap. 3, 69–99; and Devereux, ed., *Empire & Exceptionalism*.

44. Eloy Bullón y Fernandez, *Un colaborador de los Reyes Católicos: El Doctor Palacios Rubios y sus obras* (Madrid: Ramona Velasco, 1927).

45. Bullón y Fernandez, *Un colaborador de los Reyes Católicos*, pp. 126–129.

46. Biblioteca Nacional, Madrid, ms. 17641. Agustín Millares Carlo and Silvio Zavala produced the first modern edition of *De insulis* in 1954. See Juan López de Palacios Rubios, *De las Islas del mar Océano/De insulis oceanis*, introducción de Silvio Zavala, traducción, notas y bibliografía de Agustín Millares Carlo (México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1954). There have been two subsequent studies of the life and works of Palacios Rubios: Juan Mateu Climent, *Vida, época y trabajos del eminente doctor y jurisconsulto Palacios Rubios* (Bilbao: Universidad de Deusto, 1958); and Juan López de Palacios Rubios, *De las Islas del Mar Océano (Libellus de Insulis Oceanis)*. Introducción, texto crítico y traducción de Paulino Castañeda Delgado, José Carlos Martín de la Hoz y Eduardo Fernández (Pamplona: Eunsa, 2013).

47. Juan López de Palacios Rubios, *De iusticia et iure obtentionis ac retentionis regni Nauarre, necnon et de ipsius terrae situ et antiquitate* (Burgos: Fadrique de Basilea, ca. 1515–1517). Biblioteca Nacional, Madrid, R/31345. There is no modern edition of this text.

48. The most complete information pertaining to the life of Cristóbal de Santesteban is to be found in the following source: Valentín Carderera y Solano, *Iconografía española: Colección de Retratos, Estatuas, Mausoleos y demás Monumentos inéditos de Reyes, Reinas, Grandes Capitanes, Escritores, etc. desde el S. XI hasta el XVII*, 2 vols. (Madrid: Ramón Campuzano, 1855–1864). Entry 57: "Don Cristóbal nació por los años 1440 y debió servir á los Reyes Católicos, y mas tarde al Emperador Cárlos V, en calidad de caballerizo suyo. Fué regidor de Valladolid y comendador de Biedma en la órden de Santiago. Formando parte de aquella generación de ilustres varones, á quienes parecia indigna de su alto linaje la ignorancia de las letras y aun indispensable su cultivo, dejó escrito un tratado sobre la sucesion de los reinos de Jerusalen, Nápoles, Sicilia y las provincias de Pullia y Calabria, que se imprimó en Zaragoza el año 1503."

49. Cristóbal de Santesteban, *Tratado de la succesión de los reynos de Jerusalén y de Nápoles y de Cecilia y de las provincias de Pulla y Calabria* (Zaragoza: Jorge Coci, 1503). Biblioteca Nacional, Madrid, post-incunable, R/29905(2).

50. F. J. Norton, *A Descriptive Catalogue of Printing in Spain and Portugal, 1501–1520* (Mansfield Center, CT: Martino, 1999), p. 223, entry 604.

51. *CODOIN*, vol. 25, which contains the following biography of Navarro, narrated in heroic terms: *Historia del Conde Pedro Navarro, General de Infantería, Marina e Ingeniero, en los Reinados de Fernando e Isabel, y de doña Juana y su hijo don Carlos*, por don Martín de los Heros. Also in *CODOIN*, vol. 25, document 3 records Navarro's being granted the title of Count: *Título de Conde de Oliveto á favor de Pedro Navarro* (given in Segovia, June 1, 1505), pp. 407–12.

52. Pedro Navarro (1460?–1528), *Memorial para la Magestad en orden a la Conquista de Jerusalen* (1506). Biblioteca Nacional, Madrid, ms. 19699, caja 60.

1. The Mediterranean in the Spanish Imaginary During the Age of Exploration

1. Cristóbal de Santesteban, *Tratado de la succesión de los reynos de Jerusalén y de Nápoles y de Cecilia y de las provicias de Pulla y Calabria* (Zaragoza: Jorge Coci, 1503). Biblioteca Nacional de España, Madrid, post-incunable: R/29905(2). See the introduction of this book for a brief biographical sketch of Santesteban.

2. "Que çecilia la bastada de todas las cosas en mas abundancia que otra tierra ninguna del mundo: la que en si tiene el centro de aquel mas excellente elemento de fuego: la que esta assentada entre las tres partes del mundo Asia Africa y Europa: la panera y bastamiento de todas ellas . . . la que nunca se llamo nadie señor del mundo ni lo penso ser si a ella le faltasse." Santesteban, *Tratado de la succesión de los reynos de Jerusalén y de Nápoles y de Cecilia*, chap. 6.

3. Examples include Nicolás Wey Gómez, *The Tropics of Empire: Why Columbus Sailed South to the Indies* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2008); Joan-Pau Rubiés, *Travel and Ethnology in the Renaissance: South India Through European Eyes, 1250–1625* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); and Surekha Davies, *Renaissance Ethnography and the Invention of the Human: New Worlds, Maps, and Monsters* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016).

4. See Anthony Grafton, *New Worlds, Ancient Texts: the power of tradition and the shock of discovery* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992).

5. "Los sabios que escriuieron todas las tierra fizieron dellas tres partes: e a la una que es mayor pusieron nombre Asia, e a la otra Africa, e a la tercera Europa." *Primera Crónica General de España* (Que Mandó Componer Alfonso el Sabio y se Continuaba Bajo Sancho IV en 1289), vol. 1, ed. Ramón Menéndez Pidal (Madrid: Editorial Gredos, 1955), p. 5. This tripartite division is also the structure for the early fifteenth-century French polymath Pierre d'Ailly's *Ymago Mundi*. See Pierre d'Ailly, *Ymago Mundi y otros opúsculos*, ed. Antonio Ramírez de Verger (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1992), p. 253. For a late-fifteenth-century example, see Diego de Valera (1412–1488), *Crónica de España* (Seville: Alonso del Puerto, 1482), which is divided into sections devoted to Asia, Africa, and Europe.

6. Martin W. Lewis and Kären E. Wigen, *The Myth of Continents: A Critique of Metageography* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997).

7. Pierre d'Ailly, *Ymago Mundi*, p. 291.

8. Pedro Mártir, *Una embajada española al Egipto de principios del siglo XVI: la* Legatio Babilonica *de Pedro Mártir de Angleria*, ed. Raúl Álvarez-Moreno (Madrid: Instituto Egipcio de Estudios Islámicos, 2013), p. 96.

9. Wey Gómez, *The Tropics of Empire*, pp. 355–56.

10. Seymour Phillips, "Outer World of the European Middle Ages," in *Implicit Understandings: Observing, Reporting, and Reflecting on the Encounters Between Europeans and Other Peoples in the Early Modern Era*, ed. Stuart Schwartz (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 34n33.

11. Giles of Viterbo, "Fulfillment of the Christian Golden Age Under Pope Julius II: Text of a Discourse of Giles of Viterbo, 1507," ed. John W. O'Malley, S.J., *Traditio* 25 (1969): 265–338, at 325: "*Multiplicabitur*, inquit, *quae derelicta fuerat in medio terrae*, ubi sanctam ciuitatem Hierusalem a spurcissimis hostibus occupatam nostro saeculo recuperandam praedicit. Africam atque Europam *extrema terrae* / uocant Esaias, Iob, Dauid, quod magna sui parte Occeano alluantur. Iudeam, in ea Asiae ora sitam qua maxime discedit ab Occeano atque ad habitatae terrae medium sese recipit, non iniuria fortasse terrae medium appellitarunt."

12. Diego de Valera, *Crónica de España* (Seville: Alonso del Puerto, 1482), section on Asia (consulted at the Garrett Library, Johns Hopkins University, incun. 1482, vol. 3).

13. Diego de Valera, *Crónica de España*, section on Africa, chap. 16: "[Sicily] es asentada en el mar africano." Locating Sicily in the "African Sea" was not unusual. In the early fifteenth century, Pierre d'Ailly, in his *Ymago Mundi*, gave Sicily's position as abutting the "Sea of Africa." See Pierre d'Ailly, *Ymago Mundi y otros opúsculos*, ed. Antonio Ramírez de Verger (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1992), chapter 45, pp. 105–6.

14. Jaime Vicens Vives, *Fernando el Católico, Príncipe de Aragón, Rey de Sicilia, 1458–1478* (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1952). For King Ferdinand's claims to Corsica, see his attempt early in his reign to "recover" the island, in *Documentos Sobre Relaciones Internacionales de los Reyes Católicos*, vol. 1 (1479–1483), edición preparada por Antonio de la Torre (Barcelona, 1949), Document 7 (March 4, 1479): Ferdinand names Juan de Vilamarí *capitán general* to lead the recuperation of Corsica, which Ferdinand asserts belongs to him by right (pp. 5–9). For years, Ferdinand and Isabella listed Corsica among their titles.

15. "Enla meytad de iudea es la cibdad de ihrlm que es asi como onbligo de todas las tierras." Diego de Valera, *Crónica de España*, section on Asia, chap. 14, on Judea.

16. Santesteban, *Tratado de la succesión*, chap. 11.

17. Christopher Columbus, *The Four Voyages*, ed. and trans. by J. M. Cohen. (New York: Penguin, 1969), p. 288. Of course, it is open to interpretation whether Columbus was as disoriented as this entry suggests, or if he was attempting to salvage his reputation by locating himself near India and, implicitly, the fabulous riches Europeans associated with that land.

18. Dante Alighieri, *On Monarchy*, bk. 2, viii, ed. Prue Shaw, Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 55, 75, 85.

19. ". . . la que nunca se llamo nadie señor del mundo ni lo penso ser si a ella le faltasse." Santesteban, *Tratado de la succesión de los reynos*, chap. 6.

20. Mustafa b. Ali al-Muvakkit, cited in Pınar Emiralioglu, *Geographical Knowledge and Imperial Culture in the Early Modern Ottoman Empire* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2014), p. 39.

21. Emiralioglu, *Geographical Knowledge and Imperial Culture*, p. 41.

22. Johannes Putsch, *Europa: Prima Pars Terrae in Forma Virginis*, facsimile of 1537 edition (Prague: Kolegium Pro Podporu, 1990).

23. Diego de Valera, *Cirimonial de prinçipes*. Biblioteca Nacional, Madrid, ms. 1341 (fifteenth-century), fol. 68v.

24. Robert Finlay, "Prophecy and Politics in Istanbul: Charles V, Sultan Süleyman, and the Habsburg Embassy of 1533–1534," *Journal of Early Modern History* 2, no. 1 (1998): 1–31, at 2n3.

25. Emiralioglu, *Geographical Knowledge and Imperial Culture*, p. 53.

26. "Sollo Spagna secilia: puglia son los harneros del mundo a toda natura de victuaglias. Con sollo la Sicilia Los Romanos del universo tomaron la Impresa: quanto mas: y spagna y puglia." Pedro Navarro (1460?–1528), *Memorial para la Magestad en orden a la Conquista de Jerusalen* (1506). Biblioteca Nacional, Madrid, ms. 19699, caja 60, fol. 1v.

27. Letter from King Manoel of Portugal to Samudri Raja of Calicut (March 1, 1500), cited in Sanjay Subrahmanyam, "Du Tage au Gange au XVIe siècle: une conjoncture millénariste à l'échelle eurasiatique," *Annales* 56 (2001): 51–84. Subrahmanyam here draws on a transcription of the letter, printed in Jean Aubin, *Le latin et l'astrolabe: recherches sur le Portugal de la Renaissance, son expansion en Asie et les relations internationales*, vol. 1 (Paris: Centre Culturel Calouste Gulbenkian, 1996), pp. 32–33.

28. Miguel Ángel de Bunes Ibarra, "El marco ideológico de la expansión española por el norte de África," *Revista Aldaba*, no. 26 (September 1995): 113–34, here at p. 117.

29. João de Barros, *Décadas da Ásia*, cited in Vincent Barletta, *Death in Babylon: Alexander the Great & Iberian Empire in the Muslim Orient* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010), p. 147.

30. Aristotle, *Meteorologica*, trans. H. D. P. Lee (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1952). Comparing Greece to cold regions and to Asia, Aristotle writes, "The Greek race, however, occupies an intermediate position geographically, and so shares in both sets of characteristics. For it is both spirited and intelligent. That is precisely why it remains free, governed in the best way, and capable, if it chances upon a single constitution, of ruling all the others." See Aristotle, *Politics*, trans. C. D. C. Reeve (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1998), bk. 7, chap. 7, p. 202. For the presence of this line of reasoning in Islamic

thought, see Ibn Khaldun, *The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History*, ed. and trans. Franz Rosenthal (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1969; 2nd ed. 2005).

31. Wey Gómez, *The Tropics of Empire*, p. 50.

32. Wey Gómez, *The Tropics of Empire*, p. 49.

33. Ibn Khaldun, *The Muqaddimah*, ed. and trans. Franz Rosenthal (2nd ed. 2005), p. 58.

34. Diego de Valera, *Crónica de España* (Seville: Alonso del Puerto, 1482), bk. 1, on Asia, chap. 31, ". . . dela region de etiopia. ETIOPIA es asi llamada del color delos habitadores della. aquien la vezindad del sol faze negros. segun dize ysidoro enel quinzeno delas ethimologias. . . . ala parte oriental tiene muy grandes desiertos. en que ay muchos mostruosos onbres. . . . ay enella innumerables gentes de diuersos vultos y mostruosa especie. cria animals orribles y fieros y gran muchedunbre de venosas serpientes. . . ."

35. Diego de Valera, *Crónica de España*, bk. 3, on Europe, chap. 27, "dela prouincia de suecia."

36. Pierre d'Ailly's version of Haly's commentary on Ptolemy's *Tetrabiblos*: regarding the inhabitants of the temperate zone: "They are therefore medium in colouring, of moderate stature, in nature equable, live close together, and are civilized in their habits." Cited in Wey Gómez, *The Tropics of Empire*, p. 456n80.

37. Letter, apparently from Gerónimo Yllan, Cisneros's secretary, describing the return from Orán following its conquest by Spanish forces led by Cardinal Cisneros in 1509. The author of the letter, written May 24, 1509, in Cartagena, writes that they had set sail from the port of Orán the day before. *Cartas del Cardenal Don Francisco Jiménez de Cisneros: Dirigidas Á Don Diego López de Ayala*, ed. Pascual Gayangos and Vicente de la Fuente (Madrid: Imprenta del Colegio de Sordo-Mudos y de Ciegos, 1867), letter 15, p. 38.

38. Beatriz Alonso Acero, *Cisneros y la conquista española del norte de África: cruzada, política, y arte de la guerra* (Madrid: Ministerio de Defensa, 2005), p. 50.

39. See Columbus's account of his first voyage, a modern edition of which can be found in Consuelo Varela, ed., *Cristóbal Colón: Los cuatro viajes; Testamento.* (Madrid: Alianza, 1986).

40. Charles Emmanuel Dufourcq, *L'Espagne catalane et le Maghreb aux XIIIe et XIVe siècles: de la bataille de Las Navas de Tolosa (1212) à l'avènement du sultan mérinide Abou-l-Hazzan (1331)* (Paris: Presses universitaire de France, 1966).

41. Rodrigo Ximénez de Rada's thirteenth-century chronicle elaborated a Castilian claim to northern Morocco. See Roderici Ximenii de Rada, *Historia de Rebus Hispanie sive Historia Gothica*, ed. Juan Fernández Valverde (Turnholt: Brepols, 1987), bk. 3, chap. 21, p. 105. The Castilian claim to the *trans-fretum* lands of Mauretania Tingitana was reiterated in subsequent centuries by the likes of Alonso de Cartagena, Rodrigo Sánchez de Arévalo, and Diego de Valera.

42. Diego de Valera, *Crónica de España*, bk. 2, on Africa.

43. Kenneth B. Wolf, "The 'Moors' of West Africa and the Beginnings of the Portuguese Slave Trade," *Journal of Medieval and Renaissance Studies* 24, no. 3 (Fall 1994): 449–69.

44. "Et afirman que este nonbre godos tomaron de su primero padre que fue gad hijo del patriarca Jacob del qual tribo proçeden y esta opiñion tyene lugar por que la

gente deste tribo gad benya de la parte aquende del jordan la qual conquistada por los Reyes de asyria fueron llevados a poblar çiertas tyerras de syria en ribera de un rio gotya segund se escrive en el primero libro de parali pomenon e no syn razon." *Breve compendio de las Crónicas de los Reyes de España* (ca. 1492–1493), Bibliothèque Nationale de France, ms. esp. 110, fol. 4r.

45. "Otros salieron por la mar e conquistaron por las partes de libia e poblaron gesulia que es una provinçia en africa en la qual abitan fasta oy. Et por esto los godos dezian que los moros de aquella parte les eran propincos parientes segund que mas por ystenso estas cosas santesydro escrivyo en el nono de las etemologias." *Breve compendio de las Crónicas de los Reyes de España*, Bibliothèque Nationale de France, ms. esp. 110, fol. 4v.

46. The coastal region south of Tunis and running east toward Tripoli might be said to constitute a sort of frontier or transitional zone of the type discussed by Nicholas Purcell in his article "The Boundless Sea of Unlikeness?" *Mediterranean Historical Review* 18, no. 2 (December 2003): 19.

47. Fernand Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*, vol. 1, trans. Siân Reynolds (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), pp. 171–73 ("The Sahara, the second face of the Mediterranean"). Also worth consulting here is Peregrine Horden and Nicholas Purcell, *The Corrupting Sea: A Study of Mediterranean History* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000). Map 1, on p. 14, shows the rainfall isohyets and boundaries of Mediterranean vegetation, demonstrating the wide climatic variation within the Mediterranean basin. Also in *The Corrupting Sea*, Horden and Purcell's study of Cyrenaica ("The Green Mountain") (pp. 65–74) provides a striking description of the abrupt transition from the relatively watered region of Cyrenaica to the vast Sahara, which abuts it immediately to the south.

48. "No fuesen mas de las diez del dia, y era tan grandísimo calor de las armas y de la mucha gente, que no podian sofrir á estar en los escuadrones: allí viéredes hacer Fuentes con las picas, cavar en la arena entre medio de los mesmos escuadrones pensando sacar agua." Anonymous, "Relación de los sucesos de las armas marítimas de España en los años de 1510 y 1511," *CODOIN*, vol. 25, p. 512.

49. Juan Cole, *Napoleon's Egypt: Invading the Middle East* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), pp. 36–37.

50. Martyr, *Una embajada española al Egipto*, p. 60.

51. Anonymous, "Relación de los sucesos de las armas marítimas de España en los años de 1510 y 1511," p. 503.

52. Margaret Meserve, *Empires of Islam in Renaissance Historical Thought* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008).

53. See David Abulafia, *The Discovery of Man: Atlantic Encounters in the Age of Columbus* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008); and Lewis Hanke, *All Mankind Is One: A Study of the Disputation between Bartolomé de Las Casas and Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda in 1550 on the Intellectual and Religious Capacity of the American Indians* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1974).

54. Diego Guillén de Ávila, *Panegírico a la Reina Católica* (Valladolid: Diego de Gumiel, 1509), fols. 32v–33r.

55. Guillén de Ávila, *Panegírico a la Reina Católica*, fols. 32v–33r: "Abran a bizancio con su fertile sito/ ya penta polin con toda cirene/ tripol y libia con quanto contiene/

hasta juntar se su fin con egipto/ las sirtes de sirtos con todol destrito/ que africa dieron los sabios autores/ de todo han de ser tus reyes señores/ con nombre muy grande excelso & inuito:/ Ganada ellegipto veran las grandezas/ de sus hedificios las yslas del nilo."

56. Martyr, *Una embajada española al Egipto*, pp. 164–68.

57. Martyr, *Una embajada española al Egipto*, pp. 192–200 on the crocodiles of the Nile, and p. 186 on the source of the Nile in the Mountains of the Moon.

58. J. N. Hillgarth, *The Problem of a Catalan Mediterranean Empire 1229–1327*, English Historical Review, supplement 8 (Longman, 1975), pp. 19, 21.

59. Paul Freedman, *Out of the East: Spices and the Medieval Imagination* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008).

60. Anonymous, "Relación de los sucesos de las armas marítimas de España en los años de 1510 y 1511," p. 506.

61. Martyr, *Una embajada española al Egipto*, p. 28.

62. Plutarch wrote that Alexander the Great, after founding Alexandria, marched to the Siwa Oasis and consulted the Sibyl. She told Alexander that he was at least partially divine and that he was the legitimate pharaoh of Egypt. It is not known whether Palacios Rubios had read Plutarch, or if he had encountered some form of this prophecy in the early medieval Sibylline Oracles. Augustine quoted from these, so it is possible that Palacios Rubios could have come across this prophecy in reading Augustine.

63. Juan López de Palacios Rubios, *De insulis*, Introducción de Silvio Zavala. Traducción, notas y bibliografía de Agustín Millares Carlo (México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1954), pp. 62–68.

64. Pierre d'Ailly's version of Haly's commentary on Ptolemy's *Tetrabiblos*, cited in Wey Gómez, *The Tropics of Empire*, p. 456n80.

65. Martyr, *Una embajada española al Egipto*.

66. Abbas Hamdani, "Columbus and the Recovery of Jerusalem," *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 99, no. 1 (January-March 1979): 39–48, at 40.

67. I borrow the term "ecumene" here from William McNeill's use of the same in his 1963 work, *The Rise of the West: A History of the Human Community* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), in which he describes the European journeys of exploration as inaugurating the "closure of the global ecumene" (p. 297 and elsewhere).

2. The Christian Commonwealth Besieged

1. Aeneas Silvius Piccolomini, cited in Palmira Brummett, *Ottoman Seapower and Levantine Diplomacy in the Age of Discovery* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), p. 26.

2. Norman Housley, *Religious Warfare in Europe 1400–1536* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 20.

3. Anne Marie Wolf, *Juan de Segovia and the Fight for Peace: Christians and Muslims in the Fifteenth Century* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2014), pp. 125–26.

4. Jean Froissart, *Chronicles*, trans. and ed. Geoffrey Brereton (New York: Penguin, 1978), pp. 392–401.

5. Renate Blumenfeld-Kosinski, *Poets, Saints, and Visionaries of the Great Schism, 1378–1417* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2006), p. 5. See also Blumenfeld-Kosinski, "The Conceptualization and Imagery of the Great Schism," in *A Companion to the Great Schism (1378–1417)*, ed. Joëlle Rollo-Koster and Thomas Izbicki (Leiden: Brill, 2009), pp. 123–58.

6. Blumenfeld-Kosinski, *Poets, Saints, and Visionaries*, pp. 7, 11.

7. *Haec Sancta*, in *Unity, Heresy, and Reform, 1378–1460: The Conciliar Response to the Great Schism*, ed. C. M. D. Crowder (Kingston, ON: Limestone Press, 1986), document 12, p. 83.

8. Brian Tierney, *Foundations of the Conciliar Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1955), pp. 3–4, alluding here to the doctrines expressed by Conrad Gelnhausen in his *Epistola Concordia*.

9. Dietrich of Niem, *De modis uniendi ac reformandi ecclesiae*, cited in David Zacharia Flanagin, "*Extra Ecclesiam salus non est—sed quae ecclesia?*: Ecclesiology and Authority in the Later Middle Ages," in *A Companion to the Great Western Schism (1378–1417)*, ed. Rollo-Koster and Izbicki, pp. 366–67.

10. Marsilius of Padua, *Defensor Pacis*, trans. Alan Gewirth (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), p. 301 (section 5), p. 302.

11. Tierney, *Foundations of the Conciliar Theory*, pp. 96–105, 132–53.

12. Tierney, *Foundations of the Conciliar Theory*, p. 99.

13. "Christian commonwealth" is perhaps the best English rendition of the term *respublica christiana*. During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, when English writers expressed an aspiration to heal the Catholic-Protestant divide and to unite Christendom in the face of the Ottoman Empire, "Christian commonwealth" is the term they employed most frequently. See Franklin Le Van Baumer, "England, the Turk, and the Common Corps of Christendom," *American Historical Review* 50, no. 1 (October 1944): 26–48; and Baumer, "The Conception of Christendom in Renaissance England," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 6, no. 2 (April 1945): 131–56. I will use the Latin and the English interchangeably throughout this chapter.

14. "As the age of the great councils approached, one heard more frequently and with a wider reference of the Christian Commonwealth, the *res publica Christiana*. At Constance and at Basel the name was a battle cry to rally the enlightened against the divisive despotisms of Church and State. Its combination of Roman pride and Christian faith was more than a mere aspiration; it was almost a reality. In the documents of chanceries and the reasoning of lawyers, as well as in the exhortations of preachers and the dreams of scholars like Nicholas of Cusa, it stood for the common interests of the Community of Latin Christendom, interests which all men agreed were real and vital, however difficult it proved to give them practical political expression." Garrett Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy* (New York: Dover, 1988; 1st ed. 1955).

15. John N. Figgis, *Political Thought from Gerson to Grotius: 1414–1625* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1956; 1st ed. 1907), pp. 41–70.

16. Figgis, *Political Thought from Gerson to Grotius*, p. 67.

17. Colin Morris, *The Papal Monarchy: The Western Church from 1050 to 1250* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989); see also Paolo Prodi, *The Papal Prince. One Body and Two Souls: The Papal Monarchy in Early Modern Europe*, trans. Susan Haskins (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987).

18. Michael Wilks, *The Problem of Sovereignty in the Later Middle Ages: The Papal Monarchy with Augustinus Triumphus and the Publicists* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963), pp. 19–20. See also Walter Ullmann, *The Growth of Papal Government in the Middle Ages: A Study in the Ideological Relation of Clerical to Lay Power* (London: Methuen, 1955).

19. Francis Oakley, "Gerson and d'Ailly: An Admonition," *Speculum* 40 (1965): 74–83, at 82. See also Francis Oakley, "Natural Law, the Corpus Mysticum, and Consent in Conciliar Thought from John of Paris to Matthias Ugonius," *Speculum* 56 (1981): 794.

20. Walter Mignolo, in *The Darker Side of the Renaissance* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003), credits Aeneas Silvius Piccolomini with developing the notion of the *respublica christiana* as coterminous with "Europe," that is, giving it a geographical scope or boundary (p. 326).

21. Assembly of the Council of Basle, as cited in Wolf, *Juan de Segovia and the Fight for Peace*, p. 115.

22. On related lines, see James Muldoon, *Empire and Order: The Concept of Empire, 800–1800* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), p. 17, for the eight distinct conceptions of empire that circulated in medieval Europe. Likewise, see Anthony Pagden, *Lords of all the World: Ideologies of Empire in Spain, Britain and France, c. 1500-c. 1800* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995), for the plethora of meanings attached to the term "republic" in the early modern era.

23. Andrés de Escobar, cited in Alain Milhou, *Colón y su mentalidad mesiánica en el ambiente franciscanista español* (Valladolid: Casa-Museo de Colón, 1983), p. 186.

24. The "Mediterranean moment" is an idea I explore in chapter 1 and return to in chapters 5 and 6.

25. Francis Oakley, "Natural Law, the Corpus Mysticum, and Consent in Conciliar Thought from John of Paris to Matthias Ugonius," *Speculum* 56 (1981): 801.

26. Joseph Gill, *The Council of Florence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1959). See also Robert Finlay, "Crisis and Crusade in the Mediterranean: Venice, Portugal, and the Cape Route to India (1498–1509)," *Studi Veneziani* 28 (1994): 45–90.

27. Robert Finlay, "Crisis and Crusade in the Mediterranean: Venice, Portugal, and the Cape Route to India (1498–1509)," *Studi Veneziani* 28 (1994): 45–90, on the Ethiopian representatives at Basle.

28. *Unity, Heresy, and Reform*, ed. C. M. D. Crowder, document 31: Eugenius IV urges the Greeks to unite with the Latin Church (May 1439), p. 167.

29. *Unity, Heresy, and Reform*, ed. C. M. D. Crowder, document 32: *Laetentur caeli*, pp. 167–72.

30. See K. M. Setton, "Byzantium and the Italian Renaissance," *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* (Philadelphia, 1956), p. 69. See also Deno J. Geanakoplos, *Byzantine East and Latin West: Two Worlds of Christendom in Middle Ages and Renaissance* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1966), p. 107; and Wolf, *Juan de Segovia and the Fight for Peace*, p. 118, where the author describes the decree of union as "all but meaningless."

31. Cornell Fleischer, "A Mediterranean Apocalypse: Prophecies of Empire in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries," in *Speaking the End Times*, ed. Mayte Green-Mercado, special issue of the *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 61 (2018): 18–90, at 28.

32. Aeneas Silvius, *On the Origin and Authority of the Roman Empire*, in *Three Tracts on Empire: Engelbert of Admont, Aeneas Silvius Piccolomini and Juan de Torquemada*, trans. and ed. Thomas M. Izbicki and Cary J. Nederman (Sterling, VA: Thoemmes, 2000), p. 103.

33. James H. Burns, *Lordship, Kingship, and Empire: The Idea of Monarchy, 1400–1525* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1992), pp. 99–100.

34. Juan de Segovia, marginalia to his *Historia gestorum generalis synodi Basiliensis*, cited in Wolf, *Juan de Segovia and the Fight for Peace*, p. 110.

35. Margaret Meserve, *Empires of Islam in Renaissance Historical Thought* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008), p. 13: "On this view, the seventh-century rise of Islam was not the cause but rather the symptom of a far greater crisis in human history: the fall of Rome. The political and ecclesiastical fallout of that disaster had made Islam possible; now only a reunited Europe and a reformed Christendom could reverse the Islamic tide."

36. Kenneth M. Setton, *Western Hostility to Islam and Prophecies of Turkish Doom* (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1992), p. 15.

37. Mustafa Soykut, *Image of the "Turk" in Italy: A History of the "Other" in Early Modern Europe: 1453–1683* (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 2001), p. 2.

38. Real Academia de la Historia, Madrid, Colección Salazar y Castro, A-7, fol. 158, letter from Count Brotardi to unknown, Trent, February 7, 1474: "Ma ne modo ne forza humana li assecura. Dio li metta la mano sua che vedo preparata la ruina de Europa de Italia et de Christiani se Idio non confunde la potentia di questo cane." See also A-7, fol. 158, letter from Karolus Vitalis Caurell to unknown, concerning fears of a Turkish invasion in Ragusa and Venice, Sibia, October 27, 1474.

39. Real Academia de la Historia, Colección Salazar y Castro, A-7, fol. 158, Constantinople, August 20, 1476.

40. Two valuable collections that include numerous primary sources chronicling the events and aftermath of 1453 are the following: A. Pertusi, ed., *La caduta di Costantinopoli*, 2 vols. (Milan: Fondazione, 1976); and A. Pertusi, ed., *Testi inediti e poco noti sulla caduta di Costantinopoli* (Bologna: Pàtron, 1983).

41. Letter from Alfonso V to Mehmed II, September 30, 1453. The letter is held in the Archivo Municipal de Gerona, and translated and printed by S. Sobrequés Vidal, "Sobre el ideal de Cruzada de Alfonso V de Aragón," *Hispania* 12 (1952): 249–50.

42. José María Doussinague, *La política internacional de Fernando el Católico* (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1944), p. 47.

43. Real Academia de la Historia, Madrid, Colección Salazar y Castro, A-8, fol. 54, letter from the Master of the Knights of St. John of Jerusalem to Ferdinand (letter is undated, but written in a fifteenth-century hand).

44. Ferdinand wrote (August 1, 1480): "Nichil magis animo nostro insitum est quam ea aggredi studioseque decus christiani nominis conseruacionemque rei publica christianorum concernere dignoscuntur . . . Igitur uniuersos cristianorum dominates et potentatus, eos presertim qui orientalem plagam incolunt et frequentant . . ." *Documentos sobre relaciones internacionales de los Reyes Católicos*, vol. 1, ed. Antonio de la Torre (Barcelona: CSIC, 1949), p. 107. See also Ferdinand's letters of August 25, 1480 (p. 109) and February 19, 1481 (pp. 129–30), published in the same volume and also portraying the Ottoman threat to Rhodes as a threat to Christendom more broadly.

45. *Documentos sobre relaciones internacionales de los Reyes Católicos*, vol. 1, ed. Antonio de la Torre, document 43, p. 328, Ferdinand to the authorities of Cataluña, ordering them to allow for the export of grain to assist Rhodes. He describes the threat to Rhodes as a threat to "tota la christiandad, per esser insigne clau de aquella" (June 3, 1483).

46. Franz Babinger, *Mehmed the Conqueror and his Time*, trans. Ralph Manheim (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978), pp. 393, 494–95. See also Pertusi, ed., *La caduta di Costantinopoli*; and Pertusi, ed., *Testi inediti e poco noti sulla caduta di Costantinopoli*.

47. Setton, *Western Hostility to Islam and Prophecies of Turkish Doom*, p. 35.

48. Setton, *Western Hostility to Islam and Prophecies of Turkish Doom*, p. 35.

49. Ferdinand, "Instructions to Jerónimo González," February 19, 1481, in *Documentos sobre relaciones internacionales de los Reyes Católicos*, vol. 1, ed. Antonio de la Torre, p. 131.

50. Diego Rodríguez de Almela, letter of February 1481, in *Cartas* (BL Ms. Egerton 1173), ed. David Mackenzie, Exeter Hispanic Studies, XXV (University of Exeter, 1980), pp. 9–10.

51. Sixtus IV, "Redemptor noster," April 30, 1481, in José Goñi Gaztambide, *Historia de la Bula de Cruzada en España*, no. 4 (Vitoria: Editorial del Seminario de Vitoria, 1958), pp. 432–33.

52. Archivio di Stato, Milan, Visconteo Sforzesco, Potenze Estere, Cart 653, letter from Ferdinand to Duke of Milan, Barcelona, October 16, 1481: "Illiq[ue] enim recuperacione ut [. . .] a vobis scriptum est cum Regno Serenissimi Regis Ferdinandi fratris nostri amantissimi Italia liberata est addunq[ue] et nos magnam partem rei publice xpiane ad quam ex Italia se iam metus reciperat: Itaque duplice racione exultamq[ue] et omnipotenti deo publice gracias . . . : Scilicet q[ue] religio xpiana metu et quod ei Iminebat peric[o]lo liberata et q[ue] ergdem Regis statui et quieti optime consultum est."

53. *Documentos sobre relaciones internacionales de los Reyes Católicos*, vol. 1, ed. Antonio de la Torre, document 30 for the year 1482 (June 15, 1482), pp. 236–38.

54. *Documentos sobre relaciones internacionales de los Reyes Católicos*, vol. 2, ed. Antonio de la Torre, document 108 for the year 1484 (August 26, 1484), p. 100; ibid., document 42 for the year 1485 (July 16, 1485), pp. 211–14.

55. *Documentos sobre relaciones internacionales de los Reyes Católicos*, vol. 2, ed. Antonio de la Torre, document 188 for the year 1484 (December 29, 1484), p. 171, Ferdinand to King Ferrante of Naples: "Por via de Roma y del reyno nuestro de Sicilia, y ahun por otras vias, tenemos nueua que el turco prepara vna poderosa armada en las partes de la Vellona, y que se presume que seria por passar en Italia, o por venir al dicho nuestro reyno de Sicilia; y es de presumir con razon que, faziendo se dicha armada en tal parte y tan grande, no deue seyer a otro fin, saluo al que dicho hauemos. E por esto tenemos alguna admiracion que de tal nueua no tengamos cartas vuestras, assi por ser vezino y frontero de aquellas partidas, e fastaqui hauer siempre tenido vigilancia en seyer certifficados de tales cosas, como por el deudo que es entre nosotros, y el vno hauer a poner su estado por el otro." Ferdinand goes on to describe the armada he is assembling to send to defend Sicily, and that, given the order to do so, it will unite with Ferrante's armada to defend Naples as well as Sicily (p. 172).

56. *Documentos sobre relaciones internacionales de los Reyes Católicos*, vol. 2, ed. Antonio de la Torre, document 139 for the year 1488 (August 4, 1488), pp. 123–25, Ferdinand's

instructions for the fortification of Sicily against the threat of a Turkish attack; ibid., document 146 for the year 1488 (August 18, 1488), pp. 136–39, Ferdinand to don Julián Centelles, one of the presidents in the kingdom of Sicily, regarding fortifying Malta and Gozo; ibid., document 147 for the year 1488 (August 18, 1488), pp. 139–40, Ferdinand to a president of the kingdom of Sicily, concerning the Turkish threat; ibid., document 150 for the year 1488 (August 28, 1488), pp. 141–42, Ferdinand to a president of the kingdom of Sicily, giving instructions for fortifying the realm in the face of the threat of a Turkish attack.

57. Goñi Gaztambide, *Historia de la Bula de Cruzada en España*, pp. 671–76.

58. Goñi Gaztambide, *Historia de la Bula de Cruzada en España*, p. 674: "E podéis certificar a su Santidad, que negado o diferido esto, será causa que cese la prosecución de la guerra e que no proveamos a nuestro reino de Sicilia como conviene, y cuánto redundaría esto en ofensa de Dios e obprobio de la religión cristiana y en deshonor e cargo de su conciencia de su Santidad, bien lo puede considerar su Beatitud y todos los que lo sopieren e oyeren."

59. *Documentos sobre relaciones internacionales de los Reyes Católicos*, vol. 1, ed. Antonio de la Torre, document 13 for the year 1483 (January 29, 1483), p. 304, "porque de contino teneys guerra con moros."

60. Goñi Gaztambide, *Historia de la Bula de Cruzada en España*, Ferdinand to Francisco de Rojas, March 1485, p. 674.

61. For a study that explores similar questions, see Noel Malcolm, *Useful Enemies: Islam and the Ottoman Empire in Western Political Thought, 1450–1750* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019).

3. The Turk Within

1. Alonso de Cartagena, "Discurso de D. Alonso de Cartagena sobre la precedencia del Rey Católico sobre el de Inglaterra," in *Prosistas castellanos del siglo XV*, ed. Mario Penna, vol. 1. *Biblioteca de Autores Españoles*, vol. 116 (Madrid: Ediciones Atlas, 1959), pp. 205–33.

2. Cartagena, "Discurso de D. Alonso de Cartagena sobre la precedencia del Rey Católico sobre el de Inglaterra," p. 221.

3. Cartagena's argument did not differ significantly in substance from similar arguments made in other kingdoms. In France, for instance, writers represented the French monarchs as defenders of Christendom. Drawing on the crusading heritage of French monarchs such as Louis IX, medieval chroniclers in that realm depicted France as supporting the Church and the Catholic faith. This was closely linked to the notion that God had chosen France above all other kingdoms, and that the French as "a people" constituted an elect. On this topic, see J. R. Strayer, "France: The Holy Land, the Chosen People, and the Most Christian King," in *Action and Conviction in Early Modern Europe: Essays in Memory of E.H. Harbison*, ed. T. K. Rabb and J. E. Siegel (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1969), pp. 12–14.

4. Sixtus IV, "Redemptor noster," April 30, 1481, in José Goñi Gaztambide, *Historia de la Bula de Cruzada en España* (Vitoria: Publicaciones del Seminario de Vitoria, 1958), p. 432.

5. See Alan F. C. Ryder, *Alfonso the Magnanimous: king of Aragon, Naples, and Sicily, 1396–1458* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1990); Ryder, *The Kingdom of Naples under Alfonso the Magnanimous: The Making of a Modern State* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1976); David Abulafia, ed., *The French Descent into Renaissance Italy: Antecedents and Effects* (Aldershot: Variorum, 1995).

6. See the following work for the political history of these events: Steven Runciman, *The Sicilian Vespers: A History of the Mediterranean World in the Later Thirteenth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958).

7. Sometimes both ruling monarchs claimed the title of king of Sicily, while at other times the Angevin would title himself king of Naples; at times the island was known as the kingdom of Trinacria, harkening back to its Roman name. Most commonly, the mainland and island realms were known as the kingdom of Sicily *citra et ultra farum*, respectively. David Abulafia has labeled the Angevin-Aragonese conflict in the central Mediterranean "the Two Hundred Years' War." See his *The Western Mediterranean Kingdoms, 1200–1500: The Struggle for Dominion* (New York: Longman, 1997), p. xvi.

8. Ernesto Pontieri, *Per La Storia del Regno di Ferrante I d'Aragona Re di Napoli* (Naples: Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 1969), p. 594.

9. The Latin original does not survive, but the French translation that was made around 1488 describes the coronation of Charlemagne's son Pipin as "roy d'Italie" and later describes the two men as "Charles le Grant et Pippin, son filz, roys, d'Italie, en laquelle lors estoit grant partie du royaume de Cecille." From *Des Roys et Royaume de Cecille*, in Pontieri, *Per La Storia del Regno di Ferrante I d'Aragona Re di Napoli*, pp. 629, 642.

10. Leonard Baronnat, *Du droict de Charles VIII aux Roiaumes de Naples, Sicile & Aragon faict l'an 1491* (January 27, 1491), Bibliothèque Nationale de France, Paris, ms. français 5742, fol. 13v.

11. Treaty of Barcelona, Archivo General de Simancas, Estado, Francia, K-1638, fol. 28: ". . . en el recobramiento de cualquier derecho que le pertenezca en el reino de Nápoles cuando el dicho nuestro primo y los suyos quisieren aquel recobrar," cited in Luis Suárez Fernández, *Política internacional de Isabel la Católica*, vol. 3 (1489–1493) (Valladolid: Universidad de Valladolid, 1969), p. 85.

12. See Abulafia, ed., *The French Descent into Renaissance Italy*; and Silvio Biancardi, *La chimera di Carlo VIII (1492–1495)* (Novara: Interlinea, 2009).

13. For more elaboration of European anxieties about the ascendancy of the Ottoman Empire, see chapter 2.

14. This prophetic strain could be traced back to the prophecies applied to the House of Anjou following the Sicilian Vespers (1282) and subsequent Aragonese conquest of the island portion of the kingdom of the Two Sicilies.

15. Michael Fernus, *Epitoma de regno Apuliae et Siciliae* (Ex ms. codice Felini Sandei a Michaele Ferno concinnata) (Rome: Joannes Besicken et Sigismundus Mayr, 1495). Biblioteca Nacional de España, Madrid, I/2156 [10] (Micro: 21123).

16. Anne Denis, *Charles VIII et les italiens: histoire et mythe* (Genève: Droz, 1979), pp. 36, 50.

17. Donald Weinstein, *Savonarola and Florence: Prophecy and Patriotism in the Renaissance* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970); Lauro Martines, *Fire in the*

City: Savonarola and the Struggle for the Soul of Renaissance Florence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).

18. Colin Imber, "A Note on 'Christian' Preachers in the Ottoman Empire," *Journal of Ottoman Studies* 10 (1990): 59–67.

19. Didier Le Fur, *Louis XII: Un Autre César* (Paris: Perrin, 2001), p. 64. In April 1494, Pope Alexander VI issued a brief in which he praised Charles VIII for his stated profession to make war on the Turks. See Luis Suárez Fernández, *Política internacional de Isabel la Católica*, vol. 4 (Valladolid: Instituto "Isabel la Católica" de Historia Eclesiástica, 1965–1972), document 10, pp. 192–94, copy of a brief of Alexander VI to Charles VIII praising his intention to make war on the Turks, April 6, 1494, Rome. Alexander's brief discusses military logistics and expresses his belief that the Christians will need three armies (two terrestrial, one naval). Alexander proposes that Ferdinand of Aragon and Djem (Turkish: Cem, the brother of Sultan Bayezid II, and at that time captive in Italy) jointly lead the naval force.

20. Archivo General de Simancas, *Estado*, Papeles de la Correspondencia y Negociación de Nápoles (legajo 1003), document 20, letter in French written by a representative of Ferdinand and Isabella to King Charles VIII of France regarding dynastic rights to Naples (4 fols.), Madrid, December 1, 1494.

21. José María Doussinague, *La política internacional de Fernando el Católico* (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, S.A., 1944), app. 3, pp. 518–19, "Poder a Alonso de Silva," October 11, 1494, Paris, Archives Nationales: K-1638 (27–33), ms. no. 6: "... siempre hemos deseado la paz y tranquilidad de la república cristiana y la union y concordia de los príncipes cristianos."

22. Brian Catlos, *Muslims of Medieval Latin Christendom, c. 1050–1614* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp. 510–27. Catlos is presently elaborating this model more extensively in a new book, with the provisional title *The Paradoxes of Plurality: Ethno-Religious Diversity and the Mediterranean Origins of the West*, forthcoming.

23. Catlos, *Muslims of Medieval Latin Christendom*, p. 510. It is worth noting, too, that Catlos emphasizes, on p. 527, that any individual participates in each of the three modes of identity simultaneously.

24. Catlos, *Muslims of Medieval Latin Christendom*, pp. 525–26.

25. Doussinague, *La política internacional de Fernando el Católico*, app. 3, p. 519, "Poder a Alonso de Silva," October 11, 1494, Paris, Archives Nationales: K-1638 (27–33), ms. no. 6.

26. The security of Malta and Gozo had concerned Ferdinand since the mid-1480s. For similar instructions for their fortification, see chapter 2.

27. *Documentos sobre relaciones internacionales de los Reyes Católicos*, vol. 4, ed. Antonio de la Torre (Barcelona: CSIC, 1962), document 177 for the year 1494 (August 7, 1494), pp. 505–8. Malta and Gozzo were both under the purview of the viceroy of Sicily.

28. *Documentos sobre relaciones internacionales de los Reyes Católicos*, vol. 4, ed. Antonio de la Torre, document 180 for the year 1494 (August 12, 1494), p. 509.

29. *Documentos sobre relaciones internacionales de los Reyes Católicos*, vol. 4, ed. Antonio de la Torre, document 255 for the year 1494 (November 20, 1494), p. 558. See also document 256 for the year 1494 (November 20, 1494), p. 559, Ferdinand to the nobles of Majorca, on the same matters, and in language nearly identical to that used in document 255.

30. On Latin Christian thinkers' interpretation of the rapid ascendancy of the Ottoman Turks as linked to divisions as represented by the Papal Schism, see Michael A. Ryan, "Byzantium, Islam, and the Great Western Schism," in *A Companion to the Great Western Schism (1378–1417)*, ed. Joëlle Rollo-Koster and Thomas Izbicki (Leiden: Brill, 2009), pp. 197–238.

31. Catlos, *Muslims of Medieval Latin Christendom*, pp. 525–26.

32. Catlos, *Muslims of Medieval Latin Christendom*, pp. 526–27.

33. Andrés Bernáldez, *Historia de los Reyes Católicos Don Fernando y Doña Isabel*, in *Biblioteca de Autores Españoles*, vol. 70 (Madrid: M. Rivadeneyra, 1878), chap. CXXXVII, p. 682. This and later chapters of Bernáldez's chronicle give a vivid description of Charles VIII's demands of the pope in Rome: the French king apparently demanded the castle of Santangelo, as well as the papal treasury. Whether or not there is any truth to Bernáldez's assertions, his intent here is to paint a picture of the French king working against Holy Mother Church, a proclivity that Bernáldez asserts is reflective of Charles's "monstruosa é dañada intencion" (p. 683).

34. Robert Folz, *The Concept of Empire in Western Europe from the Fifth to the Fourteenth Century*, trans. Sheila Ann Ogilvie (London: Edward Arnold, 1969), p. 166. Folz describes a French prophecy that foretold a French king being hailed as king of the Greeks and then proceeding to conquer Jerusalem: "The text was not forgotten: a century later, in 1494, it was to reappear in relation to Charles VIII, whose entry into Naples was considered as a prelude to the great imperial undertaking: on his entry into the town he was acclaimed as King of France, Emperor of Constantinople and King of Jerusalem. He was a new Charlemagne, the last of the Emperors, uniting East and West—this was the picture of the King of France which formed a background to popular belief up to the end of the Middle Ages."

35. Alain Milhou, *Colón y su mentalidad mesiánica en el ambiente franciscanista español* (Valladolid: Cuadernos Colombinos, 1983), p. 338. On the symbolism deployed during Charles VIII's entry into Naples, see also David Abulafia, "La politica italiana della monarchia francese da Carlo VIII a Francesco I," in *El reino de Nápoles y la monarquía de España: Entre agregación y conquista (1485–1535)*, ed. Giuseppe Galasso and Carlos José Hernando Sánchez (Rome: Real Academia de España, 2004).

36. Milhou, *Colón y su mentalidad*, p. 332: "Las Dos Sicilias, donde se entrecruzaban las influencias bizantinas, musulmanas y normandas, eran también tierra de profecías: no olvidemos que era calabrés el famoso abad Joaquín de Fiore, quien pudo presenciar, en 1194, la conquista del reino por Enrique IV de Hohenstaufen. Tierra mítica y tierra de profecías, las Dos Sicilias representaban sobre todo piezas fundamentales en el terreno más concreto de la economía y de la política del Mediterraneao. Era por lo tanto un objetivo eminentemente deseable, que codiciaron la dinastía alemana de los Hohenstaufen, la francesa de Anjou y, más tarde, la aragonesa; veremos que todas esas casas reales se sirvieron con fines imperialistas de las profecías que hacían de la corona de Sicilia una prefiguración de las de Constantinopla y de Jerusalén."

37. Ivan Cloulas, *Charles VIII et le mirage italien* (Paris: A. Michel, 1986), p. 27.

38. David Abulafia, "La politica italiana della monarchia francese da Carlo VIII a Francesco I," p. 524.

39. Bernáldez, *Historia de los Reyes Católicos Don Fernando y Doña Isabel*, chaps. CXXXVI and CXXXVII, p. 682.

40. The small fleet was sent to aid King Ferrante II of Naples (r. 1495–1496), who at that time was in exile in Sicily. The terms of the agreement stipulated that any fortresses captured by Fernández de Córdoba were to go to Ferdinand, rather than Ferrante II. John Edwards explains that the *Gran Capitán* was instructed to remain in Sicily if it appeared France controlled all of Naples; if, however, King Ferrante controlled any fortresses, he was to hand them over to the *Gran Capitán* to be held by him on Ferdinand's behalf. On April 30, 1495, King Ferrante handed over five Calabrian fortresses, to be followed by others. For a fuller account of these events, see John Edwards, *Ferdinand and Isabella* (Harlow, UK: Pearson, 2005), p. 112. See also the anonymous chronicle of these events, written by a participant: *La conquista del reyno de Nápoles, Con todas las cosas que Gonçalo Fernandes ha fecho despues que partio de españa con toda su armada*, post-incunable, probably printed in Zaragoza by Jorge Coci, after August 10, 1504. Biblioteca Nacional, Madrid, R/29905(1).

41. Doussinague, *La política internacional*, app. 5, pp. 525–26: Traslado de las cosas pasadas con el Rey de Francia para embiar fuera del reyno (Año 1495; París, Archives Nationales, K. 1638 [27–33]).

42. Doussinague, *La política internacional*, app. 5, p. 526.

43. Simancas, Patronato Real, leg. 60, fol. 195, the bull *Ineffabilis et summi* of Alexander VI conceding to Ferdinand and Isabella the investiture of the kingdoms of Africa, in Doussinague, *La política internacional*, app. 4, pp. 521–24. In chapter 4, I examine *Ineffabilis et summi* and the doctrine on which it was based, according to which the pope may dispense lands not ruled by a Christian prince.

44. *Parlaments a les Corts Catalanes*, a cura de Ricard Albert i Joan Gassiot (1928) (1988 ed., Barcelona: Editorial Barcino). King Ferdinand's address to the *Corts* of Tortosa (December 14, 1495), p. 230.

45. *Parlaments a les Corts Catalanes*, pp. 231–32.

46. Doussinague, *La política internacional*, app. 5, p. 527.

47. Suárez Fernández, *Política internacional de Isabel la Católica*, vol. 4, document 11, pp. 195–96, brief from Alexander VI to Ferdinand and Isabella asking for assistance in recovering the castle of Ostia, April 28, 1494; ibid., document 24, pp. 221–22, second brief from Alexander VI asking Ferdinand and Isabella for assistance in recovering Ostia, September 28, 1494.

48. Suárez Fernández, *Política internacional de Isabel la Católica*, vol. 4, document 19, pp. 208–10, brief from Alexander VI to Ferdinand and Isabella, June 24, 1494; ibid., document 22, pp. 218–19, brief from Alexander VI to Ferdinand and Isabella, September 19, 1494.

49. Doussinague, *La política internacional*, app. 5, p. 527.

50. Suárez Fernández, *Política internacional de Isabel la Católica*, vol. 4, document 91, pp. 375–76, brief from Alexander VI to Ferdinand and Isabella, June 1, 1495.

51. Bernáldez, *Historia de los Reyes Católicos Don Fernando y Doña Isabel*, chap. CXXXVII, p. 682.

52. Anne Denis, *Charles VIII et les italiens: histoire et mythe* (Genève: Droz, 1979), p. 125.

53. Anonymous, *La conquista del reyno de Nápoles, Con todas las cosas que Gonçalo Fernandes ha fecho despues que partio de españa con toda su armada.*

54. Late in his reign, Ferdinand wrote about his half-brother Charles of Viana's rebellion against their father, John II of Aragon, as having led to the "loss" of Naples,

clearly indicating that he believed a "recovery" of Naples might have taken place, thereby deposing King Ferrante I of Naples and restoring the kingdom to the Crown of Aragon. See Ferdinand's personal correspondence on this matter in Doussinague, *El Testamento Político de Fernando el Católico* (Madrid: CSIC, 1950) (*Biblioteca Reyes Católicos* series), document 7, letter from Ferdinand to his secretary Pedro de Quintana (who was at that time at the French court), January 1, 1514, Madrid. Archivo General de Simancas, Estado, Francia, K, I.482, ms. 38.

55. Terrateig, *Política en Italia del Rey Católico (1507–1516), Correspondencia inédita con el embajador Vich*, vol. 2 (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1963), document 39, pp. 116–22, Ferdinand to Jerónimo de Vich, May 13, 1510.

56. *Documentos sobre relaciones internacionales de los Reyes Católicos*, vol. 1, ed. Antonio de la Torre, documents 15–30 for the year 1479, pp. 14–22; and documents 36–37, 39 for the year 1481, pp. 144–48. These documents pertain to negotiations for attaining peace with France but do not use the vocabulary of the *respublica christiana*.

57. Cristóbal de Santesteban (1440?–1520), *Tratado de la succesión de los reynos de Jerusalén y de Nápoles y de Cecilia y de las provincias de Pulla y Calabria* (Zaragoza: Jorge Coci, 1503). Biblioteca Nacional de España, Madrid, post-incunable: R/29905(2). See the introduction for full biographical details on Santesteban.

58. Santesteban, *Tratado de la succesión*, chap. 11.

59. Santesteban, *Tratado de la succesión*, table of contents and dedication.

60. Santesteban, *Tratado de la succesión*, chap. 11.

61. Santesteban, *Tratado de la succesión*, chap. 11.

62. Le Fur, *Louis XII: Un Autre César*, p. 64.

63. Suárez Fernández, *Política internacional de Isabel la Católica*, vol. 4, document 121, pp. 456–61, at pp. 456–57, bull of Alexander VI imposing censures on Charles VIII and his allies, December 17, 1495: ". . . grandia ex ipsis perfidies turcis nobis et universe Reipublice christiane imminentia pericula que christianorum viribus ex bellis inter eos ingentibus debilitates proculdubio subsequerentur."

64. The bull is held at the Archivo General de Simancas, Patronato Real, leg. 27, fol. 45. It is printed in Suárez Fernández, *Política internacional de Isabel la Católica*, vol. 4, document 166, pp. 589–90, transcription of a bull of Alexander VI granting plenary indulgences to those who should die in the war of Naples, July 3, 1496. Even in 1494, Alexander VI was trepidatious concerning Charles VIII of France's intentions. Most likely fearing that Charles's crusading professions were a subterfuge for making himself master of Italy, the pope wrote to Ferdinand and Isabella while the French invasion was still in the planning phases, urging the Spanish monarchs to exhort Charles VIII to leave aside his Neapolitan pretensions and to dedicate himself to making war on the Turks. See Suárez Fernández, *Política internacional de Isabel la Católica*, vol. 4, document 8, pp. 189–90, brief of Alexander VI to Ferdinand and Isabella, March 20, 1494.

65. Anonymous, *La conquista del reyno de Nápoles*, fol. Ci.

66. *Documentos sobre relaciones internacionales de los Reyes Católicos*, vol. 3, ed. Antonio de la Torre, document 49 for the year 1491 (May 4, 1491), pp. 400–1, Ferdinand grants commendations to a number of people of the "nacionis sueuiorum" who had fought in the war of Granada, so that they might travel to Santiago.

67. *Documentos sobre relaciones internacionales de los Reyes Católicos*, vol. 3, ed. Antonio de la Torre, document 49 for the year 1491 (May 4, 1491), pp. 400–1, "propriam patriam deserentes, pugnare contra infideles mauros regni Granate venerint."

68. *Documentos sobre relaciones internacionales de los Reyes Católicos*, vol. 6, ed. Antonio de la Torre, document 26 for the year 1504, p. 392, King Ferdinand grants a safe-conduct to Germans who had fought in the war of Naples, in order to make a pilgrimage to Santiago de Compostela (November 3, 1504).

69. Erin Kathleen Rowe, *Saint and Nation: Santiago, Teresa of Avila, and Plural Identities in Early Modern Spain* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2011).

70. Anonymous, *La conquista del reyno de Nápoles. Con todas las cosas que Gonçalo Fernandes ha fecho despues que partio de españa con toda su armada*, fol. 10r.

71. Letter from Gerónimo Yllan, Cardinal Cisneros's secretary, describing the conquest of Orán, May 25, 1509. *Cartas del Cardenal Don Francisco Jiménez de Cisneros: Dirigidas Á Don Diego López de Ayala*, ed. Pascual Gayangos and Vicente de la Fuente (Madrid: Imprenta del Colegio de Sordo-Mudos y de Ciegos, 1867), letter 17, p. 46.

72. Gomes Eanes de Zurara, *The Chronicle of the Discovery and Conquest of Guinea* (London: Hakluyt Society, 1896; reprint: Cambridge University Press, 2010), vol. 1, pp. 47, 66.

73. Anonymous, *La conquista del reyno de Nápoles*, fol. Cii.

74. I am borrowing the term "semi-Turks" from an anonymous crusading proposal composed in Majorca in 1543. See *Discurso militar en que se persuade y ordena la guerra contra los Turcos*, ed. Miguel Ángel de Bunes Ibarra and Beatriz Alonso Acero (Madrid: Biblioteca de Historia Espuela, 2004), p. 48. Here the author describes the French as "semiturcos y rebeldes." This, of course, is after the signing of the "impious alliance" between Francis I of France and Süleyman "the Magnificent." I employ the term here because, even prior to that alliance, Spain and the papacy articulated political claims against the French in a manner that represents the French as "the Turk within."

75. Pablo Fernández Albaladejo, *Fragmentos de monarquía* (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1992), p. 41.

76. Peter Martyr, *Epistolario de Pedro Mártir de Angleria*, trans. J. López de Toro, in *Documentos inéditos para la historia de España* (Madrid: Imprenta Góngora, 1953–57), vol. 10, document 449, pp. 344–45, letter from Martyr to Iñigo López de Mendoza, January 31, 1511, Seville.

77. Doussinague, *La política internacional de Fernando el Católico*, pp. 655–58, at 656, Ferdinand's instructions to Vich on how to orchestrate a universal Christian Peace (March 12, 1511): ". . . si esto no se faze y se suelta a la rienda la ambicion de franceses seria cosa muy peligrosa y esta claro que trabaiaran de destruyr toda la cristiandad."

78. Tarsicio de Azcona, *Las bulas del papa Julio II como justificación de la conquista de Navarra en 1512* (Pamplona: Gobierno de Navarra, 2013), pp. 28, 45. The *Conciliabulum* of Pisa was called on May 16, 1511, to be convened on September 21, 1511.

79. The conciliarists at Constance had issued a bull, *Frequens*, stipulating the frequency with which future popes would be obligated to summon Church councils. See Francis Oakley, *The Conciliarist Tradition: Constitutionalism in the Catholic Church, 1300–1870* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); see also Christopher M. Bellito, "The Reform Context of the Great Western Schism," in *A Companion to the Great Western Schism (1378–1417)*, ed. Joëlle Rollo-Koster and Thomas Izbicki (Leiden: Brill, 2009), pp. 303–32.

80. Jennifer Britnell, "The Anti-papalism of Jean Lemaire de Belges' *Traité de la difference des Schismes et des Conciles*," *Sixteenth Century Journal* 24, no. 4 (Winter 1993): 783–800. Britnell notes that Robert Gaguin (in a text first published in 1495) argued that the General Council is superior to the Pope. In the context of the *Conciliabulum* of Pisa, the French representatives claimed to act on behalf of the Church, to work toward the reform of the Church when Pope Julius II, they claimed, did not (p. 787). In the same article, Britnell, notes that Jean Lemaire de Belges, *Traicté des differences*, includes three shorter texts accompanying it, two of which have passages indicating that the Sophy of Persia and the Sultan of Egypt might be favorable to an alliance with Christian princes against the Ottomans, the argument being that they would be valuable allies, whereas the pope is a hindrance to the ideal of crusade against the Turks (p. 784).

81. Terrateig, *Política en Italia del Rey Católico (1507–1516)*, vol. 2, p. 109, letter from Ferdinand to Vich, March 18, 1510.

82. Terrateig, *Política en Italia del Rey Católico (1507–1516)*, vol. 2, document 39, pp. 116–22, letter from Ferdinand to Vich, May 13, 1510; see especially p. 116.

83. Doussinague, *La política internacional*, pp. 616–17, Ferdinand to Ramón de Cardona, May 1510. Ferdinand recounted that attempts at peace with France had failed and that the French king "tira a ser monarca."

84. Doussinague, *La política internacional*, p. 655, letter from Ferdinand to Jerónimo de Vich, March 12, 1511.

85. R. J. Knecht, *Renaissance Warrior and Patron: The Reign of Francis I* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 92.

86. Doussinague, *La política internacional*, pp. 661–63, letter from Ferdinand to Jerónimo de Cabanillas, June 1511. Emphasizing the unity of Christendom and the dangers of schism, Ferdinand employs the term "todo el cuerpo de la xpiandad" (p. 661). Ferdinand writes that he supports the reform of the Church, but only if done in the proper way, not in a way that leads to division and schism: "porque de dexar la via derecha y de semeiante diuision de la yglesia siempre sale scisma, que es la mayor pestilencia y aduersidad que puede hauer en la xpiandad" (p. 661).

87. Martyr, *Epistolario de Pedro Mártir de Anglería*, vol. 10, document 462, pp. 368–69, Peter Martyr to Count Trivulzio, August 23, 1511.

88. José María Doussinague, *Fernando el Católico y el cisma de Pisa* (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1946), pp. 477–85, Parecer del Licenciado Illescas, August 28, 1511: "Por cosa çierta se sabe que la gente de los turcos se espanta e son muy aterrezidos cada vez que oyen y saben que la yglesia vniversal esta ayuntada çelebrando conçilio general" (p. 481).

89. Doussinague, *Fernando el Católico y el cisma de Pisa*, p. 503, Letter from Julius II to Ferdinand, October 18, 1511: "Porque si los príncipes cristianos con las fuerzas reunidas en un solo mando atacasen a los turcos y a los sofianos que combaten entre sí o a los hijos de Bayaceto, tirano de los turcos, que luchan por la herencia paterna, fácilmente podrían arrojarlos de Europa y reconquistar la tierra santa de Jerusalén."

90. Doussinague, *Fernando el Católico y el cisma de Pisa*, p. 478, Parecer del Licenciado Illescas, August 28, 1511.

91. Doussinague, *Fernando el Católico y el cisma de Pisa*, pp. 508–12, Sermon of Villaquirán, bishop of Oviedo, here at p. 508; pp. 523–25, *Parecer* of Don Sancho de Acebes, bishop of Astorga, December 31, 1511, here at p. 524.

92. Doussinague, *Fernando el Católico y el cisma de Pisa*, pp. 538–43, Ferdinand's Instructions to Fulano and Fulano, his ambassadors at the Fifth Lateran Council, beginning of 1512, here at p. 543.

93. Doussinague, *Fernando el Católico y el cisma de Pisa*, pp. 508–12, Sermon of Villaquirán, bishop of Oviedo, late 1511 (probably November): "moued aquellos grandes exercitos que teniades contra infieles aparejados o boluetlos contra los falsos fieles que tanto son a la christiandad peores enemigos cuanto estan mas en su seno metidos." (p. 511)

94. Doussinague, *Fernando el Católico y el cisma de Pisa*, pp. 491–98, Holy League alliance, October 4, 1511.

95. Real Academia de la Historia, Colección Salazar y Castro, no. 736, letter to Julius II from his nuncio in Venice, describing the Battle of Ravenna, April 19, 1512, Venice, in Terrateig, ed., *Política en Italia del Rey Católico (1507–1516)*, document 74, pp. 193–94.

96. Margaret Meserve, *Empires of Islam in Renaissance Historical Thought* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008).

97. Azcona, *Las bulas del papa Julio II*, p. 72, for Ferdinand's letters to Jerónimo de Vich, sent June 8 and 15 of 1512.

98. Julius II, *Etsi ii*, July 21, 1512, in Azcona, *Las bulas del papa Julio II*, p. 60.

99. Julius II, *Pastor ille*, July 21, 1512, in Azcona, *Las bulas del papa Julio II*, pp. 75–83.

100. Julius II, *Exigit Contumacium*, February 18, 1513, in Azcona, *Las bulas del papa Julius II*, pp. 106–9.

101. Norman Housley, "Crusades Against Christians: Their Origins and Early Development, c. 1000–1216," in *Crusade and Settlement*, ed. Peter W. Edbury (Cardiff: University College Cardiff Press, 1985), pp. 17–36.

102. Joseph R. Strayer, *The Albigensian Crusades* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1992).

103. Diego Rodríguez de Almela, *Cartas* (BL Ms. Egerton 1173), ed. David Mackenzie, Exeter Hispanic Studies, XXV (University of Exeter, 1980), pp. 26, 30–31. Rodríguez de Almela based his argument on the precedent of Gothic rule in those areas, as well as on the precedent of Asturian rule, the latter an extraordinarily far-fetched claim.

104. Real Academia de Historia, Salazar y Castro, A-13, fol. 14, letter from Pere Miquel Carbonell to Ferdinand the Catholic, Barcelona, March 27, 1509.

105. Real Academia de Historia, Salazar y Castro, A-13, fol. 15, autograph letter from Alonso de Aragon, archbishop of Zaragoza and son of King Ferdinand, to Miguel Pérez de Almazán, Zaragoza, March 31, 1509. Alonso argued that, in the wake of what had happened at Sangüesa, Ferdinand held unfettered rights to conquer Navarre by arms.

106. Yuen-Gen Liang, *Family and Empire: The Fernández de Córdoba and the Spanish Realm* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011), p. 115.

107. Juan López de Palacios Rubios, *De iusticia et iure obtentionis ac retentionis regni Nauarre, necnon et de ipsius terrae situ et antiquitate* (Burgos: Fadrique de Basilea, ca. 1515–1517). Biblioteca Nacional, Madrid, R/31345. There is no modern edition of this text.

108. Palacios Rubios, *De iustitia et iure*, bk. 2, section 2.

109. Palacios Rubios, *De iusticia et iure*, bk. 2, fol. 1r: "Omnes enim christiani vnum corpus mysticum constituunt."

110. Palacios Rubios, *De iusticia et iure*, bk. 2, fol. 1v.

111. Palacios Rubios, *De iusticia et iure*, bk. 2: Christ gave Peter the keys (and all jurisdiction) and this was passed on to the popes. This results in universal jurisdiction for the popes: "nam cum habeat potestatem plenam in omni terra: et in omne˜ homine˜ eam habet: quia deus sibi omne˜ creatura˜ subiecti: et consequenter p̄ot papa infideles iudicare. Ita notanter dicit petrus de palude.4.di.4.q.4.prope finem."

112. Palacios Rubios, *De iusticia et iure*, bk. 2, section 7. See also the following passage in bk. 5, section 1: ". . . cum papa sit suppremum princeps super omnes reges et principes / possitque illos increpare: corrigere. castigare: et si opus fuerit / deponere."

113. Palacios Rubios, *De iusticia et iure*, bk. 3: "fautores enim ad herentes & sequaces schismaticorum: schismatici sunt & vt tales merito puniendi: vt dicit textus in.c.vno de schismaticis li.6. similiter sunt lese maiestatis rei."

114. Terrateig, *Política en Italia del Rey Católico (1507–1516)*, vol. 2, p. 255, letter from Ferdinand to Vich, September 21, 1513.

115. Doussinague, *Testamento político*, p. 235, letter from Ferdinand to his ambassador in Flanders, January 22, 1514.

116. Doussinague, *El Testamento político*, p. 352, letter from Ferdinand to his ambassador in London, August-September, 1514. Ferdinand portrays the French king as a threat to Christendom, stating that Louis XII desired to be lord of the world (*señor del mundo*). See also Doussinague, *El Testamento político*, p. 507, letter from Ferdinand to Cardinal Remolins, October 1515. Ferdinand wrote that the king of France aimed to become lord of the whole of the Church, spiritual and temporal.

117. Palacios Rubios, *De iusticia et iure*, bk. 4, section 1: "Unde rex Francorum huius schismatis autor cardinales etiam schismatici/ qui contra ecclesiam et Romanum pontificem conspirarunt: huius criminis indubitanter rei sunt: vt.l.I.ff.ad legem iuliam maiestatis.et.l.quisquis.C.eodem. Rex autem et regina nauarre in hoc crimen similiter inciderunt."

118. Palacios Rubios, *De iusticia et iure*, bk. 4, section 3, fol. 32r: "potest si opus fuerit ecclesia bellum iustum contra eos mouere." Such war is actually defensive, in line with natural law, argues Palacios Rubios (fol. 32v): "Justissime ergo ecclesia insurgit contra schismaticos & alios eius iura & bona occupantes ac perturbantes: vt eosdem a suis insolentiis prauisque actibus et moribus compescat. . . . Immo si recte consideremus: ista dicetur defensio que jure naturali permittitur."

119. Palacios Rubios, *De iusticia et iure*, bk. 4, section 3, fol. 34r: "Potest enim papa ex causa ardua jurisditionem in temporalibus quam a deo habuit vel suscepti in habitu: deducere ad actum contra quoscunque/ maxime contra schismaticos: vt patet ex iam dictis." And in bk. 4, section 4, fol. 34r: "Et non tantum poterit papa bellum indicere contra schismaticos et rebelles ecclesie: verum etiam euntibus ad bellum potest indulgentiam concedere eosque cruce signare: vt Julius papa in casu de quo agimus fecit."

120. Palacios Rubios, *De iusticia et iure*, bk. 4, section 5, fol. 36v: "Quinimmo aliqui audent dicere qd inorientes in tali bello iusto: si id faciunt principaliter propter deum & pro defensione ecclesie martyres dicuntur."

121. Anonymous, "Relación de los sucesos de las armas marítimas de España en los años de 1510 y 1511," in *CODOIN*, vol. 25, pp. 479–582, at p. 567: "A esta sazon se sonó que el Rey de Francia habia inviado á Bolonia quinientas lanzas gruesas, de los cual toda la gente hubo mucho pesar, porque mas quisieran ir en Berbería que no en Bolonia, contra cristianos."

122. Palacios Rubios, *De iusticia et iure*, bk. 4, section 5, fols. 37r–v.

123. Palacios Rubios, *De iusticia et iure*, bk. 5: "Itaque iuste fuerunt regno suo priuati ex multis causis."

124. Palacios Rubios, *De iustitia et iure*, bk. 5, section 1.

125. Palacios Rubios, *De iustitia et iure*, bk. 5, section 2.

126. Palacios Rubios, *De iustitia et iure*, bk. 5, section 3: ". . . quod ecclesia licite potest indicere bellum contra sarracenos tenentes & occupantes hierusalem (que terra sancta dicitur) et contra omnes alios infideles inter medios impedientes vel non permittentes christianos ire vel transire ad illam sanctam expeditionem: vnde & contra hos dicit fore iustem bellum. Quod est valde notandum et ad propositum nostrum satis accomodatum: presertim cum vltra resistentiam & impedimentum quod reges ipsi prestabant: erant etiam schismaticorum fautores & inimici ecclesia & per consequens sicut bellum erat iustum contra schismaticos: sic et contra eorum fautores & complices."

127. Palacios Rubios, *De iusticia et iure*, bk. 6, section 5, fol. 59v.

128. Peter Martyr, cited in Miguel Ángel Ladero Quesada, "Ideas e Imágenes Sobre España en la Edad Media," in *Sobre la Realidad de España*, ed. Antonio Rodríguez de las Heras et al. (Madrid: Imprenta Nacional del Boletín Oficial del Estado, 1994), pp. 46–47.

129. Doussinague, *Fernando el Católico y el cisma de Pisa*, pp. 606–08, Ferdinand's Instructions to Don Ramón de Cardona and Jerónimo de Vich, April 6, 1513, here at p. 607.

130. Doussinague, *Fernando el Católico y el cisma de Pisa*, p. 620, Leo X to Ferdinand, confirming concessions from previous popes, May 24, 1513.

131. Simancas, Patronato Real, leg. 41, f. 30. Bull of investiture of Naples in favor of Fernando V, July 7, 1510, in Doussinague, *La política internacional*, app. 48, pp. 620–35, at p. 22. The depiction of Ferdinand as guardian of Christendom against an implacable Muslim foe found artistic expression in Italy. See Carlos José Hernando Sánchez, "Estrategia cruzada y guerra moderna: la conquista de Nápoles en la política italiana de los Reyes Católicos," in *Los Reyes Católicos y la Monarquía de España* (Madrid: Ministerio de Cultura; Valencia: Generalitat Valenciana, Conselleria de Cultura, Educació i Esport; Sociedad Estatal de Conmemoraciones Culturales; Museu de Belles Arts de València, 2004), pp. 287–302. Hernando Sánchez examines how, at the Vatican Palace in the Incendio del Borgo, the *taller de Rafael* created a heroic allegory depicting Ferdinand as "Ferdinandus Rex Catholicus, Christiani Imperii Propagator" (pp. 287–88). Hernando Sánchez also points to Neapolitan portrayals of Ferdinand along similar lines: "Los ideales cruzados se reflejaron en la obra de otros autores napolitanos como Antonio de Ferrariis, *il Galateo* que, frente a las críticas vertidas en 1504 en su epístola *De educatione* contra los invasores extranjeros y su inferioridad cultural respecto a los italianos, en 1509 dedicó otro opúsculo en forma epistolar, *Ad Catholicum Ferdinandum*, donde exhortaba al rey español a que guiara la guerra contra el turco" (p. 288).

132. David Nirenberg, "Was There Race Before Modernity: The Example of 'Jewish' Blood in Late Medieval Spain," in *The Origins of Racism in the West*, edited by Miriam Eliav-Feldon, Benjamin Isaac, and Joseph Ziegler (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 237.

4. The African Horizon

1. Juan López de Palacios Rubios, *De las Islas del mar Océano / De insulis oceanis*, ed. Silvio Zavala and Agustín Millares Carlo (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1954), pp. 65–66.

2. Palacios Rubios, *De insulis*, pp. 66–67. Throughout his exegesis of the prophecy, Palacios Rubios draws on sources such as Genesis 49:9 and 1 Kings 16:11 to demonstrate the prophecy's applicability to Ferdinand. The use of the epithet "lion" is significant and could be linked to notions of warfare against a Muslim foe. On this, see Eulàlia Duran i Joan Requesens, *Profecia i poder al Renaixement* (Valencia: Eliseu Climent, 1997). Herein the authors include portions of a text by Alonso de Jaén, *Espejo del Mundo*, in which Jaén refers to a prophecy that a being half-eagle and half-lion would expel the Muslims from Granada and Valencia (pp. 204–6).

3. Palacios Rubios, *De insulis*, p. 68.

4. These events are addressed in greater detail in the latter portion of chapter 3.

5. David Abulafia, *The Discovery of Mankind: Atlantic Encounters in the Age of Columbus* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008), pp. 98–101.

6. Peter Martyr, *Legatio Babylonica* (ed. Alcalá, 1516), published in *Opera* (Graz: Akademische Druck-U. Verlagsanstalt, 1966, facsimile of 1516 ed.); for a modern edition with critical apparatus, see Pedro Mártir, *Una embajada española al Egipto de principios del siglo XVI: la* Legatio Babilonica *de Pedro Mártir de Anglería*, ed. Raúl Álvarez-Moreno (Madrid: Instituto Egipcio de Estudios Islámicos, 2013).

7. Peter Martyr, *Epistolario de Pedro Mártir de Anglería*, trans. J. López de Toro, in *Documentos inéditos para la historia de España*, vol. 10 (Madrid: Imprenta Góngora, 1953–57), document 442, pp. 325–27, Peter Martyr to Iñigo López de Mendoza, August 13, 1510.

8. Peter Martyr, *Epistolario de Pedro Mártir de Anglería*, vol. 10, document 449, pp. 344–45, Peter Martyr to Iñigo López de Mendoza, January 31, 1511.

9. Andrew Devereux, "North Africa in Early Modern Spanish Political Thought," *Journal of Spanish Cultural Studies* 12, no. 3 (September 2011): 275–91, special issue, *A Forgotten Empire: The Spanish-North African Borderlands*, edited by Barbara Fuchs and Yuen-Gen Liang. Here I cite a series of writings that were published in Spain in the wake of various African conquests, including Cristóbal de Santesteban, who wrote about the conquest of Melilla (1497) in a work published in 1503; Gonzalo de Ayora, who wrote about the conquest of Mazalquivir (1505); and Juan de Cazalla who participated in and chronicled the conquest of Orán (1509).

10. José García Oro, *El Cardenal Cisneros: Vida y empresas*, vol. 2 (Madrid: Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, 1992), pp. 537–38. See also Beatriz Alonso Acero, *Cisneros y la conquista española del norte de África: cruzada, política y arte de la guerra* (Madrid: Ministerio de Defensa, 2005).

11. See J. N. Hillgarth, *The Problem of a Catalan Mediterranean Empire 1229–1327*, English Historical Review, supplement 8 (Longman, 1975); Charles Emmanuel Dufourcq, *L'Espagne catalane et le Maghreb aux XIIIe et XIVe siècles: de la bataille de Las Navas de Tolosa (1212) à l'avènement du sultan mérinide Abou-l-Hazzan (1331)* (Paris: Presses universitaire de France, 1966).

12. For a fuller elucidation of what I mean by this "Mediterranean moment," see the introduction.

13. Cornell Fleischer, "A Mediterranean Apocalypse: Prophecies of Empire in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries," in *Speaking the End Times*, ed. Mayte Green-Mercado, a special issue of the *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 61 (2018): 18–90.

14. Peter Martyr, *Epistolario de Pedro Mártir de Anglería*, vol. 10, document 435, p. 314, Peter Martyr to Iñigo López de Mendoza, March 17, 1510.

15. Alonso Acero, *Cisneros y la conquista española del norte de África*. See also Marcel Bataillon, *Erasme et l'Espagne* (Paris: E. Droz, 1937), where Bataillon points to Cisneros's understanding of a conquest of the Maghrib as leading to a Christian recovery of Jerusalem.

16. On this point, I respectfully disagree with Fernand Braudel, who interpreted the Spanish conquest of Orán as Cisneros' crusade, carried out "malgré les intrigues de la cour, malgré les complots des conseillers que N. Blum appelle joliment les «anticoloniaux», malgré la mauvaise volonté evidente de Ferdinand le Catholique . . . Ferdinand le Catholique ne devait que momentanément se rallier à la politique de conquêtes africaines et son ralliement ne fut ni profond, ni définitif." Fernand Braudel, "Les espagnols et l'Afrique du nord de 1492 à 1577," in *Autour de la Méditerranée* (Paris: Éditions de Fallois, 1996), pp. 31–89, at p. 39 and at p. 52. Reprint of Braudel's article of the same title first published in the *Revue Africaine* LXIX (1928): 184–233, 351–428. I believe that in light of documentation that has been published or discovered since Braudel wrote this article (documentation cited later in this chapter), this interpretation of Ferdinand as lacking enthusiasm for a conquest of the Maghrib is no longer sustainable.

17. Palacios Rubios, *De insulis*, pp. 64–65.

18. Eloy Bullón y Fernández, *Un colaborador de los Reyes Católicos: El doctor Palacios Rubios y sus obras* (Madrid: Ramona Velasco, 1927).

19. Yves Bonnaz, ed., *Chroniques Asturiennes* (Paris: Éditions du CNRS, 1987).

20. The thirteenth-century Castilian churchman and chronicler Rodrigo Ximénez de Rada described Visigothic Hispania as comprising six dioceces: Tarraconensis, Cartaginensis, Baetica, Lusitania, Gallaecia, and Tingitana, the last of which lay across the Strait of Gibraltar, centered on the city of Tangiers ". . . et in Africa etiam una prouincia decem ciuitatum, que Tingitania dicebatur, ad Gothorum dominium pertinebant." Roderici Ximenii de Rada, *Historia de Rebus Hispanie sive Historia Gothica*, bk. 3, ed. Juan Fernández Valverde (Turnholt: Brepols, 1987), chap. 21, p. 105. Nor was this understanding of Visigothic Hispania confined to the Iberian Peninsula. The fifteenth-century French polymath Pierre d'Ailly also located Tingitana as part of Spain: "Tiene seis provincias: Tarraconense, Cartaginense, Lusitania, Galicia, Betica y la Tingitana al otro lado del estrecho en la region de Africa." Pierre d'Ailly, *Ymago Mundi y otros opusculos*, ed. Antonio Ramirez de Verger (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1992), p. 83.

21. Alonso Acero, *Cisneros y la conquista española del norte de África*, p. 28. The wording of the agreement suggests that the Aragonese claim extends eastward as far as Bougie or Tunis: "Fo avengut et especificat entre los dits reys que la conquest de Berberia pertanyes als dits reys en aquesta manera. Que del riu de Melechuya enves Cepta, et daquela part ay tant con es, es de conquest de Castela. E del dit riu reves Bugia et Tuniz aytant con es, es del Rey d'Aragó" (p. 28). On medieval Aragonese and Castilian pretensions in Africa, see also Antonio de la Torre, "La Política de los Reyes Católicos en Africa: Antecedentes y Orientaciones," in *Curso de Conferencias sobre la Política Africana*

de los Reyes Católicos, vol. 2 (Madrid: CSIC Instituto de Estudios Africanos, 1951), pp. 151–72.

22. "King Edward based his request on several grounds, not simply on the theory that the Canarians, being infidels, had no right to rule themselves. In the first place, he argued, they lacked even the rudiments of social organization, lacking even the simplest laws. In addition, they lacked trade, literature and any knowledge of metal working. The clear implication here is that conquest of these people could be justified on cultural grounds alone, that is, they would benefit greatly from European domination because it would raise their cultural level, bringing them from a near-animal way of life to one that is truly human." James Muldoon, "A Fifteenth-Century Application of the Canonistic Theory of the Just War," *Monumenta Iuris Canonici* Series C: Subsidia, vol. 5, *Proceedings of the Fourth International Congress of Medieval Canon Law* (Toronto, August 21–25, 1972), ed. Stephan Kuttner (Città del Vaticano: Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, 1976), p. 470.

23. "Primum fundamentum facti est quod ultra alias prouincias inclusis in Hispania, pertinet ad eam in regione Africae Tingitania." Alonso de Cartagena, *Allegationes super conquesta Insularum Canariae contra portugalenses*, in "Diplomacia y Humanismo en el Siglo XV," preparada por Tomás González Rolán, Fremiot Hernández González, and Pilar Saquero Suárez-Somonte (Madrid: UNED, 1994), p. 84. See also note 20 above.

24. While late antique writers, such as Isidore of Seville, were aware of the existence of the "Fortunate Isles," and the Berber dynasties of the Almoravids and Almohads did mount a couple of limited attempts at conquering the islands, the late medieval islanders had, for all intents and purposes, been isolated for centuries. On the Canary Islands, see David Abulafia, "Neolithic Meets Medieval: First Encounters in the Canary Islands," in *Medieval Frontiers: Concepts and Practices*, ed. D. Abulafia and Nora Berend (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2002); David Abulafia, *The Discovery of Mankind: Atlantic Encounters in the Age of Columbus* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008); Felipe Fernández Armesto, *The Canary Islands After the Conquest: The Making of a Colonial Society in the Early Sixteenth Century* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982).

25. Alfred Crosby, *Ecological Imperialism: The Biological Expansion of Europe, 900–1900*, 2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004). See chapter 4, "The Fortunate Isles," pp. 70–103, especially pp. 80–100, for the impact of "virgin soil epidemics" on the Canary Islanders.

26. See note 22 above. See also Joseph F. O'Callaghan, "Castile, Portugal, and the Canary Islands: Claims and Counterclaims, 1344–1479," *Viator* 24 (1992): 287–309, especially 295.

27. "Cum ergo istae insulae alludant Tingitaniae et sunt prope eam, recte possunt dici insulae et pars Tingitaniae, sicut Sicilia pars Italiae est et in Italie computatur, quia modico freto ab ea disiungitur; possumus etiam eas uocare Tingitaniam, quia insulae quae prope Italiam sunt, Italia dicuntur . . . et sic istae insulae sunt de Tingitania, ut pars Tingitaniae; cum autem Tingitania sit prouincia pertinens ad Hispaniam, ergo et istae insulae sunt pars eius." Cartagena, *Allegationes*, pp. 94–96.

28. Cartagena, *Allegationes*, p. 84. This is an assertion Cartagena made more fully in another discourse he presented at Basle (in September 1434), arguing for the precedence of the Castilian king over his English counterpart, in which Cartagena claimed for the Castilian king the six ancient provinces of Roman Hispania, including one in

Africa: ". . . en España hay seis provincias, conviene a saber: la de Tarragona, la de Cartajena, Lusitania, Gallisia, Bética [e] la pasada del mar, en el regno de África." Alonso de Cartagena, "Discurso sobre la Precedencia del rey Católico sobre el de Inglaterra," *Prosistas castellanos del siglo XV*, vol. 1, *Biblioteca de Autores Españoles*, vol. 116 (Madrid: Ediciones Atlas, 1959), p. 218.

29. Cartagena, *Allegationes*, p. 102. Referring to the pre-711 Visigothic kings, Cartagena wrote, "et post illum continuati sunt reges per rectam lineam descendentes usque ad dominum nostrum regem," Cartagena, *Allegationes*, p. 100.

30. "Concluditur ergo quod ius totius monarchiae Hispaniae remansit in Pelagio rege, tamquam in successore uniuersali qui idem princeps et eadem persona reputari debuit cum praedecessoribus suis, ut in Auctentico, *de iureiurando a morientibus praestito*, §I, collatione V; et sic ad eum pertinebant Tingitania, id est Benamarinum, et insulae eius quae sunt Canariae, sicut Toletum uel Corduba quae tunc de facto ei non oboedierunt, quia quantum ad successionem uniuersalem attinet, nihil refert, an aprehendat bona corporalia pertinentia ad successionem, quia ita habet successor totum ius integre, licet de bonis corporalibus modicum uel nihil habeat, sicut si haberet omnia. . . ." Cartagena, *Allegationes*, pp. 130–32.

31. "Nomen vero Hispaniæ re ipsa & veritate, ac debito universalis successionis titulo, sed & omnium nationum ore & nominatione in ea parte Hispaniæ mansit, quæ hodie subiicitur regi Castellæ, ea potissimum inter cæteras ratione, quia reges Castellæ à quibus ipsi descendunt, monarchiam Hispaniarum (ut dictum est) magnis temporibus in solidum nacti sunt." Rodrigo Sánchez de Arévalo, *Compendiosa historia Hispanica* (Rome: Ulrich Hahn, 1470), part 1, chap. 17, Biblioteca Nacional, Madrid: I/1167.

32. "Licet enim (ut præmisimus) Sarraceni per quingentos fere annos quinq; provincias Hispaniæ ex sex prædictis invaserunt, & sic potentia facti diminuta est: sed tamen ius monarchiæ & universalis principatus & potestas iuris non potuit hostium invasione tolli. . . ." Sánchez de Arévalo, *Compendiosa historia Hispanica*, part 1, chap. 17.

33. Ernst H. Kantorowicz, *The King's Two Bodies: A Study in Medieval Political Theology* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957).

34. "fere ad modum siluestrium animalium," Cartagena, *Allegationes*, p. 94.

35. Apparently Cartagena's uncle, Alvar García de Santa María, in his *Crónica de Juan II de Castilla* (1417), wrote that the Canaries had been settled by Iberian Muslims who had sailed there from the peninsula in the days of al-Mansur (i.e., late tenth or early eleventh century). On this, see Abulafia, *The Discovery of Mankind*, pp. 33–34. Two decades later, it seems that Cartagena knew that the argument that the Canary Islanders were descended from Muslims was untenable.

36. "Cum autem, reverendissimi patres, omnes terre quas sacraceni [*sic.*] et alii infideles in partibus Hispanie citra mare detinent et ectiam ultra in illa provincia seu regione, modico maris fretu ab Hispanie finibus distanti, qui olim Tingitania, hodie Benamarinum vocatur, et in insulis ei adiacentibus, pertineant ad prefatum serenissimum regem Castelle et Legionis tamquam ad successorem illius principatus sub quo erant prius quam per infideles violenter occuparentur," Deliberación Conciliar sobre el derecho que alegan los castellanos y portugueses a la conquista de las Canarias y de Africa (*códice* from the Archivo General de Simancas: Francia K-1711, fols. 416r–416v); printed as document 65 (1438, May 9–30, Basle) in Luis Suárez Fernández, *Relaciones*

entre Portugal y Castilla en la Época del Infante Don Enrique, 1393–1460 (Madrid: CSIC, 1960), p. 273.

37. James Muldoon provides a succinct outline of Hostiensis's arguments on this matter. See Muldoon, *Popes, Lawyers, and Infidels: The Church and the Non-Christian World, 1250–1550* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1979), pp. 15–18.

38. *The Earliest Diplomatic Documents on America: The Papal Bulls of 1493 and the Treaty of Tordesillas*, trans. Paul Gottschalk (Berlin: Paul Gottschalk, 1927). See also "Bulas Alejandrinas de 1493," texto y traduccion, in *Humanismo latino y descubrimiento*, ed. Juan Gil and Jose Maria Maestre (Seville: Universidad de Sevilla and Universidad de Cádiz, 1992). The five papal bulls of donation are *Inter caetera*, *Piis infidelium*, *Inter cetera II*, *Eximie devotionis*, and *Dudum siquidem*.

39. "Inter caetera" of May 3, in *The Earliest Diplomatic Documents on America: The Papal Bulls of 1493 and the Treaty of Tordesillas*, p. 23.

40. "Inter caetera" of May 4, in *The Earliest Diplomatic Documents on America: The Papal Bulls of 1493 and the Treaty of Tordesillas*, p. 35.

41. See the Treaty of Tordesillas, in *European Treaties bearing on the History of the United States and its Dependencies to 1648*, ed. Frances Gardiner Davenport (Washington, DC: Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1917), pp. 88–89.

42. Palacios Rubios, *De insulis*, p. 13.

43. Christopher Columbus, logbook of his first voyage, as cited in David Abulafia, *The Discovery of Mankind*, p. 112.

44. Cristóbal de Santesteban (1440?–1520), *Tratado de la succesión delos reynos de Jerusalén y de Nápoles y de çecilia y delas provincias de Pulla y Calabria* (Zaragoza: Jorge Coci, 1503), chap. 11, Biblioteca Nacional de España, Madrid, post-incunable: R/29905(2).

45. *Inter caetera* of May 3, in *The Earliest Diplomatic Documents on America: The Papal Bulls of 1493 and the Treaty of Tordesillas*, p. 23. As Anthony Pagden has noted, the grants in the bulls of donation were contingent on the Spaniards converting the local inhabitants. See Anthony Pagden, *Lords of All the World: Ideologies of Empire in Spain, Britain and France c. 1500-c. 1800* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995), pp. 31–32.

46. Simancas, Patronato Real, leg. 60, f. 195, bull of Alexander VI conceding to Ferdinand and Isabella the investiture of the kingdoms of Africa, in José María Doussinague, *La política internacional de Fernando el Católico* (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, S.A., 1944), documentary app. 4, pp. 521–24.

47. "Auctoritate omnipotentis Dei nobis in beato Pedro concessa de ipsa Affrica omnibusque regnis, terris et dominis illius sine alicuius christiani principis preiuditio, auctoritate apostolica tenore presentium de novo potiori pro cautella plene investi mus [*sic.*] illaque vobis heredibusque et successoribus prefatic auctoritate Vicariatus ipsius Domini nostro Jhesu Christi qua fungimur in terries," bull of Alexander VI conceding to Ferdinand and Isabella the investiture of the kingdoms of Africa, in Doussinague, *La política internacional*, app. 4, p. 522.

48. The Treaty of Alcáçovas, between Portugal and Castile, ended the war of succession for the Castilian Crown and established Isabella as queen of Castile. *Documentos Referentes a las Relaciones con Portugal durante el reinado de los Reyes Católicos*, ed. Antonio de la Torre and Luis Suárez Fernández, vol. 1 (Valladolid: CSIC, 1960); and *European Treaties Bearing on the History of the United States and Its Dependencies to 1648*,

ed. Frances Gardiner Davenport (Washington, DC: Carnegie Institutions of Washington, 1917), pp. 33–48.

49. There were two Treaties of Tordesillas. The more famous one established the boundary between Castilian and Portuguese zones in the Atlantic, while its Old World corollary addressed the Luso-Castilian dispute over respective zones of conquest and fishing rights in Africa, specifically pertaining to the Atlantic zone from Cape Bojador to the Rio del Oro in Guinea, and the Mediterranean zone around Melilla and Cazaza. *Documentos Referentes a las Relaciones con Portugal durante el reinado de los Reyes Católicos*, ed. Antonio de la Torre and Luis Suárez Fernández, vol. 2 (Valladolid: CSIC, 1960), pp. 421–34.

50. Pierre d'Ailly (writing in 1410) suggested that Africa, while spanning the same longitudinal distance as Europe, was latitudinally narrow and therefore only half the size of Europe: "Por eso, algunos, entendiendo que, aunque África era igual a Europa en longitude, sin embargo era mucho más estrecha, prefirieron entender a África como equivalente a una segunda parte de Europa." Pierre d'Ailly, *Ymago Mundi y otros opusculos*, ed. Antonio Ramirez de Verger (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1992), p. 85. By the time Alexander VI issued *Ineffabilis et summi*, European knowledge about the latitudinal extent of Africa had grown, thanks to Portuguese sailings down the west coast of the continent. As Atlantic Africa was reserved for Portuguese conquest, and European knowledge of Africa south of the Sahara was extremely limited, *Ineffabilis* really pertained to the North African littoral and south to the Sahara.

51. "Auctoritate Vicariatus ipsius Domini nostro Jhesu Christi qua fungimur in terries . . ." The bull *Ineffabilis et summi*, in Doussinague, *La política internacional*, app. 4, p. 522.

52. The bull *Ineffabilis et summi*, in Doussinague, *La política internacional*, app. 4, p. 522.

53. "Because they could not contradict Castilian claims to the Visigothic inheritance, the Portuguese, in order to guarantee their rights to the Canaries and to Guinea, recognized the papal *plenitudo potestatis*. The Castilians apparently did not do so at that time. . . . Ferdinand and Isabella of Spain and João I of Portugal acknowledged the papal *plenitudo potestatis* in 1493 when Pope Alexander VI confirmed Spain's rights to the lands discovered by Columbus and not occupied by any other ruler. By admitting the supremacy of the pope in this matter for pragmatic reasons, the kings of Portugal and Spain, ironically, compromised their own sovereignty." Joseph F. O'Callaghan, "Castile, Portugal, and the Canary Islands: Claims and Counterclaims, 1344–1479," *Viator* 24 (1992): 287–309, at 308.

54. On Cisneros's African policies, see in particular Beatriz Alonso Acero, *Cisneros y la conquista española del norte de África*; and José García Oro, *Cisneros: El Cardenal de España* (Barcelona: Editorial Ariel, 2002).

55. Doussinague, *La política internacional*, p. 654.

56. Letter from King Ferdinand to Pedro Navarro, May 1510, Archivo General de Simancas, Estado, leg. 461, f. 5, printed in Doussinague, *La política internacional*, app. 45, pp. 614–15.

57. It is worth noting that Pedro Navarro expressed optimism that Muley Abdallah might convert to Christianity. He conveyed this hope to Ferdinand in a letter dated June 20, 1510. See *Fuentes de Zurita*, ed. Angel Canellas (Zaragoza: Institución Fernando el Católico, 1969), document 22, p. 78.

58. Ferdinand to Pedro Navarro, December 24, 1510: ". . . y si assi fuere los de la tierra adentro podranse recebir como mudejares y darse orden mediante nuestro señor la meior que fuere possible en la seguridad dello. . . ." Doussinague, *La política internacional*, app. 51, p. 642. The Spanish word *mudejar* referred to a conquered Muslim individual who was allowed to live under Christian rule and, in exchange for a payment of tribute, could continue to practice Islam.

59. David Abulafia interprets Ferdinand's *mudejar* policy toward conquered Muslims in Granada as rooted in a traditionally Aragonese approach. See his "Ferdinand the Catholic: King and Consort," in *Man Behind the Queen: Male Consorts in History*, ed. Charles Beem and Miles Taylor (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), pp. 41–44.

60. Luis Suárez Fernández, *Política internacional de Isabel la Católica*, vol. 4 (Valladolid: Instituto "Isabel la Católica" de Historia Eclesiástica, 1965–1972), document 7, pp. 188–89, letter to Ferdinand and Isabella concerning negotiations over the "Moors of Cazaza" (18 kilometers from Melilla) becoming subjects of the Spanish monarchs, February 25, 1494.

61. Doussinague, *La política internacional*, app. 11, p. 537, letter from Ferdinand and Isabella to the "qadis & alfaquís" of the "Costa Africana," June 20, 1500. In this case, it is referring to "Cadiz algoaziles alfaquis vyejos Buenos onbres moros nuestros vasallos de las partes de Afryca que esten desde el cabo de Aguer fasta el cabo Bojador por quien nos fue dada la obediençia los dias pasados." This indicates that, along this stretch of Atlantic Africa lying opposite the Canary Islands, Castile employed a policy of accepting local judges, leaders, and elders as vassal subjects of the Crown. As of 1500, the policy of having Muslim vassals in North Africa did not differ from the policy in Granada (or other regions of the Crown of Castile). After 1502, however, the policy in Castile diverged from that enforced in North Africa.

62. Capitulation of Mostaganem and Mazagran, May 26, 1511: "& Que los xeques e vesinos ansi moros como judios e morabito e alcaide de la dicha cibdad de Mostagani e villa de Maçagrani se dan desde agora por vasallos del Rey e de la Reyna nuestros señores e se obligan de seruilles como fieles e leales vasallos a su Rey e señor deuen servir e que pagaran a sus altesas desde agora todos los pechos e derechos e seruiçios e otras cosas que al Rey de Tremeçen e a los Reyes pasados heran obligados a pagar. . . ." Simancas, Patronato Real, leg. 11, f. 154, in Doussinague, *La política internacional*, app. 60, p. 659.

63. ". . . e que non seran tornados christianos por fuerça antes seran tenidos e mantenidos en su ley e alamedan como solia e governados por sus leyes e justiçia e les seran dexadas sus casas e fasyendas libremente e se contratara con ellos como con vasallos de sus altesas en todas las cosas que non fueren vedadas. . . ." Doussinague, *La política internacional*, app. 60, p. 660.

64. Beatriz Alonso Acero, *Orán-Mazalquivir, 1589–1639: Una sociedad española en la frontera de Berbería* (Madrid: CSIC, 2000). In this study, Alonso Acero addresses the presence of Muslims in Spanish Orán (pp. 249–81) as well as the presence of Moriscos in Spanish Orán (pp. 282–318).

65. Jean-Frédéric Schaub, *Les Juifs du roi d'Espagne* (Paris: Hachette Littératures, 1999); see also Jonathan I. Israel, "The Jews of Spanish North Africa, 1580–1669," in *Diasporas within a Diaspora: Jews, Crypto-Jews and the World Maritime Empires (1540–1740)* (Leiden: Brill, 2002), pp. 151–84.

66. The account is preserved in Bartolomé de Las Casas, *Historia de las Indias*, vol. 2, edición de Agustín Millares Carlo y estudio preliminar de Lewis Hanke (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1951), bk. 3, chaps. 3–5, pp. 439–48, specifically at pp. 441–42.

67. Juan López de Palacios Rubios, *De las Islas del mar Océano*, introducción de Silvio Zavala, traducción, notas y bibliografía de Agustín Millares Carlo (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1954). Zavala argues that *De insulis / De las islas* is the full juridical argument that lies behind the *Requerimiento*. See p. CXXIV of his introduction.

68. On this, see Andrew Devereux, "Declared Enemies and Pacific Infidels: Spanish Doctrines of 'just war' in the Mediterranean and Atlantic," and Anthony Pagden, "The School of Salamanca, the *Requerimiento* and the Papal Donation of Alexander VI," both in the collection *Empire & Exceptionalism: The* Requerimiento *and Claims of Sovereignty in the Early Modern Mediterranean and Atlantic*, ed. Andrew Devereux, a special forum for *Republics of Letters* (Stanford University, Division of Literatures, Cultures, and Languages) 5, no. 3 (2018).

69. It is worth drawing a comparison here with Palacios Rubios's defense of Castilian claims to the kingdom of Navarre, *De iustitia et iure*, analyzed in chapter 3. In that text the jurist crafts an extremely strong case for the pope's role as *dominus mundi*, exercising authority in the temporal as well as spiritual spheres. This is an argument Palacios Rubios also makes elsewhere in *De insulis*, in the sections pertaining to the Americas.

70. Pagden, *Lords of All the World*, p. 39. See also Lewis Hanke, *All Mankind Is One: A Study of the Disputation between Bartolomé de Las Casas and Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda in 1550 on the Intellectual and Religious Capacity of the American Indians* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1974), pp. 40–41.

71. Hanke, *All Mankind Is One*, pp. 40–41.

72. Las Casas, *Historia de las Indias*, vol. 1, bk. 1, chaps. 15–16, pp. 73–90. Las Casas's *Historia de las Indias* was finally completed in 1561. Las Casas began the work in 1527, and this portion, in book 1, was composed much closer to the date of Fernández de Oviedo's *General Historia*.

73. Palacios Rubios, *De insulis*, p. 58.

74. Palacios Rubios, *De insulis*, p. 61: ". . . y con esa reconquista [of Granada] hicísteis una guerra justa y santa y rendísteis la debida servidumbre al Supremo Dios."

75. Palacios Rubios, *De insulis*, pp. 64–65.

76. Palacios Rubios, *De insulis*, p. 59: ". . . ni podrán los poseedores ampararse en la prescripción del largo o larguísimo tiempo transcurrido, porque como son poseedores de mala fe, no puede aplicárseles la prescripción en ningún tiempo"; and: "De donde resulta que si un negocio es de tal naturaleza que no puede en fuerza de su dificultad resolverse en breve tiempo, sera lícito hacerlo cuando la occasión se presentare, sobre todo no existiendo superior." It is worth noting that this is the same concept of perduring rights that Alonso de Cartagena invoked in his argument in support of Castilian (Visigothic) claims to the Canary Islands.

77. Palacios Rubios, *De insulis*, pp. 57–58: "De aquí que si algúna región, provincia o reino fueron en otro tiempo poseídos por Cristianos y más tarde ocupados o usurpados por infieles, podrán los primeros recuperarlos por propia autoridad."

78. This argument, of course, was not Palacios Rubios's innovation. The doctrine that Christians could licitly make war against non-Christians ruling a formerly Chris-

tian land was earlier articulated by Pope Innocent IV. On this, see James Muldoon, *Popes, Lawyers, and Infidels*, pp. 15–18.

79. Miguel Ángel de Bunes Ibarra, "El marco ideológico de la expansión española por el norte de África," *Revista Aldaba* 26 (September 1995): 117. "Pero además el islam, asentado fundamentalmente en Asia y África, está rompiendo el plan original de Dios sobre la organización del mundo y sus habitantes, entendiendo ésta como un cuerpo místico en el que cada continente es una parte del mismo, por lo que su aniquilación es volver a la organización tradicional del plan divino."

80. Pope Julius II's bull *Sacrosanctae Romane*, March 26, 1510, in Doussinague, *La política internacional*, pp. 591–92.

81. Las Casas, *Historia de las Indias*, vol. 1, bk. 1, chap. 25, p. 134: ". . . y éstos son los turcos y moros de Berbería y del Oriente, como cada día vemos y padecemos; contra éstos no hay duda ninguna sino que tenemos guerra justa, no sólo cuando actualmente nos la mueven, pero aun cuando cesan de hacerlo, porque nos consta ya por larguísima experiencia su intinción de nos dañar, *y esta guerra nuestra contra ellos no se puede guerra llamar, sino legítima defensión y natural.*" [emphasis mine]

82. Bartolomé de Las Casas, *Tratado comprobatorio del imperio soberano*, in *Tratados de Fray Bartolomé de Las Casas*, preface by Lewis Hanke and Manuel Giménez Fernández, 2 vols. (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1965), p. 1035.

83. Las Casas, *Tratado comprobatorio*, p. 1039.

84. Las Casas, discussing Hostiensis, argued that the latter was addressing the "infidels" that he knew of at the time he was writing: "Sino de los que tuvo noticia que había en su tiempo, como eran los turcos y moros, mayormente los que tiránicamente usurpada la Tierra Sancta, y España, e África tenían." Las Casas, *Tratado comprobatorio*, p. 1093. This is a puzzling claim for Las Casas to make, as Hostiensis clearly knew of the existence of pagan "infidels," such as those inhabiting the eastern Baltic or the Mongols of Central Asia.

85. Matías de Paz, *Del dominio de los reyes de España sobre los Indios*, ed. Silvio Zavala and Agustín Millares Carlo (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1954), pp. 220–21. "Hay otros a cuyo conocimiento aun no ha llegado acaso nuestra fe, o si alguna vez llegó, no recuerdan, sin embargo, en la actualidad, la existencia de esa fe sobre el orbe de las tierras. De éstos dice Santo Tomás, en la cuestión aducida, art. 1, que tienen cuando menos una infidelidad privativamente, la cual no puede llamarse pecado, sino más bien pena de pecado. . . . Mi interpretación es que no hay en los tales pecado por comisión contra la fe, y que por razón precisamente de dicha ignorancia, no tienen ningún pecado actual."

86. Kenneth B. Wolf, "The 'Moors' of West Africa and the Beginnings of the Portuguese Slave Trade," *Journal of Medieval and Renaissance Studies* 24, no. 3 (Fall 1994): 449–69.

87. Debra Blumenthal, *Enemies and Familiars: Slavery and Mastery in Fifteenth-Century Valencia* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009), p. 41.

88. Paz, *Del dominio de los reyes de España sobre los Indios*, pp. 220–21 (see note 85 above).

89. Las Casas, *Historia de las Indias*, vol. 1, bk. 1, chap. 17, p. 92, and chap. 19, p. 108.

90. Las Casas, *Historia de las Indias*, vol. 1, bk. 1, chap. 19, p. 108.

91. Las Casas, *Historia de las Indias*, vol. 1, bk. 1, chap. 19, p. 108.

92. Las Casas, *Historia de las Indias*, vol. 1, bk. 1, chap. 23, p. 126.
93. Las Casas, *Historia de las Indias*, vol. 1, bk. 1, chap. 23, p. 126.
94. Las Casas, *Historia de las Indias*, vol. 1, bk. 1, chap. 23, p. 128.
95. Las Casas, *Historia de las Indias*, vol. 1, bk. 1, chap. 24, pp. 132–33.
96. Las Casas, *Historia de las Indias*, vol. 1, bk. 1, chap. 25, p. 133.
97. Las Casas, *Historia de las Indias*, vol. 1, bk. 1, chap. 25, p. 134.
98. Las Casas, *Historia de las Indias*, vol. 1, bk. 1, chap. 25, pp. 134–35.
99. Las Casas, *Historia de las Indias*, vol. 1, bk. 1, chap. 25, p. 136.
100. Palacios Rubios, *De insulis*, p. 66.
101. Palacios Rubios, *De insulis*, pp. 58–59. "Podrá, pues, el Rey de España apoderarse de dichas provincias, incluso por la fuerza y por las armas, porque el que las posee las tiene contra la voluntad de su dueño, *y porque no existe autoridad superior ante la cual se pueda reclamar justicia* [emphasis mine]; de donde resulta que por esta falta de autoridad puede el mencionado Rey basar su derecho en la fuerza y en las armas, como se consigna en la ley 'Ut vim' del *Digesto*, tít. 'De iustitia et iure'. . . ."
102. Joseph F. O'Callaghan, "Castile, Portugal, and the Canary Islands: Claims and Counterclaims, 1344–1479," *Viator* 24 (1992): 308.
103. Today Vélez de la Gomera, along with Melilla and Ceuta, are all under Spanish rule.
104. For the full resolution, reached in the *Convenio de Cintra*, see *Documentos referentes a las relaciones con Portugal en el reinado de los Reyes Católicos*, vol. 3, ed. Antonio de la Torre and Luis Suárez Fernández (Valladolid: CSIC, 1963), pp. 160–73.
105. *Documentos referentes a las relaciones con Portugal en el reinado de los Reyes Católicos*, vol. 3, pp. 167–68.
106. Letter from Pedro Navarro to King Ferdinand, November 5, 1509, Asilah (Arcila), in *CODOIN*, vol. 25 (Madrid: Imprenta de la Viuda de Calero, 1854), pp. 405–6.
107. For details of Castilian aid to the beleaguered Portuguese fortress in Asilah, see the documents from the Real Academia de la Historia (Colección Salazar): K-4, published by Antonio Rodríguez Villa in *Boletín de la Real Academia de la Historia*, vol. 54, Madrid, 1909, pp. 373–412, 518–25; and vol. 55, pp. 137–272, 325–52, 369–406. This ream of documentation includes 661 letters written by Ferdinand during 1508–1509. Document 345, Queen Juana to her Corregidor de Xeréz de la Frontera, regarding the king of Portugal agreeing to reinforce the defenses at Asilah, in the kingdom of Fez, November 12, 1508, from Seville. Queen Juana agrees to send bread to Asilah for the sustenance of the people stationed there (vol. 55, pp. 206–7). Document 346 is similar, but concerns Castile sending bricks, wood, and so on for shoring up the fortifications of Asilah. Queen Juana was not in Seville in late 1508. This is one of the frequent cases of Ferdinand, no longer holding royal prerogatives in Castile at this date, writing and issuing instructions in his daughter Juana's name.
108. Palacios Rubios, *De insulis*, p. 137. "Mas si un superior, dejando la cosa en su integridad, concediese a alguien el derecho a ocuparla y ese alguien descuidara el hacerlo, lo dilatase sin causa justa o, habiendo marchado con un ejército, se retirase sin motive justificado, pierde el citado derecho. . . ."
109. Palacios Rubios, *De insulis*, pp. 138–39. ". . . planteándose la cuestión de si la tardanza y evidente negligencia de aquél le habían hecho perder el derecho de adquisición y de conquista del reino y lugares mencionados."

110. Palacios Rubios, *De insulis*, p. 139. "... si aquél a quien se le manda por un primer decreto tomar la posesión de una cosa, dilate el hacerlo sin causa justificada, decae de su derecho, pues el tiempo transcurrido—de dos años para el residente en la provincia misma, y de cuatro para el ausente de ella—es suficiente para evidenciar su negligencia. . . ."

111. Tamar Herzog, *Frontiers of Possession: Spain and Portugal in Europe and the Americas* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015).

112. In claiming for Castile the right to the Canary Islands, Palacios Rubios cites Cartagena's text: ". . . don Alfonso, Obispo de Burgos, en su famoso alegato sobre la conquista de las mencionadas Islas. . . ." Palacios Rubios, *De insulis*, p. 58.

113. Mercedes García-Arenal, "Moriscos e Indios: Para un estudio comparado de métodos de conquista e evangelización," *Cronica Nova* 20 (1992): 153–75.

5. The Eastern Chimera

1. Samuel Eliot Morison, *Admiral of the Ocean Sea*, 2 vols. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1942).

2. A representative sampling of these studies includes, in order of publication, Abbas Hamdani, "Columbus and the Recovery of Jerusalem," *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 99, no. 1 (January–March 1979): 39–48; Alain Milhou, *Colón y su mentalidad mesiánica en el ambiente franciscanista español* (Valladolid: Casa-Museo de Colón, 1983); Pauline Moffitt Watts, "Prophecy and Discovery: On the Spiritual Origins of Christopher Columbus' 'Enterprise of the Indies,'" *American Historical Review* 90 (1985): 73–102.

3. Cristóbal Colón, *Textos y documentos completos: relaciones de viajes, cartas y memoriales*, ed. Consuelo Varela (Madrid: Alianza, 1982), p. 278.

4. Consuelo Varela, "Aproximación a los escritos de Cristóbal Colón," *Jornadas de Estudios, Canarias-América* 3–4 (1984): 312. A fundamental source for Columbus's eclectic messianic writings is the following: *The Book of Prophecies Edited by Christopher Columbus*, ed. Roberto Rusconi, trans. Blair Sullivan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997).

5. Ernesto Belenguer Cebriá, *Cortes del Reinado de Fernando el Católico* (Valencia: Universidad de Valencia Departamento de Historia Moderna, 1972). In this work, Belenguer Cebriá reproduces a facsimile version of the original 1511 edition of the gathering's proceedings.

6. Belenguer Cebriá, *Cortes del Reinado de Fernando el Católico*, p. 127. At the conclusion of the session, the *Cortes* discussed the conquest of Africa, and Ferdinand's eventual extirpation of the Mohammedan sect and conquest of the holy house of Jerusalem and other holy places (pp. 162–63). The assembled representatives offered Ferdinand 100,000 Valencian *lliuvres* for the undertaking (p. 163).

7. The significance of the saint's day was widely noted. See the anonymous account of the Spanish capture of Tripoli, recorded by a participant in the events, who suggested that Santiago had played an instrumental role in the battle: "parescía que el bien aventurado apóstol Santiago les daba la mano." Anonymous, "Relación de los sucesos de las armas marítimas de España en los años de 1510 y 1511," *CODOIN*, vol. 25, p. 499.

8. "De lo cual nos le habemos dado y damos infinitas gracias, y estamos muy alegres, porque su divina clemencia nos muestra y abre cada dia mas el camino para

que le sirvamos en aquella santa empresa." Letter from Ferdinand to Cisneros concerning the capture of Tripoli, August 13, 1510, Monzón, in *CODOIN*, vol. 25, document 19, p. 467.

9. "Estas plazas se queden sin moro, porque, puesto que el Africa está llena de ellos, no los tengamos en la retaguardia." Luis Morales Oliver, "La Figura de Fernando el Católico en la España de su Tiempo," in *Curso de Conferencias sobre la Política Africana de los Reyes Católicos*, vol. 4 (Madrid: CSIC Instituto de Estudios Africanos, 1951–1952), pp. 81–82. This might have been one of Ferdinand's aspirations, but as demonstrated in chapter 4, Ferdinand often did not apply a policy of expelling Muslims from his North African possessions.

10. Emery d'Amboise to Ferdinand of Aragon, September 8, 1510, in María Isabel Hernández-González, *El Taller Historiografico: Cartas de Relación de la Conquista de Orán (1509) y Textos Afines*, papers of the Medieval Hispanic Research Seminar, 8 (London: Queen Mary and Westfield College, 1997), p. 60.

11. On April 7, 1502, Andrew Paleologus named Ferdinand and Isabella his successors to the kingdom of Greece and the empire of Constantinople. José María Doussinague, *La Política Internacional de Fernando el Católico*, p. 490, citing the *Anales* of Jerónimo de Zurita.

12. On the dynastic links that brought the house of Aragon into union with one branch of claimants to the throne of Jerusalem, see Alain Milhou, *Colón y su mentalidad mesiánica en el ambiente franciscanista español* (Valladolid: Cuadernos Colombinos, 1983), p. 334. See also Ricardo del Arco y Garay, *La idea de imperio en la política y literatura espanola* (Madrid, 1944), p. 88.

13. J. N. Hillgarth, *The Problem of a Catalan Mediterranean Empire 1229–1327*, English Historical Review, supplement 8 (Longman, 1975), p. 42.

14. David Abulafia, "The Aragonese Kingdom of Albania: An Angevin Project of 1311–1316," in Abulafia, *Mediterranean Encounters, Economic, Religious, Political, 1100–1550* (Aldershot: Ashgate Variorum, 2000).

15. Hillgarth, *The Problem of a Catalan Mediterranean Empire 1229–1327*, p. 19. The conquest of Majorca (1229) facilitated Catalan trade with North Africa; by 1253, the Crown had established a Catalan consulate in Tunis; by 1259, one in Bougie as well. In 1264, James I of Aragon established a consul from Barcelona in Alexandria (p. 21).

16. On this aspect of Llull's varied career, see A. Morel-Fatio, "Proverbes Rimés de Raimond Lull," *Romania*, vol. 11 (Paris: F. Vieweg, 1882), pp. 188–202. Here Morel-Fatio discusses Llull's visits to Montpellier, Pisa, and Genoa in 1307 to advertise his plan for the recovery of the Holy Land; he went to Avignon in 1308 to discuss his plan with Pope Clement V (p. 189).

17. Jean de Joinville, *Life of St. Louis*, in *Chronicles of the Crusades* (London: Penguin, 1963), in particular chaps. 4–8.

18. Alain Milhou, *Colón y su mentalidad mesiánica*, p. 369. Llull's proposal was an Iberian adaptation of the "way of Egypt."

19. These divergent views on crusading strategies are discussed by Richard Fletcher in his work on Christian-Muslim relations, *The Cross and the Crescent: The Dramatic Story of the Earliest Encounters Between Christians and Muslims* (London: Penguin, 2003). As Fletcher writes, the efforts that focused on "the way of Egypt" emerged due to problems of marching across Anatolia (p. 81).

20. Jerónimo Münzer, *Viaje por España y Portugal (1494–1495)* (Madrid: Ediciones Polifemo, 1991), p. 269. Around the same time, a delegation from Genoa made a similar address to the Spanish monarchs. On this, see Pauline Moffitt Watts, "Prophecy and Discovery," p. 95.

21. Biblioteca Nacional, Madrid: ms./19699, caja 61, two letters from Manoel of Portugal to Cisneros concerning the conquest of Jerusalem, March 2, 1506. These letters are published in Costa Brochado, "A espiritualidade dos descobrimentos e conquistas dos portuguesses," in *Brotéria: Cristianismo e Cultura*, vol. 40 (Lisbon, 1945), p. 25 and following.

22. Biblioteca Nacional Madrid, ms./19699, caja 61, letter from King Manoel of Portugal to Cisneros, on the conquest of Jerusalem, March 2, 1506, Abrantes. First letter, fol. 3r: "Acerca de lo q nos apuntais dela tomada de alexandria parecenos cosa muy buena y provechosa en su tpo por q tiene los bienes q dezis. y segun juyzio delos q lo vieron no ay mucha dificultad p.a la tomar y menos para sustentarla. y aun aora con la venida del prior del crato q viene de Rodas tuvimos asaz informaçion dello."

23. Biblioteca Nacional Madrid, ms./19699, caja 61, letter from King Manoel of Portugal to Cisneros, on the conquest of Jerusalem. First letter, fols. 3r–3v: ". . . y con lo q nos escriuistes delas cosas y ansi en los xpianos q ay en la tierra del soldan tuvimos mucho plazer y nos plugo de saberlo y cierto q nos parece q en este tpo nro. S. nos quiere demostrar muchas señales de ser esta su voluntad y ansi de nos prometer el vencimiento desta jornada . . ."

24. Biblioteca Nacional Madrid, ms./19699, caja 61, letter from King Manoel of Portugal to Cisneros, on the conquest of Jerusalem. First letter, fol. 1v: ". . . q muy presto todos tres podamos rescibir el cuerpo de nro. S. Jesuchro de vras manos en la casa santa." The phrase "todos tres" is a reference to the proposed joint crusading effort among Manoel of Portugal, Ferdinand of Aragon, and King Henry VII of England.

25. Abbas Hamdani, "Ottoman Response to the Discovery of America and the New Route to India," *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 101, no. 3 (July–September 1981): 323–30, at 326.

26. Hamdani, "Ottoman Response to the Discovery of America and the New Route to India," 323.

27. Biblioteca Nacional Madrid, ms./19699, caja 61, letter from King Manoel of Portugal to Cisneros, on the conquest of Jerusalem. First letter, fol. 2r: ". . . como confiamos en nro S. q sera por la guerra q por el mar bermejo [the Red Sea] le tenemos mandado y mandamos hazer pues nros nauios y gente a dos jornadas de meca y a dos o tres leguas de santa catalina de monte sinay pueden llegar q el en poco tiempo sea casi destruydo y desbaratado. por q su estado hasta aqui fue tan grande como todos sabemos y todo este estado le hera necesario pa se sustentar ansi contra el Turco q le es gran enemigo y muy poderoso contra el. . . ."

28. Luís Filipe F. R. Thomaz, "Factions, Interests, and Messianism: The Politics of Portuguese Expansion in the East, 1500–1521," *Indian Economic and Social History Review* 28, no. 1 (1991): 97–109, at 100.

29. Abbas Hamdani, "Columbus and the Recovery of Jerusalem," *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 99, no. 1 (January–March, 1979): 39–48. Ferdinand of Aragon may also have had interests in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean; he viewed the eastern

Mediterranean as the most efficient point of access to these eastern markets, rather than the circumnavigation of Africa.

30. Thomaz, "Factions, Interests, and Messianism," p. 101.

31. Giles of Viterbo, "Fulfillment of the Christian Golden Age under Pope Julius II: Text of a Discourse of Giles of Viterbo, 1507," ed. J. W. O'Malley, *Traditio* 25 (1969): 265–338, at 317.

32. Andrew Hess, "The Ottoman Conquest of Egypt (1517) and the Beginning of the Sixteenth-Century World War," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 4, no. 1 (1973): 55–76, at 74.

33. On the combination of commercial interests and need for politicoreligious legitimation that stimulated the designs the Ottoman Sultan Selim I (r. 1512–1520) held on Egypt, see Hess, "The Ottoman Conquest of Egypt"; and Palmira Brummett, *Ottoman Seapower and Levantine Diplomacy in the Age of Discovery* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), p. 6.

34. Pedro Navarro, *Memorial para la Magestad en orden a la Conquista de Jerusalen*, Biblioteca Nacional, Madrid, ms./19699, caja 60. For biographical details on Navarro, see the introduction to this book, and also *CODOIN*, vol. 25 (Madrid: Imprenta de la Viuda de Calero, 1854; reprinted in Nendeln, Liechtenstein, 1966), *Historia del Conde Pedro Navarro, General de Infantería, Marina e Ingeniero, en los Reinados de Fernando e Isabel, y de doña Juana y su hijo don Carlos*, por don Martín de los Heros.

35. Navarro, *Memorial para la Magestad en orden a la Conquista de Jerusalen*. This is an assurance Navarro repeats in several spots throughout the memorial, including fol. 3r, fol. 3v, and fol. 4v.

36. The document is in Castilian Spanish, although the spelling is heavily Italianized. This suggests that Navarro likely dictated the *Memorial* to a scribe whose first language was Italian.

37. Goñi Gaztambide, *Historia de la Bula de Cruzada en España*, num. 4 (Vitoria, 1958), p. 436.

38. Ferdinand thus held the right to the conquest of all the lands Navarro discusses, even if he did not exercise direct rule in any of them, just as King Manoel I of Portugal, since Vasco da Gama's return in 1499, had claimed the right to the conquest of Ethiopia, Arabia, Persia, and India (*Senhor da conquista e da navegação e comércio de Etiópia, Arábia, Pérsia e da Índia*).

39. "La turquia . . . es el stimolo y la fama de toda xanidat [christianidad]: es la vendicta de sangre precioso de nuestro saluador Xo Jhu. de tantos martires: aon son las eglesias los monasterios y las sacras reliquias de sanctos." Pedro Navarro, *Memorial para la Magestad en orden a la Conquista de Jerusalen*, fol. 4v. Navarro participated in the Hispano-Venetian fleet's engagements with the Turks in the Aegean Sea in 1500, so at least some of his impressions of Greece and Turkey are based on his own experience there.

40. Navarro, *Memorial para la Magestad en orden a la Conquista de Jerusalen*, fol. 2v. "Aquesta fortaleza se corrompe con su propia natura: por la causa suso dicha que los vasallos xanos [christianos] son angariados del gran turqo: en los fijos y fijas y en los ducados pagan por cabeça: quien siendo por V. R. M. libres de la angaria de los dineros obligados: con alegreza la pagaran por su propia libertat y de sus fijos: pagandola V. R. alteza en tal fortaleza cresçe y el gran turqo manqua."

41. Navarro, *Memorial para la Magestad en orden a la Conquista de Jerusalen*, fol. 1r. ". . . la compasion de tantos xanos sclauos y sieruos: continuamente afligidos ala blasfemia machometicha."

42. *Unity, Heresy, and Reform: 1378–1460: The Conciliar Response to the Great Schism*, ed. C. M. D. Crowder (Kingston, ON: Limestone Press, 1986), document 31, Eugenius IV urges the Greeks to unite with the Latin Church (May 1439), p. 167.

43. Gonzalo de Ayora, *Carta a Fernando el Católico sobre la toma de Mazalquivir* (September 15 and 17, 1505), Biblioteca Nacional, Madrid, ms./10415. Ayora describes the situation now that Mazalquivir has been captured as "fecho la mitad de la conquista de Africa y casi asegurada á toda España" (fol. 5v). Ayora argues that, if Mazalquivir is properly fortified, all of Africa will be easily conquered (fol. 5v): "Sin dubda yo seria de parescer que con un ejército desta manera que toda Africa se conquistaria con poca Resistencia por las grandes discordias de los moros, y por la manera de su guerrear en que claramente confiesan su flaqueza y poco saber."

44. Navarro, *Memorial para la Magestad en orden a la Conquista de Jerusalen*, fol. 4r and again at fol. 4v: ". . . a V. R. M. sea el animo a la sancta Impresa: y non a perder tiempo gientes en la barbaria [the Barbary Coast]: que tomada quando se podiesse tomar cumple se aya de dexar y spanya despoblar."

45. Letter from Hugo de Moncada to Ferdinand, October 23, 1511, Palermo, printed in *CODOIN*, vol. 24, pp. 112–22, at pp. 117–18: "Con deseo espero la respuesta de V. A., Señor, sobre reducir á Tripol á fortalezas; porque pensar de poblarle de cristianos es excusado."

46. Navarro, *Memorial para la Magestad en orden a la Conquista de Jerusalen*, fol. 2r. Regarding Turkey, Navarro writes, ". . . es tierra muy habitada Imperio porque toda o por la muy mayor parte es habitada de xanos." Navarro repeats his conviction that Turkey possesses a large Christian population on fol. 4v of the *Memorial*: "La turquia es toda habitada de xanos."

47. Mark Mazower, *Salonica, City of Ghosts: Christians, Muslims and Jews, 1430–1950* (New York: Vintage, 2006), pp. 25–26.

48. Navarro, *Memorial para la Magestad en orden a la Conquista de Jerusalen*, fol. 2v. "Cumple que los tales farmulas desemparen las prouintias y dichas prouintias non hauendo deffenssores: y mas siendo xanos [christianos] subito se rebelan: y assi dicha V. R. Mta entrando: posiede sin lançada y herida la mayor parte de la tierra: y sin hauer menester hombres agardala: por ser xanos [christianos] y ser fora de aquella angaria de los fijos y fijas se mantienen y mantendian en la obediencia de V. R. M."

49. Navarro, *Memorial para la Magestad en orden a la Conquista de Jerusalen*, fol. 2r. I am translating the term *valedores* as "defenders," rather than "protectors," as this best fits the sense of Navarro's argument.

50. Navarro, *Memorial para la Magestad en orden a la Conquista de Jerusalen*, fol. 4r. ". . . a V. R. Mta. Seria infamia q en lugar de principe conquistador: seria salteador y raptor q non conuyene: honor regis iudicium diligit."

51. Doussinague, *La política internacional de Fernando el Católico*, p. 488, citing the original letter as printed in J. S. Brewer, ed., *Letters and Papers, Foreign and Domestic, Henry VIII, Vol. 1, 1509–1514* (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1920), document 1659.

52. Palacios Rubios, *De insulis*, pp. 55–56.

53. Palacios Rubios, *De insulis*, section 8, p. 62.

54. Biblioteca Nacional de España, Madrid, ms./19699, caja 61, letter from King Manoel of Portugal to Cisneros, on the conquest of Jerusalem, March 2, 1506, Abrantes, fol. 3r. ". . . y la tierra del turco asi de grecia como de turquia segun lo q tenemos sabido y oydo tiene la mejor dispusicion y manera del mundo para se poder conquistar por aver en ella muchos xpianos y otras calidades q en ella ay. y con esto el grande miedo q tenemos sabido los Turcos tener alos xpianos lo q bien se muestra en el cerco de metelin y qdo el Rey carlos paso a Napoles." This is a reference to Charles VIII of France's invasion of Italy in 1494–95, during which he claimed that Naples would serve as a forward base of operations from which he would destroy the Ottoman Empire.

55. Letter from Peter Martyr to Íñigo López de Mendoza, Second Count of Tendilla, January 23, 1510, in Peter Martyr, *Epistolario de Pedro Mártir de Angleria*, trans. J. López de Toro, in *Documentos inéditos para la historia de España*, vol. 10 (Madrid: Imprenta Góngora, 1953–57), document 434, pp. 311–13, at p. 311.

56. Doussinague, *La política internacional*, pp. 591–92, Spanish translation of the bull *Sacrosanctae Romane* (March 26, 1510). In an expression of the pope's hopes for Ferdinand's leadership of a crusade, he wrote: ". . . que congregadas las fuerzas del mismo rey y de los demás príncipes cristianos y emprendida una expedición general contra los infieles, destruyamos para siempre con la ayuda de Dios las reliquias de la impiísima superstición." The following year, Julius reiterated this belief in a letter to Ferdinand. See José María Doussinague, *Fernando el Católico y el cisma de Pisa* (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, S.A., 1946), p. 503, Letter from Julius II to Ferdinand, October 18, 1511.

57. Letter from King Ferdinand of Aragon, cited in Luis Morales Oliver, "La Figura de Fernando el Católico en la España de su Tiempo" in *Curso de Conferencias sobre la Política Africana de los Reyes Católicos*, vol. 4 (Madrid: CSCIC Instituto de Estudios Africanos, 1951–1952), pp. 73–90, at p. 82. "Y cuando caminemos en la conquista, recibiremos de los cristianos de Oriente y recibiremos de los cautivos la ayuda, porque ellos se levantarán a nuestro favor." Unfortunately, Morales Oliver provides neither date nor addressee for this letter.

58. The Mamluks, of course, were threatened by the Ottomans' expansion in the eastern Mediterranean. For this reason, Catholic Europeans held out hope that they might serve as allies against the Turks. In 1516–1517, the Ottomans conquered the Mamluks, incorporating their lands into the Ottoman Empire.

59. Giustinian and Querini, as cited in K. M. Setton, "Leo X and the Turks," in Setton, *Europe and the Levant in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance* (London: Variorum, 1974), p. 372: "Moreover, once the Christian army had begun to fight and the first sign of victory had become manifest, according to Giustinian and Querini, 100,000,000 [*centena millia millium*] Christian subjects of the Turks would rise up and use the arms they did not lack."

60. Margaret Meserve, *Empires of Islam in Renaissance Historical Thought* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008). Meserve notes that Europeans differentiated between various Islamic polities, and that Renaissance humanists thought of the Ottomans as illegitimate, as usurpers, in a way that other Islamic empires were not (pp. 1–21). On p. 11, Meserve lists the Mamluks as among those more "legitimate" Islamic polities with which alliances might be forged. As noted above, the Italian monks Giustinian and Querini viewed the Mamluk rulers of Egypt as potential

converts to Christianity and allies in a war against the Ottomans. See Setton, "Leo X and the Turks," p. 372.

61. Meserve, *Empires of Islam in Renaissance Historical Thought*, pp. 231–36.

62. Giles of Viterbo, "Fulfillment of the Christian Golden Age," p. 316 and pp. 326–27.

63. Biblioteca Nacional de España, ms./1490, letter from Cardinal of Santa Cruz to King Ferdinand, April 11, 1514, from Rome, fol. 339v. ". . . los embaxadores de arragussa me han de esto del Turco çertificado y por esso lo escribo. . . ."

64. Biblioteca Nacional de España, ms./1490, letter from Cardinal of Santa Cruz to King Ferdinand, April 11, 1514, from Rome, fols. 338v–339v: "Despues de la otra escripta se entiende que El Turco es mui bexado, de su sobrino [el guierno] del sofi en la Anatholica, que es la assia menor y es el natural estado y ansi dexado todo lo de greçia, Com poco pressidio el ba em persona assi con todos sus exerçitos de forma que pareçe no podra este año mucho haçer en europa antes pareçe que ssi Dios quissiesse que esta, [esta] tregua traxesse paz y deudo .V. alta. y sus deudos com françia que con muçha façilidad, Y, com poca gente, se tomaria todo lo de greçia por la general enemistad de los turcos, entre si y general boluntad del pueblo griego a reduçirse, a christianos si ben con q [seguramense] lo fagan y esto es mui çierto y dello yo e hauido muçha inseligençia."

65. Margaret Meserve, "The Sophy: News of Shah Ismail Safavi in Renaissance Europe," *Journal of Early Modern History* 18 (2014): 579–608. See also Cornell Fleischer, "A Mediterranean Apocalypse: Prophecies of Empire in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries," in *Speaking the End Times*, ed. Mayte Green-Mercado, a special issue of the *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 61 (2018): 18–90. See also Jennifer Britnell, "The Anti-papalism of Jean Lemaire de Belges' *Traité de la difference des Schismes et des Conciles*," *Sixteenth Century Journal* 24, no. 4 (Winter 1993): 783–800. Britnell notes that the *Traicté des differences* is accompanied by three shorter texts, two of which have passages indicating that the sophy of Persia and the sultan of Egypt might be favorable to an alliance with Christian princes against the Ottomans (p. 784).

66. Alain Milhou, *Colón y su mentalidad mesiánica en el ambiente franciscanista español* (Valladolid: Casa-Museo de Colón, 1983).

67. Fleischer, "A Mediterranean Apocalypse"; Cornell Fleischer, "Shadow of Shadows: Prophecy in Politics in 1530s Istanbul," *International Journal of Turkish Studies* 13, nos. 1 and 2 (2007): 51–62, at 52. See also Robert Finlay, "Prophecy and Politics in Istanbul: Charles V, Sultan Süleyman, and the Habsburg Embassy of 1533–1534," *Journal of Early Modern History* 2, no. 1 (1998): 1–31.

68. Doussinague, *La política internacional*, pp. 237–38, 487. Spain, in fact, was not actually united. Nevertheless, during the twelve years that Ferdinand outlived Isabella he consistently employed Castilian soldiers and resources to pursue traditionally Aragonese ends.

69. Biblioteca Nacional de España, Madrid, ms./1341, Diego de Valera, *Obras y epistolario*. The manuscript includes the text *Cirimonial de prinçipes* (fols. 66r–74r). Valera here details the practices of royal address in various states (fol. 69r): ". . . ante los otros rreyes se acostumbra poner tres vezes la rrodilla enel suelo / alos rreyes de españa solamente se besa la mano / alos rreyes de napol la mano y el pie como al santo padre / lo qual se faze por q se yntitulan rreyes dela santa çibdat de ihrlm."

70. Carlos José Hernando Sánchez, "Estrategia cruzada y guerra moderna: la conquista de Nápoles en la política italiana de los Reyes Católicos," in *Los Reyes Católicos*

y la Monarquía de España (Madrid: Ministerio de Cultura; Valencia: Generalitat Valenciana, Consellería de Cultura, Educació i Esport; Sociedad Estatal de Conmemoraciones Culturales; Museu de Belles Arts de València, 2004), pp. 287–302.

71. "Hizo la propuesta, representando la gloria provechosa de la conquista de los Reynos de Tunez, y Buxia, que tan adelantada estaba, y prometia feliz sucesso à las esperanças de otra mayor de la Africa, hasta llegar dentro del Asia à la Casa Santa por tan immensos espacios, que se le debian como à Rey de Aragon por los derechos, y vinculos de Napoles, y Ierusalen." See Pedro Abarca, *Anales, Rey Don Fernando el Católico—Los reyes de Aragon en anales historicos . . .* (Madrid: En la Imprenta imperial, 1682–84), fol. 386r.

72. Archivo Histórico Nacional, Estado, leg. 8605, letter from King Ferdinand to Jerónimo de Vich, February 28, 1510, in Baron de Terrateig, *Política en Italia del Rey Católico (1507–1516). Correspondencia inedita con el embajador*, vol. 2 (Madrid: CSIC, 1963), pp. 95–96.

73. *The Earliest Diplomatic Documents on America: The Papal Bulls of 1493 and the Treaty of Tordesillas*, trans. Paul Gottschalk (Berlin: Paul Gottschalk, 1927). See also "Bulas Alejandrinas de 1493," texto y traduccion, in *Humanismo latino y descubrimiento*, ed. Juan Gil and Jose Maria Maestre (Seville: Universidad de Sevilla and Universidad de Cádiz, 1992).

74. Archivo General de Simancas, Patronato Real, leg. 60, fol. 195, *Ineffabilis et summi*, in Doussinague, *La política internacional de Fernando el Católico*, app. 4, pp. 521–24.

75. Archivo Histórico Nacional, Estado, leg. 8605, Ferdinand to Jerónimo de Vich, February 28, 1510, in Terrateig, *Política en Italia del Rey Católico (1507–1516)*, vol. 2, pp. 95–96. It is known that Ferdinand owned a copy of a work by Bartolus. See Juan Beneyto Pérez, "The Science of Law in the Spain of the Catholic Kings," in *Spain in the fifteenth century, 1369–1516: Essays and Extracts by Historians of Spain*, J. R. L. Highfield (London: Macmillan, 1972), p. 280.

76. The gist of Ferdinand's argument here, following Bartolus, was formulated differently, but with a slight echo, by Juan López de Palacios Rubios in his *De iustitia et iure obtentionis ac retentionis regni Nauarre* (ca. 1515–1517). Here the jurist laid out a doctrine justifying violence against any infidels who impeded the passage of crusading forces on their way to Jerusalem. Palacios Rubios, *De iustitia et iure*, bk. 5, section 3: ". . . quod ecclesia licite potest indicere bellum contra sarracenos tenentes & occupantes hierusalem (que terra sancta dicitur) et contra omnes alios infideles inter medios impedientes vel non permittentes christianos ire vel transire ad illam sanctam expeditionem: vnde & contra hos dicit fore iustem bellum."

77. For the canonical arguments about the rights of the king of Jerusalem, see James Muldoon, *Popes, Lawyers, and Infidels* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1979), p. 7. Pope Innocent IV argued that the titular king of Jerusalem had the right to make war on the occupiers of the kingdom of Jerusalem, as a defensive war, since the land had been unjustly occupied by infidels. In the case of Ferdinand's letter to Vich, however, we see the king present a significantly more expansive interpretation of those powers.

78. Letter from Ferdinand to Jerónimo de Vich, February 28, 1510, in Terrateig, *Política en Italia del Rey Católico (1507–1516)*, vol. 2, pp. 95–96.

79. Palacios Rubios, *De insulis*, pp. 62–68.

80. Palacios Rubios, *De insulis*, p. 3. "Conveniente es, por tanto, que la Iglesia Católica brille y se difunda por el mundo entero por obra de un Rey Católico . . . Por eso se dignó concederte a tí, Rey gratísimo y queridísimo de Dios, victoriosos triunfos y milagrosos combates, muy por cima de lo que podia esperar la opinión humana."

81. Palacios Rubios, *De insulis*, pp. 20–21. "Por eso son dignos de censura el Sumo Pontífice, el Emperador y los demás Príncipes cristianos de nuestra época, que obran tan negligentemente, así en la propagación como en la conservación del patrimonio cristiano."

82. In 1513, Peter Martyr wrote to his friend Iñigo López de Mendoza describing how Ferdinand ate bulls' testicles mixed into his food in an attempt to arouse his sexual appetite so that he could produce an heir for his paternal realms (i.e., the Crown of Aragon). See Peter Martyr, *Epistolario*, vol. 11, document 531, pp. 137–38. See also Martyr, *Epistolario*, vol. 11, document 542, Peter Martyr to Iñigo López de Mendoza, December 18, 1513. As cited in the introduction to this book, the royal chronicler Lorenzo Galíndez de Carvajal speculated that one of the possible causes of Ferdinand's demise in January 1516 was a "love potion" that he had been drinking. See Lorenzo Galíndez de Carvajal, *Memorial o Registro Breve de los Reyes Católicos*, (Edición Facsímil), ed. Juan Carretero Zamora (Segovia: Patronato del Alcázar, 1992), Año de 1516, Capítulo Segundo.

83. ". . . querríamos que desde luego procurassedes de ganar de nuestro muy Santo Padre vna bulla en que generalmente declarasse la dicha guerra contra los infieles y diesse a nos para nos y para nuestros sucessores reyes de Aragón todo lo que con ayuda de Dios nuestro señor conquistássemos de las tierras de los infieles." Archivo Histórico Nacional, Estado, leg. 8605, letter from Ferdinand to Jerónimo de Vich, February 28, 1510, in Terrateig, *Política en Italia del Rey Católico (1507–1516)*, vol. 2, pp. 94–96.

84. Instructions for the investiture, from Ferdinand to Jerónimo de Vich, April 14, 1507, in Terrateig, *Política en Italia del Rey Católico (1507–1516)*, vol. 2, pp. 26–27.

85. Letter from Ferdinand to Jerónimo de Vich, February 28, 1510, in Terrateig, *Política en Italia del Rey Católico (1507–1516)*, vol. 2, pp. 95–96.

86. Luís Filipe F. R. Thomaz, "L'idée impériale manuéline," in *La Découverte, le Portugal et l'Europe*, Actes du Colloque, Paris (26–28 mai 1988) (Paris: Fondation Calouste Gulbenkian, 1990), pp. 35–103, at p. 37.

87. Palacios Rubios, *De insulis*, section 8, p. 61: "En la actualidad pertenece este derecho a Vuestra Mejestad, a causa de que Juan, Rey de Jerusalén, casó a la hija que tuvo de su mujer Yolanda con Federico segundo, Emperador y Rey de Sicilia, traspasándole, a título de dote, ese derecho que sobre el reino citado le correspondía por juro de heredad." And further, at pp. 61–62: "Vuestra Majestad, empero, tiene, así por la causa expresada como por otras muchas, el título del reino de la Tierra Santa."

88. Palacios Rubios, *De insulis*, pp. 63–64: "El fracaso de tantas tentativas hay que atribuirlo a que el Señor omnipotente, de cuya causa se trata, te tenía reservada desde la eternidad, oh Rey Cristianísimo, la victoria de esta santísima expedición."

89. Palacios Rubios, *De insulis*, p. 62.

90. Palacios Rubios, *De insulis*, pp. 57–58.

91. Bartolomé de Las Casas, *Tratado comprobatorio del imperio soberano* in *Tratados de Fray Bartolomé de Las Casas*, preface by Lewis Hanke and Manuel Giménez Fernández, 2 vols. (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1965), p. 1035.

92. Palacios Rubios, *De insulis*, p. 61.

93. Palacios Rubios, *De insulis*, p. 62.

94. For more on this portion of Palacios Rubios's argument, see chapter 4.

95. Palacios Rubios, *De insulis*, p. 139: ". . . si aquél a quien se le manda por un primer decreto tomar la posesión de una cosa, dilate el hacerlo sin causa justificada, decae de su derecho, pues el tiempo transcurrido—de dos años para el residente en la provincia misma, y de cuatro para el ausente de ella—es suficiente para evidenciar su negligencia. . . ."

96. Doussinague, *Fernando el Católico y el cisma de Pisa*, p. 503, Letter from Julius II to Ferdinand, October 18, 1511.

97. For the full exposition of these arguments, see chapter 4, as well as Palacios Rubios, *De insulis*, pp. 84–85, 88, 110–11.

98. For a succinct and clear presentation of the "accident" of the union of Aragon and Castile that took place with Ferdinand's death in 1516, see Bethany Aram, *Juana the Mad: Sovereignty and Dynasty in Renaissance Europe* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005), pp. 109–10.

99. Castilian version of the bull *Sacrosanctae Romane*, March 26, 1510, in Doussinague, *La política internacional*, pp. 591–92.

100. Castilian version of the bull *Sacrosanctae Romane*, March 26, 1510, in Doussinague, *La política internacional*, p. 591. Julius praises Ferdinand for "todas las empresas hasta hoy hechas por él no solo contra los moros, sino contra cualesquiera otros infieles y las que en adelante haga las aprobamos y las confirmamos con la fuerza de la autoridad apostólica."

101. The events surrounding the *Conciliabulum* of Pisa and the subsequent Spanish conquest of Navarre are examined in chapter 3.

6. One Shepherd, One Flock

1. *Historia de los Hechos de Don Rodrigo Ponce de León, Marqués de Cádiz*, in *CODOIN*, vol. 106, pp. 247–48.

2. Palacios Rubios, *De insulis*, pp. 62–68, especially at p. 67.

3. Diego Guillén de Ávila, *Panegírico a la Reina Católica* (Valladolid: Diego de Gumiel, 1509), fols. 32v–33r.

4. "Ya veo sus naues en vuestras riberas/ y dela otra parte no sarman ningunas/ alli dondestrechan las altas colunas/ el mar con sus cumbres q tienen fronteras/ si passan allende auran muy enteras/ las tres mauritanias auran a numidia/ cartago getulia rompian la perfidia/ delos etiopes y gentes mas fieras." Guillén de Ávila, *Panegírico a la Reina Católica*, fols. 32v–33r.

5. "Abran a bizancio con su fertile sito/ ya penta polin con toda cirene/ tripol y libia con quanto contiene/ hasta juntar se su fin con egipto/ las sirtes de sirtos con todol destrito/ que africa dieron los sabios autores/ de todo han de ser tus reyes señores/ con nombre muy grande excelso & inuito:/ Ganada ellegipto veran las grandezas/ de sus hedificios las yslas del nilo." Guillén de Ávila, *Panegírico a la Reina Católica*, fols. 32v–33r.

6. James H. Burns, *Lordship, Kingship, and Empire: The Idea of Monarchy, 1400–1525* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1992), p. 94.

7. Ricardo del Arco y Garay, *La idea de imperio en la política y literatura española* (Madrid, 1944), p. 34.

8. One portion of the anonymous poem reads as follows:

> "Aquell que del mundo s'espera monarcha,
> Rey muy prestante de toda Castilla.
> Que vos soys lexso vespertilión
> Qu'están esperando los rreynos d'Espanya."

For this text, see Morel-Fatio, "Souhaits de Bienvenue Adressés a Ferdinand le Catholique par un Poète Barcelonais, en 1473," *Romania*, vol. 11, 1882, pp. 333–56. Like Isabella, Ferdinand was a member of the house of Trastámara, and some therefore considered him to have nearly as strong a claim to Castile as did Isabella.

9. El Bachiller Palma, "Divina retribución sobre la caida de España en tiempo del noble Rey Don Juan el primero" (1479), ed. Don Manuel Escudero de la Peña in *Bibliófilos Españoles* XVIII (Madrid, 1879). Palma wrote, "Los reyes de las Espannas del universo ayan monarchia" (p. 80).

10. Pedro Marcuello, *Cancionero*, ed. José Manuel Blecua (Zaragoza: Institución Fernando el Católico, 1987), p. 21.

11. Marcuello, *Cancionero*, p. 311:

> "Santïago, he acetado
> las tus gracias por los Reyes
> y digo en lo conquistado
> por ellos será asentado
> el Euangelio y sus leyes;
> y si preseruarán
> en la guerra santa mía,
> en Betlén recebirán
> victorias y boluerán
> yglesia Santa Soffía."

12. "Christianae reipublicae tutori Hispaniae atque insularum maris nri Regi," in Jerónimo Torrella, *Opus praeclarum de imaginibus astrologicis* (Valencia: Press of Alfonso de Orta, December 1496).

13. For this understanding of the way prophecy operated, see Mayte Green-Mercado, "Morisco Prophecies at the French Court (1602–1607)," in *Speaking the End Times*, ed. Mayte Green-Mercado, a special issue of the *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 61 (2018): 91–123.

14. Dante Alighieri, *On Monarchy*, trans. and ed. Prue Shaw (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), bk. 1, iii, p. 11.

15. Alighieri, *On Monarchy*, bk. I, iii, pp. 9–10.

16. For analysis of the origins of this tension between aspirations to Christian peace and hostility toward the non-Christian world, see Tomaz Mastnak, *Crusading Peace: Christendom, the Muslim World, and the Western Political Order* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001).

17. See, for example, the anonymous Catalan prophecy printed in Martin Aurell, "La Fin du Monde, l'Enfer et le Roi: Une Prophétie Catalane du XVe Siècle (Bibliothèque de Carpentras, ms. 336, fol. 116v-156)," *Revue Mabillon, revue internationale d'histoire et de littérature religieuses* (Brepols, 1994): 143–77, at 163.

18. See chapter 2 for my analysis of the ways in which fifteenth-century Europeans understood what they perceived as a moment of profound crisis.

19. Letter from King Manoel of Portugal to Samudri Raja of Calicut, March 1, 1500. "Jusqu'à ce que, par les péchés des hommes, vinrent quelques sectes et hérésies contraires annoncés, dont le Christ dit le premier qu'elles viendraient après lui pour la preuve et manifestation des bons, et pour tromper la malfaisance de ceux qui méritaient condamnation et perdition, . . . lesquelles sectes occupèrent entre vos terres et les nôtres une grande partie de la terre." In Jean Aubin, *Le latin et l'astrolabe: recherches sur le Portugal de la Renaissance, son expansion en Asie et les relations internationales*, vol. I (Paris: Centre Culturel Calouste Gulbenkian, 1996), pp. 32–33; cited in Sanjay Subrahmanyam, "Du Tage au Gange au XVIe siècle: une conjoncture millénariste à l'échelle eurasiatique," *Annales* 56 (2001): 51–84.

20. By way of a modern comparison, see Robyn Creswell and Bernard Haykel, "Battle Lines: Want to Understand the Jihadis? Read Their Poetry," *New Yorker*, June 8, 2015. This article explores the rhetoric of the jihadis and their idealization of a sought-after caliphate as a utopian space (and a return to a *status quo ante*, even if that is an imagined past), all the while juxtaposing that utopian vision against the logical inconsistencies of the jihadis and the dystopian reality they create on the ground. The aspirations to universal empire that I examine in this chapter have a similar appeal to an imagined utopian (early Christian, in this case) past.

21. For the ways in which these prophetic strains were themselves "universal" in the Old World, insofar as they served as a sort of *lingua franca* that easily transgressed confessional boundaries, see Cornell Fleischer, "A Mediterranean Apocalypse: Prophecies of Empire in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries," in *Speaking the End Times*, ed. Mayte Green-Mercado, a special issue of the *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 61 (2018) 18–90. See also Sanjay Subrahmanyam, "Du Tage au Gange au XVIe siècle: une conjoncture millénariste à l'échelle eurasiatique," *Annales* 56 (2001): 51–84.

22. Aeneas Silvius Piccolomini, *Epistola Ad Mohomatem II*, ed. and trans., with notes, Albert R. Baca (New York: Peter Lang, 1990), p. 19.

23. Piccolomini, *Epistola Ad Mohomatem II*, p. 20.

24. Alain Milhou, *Colón y su mentalidad mesiánica en el ambiente franciscanista español* (Valladolid: Cuadernos Colombinos, 1983); Pauline Moffit Watts, "Prophecy and Discovery: On the Spiritual Origins of Christopher Columbus' 'Enterprise of the Indies'," *American Historical Review* 90 (1985): 73–102; and, most recently, Carol Delaney, *Columbus and the Quest for Jerusalem* (New York: Free Press, 2011).

25. Djelal Kadir, *Columbus and the Ends of the Earth: Europe's Prophetic Rhetoric as Conquering Ideology* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), pp. 30–31.

26. The 1500-memorandum was compiled into the text known as the *Libro de las Profecias*. The best modern edition of the *Libro* is *The Book of Prophecies Edited by Christopher Columbus*, ed. Roberto Rusconi, trans. Blair Sullivan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), pp. 67–77.

27. Cristóbal Colón, *Textos y documentos completos: relaciones de viajes, cartas y memoriales*, ed. Consuelo Varela (Madrid: Alianza, 1982), p. 278.

28. Consuelo Varela, "Aproximación a los escritos de Cristóbal Colón," *Jornadas de Estudios, Canarias-América* 3–4 (1984): 312.

29. Pedro Navarro, *Memorial para la Magestad en orden a la Conquista de Jerusalen*, Biblioteca Nacional, Madrid, ms./19699, caja 60. The *Memorial* was composed in 1506. The military strategy Navarro develops in his *Memorial* is the subject of a portion of chapter 5. Here in chapter 6, my focus is on the religious and political thought underlying the *Memorial*.

30. Navarro, *Memorial para la Magestad en orden a la Conquista de Jerusalen*, fol. 1r.

31. Navarro urges the "restitutio dela sancta eglesia oriental a la sancta fe cathólica." Navarro, *Memorial para la Magestad en orden a la Conquista de Jerusalen*, fol. 1r.

32. Navarro's original reads: "membros apartados del cuerpo místico de X.o [Christo] nuestro Redemptor." Navarro, *Memorial para la Magestad en orden a la Conquista de Jerusalen*, fol. 2r.

33. Navarro, *Memorial para la Magestad en orden a la Conquista de Jerusalen*, fol. 1r.

34. For a thorough exposition of this mode of historical and religious thought, see Brett Edward Whalen, *Dominion of God: Christendom and Apocalypse in the Middle Ages* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009). Whalen's study focuses primarily on the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, but much of what he outlines is equally applicable in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries.

35. Navarro, *Memorial para la Magestad en orden a la Conquista de Jerusalen*, fol. 2r.

36. Navarro views the union of Iberian states under Ferdinand and Isabella as a "divino presagio." Navarro, *Memorial para la Magestad en orden a la Conquista de Jerusalen*, fol. 1r. Navarro uses the term "presagio" here to mean "omen or premonition." Thus, he suggests to Ferdinand that processes of union in Iberia have been orchestrated by God and point to grander projects of unification that Ferdinand has been divinely ordained to execute.

37. "Las Dos Sicilias, donde se entrecruzaban las influencias bizantinas, musulmanas y normandas, eran también tierra de profecías: no olvidemos que era calabrés el famoso abad Joaquín de Fiore, quien pudo presenciar, en 1194, la conquista del reino por Enrique IV de Hohenstaufen. Tierra mítica y tierra de profecías, las Dos Sicilias representaban sobre todo piezas fundamentales en el terreno más concreto de la economía y de la política del Mediterraneao. Era por lo tanto un objetivo eminentemente deseable, que codiciaron la dinastía alemana de los Hohenstaufen, la francesa de Anjou y, más tarde, la aragonesa; veremos que todas esas casas reales se sirvieron con fines imperialistas de las profecías que hacían de la corona de Sicilia una prefiguración de las de Constantinopla y de Jerusalén." Alain Milhou, *Colón y su mentalidad mesiánica*, p. 332.

38. Navarro lists the advantages that Ferdinand enjoys: "Sollo Spagna Secilia: Puglia son los harneros del mundo a toda natura de victuaglias. Con sollo la Sicilia los Romanos del universo tomaron la Impresa: quanto más: y Spagna y Puglia: non al universo amas a solo restaurar el sangre de Xo [Christo]." Navarro, *Memorial para la Magestad en orden a la Conquista de Jerusalen*, fol. 1v.

39. Navarro, *Memorial para la Magestad en orden a la Conquista de Jerusalen*, fol. 2r.

40. Navarro writes that, once Ferdinand launches the crusade, "ceseran las ciuiles guierras entre xanos." Navarro, *Memorial para la Magestad en orden a la Conquista de Jerusalen*, fol. 3v. This, in turn, would lead to a general Christian peace throughout Europe: "una paz pacifica por toda la xanidat en toda europa," Navarro, *Memorial para la Magestad en orden a la Conquista de Jerusalen*, fol. 3v.

41. On related lines, see Diana Perry, "'*Catholicum Opus Imperiale Regiminis Mundi*': An Early Sixteenth-Century Restatement of Empire," *History of Political Thought* 2, no. 2 (Summer 1981): 227–52, at 229. The *Catholicum Opus Imperiale Regiminis Mundi* (composed in Spain in 1525) posits that "the establishment of peace and harmony constitutes one of the principle justifications for empire."

42. Terrateig, *Política en Italia del Rey Católico (1507–1516), Correspondencia inédita con el embajador* (Madrid: CSIC, 1963), vol. 2, p. 20, letter from Ferdinand to Jerónimo de Vich, April 14, 1507.

43. Terrateig, *Política en Italia del Rey Católico (1507–1516)*, vol. 2, p. 53, letter from Ferdinand to Jerónimo de Vich, May 9, 1508.

44. Terrateig, *Política en Italia del Rey Católico (1507–1516)*, vol. 2, p. 86, letter from Ferdinand to Jerónimo de Vich, November 2, 1509, where the king refers to the "bien universal de la Christiandad."

45. Terrateig, *Política en Italia del Rey Católico (1507–1516)*, vol. 2, p. 79, letter from Ferdinand to Jerónimo de Vich, February 7, 1509.

46. Doussinague, *La política internacional*, p. 582, letter from Ferdinand to Jerónomo de Cabanillas, February 1510, wherein Ferdinand mentions the "paz y union universal de los cristianos."

47. Terrateig, *Política en Italia del Rey Católico (1507–1516)*, vol. 2, p. 44, letter from Jerónimo de Vich to anonymous, February 28, 1508.

48. "Unus deus unus princeps: sera por V[uestra] R[eal] alteza la perpetua unyon en el seruitio del omnipotente dios: y en la Gloria de V[uestra] R[eal] M[agestad]." Navarro, *Memorial para la Magestad en orden a la Conquista de Jerusalen*, fol. 2r.

49. "Cumplidamente deue restituir la sangre de nuestro ſaluador X.o Jhu [Christo Jesu]: al suo PPõ [propio] vaſo." Navarro, *Memorial para la Magestad en orden a la Conquista de Jerusalen*, fol. 1v. Navarro then goes on to cite John 10:16 concerning one shepherd and one flock: "Aq[ue]l verdadero Catholico p[or] manos del qual se ha de complir la palabra de nuestro saluador: Jhu: fiat unus pastor et unum ouille." Navarro, *Memorial para la Magestad en orden a la Conquista de Jerusalen*, fol. 1v.

50. "Un Dios en el cielo, un rey en la tierra," Gauberte Fabricio de Vagad, *Coronica de los muy altos y poderosos principes y reyes cristianissos de los tiempos constants y fidelissimos reynos de Sobrarbe, de Aragon, de Valencia y de los otros* (Zaragoza: Pablo Hurus, 1499), cited in Miguel Ángel Ladero Quesada *Los Reyes Católicos: la Corona y la Unidad de España* (Valencia: Asociación Francisco López de Gomara, 1989), pp. 75–86, at p. 80.

51. Marjorie Reeves, "Introduction," in *Prophetic Rome in the High Renaissance Period*, ed. Marjorie E. Reeves (Oxford: Warburg Institute-Clarendon Press, 1992), p. 17. See also James Hankins, "Renaissance Crusaders: Humanist Crusade Literature in the Age of Mehmed II," *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 49 (1995): 111–207.

52. Alain Milhou, *Colón y su mentalidad mesiánica*, p. 329.

53. Palacios Rubios, *De insulis*, pp. 20–21. "Por eso son dignos de censura el Sumo Pontífice, el Emperador y los demás Príncipes cristianos de nuestra época, que obran tan negligentemente, así en la propagación como en la conservación del patrimonio cristiano."

54. See Fleischer, "A Mediterranean Apocalypse," p. 29, for the apparent ubiquity of the details of Navarro's *Memorial*, including the aspiration to unify the churches

and the conquest of the Ottoman Empire, giving an indication of how widespread were the prophetic strains to which Navarro was alluding.

55. This is an aspect of Navarro's *memorial* I explore in detail in chapter 5.

56. See António da Silva Rego, ed., *Documentação para a História das Missões do Padroado Português do Oriente-India*, vol. 1 (Lisbon: Agência Geral do Ultramar, 1946–58), in particular, the letter from King Manoel of Portugal to Ferdinand of Aragon and Isabella of Castile, July 1499, doc. 1, pp. 3 and following). Here Manoel discusses bringing the eastern "Christians" of India (actually Hindus) back to Catholicism, then forging an alliance, that they might then destroy Islam.

57. Biblioteca Nacional, Madrid, ms./19699, caja 61, fol. 2v, letter from King Manoel of Portugal to Cisneros, concerning the conquest of Jerusalem, March 2, 1506, Abrantes. ". . . y cierto q[ue] quien bien quisiere mirar el misterio del decubrimiento de la yndia y querer n[uest]ro S[eñor] q[ue] en estos tiempos christianos pudiesen llegar a santa catalina de monte sinay a hazer gerra [*sic*] a los moros y q[ue] se pudiesen ajuntar con los del Preste Ju.o [Prester John] como confiamos en n[uest]ro S[eñor] q[ue] n[uest]ra gente y armada haga pues n[uest]ros navios llegan a sus puertos mas le parecera q[ue] n[uest]ro S[eñor] quiere q[ue] los moros sean destruydos en este tiempo de lo q[ue] en otra cosa alg[un]a."

58. Sanjay Subrahmanyam, "Du Tage au Gange au XVIe siècle: une conjoncture millénariste à l'échelle eurasiatique," *Annales* 56 (2001): 51–84, at 52–53.

59. *Prophetic Rome in the High Renaissance Period*, ed. Reeves; Fleischer, "A Mediterranean Apocalypse."

60. Giles of Viterbo, "Fulfillment of the Christian Golden Age under Pope Julius II: Text of a Discourse of Giles of Viterbo, 1507," ed. J. W. O'Malley, *Traditio* 25 (1969), 265–338.

61. Giles of Viterbo, "Fulfillment of the Christian Golden Age under Pope Julius II," p. 311.

62. Giles of Viterbo, "Fulfillment of the Christian Golden Age under Pope Julius II," pp. 323, 334.

63. Excellent studies of universalist political thought in Portugal during the age of exploration include Luís Filipe Thomaz, "L'idée impériale manuéline," in *La Découverte, le Portugal et l'Europe*, Actes du Colloque, Paris (26–28 mai 1988), pp. 35–103 (Paris: Fondation Calouste Gulbenkian, 1990), and Jean Aubin, *Le latin et l'astrolabe: recherches sur le Portugal de la Renaissance, son expansion en Asie et les relations internationales*, vol. 1 (Paris: Centre Culturel Calouste Gulbenkian, 1996). For a study that elucidates a French iteration of this mode of thought, see Yvonne Labande-Mailfert, *Charles VIII et son milieu (1470–1498): la jeunesse au pouvoir* (Paris: Klincksieck, 1975).

64. María Isabel Hernández-González, *El Taller Historiografico: Cartas de Relación de la Conquista de Orán (1509) y Textos Afines*, papers of the Medieval Hispanic Research Seminar, 8 (London: Queen Mary and Westfield College, 1997), p. 60. Here d'Amboise writes, "Plazerá al Soberano que todos los christianos, a enxenplo de vuestra Magestad, tomen las armas contra los infieles que tanto tienpo han fatigado la nación christiana."

65. Miguel Ángel Ladero Quesada, *Los Reyes Católicos: La Corona y la Unidad de España* (Madrid: Asociación Francisco López de Gómara, 1989), pp. 285–86. Ladero Quesada here includes a Castilian translation of the papal bull: "Vosotros servís de aviso y ejemplo a los príncipes cristianos, porque vuestras fuerzas y vuestras armas no las

habéis empleado en la ruina y matanza de otros cristianos, por ambición de tierras y de dominio, sino en la prosperidad de los cristianos y en la defense de la Iglesia y de la fe . . . Vuestra reverencia y devoción a la sede apostólica, tantas veces demostradas, de nuevo se patentiza a todas luces en la reciente guerra de Nápoles. ¿A quién, pues, cuadra major el título de Reyes Católicos que a vuestras majestades, que continuamente os esforzáis en defender y propagar la fe católica y la Católica Iglesia? . . ."

66. Doussinague, *La política internacional*, Julius II, *Sacrosanctae Romane*, March 26, 1510, pp. 591–92, for the Castilian translation of the bull in which Julius II expressed confidence that Ferdinand's crusading ambitions in Africa would exterminate Islam. Regarding Ferdinand's deeds up to this time: ". . . y hace poco, ha conquistado una parte no pequeña de Africa, ocupada por larguísimo espacio de tiempo por los mahometanos, y está preparando al presente a pasar personalmente al Africa, reunidas todas las fuerzas de sus reinos, como fortissimo atleta de Cristo, para poner fin a sangre y fuego a tan perfidísima secta, borrar la ignominia marcada sobre el pueblo cristiano por espacio de tantos años, recuperar tan gran provincia, más aún, la tercera parte del orbe antes, oh dolor, fiel y católica, oprimida por tan larga esclavitud de gentes cruelísimas, y asegurar y vengar el honor de toda la república cristiana manchado y despreciado."

67. Mohamad Ballan, unpublished paper presented at the annual Middle East Studies Association, Denver, Colorado, November 23, 2015.

68. Palmira Brummett, *Ottoman Seapower and Levantine Diplomacy in the Age of Discovery* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), p. 6; Giancarlo Casale, *The Ottoman Age of Exploration* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 7, 30. For Selim's adoption of the title Servant of the Two Sanctuaries (*Khadim al-Haramayn al-Sharifayn*), in reference to the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, see Gábor Ágoston, "Information, Ideology, and Limits of Imperial Policy: Ottoman Grand Strategy in the Context of Ottoman-Habsburg Rivalry," in *The Early Modern Ottomans: remapping the Empire*, ed. Virginia H. Aksan and Daniel Goffman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 75–103, at p. 94.

69. "Toda la morisma haze cabeça del gran turqo: quebrada la cabeça se pierde los braços y los pyes," Navarro, *Memorial para la Magestad en orden a la Conquista de Jerusalen*, fol. 4v.

70. Robert Finlay, "Prophecy and Politics in Istanbul: Charles V, Sultan Süleyman, and the Habsburg Embassy of 1533–1534," *Journal of Early Modern History* 2, no. 1 (1998): 1–31, at 2n3.

71. Cornell Fleischer, "The Lawgiver as Messiah: The Making of the Imperial Image in the Reign of Süleyman," in *Soliman le Magnifique et son temps*, ed. Gilles Veinstein (Paris: Documentation Française, 1992), pp. 159–77, at p. 162. There is an interesting parallel here with Ponce de León's prognostication, cited at the opening of this chapter, that Ferdinand would become "emperor of Rome and of the Turks."

72. Doussinague, *La política internacional*, p. 538, letter from Ferdinand to his ambassador in Rome, Don Francisco de Rojas, February 29, 1504. "Primeramente a lo de su creación le diréis que hobimos mucho placer que el fué elegido en Sumo Pontifice por que según Alejandro su antecessor dejó estragadas y fuera de orden las cosas de la Iglesia romana y muchas de la Iglesia universal, bien era menester que sucediese en la silla apostólica persona de tanta prudencia y esperiencia como su Santidad."

73. Doussinague, *La política internacional*, app. 61, p. 661, letter from Ferdinand to Jerónimo de Cabanillas, June 1511.

74. Brian Tierney, *Foundations of the Conciliar Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1955), pp. 3–4, alluding here to the doctrines expressed by Conrad Gelnhausen in his *Epistola Concordia*.

75. Palacios Rubios, *De insulis*, pp. 55–56. "Si los infieles maltraten a los Cristianos que viven entre ellos, sobre todo en las cuestiones que son de fe, intentando arrastrarlos a la infidelidad, a la herejía o a sus malvados ritos y ceremonias entonces dichos Cristianos, así libres como esclavos, si por acaso fueron hechos prisoneros en la guerra, pueden huir de los infieles y apartarse de ellos, y el Papa o los Príncipes Cristianos pueden someter por las armas a los tales infieles, para librar a los creyentes de peligro tan grande. Este es el pensamiento de Inocencio, al que siguen, por lo común, los demás tratadistas, al comentar el citado cap. 'Quod super his, De voto' de las *Decretales*."

76. Anonymous, *La conquista del reyno de Nápoles, Con todas las cosas que Gonçalo Fernandes ha fecho despues que partio de españa con toda su armada*, post-incunable, probably printed in Zaragoza by Jorge Coci, after August 10, 1504. Biblioteca Nacional, Madrid, R/29905(1).

77. Anonymous, *La conquista del reyno de Nápoles*, "El embaxador dl turco vino señor a Napoles venia a pedir paz: y sino pudiesse tregua. estuuo en Napoles xviii. dias. Y despues fue alli con el mossen soler ala velona a fablar con el Sanjaebi dela velona al nauio q es como virey de sicilia: y quando con el assentado q embiasse al Rey nro señor dandole razon y relacion delo que piden y dessean: porq ellos temian mucho segun dizen q hallan por su ley q el Rey nro señor los ha de destruyr Plega a nro señor q en aqllo sea verdadera su ley. Amen."

78. Gábor Ágoston, "Information, Ideology, and Limits of Imperial Policy: Ottoman Grand Strategy in the Context of Ottoman-Habsburg Rivalry," in *The Early Modern Ottomans*, p. 78, "In a recent comparison of Ottoman and Habsburg imperial ideologies and political propaganda—advanced most effectively by Grand Vizier Ibrahim Pasha (1523–36) and Mercurino Arborio Gattinara, Charles V's Grand Chancellor (1518–30), respectively—I have tried to demonstrate how religion, millenarianism, and competing Habsburg and Ottoman universalist visions of empire were used to strengthen the legitimacy of the two rulers in their own empires and also within the larger Muslim and Christian communities."

79. Gülru Necipoglu, "Süleyman the Magnificent and the Representation of Power in the Context of Ottoman-Hapsburg-Papal Rivalry," *Art Bulletin* 71, no. 3 (September 1989): 401–27.

80. Fleisher, "A Mediterranean Apocalypse."

81. John Leddy Phelan, *The Millennial Kingdom of the Franciscans in the New World* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970).

Conclusion

1. José Goñi Gaztambide, *Historia de la Bula de Cruzada en España*, no. 4 (Vitoria: Editorial del Seminario de Vitoria, 1958), p. 474.

2. Hendrik J. Horn, *Jan Cornelisz Vermeyen: Painter of Charles V and his Conquest of Tunis*, vol. 1 (Doornspijk: Davaco, 1989), p. 114.

3. On these artistic representations, see Álvaro Soler del Campo, *El arte del poder: Armaduras y retratos de la España Imperial* [*The Art of Power: Royal Armor and Portraits from Imperial Spain*] (Madrid: TF Editores, 2009), particularly pp. 105, 125, 147, 217.

4. Giancarlo Casale, *The Ottoman Age of Exploration* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 7, 30–31; see also Palmira Brummett, *Ottoman Seapower and Levantine Diplomacy in the Age of Discovery* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), p. 6: "It was not rich agricultural lands and commercial entrepôts alone that attracted the Ottoman gaze eastwards. The sultan required imperial and religious legitimation to match his imperial capital. Hegemony in the Muslim world demanded not papal endorsement but control over Mecca, Medina, and Jerusalem and the title, 'Protector of the Holy Cities.' It was this title to which the sovereigns of Muslim states aspired and for which they contended: the Ottoman sultans Bayezid II (1481–1512) and Selim I (1512–1520), the Safavid Shah Ismail (1501–1510) in Iran, and the Uzbeg Shaibani Khan (1500–1510) in Transoxania."

5. Casale, *The Ottoman Age of Exploration*. For Europeans' thinking on "India" (broadly understood to refer to the entire Indian Ocean basin), see Nicolás Wey Gómez, *The Tropics of Empire: Why Columbus Sailed South to the Indies* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2008).

6. Kenneth M. Setton, *Western Hostility to Islam and Prophecies of Turkish Doom* (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1992), p. 35.

7. On this, see John H. Elliott, *Imperial Spain, 1469–1716* (London: Edward Arnold, 1963; New York: Penguin, 2002); see also Hernán Cortés, *Letters from Mexico*, trans. and ed. Anthony Pagden, with an introduction by John H. Elliott (New York: Grossman, 1971).

8. Peter Bakewell, *Miners of the Red Mountain: Indian Labor in Potosí, 1545–1650* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1984).

9. Molly Greene, "Resurgent Islam," in *The Mediterranean in History*, ed. David Abulafia (London: Thames and Hudson, 2003), pp. 219–49.

10. Fernand Braudel situated Spain's "Atlantic turn" as occurring after 1580, when the Spanish monarchy assumed the interests of annexed Portugal: "If peace returned to the inland sea, it was because war had moved to its outer confines: to the Atlantic in the West, to Persia and the Indian Ocean in the East. Turkey's swing to the East was balanced by Spain's swing to the West . . . the Hispanic bloc and the Ottoman bloc, so long locked together in a struggle for the Mediterranean, at last disengaged their forces and at a stroke, the inland sea was freed from that international war which had from 1550–1580 been its major feature." Fernand Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*, vol. 2, trans. Siân Reynolds (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), p. 1185.

11. Lewis Hanke, *All Mankind Is One: A Study of the Disputation between Bartolomé de Las Casas and Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda in 1550 on the Intellectual and Religious Capacity of the American Indians* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1974).

12. Gábor Ágoston, "Information, Ideology, and Limits of Imperial Policy: Ottoman Grand Strategy in the Context of Ottoman-Habsburg Rivalry," in *The Early Modern Ottomans: remapping the Empire*, ed. Virginia H. Aksan and Daniel Goffman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 75–103, at p. 93. "Ottoman propaganda justified Selim's campaigns against the Safavids by portraying the Shi'ite enemy and its *kizilbas*

allies in eastern Anatolia as 'heretics' and even 'infidels,' whose revolts hindered the Ottomans' struggle against the Christian adversaries of the Empire, the main task of the ghazi (warrior; often warrior for the faith) Sultans according to fifteenth- and sixteenth-century Ottoman chroniclers and authors of advice-for-princes literature. Since the Sunni Mamluks cooperated with the 'heretic' Safavids, the war against them was also justifiable. Before the Sultan could turn against the empire's Christian enemies, claimed Ottoman propagandists, these rebel Muslims had to be dealt with."

13. Anthony Pagden, *The Fall of Natural Man: The American Indian and the Origins of Ethnography* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982); Lewis Hanke, *Aristotle and the American Indians: A Study in Race Prejudice in the Modern World* (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1959).

14. Ronnie Perelis, "'These Indians Are Jews!': Lost Tribes, Crypto-Jews, and Jewish Self-Fashioning," in *Atlantic Diasporas: Jews, Conversos, and Crypto-Jews in the Age of Mercantilism, 1500–1800*, ed. Richard L. Kagan and Philip D. Morgan (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009), pp. 195–211; Hanke, *All Mankind Is One*, pp. 40–41.

15. John Leddy Phelan, *The Millennial Kingdom of the Franciscans in the New World* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970).

16. John M. Headley, "The Habsburg World Empire and the Revival of Ghibellinism," in *Church, Empire and World* (Ashgate: Variorum, 1997), p. 93.

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BNE Biblioteca Nacional de España (Madrid, Spain)
Mss. (Manuscritos): 1341; 1490; 3449; 10415; 19699, caja 60 and caja 61
Incunables: I/1167; I/2156 [10] (Micro: 21123)
Post-incunables: R/29905(1); R/29905(2); R/31345; R/34182-6; R/34182-7; R/34182-8
BNF Bibliothèque National de France (Paris, France)
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Manuscrits espagnols: 110
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